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Abstract:
This thesis is a study of the major phases of the career of Philip Roth. In the nearly 
fifty years since his first book, Roth has published close to thirty works, creating a 
body of work now as large and as varied as any twentieth century writer. In an 
attempt to chart the progression of this career, I break down Roth’s oeuvre into six 
chronological phases, beginning in the late 50s and ending at the start of the new 
century. Having carried out extensive research into Roth’s archive in the Library of 
Congress, contemporary reception of the books, and a variety of often overlooked 
cultural contexts, I have attempted to offer a new and original take on Roth’s most 
interesting and distinctive preoccupations.
Beginning with Goodbye, Columbus, Roth’s first book, I examine the author’s 
complicated relationship with, and treatment of, the idea of Jewish community in 
America. The second chapter follows Roth’s vexed pursuit of, and eventual rejection 
of, an ideal of literary seriousness in the 1960s, especially in relation to the example 
of the New York Intellectuals. Chapter 3 looks at Roth’s preoccupation with two 
figures from twentieth century European Jewish history, Franz Kafka and Anne 
Frank, who figure in a number of Roth’s books during the 1970s. Chapter 4 examines 
the important role that psychoanalysis plays in Roth’s books, from the burlesque of an 
analytic session of Portnoy's Complaint, to an apparent break with psychoanalytic 
thinking in 1986’s The Counterlife. The next phase is Roth’s “autobiographical” 
period of 1988 to 1993, during which he produced four books each at a different point 
along a continuum between autobiography and fiction. In these works, Roth comes to 
grips with the ethical issues that his fiction had played with for so long. Finally, the 
last chapter looks at Roth’s final books of the century, investigating how his 
assessment of three periods of twentieth century American history shows a fascination 
with individuals who attempt to break free from the forces of determination. Rather 
than, as is commonly espoused, a break with his earlier work, I argue that the 
“American Trilogy” continues concerns that have preoccupied Roth from the very 
start of his career.
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Introduction
Inward/Outward
In 1973, at the age of forty, having published seven books, Philip Roth took a 
moment to sit back, reflect, and interview himself on the subject of the shape of his 
career to date. For a writer who has claimed that “the art of impersonation” is “the 
fundamental novelistic gift,” impersonating his own interviewer came naturally 
enough.1 Asking himself a question about his alternation between the “serious” and 
the “reckless,” Roth allowed himself a long response that, after taking in his early 
battles with Jewish critics over his debut publication Goodbye, Columbus (1959), 
eventually cites Philip Rahv’s 1939 essay “Paleface and Redskin,” which posited two 
polarized types of American writer.2 Paleface writers, like T.S. Eliot and Henry 
James, were refined, educated, east coast figures, exhibiting an old world interest in 
moral concerns. Redskins, like Walt Whitman and Mark Twain, were the writers of 
the frontier and the big city: emotional, vernacular, energetic writers who reflected the 
new world’s vitality and the explorer’s spirit of curiosity. After introducing Rahv’s 
dichotomy, Roth claims membership in a new, hybrid category of American 
writer—the “redface,” who is some combination of paleface and redskin, while 
remaining “fundamentally ill at ease in, and at odds with, both worlds.” It is telling 
that Roth does not go on to claim that he writes like some combination of paleface 
and redskin—there is no assertion of the ways in which he has been influenced by,
1 Philip Roth, “Interview with The Paris Review,” in Reading Myself and Others, (New York: Vintage, 
2001), 123.
‘ Philip Rahv, “Paleface and Redskin,” in Image and Idea: Twenty Essays on Literary Themes, Revised 
and Enlarged (London: Weidenfeld and NicoIson, 1957), 1-6.
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say, both James and Twain—but rather it is the alternation between opposing modes, 
the awkward uncertainty as to which path to choose, that is emphasized:
To my mind, being a redface accounts as much as anything for the 
self-conscious and deliberate zigzag that my own career has taken, 
each book veering sharply away from the one before, as though the 
author was mortified at having written it as he did and preferred to put 
as much light as possible between that kind of book and himself.3
This “self-conscious and deliberate zigzag” has continued to define Roth’s career to 
the present day, creating a body of work as varied and fertile as that of any writer in 
recent memory. Is there another writer of fiction who has been so many things to so 
many readers? At one time or another, Roth has been seen as the sharp-eyed 
chronicler of the affluent Jewish-American suburbs; the best-selling celebrity author 
of sexual transgression; the keeper of the flame of Jewish humour; the self-hating 
Jewish writer, eager to drag his people in the mud to sell a few more copies of his 
books; the politically incisive satirist in the tradition of Swift and Orwell; the self­
obsessed teller of psychoanalytic tales of the self; the champion of the work and 
traditions of Eastern European writers behind the Iron Curtain; the playful 
postmodernist, blurring the lines between fiction and fact; the nostalgic bard of 
Newark, New Jersey; and the unabashed Great American Novelist, writing works that 
condense and comment upon whole decades of American experience. How are we to 
make sense of such a career?
In another interview eleven years later, in 1984 (this time with Hermione Lee 
as the interviewer), Roth spoke of Nathan Zuckerman’s actions in The Anatomy 
Lesson (1984)—in which he both decides to become a doctor and spontaneously 
impersonates a pomographer who publishes a magazine called, appropriately enough, 
Lickety Split—in terms that seem to recall his earlier vision of himself as a redface:
There had to be willed extremism at either end of the moral spectrum, 
each of his escape-dreams of self-transformation subverting the 
meaning and mocking the intention of the other [...] The thing about
3 Philip Roth, “On The Great American Novel, in Reading Myself and Others, 72-3.
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Zuckerman that interests me is that everybody’s split, but few so 
openly as this.4
Later in the same interview, Lee asked Roth about his alternation between first and 
third person narration in the Zuckerman Bound novels; Roth’s explanation again 
describes a balancing act, a movement between two poles:
The Ghost Writer is narrated in the first person, probably because 
what’s being described is largely a world Zuckerman’s discovered 
outside of himself, the book of a young explorer. The older and more 
scarred he gets, the more inward-looking he gets, the further out I  have 
to get. The crisis of solipsism he suffers in The Anatomy Lesson is 
better seen from a bit of a distance.5
Alternating between inward and outward perspectives, between the willed extreme of 
a noble profession and the willed extreme of a sordid one, between paleface and 
redskin, Roth has made a career out of such shifts, and in this thesis I will argue that 
this has been a defining characteristic of Roth’s writing from its beginnings to the 
start of the present century.
*
In the introduction to his 2006 monograph on Roth’s work, Ross Posnock 
sounds the bell for an understanding of Roth as much more than a Jewish-American 
writer with a handful of, by now, familiar settings and concerns. Posnock claims that 
Roth is “a writer usually regarded as a wholly known quantity, confined to a 
particular region (New Jersey), a particular aesthetic tradition (American literary 
realism and naturalism), and, above all, a particular ethnicity (third-generation 
American Jew).” Posnock argues that seeing Roth only in these terms is unfair to a 
writer who “long ago slipped the bonds of particularism not least by exemplifying that 
the local cannot be thought apart from the worldly.” In contrast to “the pigeonholing
4 Roth, “Interview with The Paris Review,” 123.
5 Ibid., 142-3.
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critics who would anchor him to his historical coordinates,” Posnock aims to place 
Roth’s writing in the much wider, looser contexts of world literature:
I hope readers expecting (yet one more) discussion about Roth and 
being Jewish in America will come to be persuaded that this topic has 
for too long been isolated from a more capacious inquiry into larger 
dimensions of his art and broader questions of what it means to be 
human.6
Asserting that Roth is not “merely” a Jewish-American writer has long been a 
favorite pursuit of academic critics of Roth’s work.7 But this “pigeonholing” approach 
still retains its familiarity and power, especially in the popular press, even though the 
famous firm of Bellow, Malamud, and Roth is now down to one member. Posnock’s 
sentiment seems to be shared by other authors of recent book-length studies of Roth’s 
work. Along with Posnock, Mark Shechner, Debra Shostak, Elaine B. Safer, and 
David Brauner have all recently written books on Roth that reckon with a career that 
has now lasted nearly fifty years. Beyond the mere fact that Roth has written more 
than twenty-five books, making it particularly difficult to quickly sum up the sort of 
writer he is, his most recent books have been almost universally hailed as more 
ambitious, wider in scope, and more concerned with “the human” than with “the 
Jewish.” None of these new studies, in fact, takes Roth’s Jewishness, or his treatment 
of Jewish themes, as the main subject of their inquiry. Rather, each takes a different, 
broad, somewhat vague, unifying concept to be the backbone of his or her study. 
Posnock ties together Roth’s works through an exploration of his interest in 
immaturity and provocation. Shostak sees an intense concern with the various aspects
6 Ross Posnock, Philip Roth’s Rude Truth: The Art o f  Immaturity (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2006), xii.
7 John N. McDaniel, in his 1974 monograph, argued that Roth was essentially a humanist, rather than a 
Jewish, writer. “As a writer who is a Jew, Roth asks for a literary rather than a narrowly religious 
evaluation of his fiction; as a social realist, he takes as his domain the society that he has seen and 
known— which includes but is not limited to Jewish life.” John N. McDaniel, The Fiction o f Philip 
Roth (Haddonfield, N.J.: Haddonfield House, 1974), 34. In his 1978 monograph, Bernard F. Rodgers 
Jr. sounds a similar note: “[S]o much o f the commentary on [Roth’s] fiction has continued to be 
preoccupied with determining the nature and extent o f his relationship to Jewish-American religious 
and literary traditions that other elements in his work, which are just as important, have been 
consistently ignored or obscured.” Bernard F. Rodgers Jr., Philip Roth (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 
1978), 7-8.
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oof subjectivity as the common element of Roth’s long career. Both Safer and Brauner 
restrict their focus to Roth’s books since The Ghost Writer (1979), with Safer arguing 
that Roth’s comedy, as used to comment on culture and society, is the unifying 
feature of his career.9 Brauner uses paradox, “both as a rhetorical device of which 
Roth is particularly fond, and also as an organising intellectual and ideological 
principle that inflects all of his work,” as a thread that runs through his study.10 
Shechner, even broader in his thesis, allows himself only this by way of an 
explanation of Roth’s methods: “Roth does what he does because he does what he 
does.”11
This is not to say that these recent studies are vague or unfocused in their 
engagement with Roth’s works; on the contrary, these five works, as well as a number 
of new essay collections on Roth, have contributed substantially to a newfound depth 
and breadth of serious criticism on Roth. Rather, the general concepts around which 
these studies are organized—immaturity, subjectivity, comedy, paradox, 
willfiillness—suggest that it is no longer the case that Roth is spoken of as a “wholly 
known quantity.” These are terms with which to discuss a writer concerned with 
subjects that concern us all. But beyond an acknowledgement of Roth’s universality, 
this is also, I suspect, a token of the extraordinary variety to be found within Roth’s 
work, and the extraordinary difficulty (or perhaps even inappropriateness) of an 
attempt to unify it all. Attempting to unify the fiction under one of these general 
headings, often the conclusion is that such unity is impossible to declare.
I would suggest that even some of the best critical work on Roth has tended to 
overlook the ways in which Roth’s career frustrates most attempts at imposing unity. 
Consider, for example, the recent monographs by Shostak and Posnock. Both take on 
the entirety of Roth’s career with a willingness to rethink common assumptions about 
familiar works, and a capacity for spotting both the overlooked details as well as the
8 Debra Shostak, Philip Roth—Countertexts, Counterlives (Columbia: University o f South Carolina 
Press, 2004).
9 Elaine B. Safer, Mocking the Age: The Later Novels o f  Philip Roth (Albany: State University o f New 
York Press, 2006).
10 David Brauner, Philip Roth (Manchester. Manchester University Press, 2007), 8.
11 Mark Shechner, Up Society’s Ass, Copper: Rereading Philip Roth (Madison: University of 
Wisconsin Press, 2003), 4. Shechner’s phrase is a derivation o f Louis Smilesburger’s justification for 
his work for the Mossad in Roth’s Operation Shylock. Imagining what he will say in the event of a 
Palestinian triumph, Smilesburger “‘will offer no stirring rhetoric when I am asked by the court to 
speak my last words but will tell my judges only this: “I did what I did to you because I did what I did 
to you.” And if that is not the truth, it’s as close as I know how to come to it.’” Philip Roth, Operation 
Shylock (London: Vintage, 1994), 351. Subsequent references will be noted parenthetically in the text.
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larger threads that run through the fiction. But although, as noted above, both works 
take broad concepts as central to their efforts to do justice to Roth’s multiplicity of 
concerns, their approaches tend to focus on two different, perhaps opposing, sides of 
Roth.
Shostak’s central argument is that Roth has a handful of characteristic 
concerns, all revolving around the enigma of subjectivity. This Roth, by turning 
inward to focus on “masculinity, embodiment, Jewish American identity, storytelling 
as an act of both fictive imagination and quasi-autobiographical disclosure, and the 
position of the subject within American history,” can provide “an index into the 
shifting ideologies of the time, both social and literary.”12 But despite his repeated 
explorations of such topics, Roth has never “solved” any of his self-imposed 
problems. Rather, Shostak argues, taking a page from The Counterlife (1986), Roth’s 
books are a series of “countertexts,” each testing out a number of speculative 
situations to explore the many implications of selfhood. Shostak’s focus, in widening 
the scope of Roth studies from traditional takes that would see him as ‘merely’ a 
Jewish writer, or ‘merely’ a comic writer, is to examine the ways that Roth has made 
human subjectivity, the way that we inhabit ourselves, his most significant enduring 
concern. “Roth has chosen to explore the process of how one comes to rest at a 
position, how one thinks about what one really thinks, by tracing the journeys of 
imagined selves through a series of subject-positions.”13 This is the Roth who has said 
that “Updike and Bellow hold their flashlights out into the world, reveal the world as 
it is now. I dig a hole and shine my flashlight into the hole.”14
Posnock, by contrast, presents a Roth who has been shining his flashlight out 
into the world, or at least into the library, since his earliest writings. In a study 
distinguished by its wide range of reference points, Posnock makes the case that Roth, 
rather than Jewish Newark’s native son, actually resides in the “republic of culture,” a 
space defined by his reading instead of his geographical, or even biographical, 
origins.15 Borrowing Ellison’s concept of “the appropriation game” (a concept which, 
Posnock points out, originates in Goethe and Emerson), Posnock sees this, rather than
12 Shostak, Countertexts, Counterlives, viii.
13 Ibid., 7.
14 David Plante, “Conversations with Philip,” New York Times, 1 January 1984, 3.
15 Posnock, Philip Roth’s Rude Truth, xiii.
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assimilation, as the key to Roth’s movement from the particular circumstances of his 
origins to the universal ground of world literature:
To rewrite assimilation as appropriation banishes the whole 
melodrama of assimilation whereby the outsider is required to cast off 
old (ethnic) ways for new and submit to a culture assumed to possess a 
stable, homogenous identity; this sacrificial process affirms a hierarchy 
of insider/outsider, native/alien grounded in blood and origin.
By contrast, all that appropriation requires is a good library.16
The library from which Roth has appropriated, Posnock insists, is much larger and 
idiosyncratic than is often claimed. Along with such familiar names as Henry James 
and Milan Kundera, Posnock ties Roth into a distinctive tradition that includes 
Montaigne, Emerson, Witold Gombrowicz, Robert Musil, William James, 
Dostoyevsky, and Ellison. Uniting all of these writers with Roth is an attraction to 
aspects of the broadly defined concept of immaturity: resistance to bourgeois notions 
of civilized adulthood, rejection of belief in a transparently static and comprehensible 
reality, willingness to transform and be transformed, and a generally anarchic spirit of 
provocation. Included within this definition of immaturity is the very concept of 
appropriation itself, which rejects the assumed boundaries of biographical 
circumstance in favor of an approach that promiscuously takes from wherever the 
individual chooses. Roth “negotiates his identity as an American citizen and writer” 
through “a freewheeling approach to culture that rewrites heritage not as a passive 
inheritance but as an assemblage produced by the act of seizing or appropriating from 
the past and present.”17 Posnock elucidates this approach through a series of wide- 
ranging case studies. For example, instead of merely focusing on the much-noted 
influence of Henry James on Roth’s early career, Posnock argues that, in the final 
chapter of American Pastoral, Roth appropriates and revises a crucial moment of The 
Golden Bowl for his own purposes, illuminating Swede Levov through an implied 
comparison with Maggie Verver.18 This is a Roth pointed outwards, perched, like one 
of his first protagonists, Neil Klugman, on a high chair in a grand library, roaming
16 Ibid., 5.
17 Ibid., 90,91-2.
18 Ibid., 114-6.
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through a “republic of culture,” entrance to which is granted to anyone curious 
enough to spend most of his time reading.19
*
Whereas Shostak tends to focus on the ways in which Roth turns inward in his 
interest in the creation of subjectivity, and Posnock tends to focus on Roth’s outward 
trajectory towards the appropriation of literary models and discourses, I hope to show 
that my approach requires a modulation between the two directions. Roth’s intense 
and durable self-consciousness has ensured a focus on the formation of identity, both 
in the ways in which the self is constructed and understood and in the ways in which 
the self is affected by the world ‘out there’, by culture, but also by history, by other 
people. This inward/outward, or inside/outside, distinction, is a useful one in 
discussing Roth’s career, especially because he has tended towards a refusal to choose 
one over the other. The critical firestorm that greeted his debut centered on just this 
distinction: Roth was accused of betraying his people by writing about them in a way
that, while perhaps acceptable when speaking within the community, was tantamount
20to ‘informing’ when spread to the world at large, outside the community. Roth’s 
work in the 1970s and early 80s shows him, on the one hand, apparently turning 
inward, focusing on the trials and comic effects of a psychoanalytically defined self, 
while, on the other hand, turning outward to describe and make use of a culture 
decidedly not his own, that of Eastern Europe. Roth’s work of the late 1980s and early 
90s seemed again to reflect an inward turn, with four books of varyingly 
autobiographical concerns. Soon after, however, Roth was seen to apparently change
19 My characterizations here—o f Shostak’s study as positing an inward-looking Roth and o f Posnock’s 
positing an outward-looking Roth— should be tempered by a few caveats. Shostak, despite her 
predominant focus on the problems o f subjectivity, does engage with the ways in which Roth has 
turned outward to include history in his later work, arguing that this period “suggests that subjectivity 
is not just a narrative construct but also, inextricably, a historical product.” Shostak, Countertexts, 
Counterlives, 18. Posnock, for all that he shows that Roth is open to a wide variety of outside 
influences and unfamiliar discourses, tends to overly focus on literary intertextuality, leaving aside 
Roth’s entanglements with Richard Nixon (in Our Gang and a number of essays in the 1970s), Prague 
(in The Professor o f Desire and The Prague Orgy), Israel (in Portnoy's Complaint, The Counterlife and 
Operation Shylock), and London (in The Counterlife and Deception), to name a few of Roth’s more 
notable outward turns.
20 “Informing. There was the charge so many o f the correspondents had made, even when they did not 
want to make it openly to me, or to themselves. I had informed on the Jews. I had told the Gentiles 
what apparently it would otherwise have been possible to keep secret from them: that the perils of 
human nature afflict the members o f our minority.” Philip Roth, “Writing About Jews,” in Reading 
Myself and Others, 204. Originally published in Commentary (Dec. 1963): 446-52.
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tack, shifting his focus directly outward to the effects of American history in his late 
90s trilogy. Roth’s comment above, about shining his flashlight into a hole, seems to 
indicate that he sees his vocation as mainly an inward-looking one. However, we 
should keep in mind the response of the American writer David Plante, to whom Roth 
directed those remarks, when considering the shape of Roth’s career as a whole:
“What I keep forgetting about you, and shouldn’t, is that when you talk about yourself 
digging a hole and shining a flashlight into it you’re talking just to try it on for five 
minutes to see what it looks like.”21 If there is one constant to Roth’s career, now 
nearing five decades long, it’s that he has never stopped “trying on” such positions for 
himself, pointing both inward and outward.
There are a few baseline assumptions that will guide my approach to Roth’s 
career. First, the long procession of Roth’s fiction unsurprisingly shows a variety of 
preoccupations: obviously Roth’s interests and approaches have changed over the 
years, the product of an intensely curious and often impetuous writer who has taken 
great pleasure in changing tack from book to book, often it sometimes seems trying to 
frustrate those readers who would pin him down as a certain type of writer.
Therefore I have found it necessary to break Roth’s career down into clusters of 
books, positing ‘phases’ of Rothian preoccupation, while trying not to lose sight of 
the cumulative whole. Sometimes these phases overlap, reflecting the messy interplay 
of a writer’s primary concerns as they are tailored to the needs of the individual 
books. For example, Portnoy's Complaint (1969) serves both as the culmination of 
Roth’s early attempts to define himself through both high and low culture, as well as 
the beginning of a period of intense fascination with the processes and literary uses of 
psychoanalysis, a preoccupation which would last for nearly two decades.
Secondly, Roth’s self-consciousness, compounded by (perhaps birthed by) the 
defining scrutiny he suffered over his early work, makes a chronological approach 
preferable. Roth has spoken about the “exuberance of being a literary orphan,” the 
freedom that he felt upon writing his first book: “Not as yet informed that he is a 
realistic writer, or a Jewish writer, or an academic writer, or a controversial writer, he
21 Plante, “Conversations with Philip,” 3.
22 When asked by Hermione Lee whether he writes with a Roth reader in mind, he answered, “No. 1 
occasionally have an anti-Roth reader in mind. I think, ‘How he is going to hate this! That can be just 
the encouragement 1 need.” Roth, “Interview with The Paris Review,” 121.
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is not tempted either to satisfy the expectation or to subvert it.”23 Implied here is that, 
since writing Goodbye, Columbus, Roth has always felt the temptation to satisfy 
and/or subvert the expectations that have circled his career. Roth has always been 
acutely aware of how his books have been received, of the shape of his career to date, 
and, as the initial Zuckerman trilogy shows, he is attuned to the way a writer’s life 
and career make a compelling narrative. Such a narrative is also implied by the 
definite development of his preoccupations, tied to the chronological points o f his 
career. In the early books, he is most concerned with the initial definition of the self, 
especially through early experiences of culture. In the middle period, the 
preoccupations become more self-consciously intellectual, as he pursues topics that 
interest him as an established author, as a teacher, and as an adult. The later period 
seems most concerned with looking back on his career as a writer to date, and 
evaluating the culture that has shaped him as a writer and as an American.
Third, Roth’s fiction shows a writer particularly open to the culture around 
him. The interplay between the writer of fiction and his contemporary culture is a 
central topic in Roth’s early forays into literary criticism as a young author. His oft- 
quoted remark that “the American writer in the middle of the twentieth century has 
his hands full in trying to understand, describe, and then make credible much of 
American reality,” although its meanings have been contested, certainly implies that 
Roth thinks part of an American writer’s job is to address the reality around him.24 
Portnoy's Complaint alone, to pick an obvious example, contains literary allusion, 
both high and low, reference to popular song, Hollywood movies, the golden age of 
radio, baseball and its myths, presidential politics, advertisements, tabloid headlines, 
and the television quiz show scandal, to name just some of the cultural artifacts which 
find their way into Portnoy’s monologue. To follow on from Posnock’s conception of 
Roth as promiscuous, cosmopolitan, appropriator, I think it is necessary when writing 
about Roth to remain open to unexpected cultural connections. As I work 
chronologically through Roth’s career, I bring to the discussion certain discourses that 
I feel can show Roth’s writing in a new light. These include the progression of liberal 
thought from socialist left to anti-Stalinist right, the costs of the New York
23 Philip Roth, “The Story of Three Stories,” in Reading Myself and Others, 213.
24 Philip Roth, “Writing American Fiction,” in Reading Myself and Others, 167. Subsequent references 
will be noted parenthetically in the text. Reprinted from Commentary 31 (March 1961), 223-33. I 
discuss this essay in greater depth in Chapter 2.
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Intellectuals’ embrace of seriousness, the Broadway production of The Diary o f  Anne 
Frank, the psychotherapeutical practice of narrative therapy, and many others.
*
Each of my chapters will follow an inward or outward turn from Roth, always 
remembering that, of course, as he turns inward, he very often also turns outward, and 
vice versa. The first two chapters examine Roth’s early career, showing that, as Roth 
established himself, he, often through the crucible of controversy, worked at defining 
himself as an American writer, often revising the definition as he went along. Roth’s 
initial attempts at definition show a writer made keenly aware of his readership and 
their expectations for his fiction. In Chapter 1 ,1 look at how, in Goodbye, Columbus, 
while apparently performing the role of the outsider (he who would violate the code 
of the ethnic group through allegiance to the wider conscripts of literature), Roth 
actually enacts and seems to anticipate the internal debate of the American Jewish 
community that would come to the surface upon the book’s publication. With a 
similar janus-faced approach, in Chapter 2 ,1 examine how Portnoy's Complaint, 
which apparently breaks with Roth’s earlier ardent pursuit of literary seriousness in 
exchange for the wild ‘new sensibility’ of the 60s, tends to concern itself precisely 
with the “assimilation-by-culture trail”—Jonathan Freedman’s phrase for the 
highbrow road many Jewish intellectuals attempted to follow into America—as a path 
towards identity formation.25 Both chapters refer frequently to the work of the New 
York Intellectuals, both as a cultural barometer of the times and as a sort of baseline 
indication of the way that American Jews made their way into the mainstream of 
American letters.
Chapters 3 and 4 are concerned with the period that followed the cataclysmic 
popular success of Portnoy's Complaint, signalling Roth’s entrance into mainstream 
American culture, and also granting him the cultural capital to shift from his initial 
definitions of himself to the more self-consciously intellectual interests of an 
established author. Chapter 3 sees Roth turn outward to address models outside of his 
immediate experience, in the form of Franz Kafka and Anne Frank. Characteristically,
25 Jonathan Freedman, The Temple o f  Culture: Assimilation and Anti-Semitism in Literary Anglo- 
America (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 8.
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these appropriative moves allow Roth to further define himself and his personae. In 
Chapter 4 ,1 follow what might be called Roth’s psychoanalytic period, as a 
fascination with Freudian ways of conceiving of, dealing with, and talking about the 
self reveals itself to be central to the work of the fifteen year period that begins with 
Portnoy's Complaint. As the period progresses, I detail how a growing frustration 
with the limits of a psychoanalytic mindset leads Roth to introduce a radically 
different vision of the self in The Counterlife, the book that David Brauner has called 
“the beginning of Roth’s second coming.’
The final two chapters follow Roth’s work from his memoir The Facts (1988) 
through his American trilogy, which culminates in The Human Stain (2000). 
Increasingly established as one of the most significant authors of the later twentieth 
century, Roth begins to look backward, sizing up, taking stock, and revising his own, 
and his culture’s, history. This involves both inward and outward moves. Chapter 5 
examines Roth’s four ‘autobiographical’ works that begin with The Facts. Although 
in many senses this is an inward turn, a late-career reappraisal of the self seemingly 
provoked by a series of near-fatal medical scares, I work to show how writing about 
his self so explicitly leads Roth into a consideration of how writing affects others—an 
ethical consideration with roots going back to the very beginning of his career. 
Chapter 6 is concerned with the three books most cited as responsible for Roth’s 
‘career resurgence’ in the late nineties, American Pastoral (1997), I Married a 
Communist (1998), and The Human Stain (2000). As Roth seems to turn recognizably 
outward again, the chapter makes the case that the trilogy shares many concerns with 
Roth’s earliest work, demonstrating that this new Roth is much like the old one. 
Ultimately, I hope to show that Roth’s “self-conscious and deliberate zigzag” has 
resulted in a body of work that is both remarkably diverse and unmistakably his.
2h Brauner, Philip Roth, 3.
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Chapter One
“Is it us?”: Goodbye, Columbus
On January 8th, 1914, Franz Kafka wrote in his diary:
What have I in common with Jews? I have hardly anything in common 
with myself and should stand very quietly in a comer, content that I 
can breathe.1
This statement is instructive, as it speaks of the dangers inherent in assigning group 
loyalties to essentially individualistic artists. How would Kafka, that most 
uncomfortable and lonely of writers, have reacted if told that one day he would be 
hailed as “the most quintessentially Jewish of writers”?3 How would Kafka have 
responded to calls from the Jewish community for him to represent the virtues of that 
community to the wider world? Of course, Kafka only published a handful of stories 
during his lifetime, and wrote before there was much of a literary industry eager to 
categorize writers into ethnic and religious ‘schools’. But one can assume that if he 
were bom fifty years later, and had emigrated to America, he would be lumped in
1 Franz Kafka, The Diaries, 1910-1923, ed. Max Brod, trans. Martin Greenberg with Hannah Arendt 
(New York: Schocken, 1976), 252. Quoted in Philip Roth, ‘“ 1 Always Wanted You to Admire My 
Fasting’; or, Looking at Kafka,” in Reading Myself and Others, 288. Subsequent references will be 
noted parenthetically in the text.
2 Of course it is also telling that Roth quotes this statement himself. Mark Shechner points out that 
Roth uses Kafka, in the 1970s, as his “point o f entry” to the historical inheritance o f European Jewish 
culture, allowing him access to a richer, older Jewishness than his upbringing in New Jersey would 
allow. Kafka’s stated discomfort with ethnic belonging should make us skeptical o f any straightforward 
alignment o f Kafka with Jewishness, and yet Roth does use Kafka to refine his own sense o f Jewish 
identity. 1 take up this issue in Chapter 3. See Shechner, Up Society’s Ass, Copper, 98.
3 David Brauner, Post-War Jewish Fiction (Hampshire: Palgrave, 2001), 8.
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with Saul Bellow and Bernard Malamud in the “Jewish-American school,” with all 
the assumptions and expectations that such a title implies.
Philip Roth was bom in 1933, fifty years after Kafka, and, as such, would go 
on to become the third name in that magical triumvirate, Bellow-Malamud-Roth, 
upon the publication of his debut, Goodbye, Columbus, in 1959. He also found 
himself in the middle of a storm of controversy amongst ordinary Jewish readers and 
Jewish community leaders as a result o f the portrayal of Jews in his stories. Due to 
many factors (at the very least, the economic gains of the Jewish-American 
community, the explosion of popular Jewish-American fiction, and the prominent 
Jewish presence at such highbrow journals as Commentary and Partisan Review), 
questions of Jewish literary identity were of great interest to many in 1959. Writing 
when he did, and writing about Jews, Roth could not merely be a writer who 
happened to be Jewish. Rather, the pressures exerted by the Jewish-American 
community, and the specific nature of that community at the time, in many ways 
dictated the formation of Roth’s literary sensibility, and his sense of himself as a 
writer for years to come.
Goodbyet Columbus consists of the title novella as well as five short stories, 
all of which were initially published in magazines over the previous year and a half. 
Each of the stories centers on contemporary Jewish life in American suburbia, save 
“Defender of the Faith,” which transposes its Jews onto a US army base in Missouri 
near the end of World War II. Much of the appeal of the collection lies in the sharp 
eye it directs towards the Jewish suburbs. The Jewish-American population went 
through a remarkable demographic shift in the fifteen years following the war. As 
second- and third-generation American Jews moved into the middle and upper-middle 
class, there was a tremendous migration out of the cities and into the suburbs. The 
New Jersey city of Newark, where Philip Roth grew up, had 58,000 Jewish residents 
in 1948. By 1958, that number had fallen to 41,000. By contrast, the Jewish 
population of West Orange, just one of the many suburbs within twenty miles of 
Newark, rose from 1,600 to 7,000 within the same ten-year period.4 The nature of 
Jewish life, for so long poor and urban, had become, seemingly overnight, wealthy
4 Edward S. Shapiro, A Time for Healing: American Jewry since World War II (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1992), 145.
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and suburban.5 As Saul Bellow noted in his review of Goodbye, Columbus, “nothing 
in history has so quickly and radically transformed any group of Jews.”6 It is this 
transformation that informs the stories of Roth’s debut.
This significant demographic shift must be taken into account when looking at 
the Jewish response to Goodbye, Columbus. The response was remarkably polarized, 
reflecting the great changes affecting the Jewish-American community, and 
problematizing the notion of the Jewish-American writer. As I will argue, the 
simmering issues reflected in the book’s reception are ones that the book itself takes 
up.
Any analysis of the Jewish response to a book published in the 1940s or ’50s 
must begin with the so-called New York Intellectuals. First coming together in the 
1930s, the New York Intellectuals were a (largely Jewish) group of critics, writers, 
and thinkers who made their mark in the pages of such journals as Partisan Review, 
Commentary, and Dissent. Perhaps the most useful way of understanding this 
disparate group comes from Norman Podhoretz’s conception of the New York 
Intellectuals as a Jewish family, made up o f three generations. The founding 
generation included Philip Rahv, Lionel Trilling, Clement Greenberg, and Sidney 
Hook, all active in New York in the 1930s.7 Rahv, along with William Phillips, 
launched Partisan Review in 1934, perhaps the most influential American intellectual 
journal of the mid-twentieth century. The second generation, arriving in the 1940s,
o
included Irving Howe, Leslie Fiedler, Alfred Kazin, Irving Kristol, and Saul Bellow. 
The third generation brought Podhoretz, Susan Sontag, and Midge Decter into the 
fold.9 Although Roth is considered by some to be a part of this third generation, the 
link seems tenuous. He did initially publish two of the stories from Goodbye,
5 It is worth noting that this movement to the suburbs was by no means confined to the Jewish 
community. As Catherine Jurca notes, “In 1950, the suburban growth rate was ten times that o f  central 
cities.” Catherine Jurca, White Diaspora (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), 218. But, 
perhaps more than any other group, Jewish culture had seemed inextricably tied up with the urban 
landscape. For an analysis o f how these ties were expressed through a fear o f nature in postwar fiction, 
see Brauner, Post-War Jewish Fiction, 24-7.
6 Saul Bellow, “The Swamp o f Prosperity,” Commentary, July 1959, 79.
7 Norman Podhoretz, Making It (London: Jonathan Cape, 1968), 111.
8 Ibid., 120. Although Bellow was based in Chicago, not New York, he was considered integral to the 
group—the New York Intellectuals' great hope among novelists. His frequent, long visits to New York 
in the 1940s established connections between the budding novelist and the milieu around Partisan 
Review. See Alexander Bloom, Prodigal Sons: The New York Intellectuals & Their World (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1986), 290-95; and James Atlas, Bellow: A Biography (London: Faber and 
Faber, 2000), 81-93.
9 Bloom, Prodigal Sons: The New York Intellectuals & Their World, 211.
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Columbus (“Eli, the Fanatic” and “You Can’t Tell a Man by the Song He Sings”) in 
Commentary, as well as “Writing About Jews” and “Writing American Fiction,” but 
he tended to run in different circles, and is rarely mentioned in the various histories of 
the group.10 Like a family, all o f these figures “found themselves stuck with one 
another against the rest of the world whether they liked it or not.”11
The various reviews of Goodbye, Columbus by the New York Intellectuals are 
remarkable in their similarity. Almost unanimously positive, each reviewer noted 
Roth’s sharp portrayal of suburban Jewish communities in similar terms. Irving Howe 
praised Roth for his “ruthless” depiction of the Jewish suburbs, calling it “ferociously 
exact” Alfred Kazin noted Roth’s “refusal o f a merely sentimental Jewish solidarity 
[...] He cast[s] a cold eye on Jews as a group.” Harvey Swados, something of a 
distant Jewish cousin to the New York core group, admired Roth’s “fiendishly 
accurate eye for the minutiae of middle-class Jewish life.”12 Perhaps Saul Bellow’s 
assessment, in a review in Commentary, best sums up the response of the New York 
Intellectuals:
Here and there one meets people who feel that the business of a Jewish 
writer in America is to write public relations releases, to publicize 
everything that is nice in the Jewish community and to suppress the 
rest, loyally. This is not at all the business of Jewish writers or of
writers of any kind. [...] The loss to our sense of reality is not worth
11the gain (if there is one) in public relations.
Reviews such as these strive to paint a picture of what a Jewish-American 
writer should be. He should be “ruthless” and “ferocious;” the eye he casts toward his
10 See Bloom, Prodigal Sons, 297; and “The New York Jewish Intellectuals,” in Arguing the 
World—The New York Intellectuals [website] (PBS online, 1999, accessed 16 May 2004); available 
from http://www.pbs.org/arguing/nyintellectuals_geneology.html; Internet.
11 Podhoretz, Making It, 110.
12 Irving Howe, “The Suburbs o f Babylon [review o f Goodbye, Columbus]," in Celebrations and 
Attacks: Thirty Years o f Literary and Cultural Commentary (New York: Horizon Press, 1979), 37; 
Alfred Kazin, Bright Book o f  Life (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1973), 145; Harvey Swados, 
“Good and Short” [review o f Goodbye, Columbus and other books], The Hudson Review 12 (Autumn 
1959): 459.
13 Bellow, “The Swamp of Prosperity,” 79. Roth borrowed Bellow’s terms when defending himself in 
his account o f the controversy over Goodbye, Columbus: “The concerns of fiction are not those o f a 
statistician— or o f a public-relations firm. The novelist asks himself, ‘What do people think?’; the PR 
man asks, ‘What will people think?”’ Roth, “Writing About Jews,” 200.
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community should be “cold” and “fiendishly accurate;” and he must be “exact,” 
responsible for portraying “our sense o f reality.” This is the modernist idea of the 
artist as alienated from, and independent of, his community. But the aspects of 
Goodbye, Columbus that these Jewish critics praised—Roth’s “refusal of a merely 
sentimental Jewish solidarity”—seemed precisely the aspects that sparked a strikingly 
different response from Roth’s more middlebrow Jewish readers.
*
The controversy began with the publication of “Defender of the Faith” in The 
New Yorker in March of 1959, and continued when the story was reprinted as part of 
Goodbye, Columbus, in June of that year. “Defender of the Faith,” narrated by US 
army sergeant Nathan Marx, takes place on a base in Missouri during World War II. 
One of the base’s new recruits, Sheldon Grossbart, proceeds to extract a series of 
favors and privileges from Marx, based upon their shared Jewish heritage. Although 
Marx is deeply uncomfortable and confused about giving Grossbart special treatment, 
Grossbart takes advantage of Marx’s basically compassionate nature for his own ends. 
The story is essentially about Marx’s troubled conscience, as he must eventually 
decide between his allegiance to a fellow Jew and his allegiance to his own sense of 
justice.
This moral dilemma was not what had enraged the readers who denounced the 
story and its author. Rather it was the character of Sheldon Grossbart. The portrayal 
of a Jew who is manipulative, conniving, and greedy, they argued, would only 
provide fuel to the fire of anti-Semites, who are eager to characterize all Jews as such. 
Almost immediately after the story was initially published, letters poured in, both to 
The New Yorker's editorial office and to Roth himself. One reader wrote, in a 
personal letter to Roth, “With your one story, ‘Defender of the Faith,’ you have done 
as much harm as all the organized anti-Semitic organizations have done to make 
people believe that all Jews are cheats, liars, connivers.”14 Another letter, to The New 
Yorker, imparted the message that “we cannot escape the conclusion that [this story]
14 Pearl Farberow to Philip Roth, undated, “Readers’ reactions and reviews, 1959,” Box 101, Philip 
Roth Collection, Manuscript Division, Library o f  Congress, Washington, D.C.
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will do irreparable damage to the Jewish people. [...] Cliches like ‘this being art’ will 
not be acceptable.”15
The controversy soon spread to American synagogues, where Roth and his 
work became the subject of intense debate. Rabbis made Roth the topic of their 
sermons, pointing out the dangers that lurked within Goodbye, Columbus. One rabbi 
wrote, in his synagogue newsletter, that “the only logical conclusion any intelligent 
reader could draw from [Roth’s] stories or books, is that this country—nay that the 
world—would be a much better and happier place without the ‘Jews.’”16 Another 
rabbi wrote to the Anti-Defamation League, asking, “What is being done to silence 
this man? Medieval Jews would have known what to do with him.”17 At the age of 
twenty-six, with a single book published, Roth suddenly had more notoriety within 
the Jewish community than anyone could have predicted.
*
What I hope emerges from this account of the controversy surrounding 
Goodbye, Columbus is a sense of the late 1950’s Jewish-American community as very 
sensitive to the ways in which Jews were portrayed to the wider world, and a sense 
that the community was willing and able to exert tremendous pressure upon those 
who would attempt to make those portrayals. I would argue that there were two main 
historical reasons for this sensitivity.
The first aspect to consider is the effect of the Holocaust. The extermination of 
six million European Jews had an immense impact on their American counterparts.
As American Jews became more prosperous and left the traditional Jewish 
neighborhoods of the cities for anonymous American suburbs, the nature of Jewish 
life in America was in rapid flux. And yet, as Irving Howe points out, “Memories of 
the Holocaust pressed deep into the consciousness of Jews, all, or almost all, making 
them feel that whatever being a Jew meant, it required of them that they try to remain 
Jews.”18 No matter how secure and Americanized Jews became, the Holocaust
15 Adolph Levy to Philip Roth, 12 June 1959, “Readers’ reactions and reviews, 1959,” Box 101, Philip 
Roth Collection.
16 Temple Topics, Progressive Synagogue, Brooklyn, New York, 30 December 1963, “‘Writing About 
Jews’ (essay/speech), Commentary, 1962-1964,” Box 247, Philip Roth Collection.
17 Roth, “Writing about Jews,” 204.
18 Irving Howe, World o f Our Fathers (London: Phoenix Press, 2000), 627.
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remained fixed in the collective Jewish psyche as a permanent reminder of the 
tenuous survival of the Jewish people. This manifested itself most noticeably in a 
heightened suspicion of the existence of anti-Semitism. Howe goes on to state that:
Haunted by the demons of modem history, most of the immigrants and 
many of their children kept a fear, somewhere in their minds, that anti- 
Semitism might again become a serious problem in America. By mid­
century, it was often less an actual fear than a persuasion that they 
should keep this fear, all past experience warranting alertness even if 
there was no immediate reason for anxiety.19
When Philip Roth’s story “Defender of the Faith” portrayed a Jew such as Sheldon 
Grossbart as selfish, greedy, and manipulative, many Jewish readers seemed to fear 
what an American anti-Semite would make of it.
The second aspect of the Jewish-American community that needs to be 
considered has to do with its socio-economic position at the time. As already noted, 
the overall trend for American Jews after the war was towards the upper-middle class 
and towards the suburbs. After centuries as a wandering people without a nation, 
never secure for very long, Jews had seemingly found, in America, a place where they 
could be successful members of the broader community. Albert Gordon, in his 1959 
sociological study Jews in Suburbia, noted, “The uniqueness of present-day Jewish 
suburbanites, then, is associated with the fact that they, unlike their fathers’ 
generation, feel ‘at home’ and secure in their Americanism.’ Having finally attained 
comfort and security, there was a tremendous collective desire to protect and maintain 
it. Jews had finally established safe and prosperous communities, and, 
understandably, they wanted to keep them that way. Jewish historian Milton Plesur 
claims that, in the new suburban communities, or ‘Golden Ghettoes’, “one’s 
affiliation with the Jewish community is compulsive; he is subject to its claims and
91demands in the way the metropolitan Jew has never been.” Philip Roth certainly felt 
these claims and demands after the publication of Goodbye, Columbus.
19 Ibid., 630.
20 Albert I. Gordon, Jews in Suburbia (Boston: Beacon Press, 1959), 16.
21 Milton Plesur, Jewish Life in Twentieth-Century America (Chicago: Nelson-Hall, 1982), 166.
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The Jewish response to Goodbye, Columbus had two distinct strains. The New 
York Intellectuals praised Roth’s cutting portrayal of the prosperous Jewish suburbs, 
affirming a modernist view of the artist who must maintain a critical eye towards his 
or her community. The outraged readers, by contrast, were precisely concerned with 
protecting that community, especially in regard to the way it is seen by outsiders. The 
contrast raises the question of the artist’s, or in fact any individual’s, responsibility to 
his community. Can, or should, an artist be a representative of his ethnic or religious 
community? How much are any individual’s actions constricted by the collective 
desires of his community? What is most interesting about the questions that the 
Jewish response to Goodbye, Columbus raised is that they seemed to echo the 
questions raised in the stories themselves. In the best stories in the collection, Roth 
focuses upon the complicated relationship between an individual protagonist and the 
Jewish community of which he is a part.
*
The question of an artist’s responsibility to represent his community is most 
explicitly on display in the book’s final story, “Eli, the Fanatic,” as the eponymous 
hero must literally represent his community. As a lawyer, Eli has been hired by the 
Jews of his town to evict, by appeal to zoning laws, the members of the newly arrived 
Yeshiva—a Talmudic boarding school that houses two adults and eighteen Hasidic 
children. Hasidic Jews have a traditional style of dress dating from nineteenth century 
Eastern Europe, and believe in an ecstatic communion with God through joyous 
prayer. The town of Woodenton, Eli informs the Hasidic headmaster, “is a 
progressive suburban community whose members, both Jewish and Gentile, are 
anxious that their families live in comfort and beauty and serenity.”22 It seems that 
Woodenton’s comfort, beauty, and serenity have all been disturbed by the Yeshiva, 
whose ancient practices and strange dress will threaten the delicate balance of 
assimilation.
Much of the story centers on the pressures that Eli’s townsmen exert upon 
him, underlining the importance of his mission. Eli’s every spare moment is spoiled
22 Philip Roth, “Eli, the Fanatic,” in Goodbye, Columbus (London: Penguin, 1986), 242. Subsequent 
references will be noted parenthetically in the text.
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by a ringing phone, bringing with it another townsman’s plea that he rid the town of 
the Yeshiva. The individual characterization of Woodenton’s concerned citizenry is 
minimal—the community as a whole becomes a character, shouting its demands into 
Eli’s ear. Through these pressures, Roth portrays a modem suburban Jewish 
community in which the protection of comfort and prosperity trumps all other 
considerations.
It quickly becomes clear that what prompts the Jewish community of 
Woodenton to want to evict the Yeshiva is a desire to maintain their assimilated 
suburban community, with its homogenized culture that has no room for such 
‘extreme’ practices. The conception of the suburbs as an escape from traditional 
American Jewish urban communities is made clear enough by one of Eli’s neighbors, 
who, speaking of the yeshiva, exclaims, “when I left the city, Eli, I didn’t plan the city 
should come to me” (GC 237). This is in line with one accepted view of twentieth 
century Jewish suburbia, in which “[wjhatever spoke too emphatically of traditional 
ways in religious practice, or too stridently o f traditional ideologies in Yiddish secular 
life, was left behind.”23 But Roth goes further than this claim, depicting the rejection 
of even fundamental Jewish religious values and practices in such communities.
One townsman expresses his worry that soon the town will be filled with 
Hasidic children, wearing yarmulkes and chanting their prayers through the center of 
town. He goes on to admit:
“Look, I don’t even know about this Sunday school business. Sundays 
I drive my oldest kid all the way to Scarsdale to learn Bible stories [...] 
and you know what she comes up with? This Abraham in the Bible 
was going to kill his own kid for a sacrifice. [...] You call that 
religion? Today a guy like that they’d lock him up.” (GC 256)
The distaste shown for the Yeshiva’s traditional religious practices highlights the 
extent that a desire for normalcy has gripped the modem Jewish community, eclipsing 
even the most fundamental aspects of religion, the ostensible source of Jewish 
identity. The same townsman even goes on to imply that it was the European Jews’ 
inability to ‘blend in’ that led to the atrocities of the Holocaust: “‘The way things are
23 Howe, World o f Our Fathers, 614.
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now are fine—like human beings. There’s going to be no pogroms in Woodenton. 
Right? ’Cause there’s no fanatics, no crazy people [...] just people who respect each 
other, and leave each other be’” (GC 257).
The mention of the Nazi pogroms is not merely incidental to the story, as the 
twenty residents of the Yeshiva are all D.P.s—“displaced persons”—Jewish survivors 
of the Holocaust, left without any family, community, or home. The Yeshiva in 
suburban Woodenton is their refuge; America, with its traditions of religious 
tolerance, will offer them a place to live as Jews. The irony Roth introduces here is 
clear. The rise of American Jews from poor immigrants at the end of the nineteenth 
century to prosperous suburbanites by the 1950s was perhaps the most remarkable 
demographic shift in twentieth century American history. Jews, for whom the world 
had seemingly no home for centuries, could finally feel comfortable and secure. But, 
in this story at least, this comfort and security comes at a steep price. Holocaust 
survivors, the modem age’s most striking symbol of the homeless Jewish people, 
chased from their homes by the Nazi atrocities, do not fit in to the Woodenton Jews’ 
plan for their community. Here, it is the Jews themselves who initiate a pogrom.24
Eli stands out as the only member of the Woodenton Jewish community who 
seeks to understand the elements of the conflict. Keeping in mind Roth’s experience 
with the outraged Jewish readers of Goodbye, Columbus, Eli might be seen as 
something like an artist figure for Roth, pushed and pulled by the claims of his 
society, struggling to maintain his individual perspective. Throughout, he is filled 
with self-doubt and self-questioning. This self-doubt stands in stark contrast to the 
assured, unified voice of the community, which only states that it wants the Yeshiva 
gone. But Eli’s investigative approach leads him to a true understanding of the 
motives of both sides of the conflict, and, eventually, to a sort of resolution. He 
understands the town’s desires, and, for most of the story, tries to be conciliatory in 
carrying out their demands. Driving through the prosperous suburb, he thinks of his 
ancestors, who struggled for generations in Eastern Europe to establish a stable, safe 
community:
24 Michael Rothberg, in his essay on the Holocaust in Roth’s fiction, sees in the story a portrayal o f a 
pivotal moment for American Jews, when “knowledge o f the fact o f the Nazi genocide has not yet 
become consciousness o f the rupture the Holocaust would soon represent. But the proximity o f the 
yeshiva to the town and Eli’s deluded attempt to take over the identity of the Hasidic man also 
prophetically suggest that that consciousness is about to erupt and that, when it does, the results will 
sometimes be troubling.” Michael Rothberg, “Roth and the Holocaust,” in The Cambridge Companion 
to Philip Roth, ed. Timothy Parrish (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 56.
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And now they had it—the world was at last a place for families, even 
Jewish families. After all these centuries, maybe there just had to be 
this communal toughness—or numbness—to protect such a blessing. 
(GC 259)
At the same time, Eli spends time speaking with the Hasidic headmaster, actually 
listening to the survivors’ story. He feels compassion for their situation, and attempts 
to strike a compromise that would allow the Yeshiva to stay. The compromise, in 
which the Yeshiva’s two adults agree to wear modem dress (actually suits that Eli 
gives them) when in the town, shows an understanding that most of the town’s 
grievances concern the outward appearance of normalcy. Eli’s final act, however, 
transgresses Woodenton’s conventions of normalcy, emphasizing his rebellious 
character. In a sort of epiphany of empathy and understanding for the Hasids, he 
dresses in the traditional Hasidic suit and hat, and parades down the main street of 
town. It is only a token act o f defiance, perhaps, but it is sufficiently subversive to 
convince his fellow townsmen that he is having a nervous breakdown.
The sensitivity of the suburban Jewish community in “Eli, the Fanatic” is a 
product of that community’s fervent desire to be normal, American, and 
inconspicuous to the broader, secular world. This fictional community uncannily 
foreshadowed the outspoken opponents of Goodbye, Columbus, who saw Roth as 
playing Eli’s role, parading down the street and exposing to America what should be 
hidden.
*
In another, more light-hearted story in the collection, “The Conversion of the 
Jews,” Roth depicts the sensitivity of another suburban Jewish community, and 
depicts its suspicious attitude towards individual dissent and self-questioning. Ozzie 
Freedman, the story’s thirteen-year-old protagonist, is in trouble with Rabbi Binder, 
the teacher of his Hebrew school class. For the third time in recent memory, Ozzie’s 
mother will have to come in to discuss Ozzie’s transgressions with the rabbi. Each of 
these meetings is prompted by Ozzie’s persistent curiosity and questioning of 
accepted Jewish practices. The first time, Ozzie asks “how Rabbi Binder could call
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the Jews ‘The Chosen People’ if the Declaration of Independence claimed all men to 
be created equal.” The second time occurs after a plane crash. Ozzie’s mother, after 
finding eight Jewish names on the casualty list, declares the crash a tragedy. Ozzie 
brings this up in class, and, after Rabbi Binder explains “cultural unity and some other 
things,” Ozzie shouts that he wishes everyone on the plane had been Jewish. The 
third of Ozzie’s offences results from a theological discussion in class. Rabbi Binder 
explains to the class that although, like Christians, Jews believe that Jesus Christ 
existed, they do not believe that he was the son of God. He appeals to the students’ 
common sense to convince them that Jesus Christ was “historical”: “‘The only way a 
woman can have a baby is to have intercourse with a man’” (GC 128). This 
explanation, however, does not fly with Ozzie. If God could create the whole world in 
six days, he wonders aloud, isn’t it possible that he could let a woman have a baby 
without having intercourse? Rabbi Binder takes Ozzie’s remarks as pure impudence, 
and tells him that his mother will have to come in. In the meantime, the rabbi tells 
Ozzie that he should think over what he has said. Ozzie later admits to his friend Itzie: 
“‘Itz, I thought it over for a solid hour, and now I’m convinced God could do it’” (GC 
130).
This phrasing of Ozzie’s ostensible blasphemy is important to the main thrust 
of the story, as Ozzie’s transgression comes in the form of a statement of belief. 
Whereas in “Eli, the Fanatic,” Roth depicts a non-religious Jewish community that 
pursues a homogenized state of assimilation at the expense of conspicuously strange 
religious Jews, here Roth operates within a specifically religious Jewish setting. In 
“The Conversion of the Jews,” instead of suburbia, it is an institutionalized and 
intellectually stagnant Judaism that resists individual difference. Ozzie is punished 
because his honest, ingenuous belief differs from accepted dogma.
Rabbi Binder, as the leader of Ozzie’s synagogue and Hebrew school class, is 
depicted as an authoritarian figure, or at the very least, someone who aspires to such a 
position. His is “the attitude of a dictator, but one—the eyes confessed all—whose 
personal valet had spit neatly in his face” (GC 136). As the figurative voice of the 
Jewish community, it is striking that it is his voice that receives the most descriptive 
detail from Roth. It is first described as “the monumental voice of Rabbi Binder” (GC
25 Philip Roth, “The Conversion o f the Jews,” in Goodbye, Columbus, 129. Subsequent references will 
be noted parenthetically in the text
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127). Later, Ozzie relates that when the rabbi scolds him about his remarks about 
God, he speaks “in that voice like a statue, real slow and deep” (GC 130). Finally, the 
narrator reports that the rabbi’s voice, “could it have been seen, would have looked 
like the writing on scroll” (GC 135).26 The pressures of the Jewish community are 
brought to bear on the individual through a voice that strives toward an 
unquestionable authority. Of course, Rabbi Binder’s role in the story is clearly 
signaled by his very name. His attempts to bind his students, to restrict their response 
to the ideas they are being taught, are frustrated by Ozzie Freedman, whose own name 
suggests that he cannot be bound.
The rabbi uses his authoritarian voice in the service of an institutionalized, 
lifeless Judaism. For example, he scolds Ozzie in class for reading too slowly from 
the Hebrew prayer book. “Ozzie said he could read faster but that if he did he was 
sure not to understand what he was reading.” Nevertheless, when Ozzie continues to 
read at his snail’s pace, the rabbi administers a “soul-battering” to the student (GC 
132). Ozzie’s meticulous reading is clearly contrasted with the perpetual mumbling of 
Yakov Blotnik, the seventy-one-year-old custodian who seems as integral to the 
synagogue’s structure as its roof or walls. “To Ozzie the mumbling had always 
seemed a monotonous, curious prayer; what made it curious was that old Blotnik had 
been mumbling so steadily for so many years, Ozzie suspected he had memorized the 
prayers and forgotten all about God” (GC 131-2).
In their 1961 sociological study of three generations of Jewish-American 
immigrants, Judith R. Kramer and Seymour Leventman argued that, for third 
generation American Jews in the suburbs, religious practice had more to do with a 
desire for group survival than authentic belief. For these Jews, they argued, “religious 
observance has been reduced to an occasional acknowledgment of synagogue and 
ritual. Sentiment exceeds commitment in the third generation, sufficing to assuage the 
conscience without isolating the Jew from the general community.” In this way, the 
suburban community in “The Conversion of the Jews” differs little from the 
community in “Eli, the Fanatic.” Whereas the Jews in the latter are suspicious of any 
visibly religious practices, the community of the former seems to maintain these
26 Roth would go on to farther caricature the rabbinical voice for more humorous purposes in Portnoy’s 
Complaint, portraying a rabbi who pronounces the word ‘God’ in three syllables. Philip Roth,
Portnoy's Complaint (London: Vintage, 1999), 73. Subsequent references will be noted parenthetically 
in the text.
31
practices merely for their own sake, suspicious of any religious practices that differ 
from the norm. It is a memorized, anaesthetized Judaism that Ozzie runs up against. 
Kramer and Leventman continue:
The third generation’s religious observance, such as it is, continues to 
be rationalized by a desire to perpetuate Jewish identity. Only a few 
young intellectuals, puzzled voices in a Philistine wilderness, wonder 
whether the religion justifies the people or the people the religion.27
Rabbi Binder’s voice can be monumental, like a statue, or like the writing on a scroll, 
but it is never puzzled. It is Ozzie who fits the role of the wondering young 
intellectual.
The second half of “The Conversion of the Jews” contains the story’s most 
memorable scene, with Ozzie standing on the roof of the synagogue, and a large 
crowd of people down below watching him. Ozzie has escaped to the roof following a 
confrontation with Rabbi Binder. The boy shouted at the rabbi, telling him, “You 
don’t know anything about God!” and the rabbi (accidentally) hit Ozzie, causing him 
to flee to the roof (GC 133-4). The scene that follows has a touch of the ridiculous, 
ending as it does with the whole crowd following Ozzie’s orders to go down on their 
knees “in the Gentile posture of prayer” (GC 143). But it works because it clearly 
juxtaposes the individual (Ozzie) and his community (the crowd below, made up of 
many people, including Rabbi Binder, Yakov Blotnik, and Ozzie’s mother). This 
allows Roth to develop his theme in a clear progression, as self-questioning and 
iconoclasm leads to a questioning o f the broader community and collective action.
When Ozzie first finds himself up on the roof, a question runs through his 
mind: ‘“ Is it me? Is it me ME ME ME ME! It has to be me—but is it!”’ (GC 135). He 
might be asking himself if it was he who called his religious leader a bastard after the 
rabbi hit him. Or he might be wondering if it is really him on top of his synagogue 
roof. Either way, this streak of self-questioning runs through him, just as it runs 
through Eli. Nonetheless, it is the bizarre scene that ensues, with the rabbi and Ozzie’s 
mother pleading that the boy not jump to his death, and Ozzie’s gleefully anarchic
27 Judith R. Kramer, and Seymour Leventman, Children o f  the Gilded Ghetto (New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press, 1961), 17.
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classmates shouting that he should jump, that prompts Ozzie to think: “If there was a 
question to be asked now it was not ‘Is it me?’ but rather ‘Is it us?”’ (GC 142). He 
might as well be asking, “Who are we?”. Eventually, realizing his power over the 
crowd of people below him, Ozzie makes everyone get down on their knees— 
otherwise he’ll jump. He then proceeds to make everyone say that God can let a 
woman have a child without having intercourse. Finally, he asks that his mother 
promise that she will “never hit anyone about God.” “He had asked only his mother, 
but for some reason everyone kneeling in the street promised he would never hit 
anybody about God” (GC 145). What had begun with a child’s honest, brazen 
question meeting rebuke from an impatient rabbi has led to a small community 
pledging to change their ways. Like “Eli, the Fanatic,” “The Conversion of the Jews” 
suggests the ways that an individual’s actions can change his community, if that 
individual is sufficiendy inquisitive and independent. Once again, we can see the 
figure of the artist manifest in the story’s protagonist This scene, with Ozzie on the 
roof, and his community down below, listening to him, giving credence to his ideas, 
even following his orders, is something of an artist’s fantasy. Roth, who would insist 
to his community that Jews in America need to be more inquisitive and self­
questioning, could only dream of such an audience in 1959.
*
Unlike “Eli, the Fanatic” and “The Conversion of the Jews,” “Defender of the 
Faith” does not take place within a Jewish community. But, in the distinctly non- 
Jewish environment of a US army base, Sheldon Grossbart effectively imports the 
coercive power of the Jewish community to manipulate Sergeant Nathan Marx. 
Grossbart is keenly aware of the power of the widely-held belief that Jews need 
conformity for survival, and harnesses that power to his own selfish ends.
Initially, his efforts are relatively benign. Guessing (correctly) that Sergeant 
Marx, his superior, is Jewish, Grossbart asks Marx to make clear to the other soldiers 
that, when the Jewish soldiers leave their duties to attend religious services, they’re 
not just “goofing off.” Sergeant Thurston, Marx’s predecessor, would never make 
such a statement, Grossbart says, “‘but we thought that with you here things might be
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a little different.” This type of insinuating group mentality colors many of 
Grossbart’s statements to Marx. Asking Marx for a weekend pass, Grossbart lies and 
says that he wants to go to his aunt’s house for a seder, the ceremonial meal that 
marks the beginning of the Jewish holiday Passover. “‘[A] 111 ask is a simple favor. A 
Jewish boy I thought would understand’” (GC 173). Some things are important for 
Jews, Grossbart implies, and Jews must rely on each other to maintain them in a 
Gentile world. Grossbart’s persuasive powers should not be underestimated, and 
Marx eventually writes him the pass, only to learn, later, that Grossbart’s ‘seder’ was 
actually a meal at a Chinese restaurant.
As the events of the Holocaust played a large role in the creation of this 
particular group mentality in American Jews, it is not surprising that Grossbart evokes 
the decimated European Jewish population in his efforts. Early in the story, Marx sees 
Grossbart and his two Jewish tag-alongs, Mickey Hal pern and Larry Fishbein, talking 
and laughing through the prayers at the aforementioned religious services. He asks 
them if services are important to them.
“Not so much at home,” said Grossbart, stepping between us, “but 
away from home it gives one a sense of his Jewishness.”
“We have to stick together,” Fishbein said. [...]
“That’s what happened in Germany,” Grossbart was saying, loud 
enough for me to hear. “They didn’t stick together. They let 
themselves get pushed around.” (GC 160)
Like in “Eli, the Fanatic,” the reference to the Holocaust increases the power of the 
community’s coercive argument Whereas in “Eli,” the purported lesson of the 
Holocaust was that the Jews did not ‘blend in’ enough, here it is that they were not 
unified. Later, when Marx initially denies Grossbart his request for the weekend pass, 
Grossbart wildly lashes ou t in terms that would be repeated by Roth’s detractors: 
“‘Ashamed, that’s what you are [...] So you take it out on the rest of us. They say 
Hitler himself was half a Jew. Hearing you, 1 wouldn’t doubt it’” (GC 172-3). For 
Grossbart, the Jewish fear of a repetition of the Holocaust’s atrocities becomes just
28 Philip Roth, “Defender o f the Faith,” in Goodbye, Columbus, 151. Subsequent references will be 
noted parenthetically in the text.
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another tool for his own aims, and the story becomes, in Michael Rothberg’s words,
“a warning to avoid turning [the Holocaust] into ethnic property and cultural 
capital.”29
Many times in the story, Marx catches Grossbart in a lie, and presses him for 
an explanation. Grossbart explains that he’s not merely trying to obtain special 
privileges for himself; he wants to help and protect his fellow Jews, Halpem and 
Fishbein. For this, he has a religious argument:
“What Mickey [Halpem] says is the Messiah is a collective idea. He 
went to Yeshiva, Mickey, for a while. He says together we’re the
Messiah. Me a little bit, you a little bit. [ ] It doesn’t seem too bad a
thing to believe, Sergeant. It only means we should all give a little, is 
all.” (GC 168)
Along with the Jewish desire for unity and references to the Holocaust, here Grossbart 
uses religious precepts to suit his purposes. Nevertheless, the sentiment of this 
statement does appeal to Marx.
Marx is not a hard-hearted man. He does feel for his fellow soldiers, and, from 
time to time is touched by Grossbart’s appeals for Jewish compassion. At one point, 
he chides himself for his coldness to Grossbart’s seemingly honest desire to go visit 
his aunt, remembering his own grandmother’s gentle way with her misbehaving 
grandson. He asks himself, “Who was Nathan Marx to be such a penny pincher with 
kindness?” (GC 177). He tells Fishbein, “‘you understand I’m not trying to deny you 
anything, don’t you? If it was my army, I’d serve gefilte fish in the mess hall, I’d sell 
kugel in the PX, honest to God.’” (GC 176). The story’s richness derives from the fact 
that Roth is alive to the complexities of the situation. This is accomplished through 
the character of Nathan Marx, who, like Eli and Ozzie, seems to represent the figure 
of the artist for Roth, always questioning both himself and the situation, agonizingly 
pursuing the right decision. No matter how distasteful Grossbart is, Marx cannot 
ignore the young soldier’s humanity, or his own compassionate feelings for his Jewish 
community.
29 Rothberg, “Roth and the Holocaust,” 57.
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Nonetheless, when Grossbart’s manipulations defy Marx’s sense of morality, 
he acts. Marx informs Grossbart that all o f the trainees will soon be shipped off to the 
Pacific war. After Grossbart fails in his attempt to get Marx to somehow change his 
orders, Marx learns that Grossbart has found another Jewish string to pull. By 
befriending a Corporal Shulman, Grossbart has managed to become the only trainee 
to be sent to duty in peaceful Monmouth, New Jersey. This Marx cannot abide. He 
makes a phone call and makes sure Grossbart is on the list to go to the Pacific, along 
with all the other trainees. He is not proud of his vindictiveness, but the act is 
something that Marx feels he must do to answer to his own conscience.
*
Amidst all the controversy that his first book roused, Roth quickly became 
schooled in defending himself and his work, insisting on his freedom to write 
literature, not pro-Jewish propaganda. Many of the angry correspondents may have 
been surprised to find Roth’s even-tempered, thorough refutations of their letters 
waiting in their mailboxes. He went to many synagogues and Jewish community 
centers to speak and take questions from the often angry audience members.30 And in 
1963, Roth published “Writing About Jews” in Commentary, an essay that went into 
great detail in the description and analysis of the attacks upon him and his work. The 
entire experience was certainly a demanding one; looking back on it in 1975, Roth 
states that “I seem to have felt called upon both to assert a literary position and to 
defend my moral flank the instant after I had taken my first steps.”31 One particular 
exchange with a correspondent illuminates this literary and moral position.
One of the letters Roth received in this period asked him what grudge he held 
against his heritage, and, to reinforce the point, included a clipping of an interview 
given by Leon Uris in the New York Post. Uris was a Jewish cultural star at the time, 
following the 1958 publication of Exodus, his unabashedly pro-Israel work of 
historical fiction. The correspondent marked off a section of the piece, in which Uris 
states, “‘There is a whole school o f Jewish American writers who spend their time 
damning their fathers, hating their mothers, wringing their hands and wondering why
30 Philip Roth, “Interview with The London Sunday Times,” in Reading Myself and Others, 115-16.
31 Roth, Reading Myself and Others, xiii.
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•  • i othey were bom. [...] Their work is obnoxious and makes me sick to my stomach.”’ 
Roth’s response to the implication of this passage is telling, and sheds light upon his 
attitude towards the Jewish-American community that he investigates in Goodbye, 
Columbus:
I take it that the inked section of Uris’ speech is meant somehow to 
refer to me. Am I right? If it does, I am deeply sorry you find in my 
work that I damn my father and that I hate my mother. As for wringing 
my hands and wondering why I was bom, I will admit to it. I do 
wonder about that. Doesn’t Mr. Uris?33
Roth’s insistence here on self-questioning speaks to the brand of artistic individualism 
he has adopted, a stance that is evident in the three stories discussed here, and 
throughout his entire body of work. Each of these stories features a Jewish 
community striving towards a conformity and forced unity that places immense 
pressure on any individual as intellectually curious as Roth insists that he remain. 
Goodbye, Columbus, unlike many of Roth’s later books, does not feature protagonists 
who are writers. Nonetheless, seen in relation to Roth’s public response to the Jewish 
community’s reception of the book, these protagonists are perhaps the predecessors of 
Peter Tamopol and Nathan Zuckerman, Roth’s future alter egos. Self-questioning, 
ambivalent, and steadfastly independent, Eli, Ozzie, and Nathan are proto-Rothian 
writers by other names.34 And, like Roth, they must fight against a community that 
would dictate their actions. In “Eh, the Fanatic,” the community pursues an American 
ideal of normalcy and assimilation at the expense of any other vision of Jewishness.
In “The Conversion of the Jews,” the community desires an institutionalized, stable 
Judaism at the expense of individual questioning and curiosity. And in “Defender of
32 Joseph Wershiba, “Daily Closeup: Leon Uris, Author o f ‘Exodus,’” New York Post, 2 July 1959, 34, 
“Readers’ reactions and reviews, 1959,” Box 101, Philip Roth Collection.
33 Philip Roth to Mrs. Strausberg, 22 July 1959, “Readers’ reactions and reviews, 1959,” Box 101,
Philip Roth Collection.
34 Victoria Aarons particularly sees Eli, with his “obsession with identity, with trying on and discarding 
selves,” as a forerunner to many o f Roth’s later characters: “We hear, in Eli Peck’s uncontrolled 
anxiety and in his phobic responses to conditions that he unwittingly creates, the prototype for Roth’s 
later protagonists. Such characters may become more urbane, more sophisticated, and more self-ironic 
as his fiction develops, but they are no less comically and indelibly preoccupied and apprehensive as 
they attempt to negotiate the uncertain terrain o f their American-Jewish lives.” Victoria Aarons, 
“American-Jewish Identity in Roth's Short Fiction,” in The Cambridge Companion to Philip Roth, 10,
14.
37
the Faith,” Grossbart takes advantage of a broad Jewish desire for unity and solidarity 
at the expense of individual justice. These communities all, in some way, prompt the 
individual protagonists to question these pressures, to swim against the tide.
*
Writing in the late 1950s, Roth was by no means alone in his portrayal of the 
individual as against the collective desires of community or mass society. Goodbye, 
Columbus must be seen within the changing discourse of liberal thought in postwar 
America, as detailed in Thomas Hill Schaub’s American Fiction in the Cold War. 
Schaub’s study argues that, from the late 1930’s onward, “the nature and obligations 
of writing were altered in response to the decline of the left, to the fact of Hiroshima, 
Nagasaki and the Holocaust, and to the anticommunism which dominated politics and 
culture for some years afterward.”35 He charts a narrative that runs through the work 
of a great number of liberal intellectuals and writers; simply, the rejection of staunch 
socialism following the disillusionment with Russian Communism under Stalin, 
leading to a move rightward, towards a chastened, more realistic, de-idealized 
liberalism. This “new liberalism,” as it was often called, embodied a host of powerful 
cultural norms that were expressed throughout the literature and critical writing of the 
time, and could not have helped but to influence Roth.
This fundamental change in liberal thought is perhaps most thoroughly
exemplified by the evolution of the New York Intellectuals. The group’s beginnings
are usually traced to the birth of Partisan Review, in 1934. The journal was launched
by Philip Rahv and William Philips under the sponsorship of the New York John
Reed Club, a Communist organization that aimed to advance the cause of American
proletarian literature. Leaving New Masses to focus strictly on politics, Partisan
•  •  •Review would take up literary and cultural matters from a socialist perspective. 
Almost all of the first generation of the New York Intellectuals were socialists of 
some sort in the 1930s, and brought this orientation to bear on their literary and 
cultural criticism.
35 Thomas Hill Schaub, American Fiction in the Cold War (Madison, WI: University o f Wisconsin 
Press, 1991), vii.
36 Neil Jumonville, Critical Crossings: The New York Intellectuals in Postwar America (Berkley: 
University of California Press, 1991), 49.
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In the years that followed, however, nearly all of these individuals moved 
steadily to the right. Although the individual paths were idiosyncratic, a pattern of 
political affiliation can be discerned. After the revelations of the Moscow trials 
(begun in 1936) and Stalin’s non-aggression pact with the Nazis, revolutionary 
socialism, in full-fledged support o f the Soviet Union, became anti-Stalinist Marxism. 
This, in turn, became pro-American liberalism after the war, often falling in line with 
Cold War anticommunism. As Alan Wald points out, “[w]hat remained most 
consistent in their ideological outlook in the postwar era was their virulent hostility to 
Stalinism, which increasingly became redefined to mean Leninism, and ultimately 
any form of revolutionary Marxism.” This is a simplified version of the twists and 
turns that led each individual from one affiliation to another, but it is useful in 
providing an archetype of postwar liberal thought, often haunted by memories of 
failed or compromised socialist ideals.
Within this political and cultural narrative, one of the most crucial changes 
was the repositioning of the liberal attitude towards collective action and the power of 
the masses. What had been a socialist belief in mass uprising towards revolutionary 
ends became the postwar fear of totalitarianism, the crass products of mass culture, 
and the specter of widespread cultural conformity.
the “masses”—once the hope of revolutionary change—became 
transformed into the disappointing and potentially threatening “mass 
society.” “Alienation,” once defined as the separation of the worker 
from the fruits of his labor, now became a badge of radicalism and 
autonomy—a sign that one was not a member of “mass society.”38
The liberal’s faith in the benevolence of social institutions, in the positive power of 
mass action, in the socialist society o f the Soviet Union, was broken by the 
revelations of the Moscow trials, Stalin’s nonaggression pact with Nazi Germany, the 
Holocaust, and the detonation of two atomic bombs. The postwar American boom, 
bringing with it a seemingly all-pervasive, dumbed-down, mass-produced culture
37 Alan Wald, The New York Intellectuals: The Rise and Decline o f  the Anti-Stalinist Left from the 
1930s to the 1980s (Chapel Hill: University o f North Carolina Press, 1987), 268. Much o f this account 
of the New York Intellectuals' move toward the right comes from Wald’s detailed study, which goes to 
great lengths to highlight the often contradictory political reversals o f many in the group.
38 Schaub, American Fiction in the C old War, 150.
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industry only strengthened the suspicion that the masses were not a force for good. 
Instead, what becomes apparent in much of the liberal thinking in the postwar era is a 
widespread championing of nonconformity, dissent, and individual rebellion against 
what was seen as a dangerous cultural consensus.
In 1955, R.W.B. Lewis published The American Adam, a study of nineteenth- 
century American literature that traces a narrative of “the authentic American as a 
figure of heroic innocence and vast potentialities, poised at the start of a new 
history.”39 He finds this “Adamic tradition” running through the work of Whitman, 
Hawthorne, and Melville among others, but the way he sees this tradition adapted in 
the best literature of the 1950s is telling. Lewis praises Ralph Ellison’s Invisible Man 
(1952), J.D. Salinger’s The Catcher in the Rye (1951), and Saul Bellow’s The 
Adventures ofAugie March (1953) because, in each, “the hero is willing, with 
marvellously inadequate equipment, to take on as much of the world as is available to 
him, without ever fully submitting to any o f the world’s determining categories.”40 
This idea of the individual who must resist and fight against submission to society’s 
“determining categories” is central to Schaub’s portrait of American liberal thought in 
the Cold War era, and, of course, central to the three stories discussed above. 
Everywhere—in fiction, in critical texts, even in popular cinema—the dissenting, 
defiant individual was championed for resisting the bland, homogenizing effects of 
cultural conformity. Even a seemingly radical text such as Norman Mailer’s “The 
White Negro” (1957), which posited a revolutionary power in the defiantly 
nonconformist “hipster,” affirmed this widespread mentality. “[Mailer] was merely 
indulging a commonplace of the cold war consensus, familiar to mass, mid, and high 
culture alike. Everyone feared the effects of conformity. Everyone lionized the 
‘individual.’”41
Along with this widespread emphasis on individual freedom and resistance to 
“determining categories,” the new liberalism was institutionally conscious of the 
failures of past liberal thought, the seeming naivete of the belief in the perfectibility of 
social institutions, the liberal utopia. “The list of charges that liberals brought against 
themselves [included]: the old liberalism was unimaginative, it subscribed to ‘facile’
39 R.W.B. Lewis, The American Adam (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955), 1.
40 Ibid., 199.
41 Schaub, American Fiction in the Cold War, 142.
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ideas of progress and ‘history,’ it wavered in its rejection of totalitarian politics.”42 
Having vehemently believed in socialist ideals that, under Stalin, were perverted into 
totalitarianism, many liberals, including the bulk of the New York Intellectuals, were 
determined to learn from their mistakes. These mistakes were very often attributed to 
youthful innocence and naivete, an unwillingness to acknowledge and deal with life’s 
complexity and man’s imperfections. In 1955, Lionel Trilling wrote:
We tried as hard as we could to believe that politics might be an idyll, 
only to discover that what we took to be a political pastoral was really 
a grim military campaign or a murderous betrayal of political allies.
[...] The evidence of this is to be found in a whole literary genre with 
which we have become familiar in the last decade, the personal 
confession of involvement and then disillusionment with 
Communism.43
This political narrative, a movement from innocence to a chastened, world-weary 
maturity, would have a great effect on the nature of the literary and cultural criticism 
that was produced by these new liberals, especially by the New York Intellectuals.
Just as an apparently naive socialism was eschewed in favor of a more 
complex, measured, ambiguous view of the political landscape, so many liberal critics 
began to reject literary works of naturalism, the traditional vehicle for proletarian 
literature, for a more modernist aesthetic. Naturalism, with its often simplified 
assumptions of the individual determined by societal forces, clashed with the new 
liberalism, both in the former’s disavowal of significant individual freedom, and in its 
supposed positivist portrayal of a black and white world. As Schaub points out, the 
New York Intellectuals in particular were drawn to a modernist aesthetic for 
ideological reasons, as modernism’s watchwords of ambiguity, contradiction, tension, 
and complexity appealed to a group that attributed the failure of their erstwhile 
political affiliations to a simplified, naive view of the world.44 By championing 
modernism, these critics could continue to insist upon literature’s relevance to the
42 Ibid., 7.
43 Lionel Trilling, “George Orwell and the Politics o f Truth,” in The Opposing Self: Nine Essays in 
Criticism (New York: The Viking Press, 1955), 152.
44 Schaub, American Fiction in the Cold War, 25-49.
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social and political world, without falling back upon the simplified ideas of the 
revolutionary proletarian novel. “On the one hand it grounds the literary idea in the 
emotions produced by history; on the other it establishes the aesthetic, or formal, 
standard of contradiction and paradox as the central quality of great art.”45 The new 
liberalism’s twin preoccupations with individual freedom and a complex, measured 
view of the world found a compatible aesthetic in modernism.
*
The three stories discussed above all seem to have been bom of this new 
liberalism. Emphasizing the dangers of collective societies, here in the form of Jewish 
communities, each story seems to be most concerned with the fate of the individual 
within these communities. Roth’s individuals are each marked off from the collective 
by their ambivalence, self-questioning, and, often, self-contradiction—qualities that, 
in line with the new liberalism, are presented as in vital opposition to the idea of 
collective will. Even more than the other stories, the title novella of the collection 
embodies the spirit of the new liberalism, as it follows an ambivalent protagonist 
whose very ambivalence sets him apart from the culture surrounding him.
Twenty-three year old Neil Klugman lives in Newark with his Aunt Gladys. 
“Goodbye, Columbus” is the story o f the romance that blossoms (and then dies) 
between Neil and Brenda Patimkin, but it is shadowed by the larger story of the 
Jewish-American community, in flux between its urban past and its rapidly suburban 
present. The Patimkins are a nouveau riche Jewish family living in Short Hills, a 
prosperous New Jersey suburb less than ten miles away from Newark on the map, but 
much further in terms of lifestyle. Early in the story, Neil asks his aunt where she 
keeps the suburban phone book, so he can call Brenda. Aunt Gladys is typically 
exasperated: “‘That skinny book? What, I gotta clutter my house with that, I never use 
it?’”46 Later, Aunt Gladys, ever the voice of urban Jewishness, asks, “‘Since when do 
Jewish people live in Short Hills? They couldn’t be real Jews believe me’” (GC 53). 
Real Jews or not, suburban families like the Patimkins were now a fact of Jewish life 
in America, and “Goodbye, Columbus” was Roth’s attempt to come to grips with the
45 Ibid., 34.
46 Philip Roth, “Goodbye, Columbus,” in Goodbye, Columbus, 4. Subsequent references will be noted 
parenthetically in the text.
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new Jewish-American reality, through the eyes of his ambivalent narrator. Sanford 
Pinsker notes that “for all its initial difficulties, the battle for assimilation was a 
relatively short skirmish. The harder task of assessing the ‘victory’ fell to 
contemporary American-Jewish writers like Philip Roth.”47
From the beginning of the novella, the reader is made aware of the differences 
between Newark and Short Hills, and of the different Jewish lifestyle each represents. 
Aunt Gladys’s greatest worry in life is that the food she buys might go uneaten by her 
family. As Neil eats, she sits across the table, rapt with attention, monitoring what he 
eats. “‘You’re going to pick the peas out is all? You tell me that, I wouldn’t buy with 
the carrots’” (GC 6). A stereotypical Jewish matriarch, Aunt Gladys seems to spend 
most of her time warning, in Yiddish-inflected English, about the dangers of wasting 
food. Neil muses: “I only hope she dies with an empty refrigerator, otherwise she’ll 
ruin eternity for everyone else, what with her Velveeta turning green, and her navel 
oranges growing fuzzy jackets down below” (GC 6). If this reads as typically Jewish 
trait, it is reflective of the accepted socio-economic status of urban Jewish 
immigrants. When money is scarce, food must not be wasted.
For the Patimkins, by contrast, food and other material goods are so abundant 
that, to Neil at least, they do not need to be bought at all; they seem to sprout from the 
soil. Looking out through the window of the suburban house, Neil sees, under two oak 
trees, “like fruit dropped from their limbs,” an abundance of sporting goods—the 
accessories of the Patimkins’ preferred recreations (GC 20). Later, Neil discovers an 
old refrigerator in the Patimkin basement, overflowing with fruit of every kind. He is 
astonished: “Oh Patimkin! Fruit grew in their refrigerator and sporting goods dropped 
from their trees!” (GC 40). And when Brenda wonders if the cherry and watermelon 
pits that the young couple spit onto the grass will take root and bear fruit, Neil 
responds, “‘If they took root in this yard, sweetie, they’d grow refrigerators and 
Westinghouse Preferred’” (GC 50). This repeated motif, of material possessions 
growing in suburban Short Hills, without even the unseemliness of purchase, 
emphasizes Neil’s vision of Brenda and her family in both socio-economic and 
literary terms. In this way, Neil’s sometimes ardent, often conflicted love affair with 
Brenda is also a love affair with Short Hills, with the increasingly prosperous lifestyle
47 Sanford Pinsker, The Comedy that “Hoits An Essay on the Fiction o f Philip Roth (Columbia: 
University of Missouri Press, 1975), 22.
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of American Jews. Near the end of the novella, when Neil is apprehensive about his 
future with Brenda, he wanders into a cathedral and informally addresses God. What 
is he after? What is he pursuing? Which prize will be his reward? “Which prize do 
you think, schmuck? Gold dinnerware, sporting-goods trees, nectarines, garbage 
disposals, bumpless noses, Patimkin Sink, Bonwit Teller—” (GC 92).
In both “Eli, the Fanatic” and “The Conversion of the Jews,” Roth provides 
vivid Jewish communities whose collective desires clash with those of the 
protagonists, who are, by their nature, conflicted and uncertain. In “Defender of the 
Faith” there is no such community, but the idea of a collective will is sufficiently 
expressed through Grossbart’s intimations of Jewish solidarity. Similarly, there is no 
explicit community in “Goodbye, Columbus” that is in conflict with Neil. But 
something like a collective will is present It is the seemingly foregone conclusion of 
Jewish-American upward mobility—the certainty that Aunt Gladys and Newark 
belong to the past and that Brenda Patimkin and Short Hills belong to the future. 
Neil’s sensitivity to this force is often expressed somewhat bitterly, in small signs of 
resentment that occasionally appear amidst the seeming idyll of budding romance. 
When Brenda vaguely indicates that she goes to university in Boston, Neil remarks, to 
the reader, “Whenever someone asks me where I went to school I come right out with 
it: Newark Colleges of Rutgers University. I may say it a bit too ringingly, too fast, 
too up-in-the-air, but I say it” (GC 10). When Brenda casually mentions that she 
“lived in Newark when [she] was a baby,” Neil is suddenly, unaccountably, angry 
(GC 12). And when Brenda unwittingly derides Newark in chastising her mother for 
not properly adapting to the family’s affluence, Neil “could not shake from [his] 
elephant’s brain that she-still-thinks-we-live-in-Newark remark” (GC 24).
Throughout their time together, Neil is unable to forget the difference in status 
between Brenda and himself. The implicit rejection of urban Jewish life that seems 
inherent in the Jewish suburbs and the ease with which Brenda takes for granted her 
affluence are a constant nagging presence in Neil’s perception of their relationship.
The certainty and momentum of this change in Jewish lifestyles is rendered in 
a meditation Neil makes while driving through Newark’s Third Ward:
The neighborhood had changed: the old Jews like my grandparents had 
struggled and died, and their offspring had struggled and prospered, 
and moved further and further west, towards the edge of Newark, then
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out of it, and up the slope of the Orange Mountains, until they had 
reached the crest and started down the other side, pouring into Gentile 
territory as the Scotch-Irish had poured through the Cumberland Gap. 
Now, in fact, the Negroes were making the same migration, following 
the steps of the Jews [...]
This is the master story of the Americanization of immigrants, grounded in the 
specific story of the end of Newark Jewry. It is a story that is told again and again 
throughout Roth’s work, whether by Zuckerman, in Zuckerman Unbound and 
American Pastoral, David Kepesh’s father, in The Professor o f  Desire, or Roth’s own 
father, in Patrimony. But whereas, in those works, the tone is generally mournful or 
nostalgic for Newark’s Jewish past, here, because Neil is caught up between the life 
of Aunt Gladys and that of the Patimkins, the tone is more bitter. Continuing his 
thoughts, Neil predicts that “someday these streets [...] would be empty and we 
would all of us have moved to the crest o f the Orange Mountains, and wouldn’t the 
dead stop kicking at the slats in their coffins then?” (GC 82-3). The remark is ironic, 
indicating the abandonment of the Jews’ connection with their recent past, as urban 
creatures. This invocation of “the dead” is the closest Neil gets to explicitly 
condemning the suburbs. For the majority of the story his attitude to Short Hills, like 
his attitude to Brenda, is typically conflicted; he is simultaneously tempted and 
repulsed.
In his review of Goodbye, Columbus in The Nation, George P. Elliott praises 
the stories, but faults the novella for its romantic plot. The problem is that Neil “is 
represented as being so detached and ironic an observer that whether he marries 
[Brenda] or not doesn’t matter very much to the reader.”48 Elliott’s assessment of 
Neil’s character is astute, but his emphasis on the romance as the main thrust of the 
story seems off the mark. Neil is most definitely a detached and ironic observer, and 
this does detract somewhat from the dramatic tension in the portrayal of his 
relationship with the satirically depicted Brenda. But if that relationship is seen as tied 
up with another relationship—that between Neil and the broader Jewish-American 
community, so rapidly enacting changes to the very nature of Jewish life in 
America—then irony and detachment do not seem so inappropriate a response. Neil’s
48 George P. Elliott, “Real Gardens for Real Toads,” The Nation 189 (14 November 1959): 346.
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character is essential to Roth’s greater purpose: an exploration of how one is to live as 
a Jew in mid-twentieth century America.
Neil’s burgeoning love for Brenda often takes the form of putting her upon a 
pedestal, elevating her above the majority o f her peers, of whom Neil is generally 
disdainful. Amongst the women of the country club, whose gaudy dress betray an 
abundance of wealth and a corresponding lack of taste, Brenda is “elegantly simple, 
like a sailor’s dream of a Polynesian maiden” (GC 13-14). Upon seeing Brenda in a 
dress for the first time, Neil is taken aback by her naturalness and beauty, especially 
as compared to other suburban girls. “So many of those Lincolnesque college girls 
turn out to be limbed for shorts alone. Not Brenda. She looked, in a dress, as though 
she’d gone through life so attired” (GC 35). But Neil can never quite convince 
himself of his belief in Brenda, and tends to undercut this sentiment as well. He 
imagines Brenda’s mother as a “captive beauty, some wild princess, who had been 
tamed and made the servant to the king’s daughter— who was Brenda” (GC 20). This 
still demonstrates some of Neil’s esteem for Brenda, envisioning her as the king’s 
daughter, but also intimates something of his disdain for her spoiled and pampered 
existence.
One day, when Brenda goes shopping in New York, Neil drives down to a 
park in the Orange Mountains, an echo of the forgotten wilderness amidst the many 
suburbs that so recently exploded around it. Instead of merely finding deer there, he 
has occasion to observe the young suburban mothers who “cha[t] in their 
convertibles” and “comparje] suntans, supermarkets and vacations.” “They looked 
immortal sitting there. Their hair would always stay the color they desired, their 
clothes the right texture and shade.” It is a vision of conformity and mindless, 
tasteless materialism. Neil justifies his newfound presence in this crass community by 
believing that Brenda is somehow better than these “immortals,” somehow 
uncorrupted by her affluence. But his enduring ambivalence, both towards Brenda and 
towards himself, does not allow him to fully believe:
Only Brenda shone. Money and comfort would not erase her 
singleness—they hadn’t yet, or had they? What was I loving, I 
wondered, and since I am not one to stick scalpels into myself, I 
wriggled my hands in the fence and allowed a tiny-nosed buck to lick
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my thoughts away. (GC 87-88)
Neil wonders what he is loving throughout his time with Brenda, never forgetting that 
she is a part of the materialistic suburbs that have earned his contempt. He strives to 
keep in check “that hideous emotion I always felt for her, and is the underside of 
love” (GC 25).
Roth’s use of ambivalent protagonists can be seen from two different, though 
complementary, perspectives. As it was for many liberal thinkers in the mid-twentieth 
century, focusing on the conflicted individual was an artistic and ideological stance, a 
statement of belief in the concepts of difficulty, contradiction, and paradox in the face 
of social institutions that seemed to be conspicuously lacking these traits. Stories told 
through the voice of an ambivalent narrator were perhaps the most noticeable product 
of the new liberalism within the literature of the time. But an ambivalent narrator or 
protagonist also serves another purpose for Roth. By keeping Neil aloof and non­
committal, Roth is better able to capture his complex subject. As heavily contested a 
topic as the idea of American Jewishness was (and still is), “Goodbye, Columbus” 
manages to investigate an often confusing crossroads in Jewish-American life without 
seeming to advocate one direction or another. Saul Bellow’s review of Goodbye, 
Columbus insists that the Jewish writer’s responsibility is to “our sense of reality,” 
rather than “public relations.” A narrator like Neil allows Roth to better portray this 
sense of reality, to see clearly. For Neil, as well as Roth, individual autonomy seems 
connected to accuracy of vision.
Seeing, being able to observe his surroundings, knowing exactly where he is, 
is paramount for Neil. Brenda, by contrast, has no similar need to see. In the Jewish- 
American community, the novella implies, there are those who see, who choose to 
open their eyes to reality, and there are those who choose to remain blind. It is 
perhaps no surprise that Neil, hailing from lower middle class Jewish Newark sees, 
whereas Brenda, wealthy and suburban, does not This difference is introduced in the 
first lines of the novella: “The first time I saw Brenda she asked me to hold her 
glasses. Then she stepped out to the edge of the diving board and looked foggily into 
the pool; it could have been drained, myopic Brenda would never have known it” (GC 
4). Neil reports this first encounter in visual terms—it was the first time he saw 
Brenda, not the first time he met her. And his first impression of Brenda is that she 
cannot see. On two other occasions Neil holds Brenda’s glasses, emphasizing his need
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to see, and her corresponding lack thereof. At one point he has to remind her that he is 
holding them: “‘Your glasses,’ I said.” Brenda responds, “‘Oh break the goddam 
things. I hate them’” (GC 14).
Neil’s need to see is often evoked through his discomfort in the darkness, 
where he cannot trust his vision. Playing basketball with Brenda’s younger sister in 
the dying light of the evening, he has a frightful premonition. “For an instant [...] I 
had one of those instantaneous waking dreams that plague me from time to time, and 
send, my friends tell me, deadly cataracts over my eyes.” He suddenly envisions 
himself locked in an interminable game with the sister, forever in darkness, “and it 
never was morning” (GC 25). When Neil and Brenda sneak into Brenda’s country 
club after hours, Neil begins to panic only when the lights go out. “My heart must 
have beat faster, or something, for Brenda seemed to guess my sudden doubt— we 
should go, I thought” (GC 45). Nonetheless, they stay, and play a game where one 
person goes into the water, while the other waits at the side of the pool, eyes closed, 
waiting to be surprised by a wet embrace. As Neil dives into the water, “head[ing] 
blindly down I felt a touch of panic” (GC 48). He becomes momentarily desperate 
and frightened in the darkness, worried that Brenda has disappeared. Again he fears 
that he will have to be out in the blind darkness until morning, and prays for the sun to 
rise “if only for the comfort of its light” (GC 49). Vision is Neil’s security, and he 
needs it to feel comfortable with Brenda. She has her big house, Radcliffe education, 
and cashmere sweaters, and he has his sight. Brenda, accordingly, is exceedingly 
comfortable without her glasses, and in the darkness. Watching her play tennis as the 
sun goes down, Neil notices that “[t]he darker it got the more savagely did Brenda 
rush the net” (GC 9). When it’s light out, Brenda stays back, worried about the effects 
a tennis ball might have on her expensively “fixed” nose. But in the dark, she goes for 
broke.
This emphasis on vision seems particularly relevant to the overall thrust of the 
novella, a focus alluded to by its title. The phrase, “Goodbye, Columbus,” comes 
from a record that Brenda’s brother Ron plays for Neil. The record is an audio 
highlight reel of Ron’s final year at Ohio State University in Columbus, Ohio, and 
concludes with a nostalgia-laden, wistful farewell to the ivy-covered campus of the 
university: “We will miss you, in the fall, in the winter, in the spring, but some day 
we shall return. Till then, goodbye, Ohio State, [...] goodbye, Columbus . . .  goodbye, 
Columbus . . .  goodbye...” (GC 96). The phrase is a signal to the graduates that their
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picturesque days at university are over, and that they now must enter the “real world,” 
with all of the complications and uncertainty that that cliched catch-all implies. But it 
can also be seen as a more general farewell to idyllic illusions, signaling a chastened, 
clear-eyed view of reality. Neil’s relationship with Brenda must eventually end; 
although their break-up is nominally triggered by Brenda’s mother’s discovery of her 
daughter’s diaphragm, there is a sense that Neil is not able to wholeheartedly commit 
to a life as an affluent suburban husband. For Neil, seeing clearly means saying 
goodbye to the dream of unproblematic love. The title’s historical suggestion, 
bringing to mind the storied discoverer of the new world, implies also a farewell to an 
unproblematic American dream. As in “Eli, the Fanatic,” “The Conversion of the 
Jews,” and “Defender of the Faith,” Roth portrays the difficulty in reconciling an 
identity as a Jew and as an American. The mostly suburban America that is portrayed 
in Goodbye, Columbus is neither a utopia for the Jews, offering them a perfect blend 
of assimilation and acceptance, nor the end of Jewish identity altogether.
*
It is clear that, as a young writer, Philip Roth had already internalized many of 
the precepts of the new liberalism. In its implicit preference for the autonomous 
individual over the conformist masses, complexity over simplicity, and ambiguity 
over certainty, Goodbye, Columbus takes its place within the discourse of dissent, 
difficulty, and contradiction so in fashion among liberal intellectuals of the 1950s.
The sensitivity of the Jewish-American community at the time, in part produced by 
their rapidly changing socioeconomic status, provided Roth with a deeply known 
subculture within which he could express his autonomy. The similarity of the 
communities evoked in these stories to the community that responded so vehemently 
to Goodbye, Columbus suggests not only that Roth had an astute understanding of the 
Jewish-American community when he wrote it, but also that the particular nature of 
the community at the time, with its all-encompassing drive towards normalcy and 
comfort, may have played a large role in the formation of his defiantly individualistic 
artistic stance. The forces that combined to create the response to Roth’s debut were 
the very same ones that played a part in its creation. There seems to have been a 
synchronicity of influences on Roth, from the intellectuals of the time who extolled
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the conflicted, ambivalent, autonomous individual, and from the sensitive and 
coercive community imposed by his identity as an American Jew.
At one point in “Goodbye, Columbus,” Neil’s awareness of his own 
detachment from the life around him emerges in a section concerning his employment 
at the library. He fears that one day he will be like his fellow employees, lifeless, 
uninteresting, and uninterested, each of whom seem to have “a thin cushion of air 
separating the blood from the flesh.” Looking at himself in the bathroom mirror, Neil 
imagines that one day he “would see that at some moment during the morning I had 
gone pale [...] and so life from now on would not be a throwing off, as it was for 
Aunt Gladys, and not a gathering in, as it was for Brenda, but a bouncing off, a 
numbness” (GC 30). It is a telling moment for Neil, defining him, as it does, against 
both Aunt Gladys and Brenda, the representatives of the two ways of life seemingly 
available to him. Having distanced himself from both worlds, preferring to remain a 
non-committal observer, would “numbness” be the necessary result? In such times, 
what role can an observer play? What is left for the man who will not “submit to any 
of the world’s determining categories?”
Perhaps Roth’s answer is to be found in another moment when Neil looks at 
his reflection, at the end of the novella. Having ended his relationship with Brenda in 
Boston, where she is at university, Neil wanders over to the Harvard library, and 
catches sight of himself in the darkened windows. Staring at himself, he tries to make 
sense of his situation. “I looked hard at the image of me, at that darkening of the 
glass, and then my gaze pushed through it, over the cool floor, to a broken wall of 
books, imperfectly shelved” (GC 124). This image, of Neil’s reflection merging with 
a wall of books, shows Roth’s protagonist simultaneously looking both inward and 
outward. For Alan W. France, this is an image of resignation, a signal that “[f]or Neil 
there is no alternative to the hollowness of 1950s commodity culture; he must go back 
to the Newark Public Library.”49 But the Newark Public Library is an alternative to a 
life among the Patimkins or with Aunt Gladys; the library offers up a different sort of 
community than the ones presented in Goodbye, Columbus—the community of 
literature.50 The novella’s final image, in contrast to Neil’s ostensible position
49 Alan W. France, “Philip Roth’s Goodbye, Columbus and the Limits o f Commodity Culture,” MELUS 
15, No. 4 (Winter 1988): 89.
50 In 1969, when the Newark City Council voted to cut off funding for the Newark Public Library, Roth 
wrote a piece for the New York Times, defending the library’s place in the city’s culture, arguing that it
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between the poles of Jewish life represented by Aunt Gladys and Brenda Patimkin, 
posits Neil as a characteristically Rothian figure, poised between an inward focus on 
the experience of the self (Shostak’s situated subject) and an outward focus on the 
boundless world of literature (Posnock’s republic of culture). The image’s ingenuity, 
the window acting as both mirror and lens, obviates the need for Neil to choose 
between the two. For Roth, himself a questioning, iconoclastic individual, who, at the 
start of his career, felt the full brunt of the Jewish-American community’s coercive 
force, the only determining category ever fully submitted to has been that of the 
writer.
taught him about the responsibilities o f being in a community as a child: “No less satisfying was the 
idea of communal ownership, property held in common for the common good. Why I had to care for 
the books I borrowed, return them unscarred and on time, was because they weren’t mine alone, they 
were everybody’s. That idea had as much to do with civilizing as any I was ever to come upon in the 
books themselves.” Philip Roth, “The Newark Public Library,” in Reading Myself and Others, 217.
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Chapter Two
Portnoy’s Complaint and the Idea o f Seriousness
In 1971, reflecting on the experience of writing Goodbye, Columbus, Roth 
remembered “the exuberance of being a literary orphan.” “Not as yet informed that he 
is a realistic writer, or a Jewish writer, or an academic writer, or a controversial 
writer, he is not tempted either to satisfy the expectation or to subvert it.”1 As the 
1960s dawned, those days were over for Roth, and having been informed that he was 
both a Jewish writer, and a controversial writer, he immediately set out to subvert 
those expectations. For most of the sixties, Roth chose a path that served to reject both 
the narrowness of subject-matter implied by the “Jewish-American writer” label, and 
the irresponsibility that he was accused of demonstrating in his first book. Explaining 
that because he felt that it was “my seriousness, my sense of proportion and 
consequence that was under attack” by the angry Jewish readers of Goodbye, 
Columbus, “I did not have the nerve to appear frivolous in any way.”2 Roth is 
describing here his very earnest response to these critics in the essay “Writing About 
Jews,” but he might just as well as be characterizing his writing throughout much of 
the sixties, a period in which, in a number o f essays and two novels, the maintenance 
of seriousness and the banishing of frivolity seem just as central as the works’ 
ostensible content. Although not entirely a “literary orphan” anymore, Roth’s writings 
in the early sixties seemed concerned with establishing a place for himself in the 
cultural landscape, quickly casting him in the role of the serious intellectual.
1 Roth, “The Story of Three Stories,” 213.
2 Roth, “On The Great American Novel," 70.
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This word, ‘serious’, is worth unpacking. For I feel it is the best term to 
characterize Roth’s overall output until 1967, the year in which the first installment of 
that deeply unserious book, Portnoy’s Complaint, was published in Esquire. There is 
the everyday, dictionary definition, which is pretty close to Roth’s usage above, his 
“sense of proportion and consequence.” For to be serious is to consider the issues 
carefully, thoughtfully, instead o f frivolously. As commonly distinguished from 
comic by its earnestness, seriousness implies the ability to recognize the significance 
of significant things, and to address them as such. But seriousness can also refer to 
significance itself, that which is taken seriously. Looked at this way, the nature of 
seriousness changes with context; one era’s serious or significant writers or works 
often differ from another’s. Attaining literary seriousness often involves aligning 
yourself with certain writers or literary works to demonstrate your credibility, to show 
that, like these serious writers and works, you need to be taken seriously. In addition, 
setting yourself up as an arbiter o f seriousness, telling others what is serious and what 
is not, is a sure-fire way of demonstrating your own seriousness. In one of his first 
published pieces of writing after Goodbye, Columbus, Roth put himself forward as 
someone who should be taken seriously as a writer and an intellectual. Thoughtful, 
earnest, and serious in the right ways for the time and milieu, “Writing American 
Fiction” established the sort of seriousness that would characterize Roth’s writing for 
much of the sixties.
First given as a speech at a symposium on “Writing in America Today,” held 
at Stanford University in November 1960, “Writing American Fiction” was published 
in Commentary magazine in March 1961. The essay, in attempting to tackle head-on 
the problems of writing fiction in contemporary America, was a rite of passage for 
Roth, a declaration of intent, a bold statement from a young writer who dared to 
criticize, albeit with intellectual decorum, his better-established and well-respected 
fellow writers. Roth begins the essay by recounting the story of the Grimes sisters, 
two teenage girls who were killed a few years previous in Chicago, when Roth was 
living there. In what Roth sees as particularly American fashion, the crime soon turns 
into a media circus; as the papers fly off the newsstands, the mother of the girls, the 
alleged murderer, and his mother all become local celebrities, and Mrs Grimes ends 
up with a brand new kitchen, the gift o f a concerned philanthropist. In the most- 
quoted passage of the essay, Roth gives us the moral of the story:
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The American writer in the middle of the twentieth century has his 
hands full in trying to understand, describe, and then make credible 
much of American reality. It stupefies, it sickens, it infuriates, and 
finally it is even a kind of embarrassment to one’s own meager 
imagination. The actuality is continually outdoing our talents, and the 
culture tosses up figures almost daily that are the envy of any novelist. 
(“Writing” 167-8)
That American reality is increasingly unreal is a particularly vexing problem for the 
American writer, for, in Roth’s consideration, a writer’s world must be 
understandable to him, must feel like it is his world, for him to write. “For a writer of 
fiction to feel that he does not really five in his own country [...] must seem a serious 
occupational impediment For what will his subject be? His landscape?” (“Writing” 
169). There are two points to untangle here. The first is that the outlandishness of 
contemporary America makes it very difficult for the writer of fiction to keep up, to 
write believable fiction in an unbelievable time. The second is that the task of writing 
is doubly difficult if the writer feels estranged from his culture, for his culture 
inevitably furnishes both his subject and his landscape.
Taking this as the essay’s starting point, Roth wonders how there are any 
books being written that are set in the “here and now.” And yet, he points out, every 
week there appears another book in the best-seller list that seems to deal with 
contemporary reality. Perhaps not surprisingly, he does not find these books ‘serious’ 
enough; books such as Herman Wouk’s Marjorie Morningstar and Sloan Wilson’s 
The Man in the Gray Flannel Suit do not “imagine the corruption and vulgarity and 
treachery of American public life any more profoundly than they imagine human 
character” (“Writing” 169). As for Norman Mailer, Roth surmises that he is a writer 
“in whom our era has provoked such a magnificent disgust that dealing with it in 
fiction has almost come to seem, for him, beside the point” (“Writing” 170). Roth 
sympathizes with Mailer’s turn towards journalism and political activism (for it is 
difficult to write fiction), but ultimately, both Mailer and the books on the best-seller 
list are beside the point for Roth’s current subject, because neither attempts to make 
“an imaginative assault on the American experience” (“Writing” 171). Roth then 
turns to “our best writers” and finds “certain signs [...] supporting the notion that the
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social world has ceased to be as suitable or as manageable a subject as it once may 
have been” (“Writing” 172).
He begins with a look at the work of J.D. Salinger and Bernard Malamud, in 
both of which he finds “a spuming of our world” (“Writing” 174). In Salinger’s work,
the hero “has learned to live in this world [ ] by not living in it” (“Writing” 173).
The world being unsuitable, or too harsh, Salinger’s protagonists retreat into madness 
or mysticism. As for Malamud, Roth finds his timeless, almost mythical Lower East 
Side to have very little in common with the contemporary world as it is lived. Roth’s 
suggestion is that outlandish contemporary America, as it is, may account for these 
writers’ decisions to shy away from a fictional investigation of it.
Moving on to the novels of Saul Bellow, Herbert Gold, and William Styron, 
Roth has two main points to make. First, in noting the “bouncy” prose style that these 
and other writers have seemed to have adopted in recent years, he compares a passage 
from Bellow’s The Adventures o f Augie March with one from Gold’s Therefore Be 
Bold? Whereas he finds the Bellow passage “tough-minded, exact, not primarily 
exhibitionistic,” in Gold’s passage he merely sees evidence of the author showing off, 
thrusting his authorial presence at the reader.4 This, Roth suggests, “may perhaps be 
thought of as a symptom of the writer’s loss of community—of what is outside 
himself—as subject” (“Writing” 177-8). Secondly, Roth points out that many of the 
books from these writers seem to sound more than a note of affirmation and 
celebration of the self. Both Bellow’s Henderson the Rain King and Styron’s Set This 
House on Fire end with an affirmation of the hero, an optimistic belief in the powers 
of the self. But both of these protagonists’ selves are celebrated apart from American 
society: Henderson in a fantastical Africa and an unpeopled Arctic, and Styron’s 
Kinsolving in a small Italian town. Roth’s connection is implicit—that contemporary 
reality is so baffling, so incredible, that these writers have retreated from it, instead 
celebrating the self “imagined as the only real thing in an unreal-seeming 
environment” (“Writing” 181).
3 Roth introduces these “bouncy” writers by referring to an article by Harvey Swados, in which a group 
of writers are singled out for their “nervous muscular prose.” What Roth fails to mention is that, along 
with Bellow and Gold, Swados includes Roth in this group, singling him out for particular praise. 
Swados, “Good and Short,” 358-59.
4 Roth and Bellow enjoyed a long relationship o f mutual admiration; Roth dedicated Reading Myself 
and Others, his collection of essays and interviews, to Bellow, “the ‘other’ I have read from the 
beginning with the deepest pleasure and admiration.” Roth, Reading M yself and Others, vii. For an 
account o f the two authors’ correspondence, as found in Roth’s archive in the Library o f Congress, see 
David Gooblar, “Lessons From the Master,” Guardian, 8 October 2005, Review, 6.
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Although this is not a condemnation of these writers’ books, he does find such 
affirmation “unconvincing” in the current climate. He closes the essay with a mention 
of the hero of Ralph Ellison’s Invisible Man, a man who “has gone out into [the 
world], and out into it, and out into it,” but in the end chooses to go underground and 
wait (“Writing” 182). That this decision is not celebrated in Ellison’s novel, that it is 
cause for despair, seems to Roth a much more appropriate fictional response to the era 
than the books by Bellow, Gold, and Styron. Once again, we see Roth depicting an 
image that sets up poles of inward and outward; it is telling that, for Roth, Invisible 
Man’s decision, after going “out into the world,” to be “left with the simple stark fact 
of himself,” is not a “cause for celebration.” In the best literature, it is implied, neither 
an inward nor outward focus is wholly neglected in favor of the other.
It is a confident, wide-ranging essay, and it has since become much-discussed 
in studies of Roth, and in broader studies o f postwar American fiction as well. Critics 
have interpreted the essay in many different ways in applying it to their own view of 
Roth’s fiction. Some, seemingly taking Roth at his word, paint him as a social realist, 
committed to an accurate portrayal of American reality.5 Others have detected the 
essay’s polemical intent in Roth’s novels, and claim that Roth is always trying to 
make a point through his fiction, rather than letting his stories come to life.6 1 would 
focus instead on the cultural move that Roth made here with his first significant piece 
of published criticism. The essay declared Roth a serious intellectual, taking on the 
biggest writers of the era, making judgments about the culture as a whole, deciding 
which writers profoundly engage with the times, and which do not. Following 
Goodbye, Columbus, with its probing view of American Jewish life, Roth was often 
discussed as part of a wave of Jewish-American writers who had come to prominence 
in the fifties. But this essay is titled “Writing American Fiction,” not “Writing Jewish- 
American Fiction.” Roth here takes a larger scope than might be expected of him, 
laying claim to the whole of American fiction, instead of just his small allotted 
cultural space. Also indicative o f his sensibility is the marked distaste shown for 
popular culture and its products. The reader gets the definite feeling that most of what
5 See McDaniel, The Fiction o f  Philip Roth, 3-8; and Rodgers, Jr., Philip Roth, 9-18.
6 See Norman Podhoretz, “The Gloom o f  Philip Roth,” Show 2 (1962): 92+. Reprinted in Doings and 
Undoings: The Fifties and After in American Writing (London: Rupert Hart-Davis, 1965), 236-43; 
Stanley Edgar Hyman, “A Novelist o f  Great Promise,” The New Leader, 11 June 1962, 22-23; and 
Scott Donaldson, “Philip Roth: The Meanings o f  Letting Go,” Contemporary Literature 11 (Winter 
1970): 21-35.
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“sickens” and “stupefies” Roth about the Grimes case is the popular media’s role in 
creating an event. The tabloid coverage, a song about the case on the radio, a 
newspaper’s fundraiser to help redecorate Mrs. Grimes’s house, all o f these seem to 
add to Roth’s dismay. As evidence of the increasing feeling of a descent into the 
absurd, he offers an example: “my wife turned on the radio and heard the announcer 
offering a series of cash prizes for the three best television plays of five minutes’ 
duration written by children. It is difficult at such moments to find one’s way around 
the kitchen” (“Writing” 169). At moments like this, the writer sounds more like 
Edmund Wilson (to whom Roth alludes in the next paragraph) than the man who 
would write the raucous, pop culture-steeped Portnoy’s Complaint. It is no surprise 
then, that he finds the novels that sit atop the best-seller list insufficiently ‘serious’ to 
provide “the literary investigation of our era” (“Writing” 170).
What emerges from Roth’s look at “Writing American Fiction” is a hierarchy 
of cultural seriousness. American reality, as it is filtered through mass culture, is, by 
Roth’s definition, deeply unserious. The problem in trying to “make credible much of 
American reality” is that American reality is something that Roth cannot take 
seriously. It is outlandish, vulgar, and often unbelievable, terms that, if used in a book 
review, would condemn a piece of serious literature. Wouk, Wilson, and best-selling 
novels in general fare no better; Roth spends little time on them, and ties them in with 
television and the “amor-vincit-omnia boys” of sentimental Broadway musicals 
(“Writing” 170). Bellow, Malamud, and Salinger are certainly much more serious, 
even if they seem to have withdrawn from engaging with contemporary American 
reality; Roth can forgive this, because “what is particularly tough about the times is 
writing about them, as a serious novelist or storyteller” (“Writing” 171). Ellison, 
brought up as he is in the essay’s final paragraph, has pride of place as the most 
serious of all, seemingly because Invisible Man's pessimistic final image o f a man 
bitterly retreating from America fits in well with Roth’s picture of American reality.
A similar hierarchy emerges in a 1961 piece, “Some New Jewish Stereotypes,” in 
which Roth looks at recent cultural representations of the Jew.7 Here it is Leon Uris, 
whose Exodus had recently been turned into a Hollywood movie, complete with a 
theme song sung by Pat Boone, and Harry Golden, whose nostalgic novels of the
7 “Some New Jewish Stereotypes” was given as a speech for a 1961 symposium on “The Needs and 
Images o f Man,” and later published in Roth’s non-fiction collection, Reading Myself and Others.
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Jewish Lower East Side had met with great commercial success, who come in for 
Roth’s derision. To provide a counterbalancing example of a serious Jewish novelist, 
Roth invokes Elie Wiesel, in whose Dawn Roth finds ambiguity, complexity, and 
legitimate tragedy.8 Again, that which is popular, accessible, and embraced by 
American pop culture is eschewed in favor of the highbrow, difficult, and complex.
Perhaps it is not surprising that Roth set himself up as an arbiter of seriousness 
in “Writing American Fiction” and “Some New Jewish Stereotypes.” The two are 
essentially works of literary criticism, and a literary critic is expected to make 
judgments. But it is clear that the nature of these judgments, the grounds for approval 
or disapproval, stems from a sensibility much more attuned to high culture than to 
mass culture. This particular aspect o f Roth’s sensibility is further revealed in a quite 
different piece, “Writing About Jews,” Roth’s response to the Jewish critics of 
Goodbye, Columbus, published in Commentary in December 1963. In laying out, and 
then picking apart, the case brought against him by rabbis, community leaders, and 
ordinary Jewish readers, Roth uses examples from the “World Literature Pantheon” to 
justify whatever offense Goodbye, Columbus had caused.9 One outraged reader wrote 
a letter to Roth concerning “Epstein,” a story in which the eponymous, middle-aged 
Jew cheats on his wife, with unfortunate results. The reader asked Roth why he 
thought adultery was a Jewish trait. Roth’s answer, in the essay, is by way of Tolstoy: 
“Anna Karenina commits adultery with Vronsky, with consequences more disastrous 
than those Epstein brings about. Who thinks to ask, ‘Is it a Russian trait?’”10 To the 
rabbis who would want Jewish writers’ novels to represent, as in sociological works, 
the full range of Jewish life, Roth invokes Flaubert: “Madame Bovary is hardly 
recognizable as a sociological study either, having at its center only a single, dreamy, 
provincial Frenchwoman.” Continuing on to respond to those readers who did not find 
in Goodbye, Columbus a “balanced portrayal” of Jews, Roth brings in some more 
distinguished authors: “Dear Fyodor Dostoevsky— [...] do you call Raskolnikov a 
balanced portrayal of students as we know them? [...] Dear Mark Twain— [...] Dear 
Vladimir Nabokov— .”n Although the essay is a brilliant defense of his work, it is 
defensive, and in his defensiveness Roth reaches for his high art credentials—Tolstoy,
8 Philip Roth, “Some New Jewish Stereotypes,” in Reading Myself and Others, 184-6, 191-2.
9 Roth, “On The Great American Novel,” 70.
10 Roth, “Writing About Jews,” 196.
" Ibid., 199.
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Flaubert, and Dostoevsky. One wonders how the reader who wrote to the New Yorker, 
insisting that “cliches like ‘this being art’ will not be acceptable” would respond to 
Roth’s justification for his writing.12
In 1973, looking back on the controversy and his response, Roth regretted this 
defensiveness, and admitted that he was totally unprepared he was for such 
accusations:
I might turn out to be a bad artist, or no artist at all, but having 
declared myself for  art—the art of Tolstoy, James, Flaubert, and Mann, 
whose appeal was as much in their heroic literary integrity as in their 
work—I imagined I had sealed myself off from being a morally 
unacceptable person, in others’ eyes as well as my own.
The last thing I expected, having chosen this vocation— the 
vocation—was to be charged with heartlessness, vengeance, malice, 
and treachery.13
This formulation intimates the level of investment which Roth put in the idea of 
literary seriousness in his youth. Having cast his lot with the cause of literary 
integrity, artistic ambition, and intellectual scrutiny, he was “instinctively fanatical 
about seriousness.”14 And yet he found himself completely out of touch with this very 
vocal segment of his reading public. This could not have been too much of a surprise, 
for at least some part of this drive to be serious was prompted by a rejection of all that 
seemed to be unserious in America, and the fear that the philistines would soon be 
taking over.
Alienated in America, a stranger to its pleasures and preoccupations— 
that was how many young people like me saw their situation in the 
fifties. It was a perfectly honorable stance, I think, shaped by our
12 Adolph Levy to Philip Roth, 12 June 1959, “Readers’ reactions and reviews, 1959,” Box 101, Philip 
Roth Collection.
13 Roth, “On The Great American N ovel"  67-8. Instead o f  invoking his patron saints o f high 
seriousness, Roth wished that he “had mentioned the name o f Henny Youngman, a Jewish nightclub 
and vaudeville comic, whose wisecracks, delivered in an offhand whine while he played atrociously on 
the violin from the stage o f the Roxy, had impressed me beyond measure at the age o f ten.” “On The 
Great American Novel" 70.
14 Philip Roth, “Just a Lively Boy,” in An Unsentimental Education: Writers and Chicago, ed. Molly 
McQuade (Chicago, University o f Chicago Press, 1995), 127.
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literary aspirations and modernist enthusiasms, the high-minded of the 
second post-immigrant generation coming into conflict with the first 
great eruption of postwar media garbage.15
What Roth leaves unsaid here is an explanation of why the second post-immigrant 
generation was so high-minded. For this idea of seriousness cannot be taken as a 
culturally neutral term, especially when discussing an American Jew.
♦
The critic and editor Theodore Solotaroff met Philip Roth in the fall of 1957 
when they were both graduate students at the University of Chicago. In a seminar on 
Henry James, Solotaroff and the “handsome, well-groomed young man” who spoke in 
a “very precise and concrete way,” teamed up to argue against another student, who 
was expounding “one of those symbolic religious interpretations” of Daisy Miller .16 
The two met properly after the class and discovered that they had in common a Jewish 
upbringing in New Jersey, as well as similar ambitions of literary seriousness. They 
were both in the midst of a “journey from the halfway house of semi-acculturation 
[...] into the realm of literature and culture.” Solotaroff explains: “In our revolt 
against the exotic but intransigent materialism of our first-generation bourgeois 
parents, we were not in school to learn how to earn a living but to become civilized. 
Hence our shared interest in James.”17 The pull of Henry James, seen as a 
representative of serious, moral scrutiny of the highest (and lowest) of life’s concerns, 
was but one aspect of the atmosphere o f high-mindedness and difficulty that 
characterized graduate life in the late fifties for Solotaroff and Roth. Looking back on 
those times from the vantagepoint of 1969, Solotaroff claims:
It was a time when the deferred gratifications of graduate school and 
the climb to tenure and the problems of premature adjustment seemed 
the warranty o f ‘seriousness’ and ‘responsibility’: those solemn 
passwords of a generation that practiced a Freudian/Jamesian concern
15 Roth, “Interview with The Paris Review,” 136-7.
16 Theodore Solotaroff, “The Journey o f  Philip Roth,” The Atlantic Monthly, April 1969, 64.
16 Ibid., 65.
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about motives, pondered E.M. Forster’s ‘only connect,’ and subscribed 
to Lionel Trilling’s ‘moral realism’ and ‘tragic sense of life.’ In 
contrast to today, everyone came on as though he were thirty.18
The mention of Trilling, in addition to James, does not seem accidental, for, if James 
became a central talisman of seriousness and artistic integrity to second-generation 
American Jews like Solotaroff and Roth, he played an even larger role in the 
intellectual lives of such older Jewish intellectuals such as Trilling. In fact, without 
the work of Trilling, and other Jewish intellectuals in the forties and fifties, it is very 
likely that Roth and Solotaroff would not have had the option of taking a course on 
Henry James at all.
As detailed in chapter 1, the New York Intellectuals’ move from staunch 
socialists to ‘new liberals,’ as well as their analogous move from championing 
proletarian, naturalistic fiction to the exaltation of works of high modernism, was part 
of a broader liberal narrative amongst American intellectuals in the decades 
surrounding World War II. But it must be remembered that most o f these men (and, 
for the most part, they were men) were also Jews. And, as Jonathan Freedman 
demonstrates in The Temple o f  Culture, the alignment with difficult, serious, 
highbrow culture, and James in particular, performed powerful cultural work for these 
first- and second-generation American Jews in their quest to escape the provincial 
world of their immigrant upbringing and establish themselves as successful American 
intellectuals. The New York Intellectuals were merely the most visible representatives 
of a trend that manifested itself in a wide number of assimilating American Jews who 
felt “a persistent sense of inadequacy in the face of the cultures of the West and 
[made] an earnest attempt to slough off immigrant garb and beliefs in order to pass as 
‘real’ Americans.”19 The irony, of course, was that mainstream America was scarcely 
less suspicious of highbrow culture as it was of Jewish immigrants. Nonetheless, a life 
devoted to ‘the best that has been thought and said’ became “a kind of middle ground 
between a hostile and seemingly anti-Semitic American society and the suffocating 
family and neighborhood—a place where they could stake their own fates, make their 
own futures, outside the constraints both within and without the Jewish
18 Ibid., 67.
19 Freedman, The Temple o f Culture, 164.
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community.” For many of these Jewish intellectuals on the “assimilation-by-culture 
trail,” it was Henry James, whose books often exhibited a less than wholly positive 
view of Jews, who was to become the epitome of the literary seriousness that was to 
be exalted.21
In 1943, Philip Rahv, the Russian-bom Jewish critic and one of the founders 
of Partisan Review, wrote an essay, ‘‘Attitudes Toward Henry James,” that detailed 
the almost wholly negative contemporary reception of James. Rahv quoted from a 
wide variety of sources, including The College Book o f  American Literature, which 
stated, “It is not certain that Henry James really belongs to American literature, for he 
was critical of America and admired Europe.” Rahv argued forcefully for a renewed 
appreciation of “the depth and quality of [James’s] contradictions.”22 The essay was 
later published as part of Rahv’s collection, Image and Idea, in 1949. Eight years 
later, in the preface to that book’s second edition, Rahv felt compelled to note that the 
essay was written before the ‘James revival’: “I was quite as surprised as anyone else 
by the unexpected dimensions of the interest in him and by the collapse of the 
resistance to his appeal in some of the literary and academic circles characterized in 
[‘Attitudes Toward Henry James’].”23 This note, while communicating just how 
swiftly and broadly the ‘James revival’ took hold, leaves unsaid the integral part 
Rahv, and other Jewish intellectuals, played in resurrecting James to his exalted place 
in the canon, and to his stable place in college curricula. As Freedman points out, “the 
so-called James revival of the 1940s and 1950s was the first effort in American canon 
formation in which Jews participated on an equal footing with gentiles.”24 Rahv wrote 
a number of essays on James in Partisan Review in the late thirties and early forties, 
casting James as “a model who might stand both within and without a culture from 
which Rahv [felt] profoundly alienated.”25 Trilling wrote often, and influentially, on 
James; amongst the thirteen essays of Trilling’s landmark collection, The Liberal 
Imagination, James figures in nine of them. And Trilling’s only published novel, The 
Middle o f  the Journey, is a distinctly Jamesian work, in both spirit and tone. Leon
20 Ibid., 166-67.
21 Ibid., 8.
22 Philip Rahv, “Attitudes Toward Henry James,” in Image and Idea, 77, 83. Note again the tendency 
of the New York Intellectuals to seek out and uphold “contradictions,” paradox, and difficulty as key 
features o f a modernist aesthetic.
23 Rahv, Image and Idea, ix.
24 Freedman, The Temple o f Culture 12.
25 Ibid., 191.
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Edel, a Russian-born Jewish immigrant, became, in the 1940s, perhaps the leading 
James scholar, publishing a number of anthologies of James’s neglected works, 
writing a five-volume biography, and casting himself as the owner and protector of 
James’s legacy. Without the work of these men, it is unlikely that James would hold 
such appeal for younger Jews such as Roth and Solotaroff. James became an 
important touchstone for many Jewish intellectuals in the thirties and forties, and if 
their work on him helped to elevate him to the canonical status he continues to hold, it 
also validated their own still-tenuous positions in the American literary world.
What is missing from this very brief summation of the role Jewish 
intellectuals played in the revival o f Henry James, that representative of genteel, 
highbrow seriousness, is what Freedman calls the “unstable amalgam of affect” that 
was the necessary product o f such a role.27 Irving Howe has noted that the New York 
Intellectuals were nothing if not ambitious as critics, working under the implicit 
assumption that a critic should comment on as wide a range of culture as possible; this 
assumption seems to underlie Roth’s own wide-angle lens, so boldly exhibited in 
“Writing American Fiction.” Howe explained this ambition by saying that “behind 
this is a very profoundly Jewish impulse: namely, you’ve got to beat the goyim at 
their own game. So you have to dazzle them a little.”28 The idea put across here is that 
to succeed in the very gentile world of literary criticism, Jews had to work harder and 
attempt more, but also, I think, there is the implication that these Jews felt they had to 
be more goyish than the goyim, so to speak. This negotiation is a complicated one, 
defined by ambition and insecurity, attraction and repulsion. It brings to the surface a 
seemingly contradictory set o f relationships. The Jewish intellectual aligns himself 
with highbrow culture, at least partly as a way to demonstrate his full capabilities, to 
pull himself out of the role of the alien, as only Jewish. But this culture that is sought 
out, championed, and used as a foothold to some sort of assimilation, has itself played 
a large role in the construction o f the Jew as alien. Alfred Kazin, in reminiscing about 
his beginnings as a Jewish critic in New York in the late thirties, simultaneously notes 
the anti-Semitism he felt in the literary milieu and his “[falling] in love with 
American literature and the native Protestant tradition.” In a remarkable passage, he
26 Ibid., 199-200.
27 Ibid., 192.
28 Quoted in Bernard Rosenberg and Ernest Goldstein, Creators and Disturbers: Reminiscences by 
Jewish Intellectuals o f New York (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), 284.
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(perhaps unwittingly) yokes together his feelings of otherness with his attachment to 
Henry James:
As a young reviewer and writer, a freelancer in New York, I was 
invited everywhere. I had experiences which made me realize that I 
was regarded as a Jew. It had to do with a phenomenon Henry James 
touched upon in The American Scene. Coming back to New York, 
James noted the obvious ‘lowness’ of the people. It’s something you 
can observe everywhere in the city. I was being watched, and judged.
It struck me as being a question of manners.
This intimates something of the psychic toll that must have been the product of the 
alignment with serious, highbrow culture for many Jewish intellectuals. Kazin’s 
appreciation and analysis o f the serious writers of high culture was his ticket into the 
literary world. But it also served as a lens through which he was cast as an alien too 
“low” for that world. The emphasis on “manners” here is telling, for it indicates the 
importance of expression and decorum in the quest to be taken seriously. Early in his 
career at Columbia, Lionel Trilling faced a number of instances of anti-Semitism, at 
one point nearly losing his job because he was “a Jew, a Marxist, and a Freudian.” As 
Freedman details, Trilling’s response to such affronts was always a suppression of his 
anger, “a stiff upper lip, a gentlemanly reserve, an elegant silence.” “The best revenge 
for Trilling, it would seem, was to perform the equanimity that Jews, stereotyped as 
being passionate and overemotional, were accused of lacking.”30 This display of 
manners seemed to play a large role in Trilling’s demonstration of his own 
seriousness; indeed amongst all o f the Jewish intellectuals who made their name 
through an attachment to highbrow culture, Trilling showed the least signs of there 
being any contradiction in this move. But that does not mean that it was without its 
negative effects.
Trilling was perhaps the most successful of the Jewish intellectuals who came 
to prominence in the 1930s and 40s, and provided the most visible model for those
29 Ibid., 197.
30 Freedman, The Temple o f  Culture, 195.
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younger Jews, like Roth and Solotaroff, who had ambitions of seriousness. Solotaroff 
has written that Trilling:
functioned as a guide, for young Jews like myself, to the Anglo- 
American literary tradition and to the higher style of criticism. [...] 
Trilling could show you the way to Henry James; he came to seem like 
the best model for the academic I was becoming: a Jewish Matthew 
Arnold, full of graceful energy and high public concerns.31
For Trilling did put himself across as a twentieth-century Matthew Arnold, but 
without the ethnic adjective that Solotaroff applies. In forty years of critical writing, 
Trilling was perhaps the most prominent and committed exponent of the Amoldian 
vision of the value of high culture of any figure, Jewish or not, and seemed 
determined never to admit that his Jewishness played any role, for good or for bad, in
‘X'yhis professional endeavors. Although he never denied his Jewishness, he stated 
directly that:
I cannot discover anything in my professional intellectual life which I 
can significantly trace back to my Jewish birth and rearing. I do not 
think of myself as a ‘Jewish writer.’ I do not have it in mind to serve 
by my writing any Jewish purpose.34
This statement is borne out by Trilling’s writings, which never displayed a ‘Jewish 
perspective,’ never showed any apparent effects of the anti-Semitism he faced in
31 Quoted in Rosenberg and Goldstein, Creators and Disturbers, 409.
32 Of course, Trilling’s first book, derived from his PhD dissertation, was a study o f  Arnold; Trilling 
expressed admiration for “the depth o f [Amold’sl seriousness,” echoing Arnold himself, in his 
formulation in “The Study o f Poetry”: “The substance o f Chaucer’s poetry, his view o f things and his 
criticism o f life, has largeness, freedom, shrewdness, benignity; but it has not this high seriousness. 
Homer’s criticism o f life has it, Dante’s has it, Shakespeare’s has it” Arnold’s discriminating 
evaluation seems a model for the sort o f argument Roth mounts in “Writing American Fiction.” Lionel 
Trilling, Matthew Arnold (London: Allen & Unwin, 1949), 28; Matthew Arnold, “The Study o f  
Poetry,” in Essays in Criticism, Second Series (London: Macmillan, 1913), 33.
33 Many Jewish writers, however, saw an implicit denial in Trilling’s performed seriousness. Alfred 
Kazin, for example, has written that “I had from the very beginning written as a Jew; I never felt the 
way Lionel Trilling did. Trilling’s manner amused me.” Quoted in Rosenberg and Goldstein, Creators 
and Disturbers, 204.
34 “Under Forty: A Symposium on American Literature and the Younger Generation o f American 
Jews,” Contemporary Jewish Record, February 1944, 12. Quoted in Bloom, Prodigal Sons, 24.
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entering the literary world, and rarely allowed any cracks in his serious fa9ade to 
show at all.
In a recent essay, Adam Phillips concurs with Freedman’s view of Trilling’s 
performed seriousness, suggesting that it was prompted by his desire to avoid being a 
victim:
Being a Jew for Trilling meant not submitting to the myths of being a 
Jew, which meant not only not fighting the myths, which would be to 
acknowledge that one was already victimized by them, but also not 
accepting them to his own advantage, which would be to consent to 
them.35
But Phillips notes that, in private, Trilling expressed regret over his inability to 
surrender his seriousness, and tied his lifelong committment to literary seriousness to 
his perceived failure as a novelist Phillips calls attention to two journal entries, in 
which Trilling praises Hemingway for his “foolish postures” and his “self-revealing, 
arrogant” expression. Trilling felt:
How his life which he could expose without dignity and which is 
anarchic and ‘childish’ is a better life than anyone I know could live, 
and right for his job. And how far-far-far I am going from being a 
writer—and how less and less I have the material and the mind and the 
will.34
It seems that Trilling, whose career-long performance of seriousness in print may or 
may not have been prompted by a desire to not be seen as a Jewish other, and who 
admitted, late in life, that “I am always surprised when I hear myself referred to as a 
critic,” conceived of this attachment to seriousness as something like a neurosis which 
prevented him from fulfilling his abiding ambition to be a significant novelist.37 
“[Trilling] stages it in terms of an opposition: himself and the ‘good minds’ of his
35 Adam Phillips, “Lionel Trilling’s Concentrated Rush,” Raritan 21, no. 4 (Spring 2002): 168.
36 Ibid., 164.
37 Lionel Trilling, “Some Notes for an Autobiographical Lecture,” in The Last Decade: Essays and 
Reviews, 1965-75, ed. Diana Trilling (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), 227.
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university life versus himself as a potential novelist and Hemingway, who could
'l O
expose his life without dignity.”
A more explicit version of this narrative was voiced by Saul Bellow in a 1965 
interview. Speaking of his years in university, Bellow noted that “[i]t was made clear 
to me [...] that as a Jew and the son of Russian Jews I would probably never have the 
right feeling for Anglo-Saxon traditions, for English words.” This experience, Bellow 
implied, contributed to the shortcomings of his first two, “well made,” novels, 
Dangling Man and The Victim: “I still felt the incredible effrontery of announcing 
myself to the world (in part I mean the WASP world) as a writer and an artist. [...] I 
was afraid to let myself go.” It was only with the writing of The Adventures o f  Augie 
March, a breakthrough for Bellow in much the same way that Portnoy’s Complaint 
would be for Roth, that the former was able to escape the constraints of received 
notions of seriousness:
Why should [a writer] hobble himself with formalities? With a 
borrowed sensibility? With the desire to be ‘correct’? Why should I 
force myself to write like an Englishman or a contributor to The New 
Yorker? I soon saw that it was simply not in me to be a mandarin.39
Likewise, Roth has spoken of a confidence he discovered in the writing of Portnoy’s 
Complaint, something that carried over into his next three books, all something other 
than serious: “This confidence expressed itself partly in a greater willingness to be 
deliberately, programmatically perverse—subversive not merely of the ‘serious’ 
values of official literary culture [...] but subversive of my own considerable 
investment [...] in seriousness.”40 In these cases, overcoming the need to be serious, 
the need to “be ‘correct,’” is seen as the key to reaching full potential as a writer of 
fiction. Phillips claims that Trilling felt he could not “expose his life without dignity,” 
because a critic, “by definition, as it were, cannot be disreputable in his self­
38 Phillips, “Concentrated Rush,” 167. Ross Posnock also calls attention to the revelations within 
Trilling’s journal, contrasting Trilling’s suppressed desire to be un-serious with Roth’s successful 
“embrace o f irresponsibility.” In Posnock’s view, Roth “avoidfed] the solution o f elegant Anglophilia,” 
and instead “devised a more complicated strategy, one that preserved irreverence but connected it to his 
canonical American predecessors”: Melville, Whitman, Henry James, and Emerson. Posnock, Philip 
Roth's Rude Truth, 53-4.
39 Gordon L. Harper, “Saul Bellow,” in Writers at Work: The Paris Review Interviews, Third Series, 
ed. George Plimpton (New York: Viking Press, 1968), 182-3.
40 Roth, “On The Great American Novel," 75-6.
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presentation.” But Phillips concludes his essay by noting that “the option he and 
others did have, however, was psychoanalysis, in which one is invited, as a 
therapeutic measure, [...] to abrogate one’s ‘conscious effort for dignity’ in the service 
o f something putatively better.”41 It is surely telling that it was only when Roth 
utilized the freedom of a psychoanalytic monologue, in Portnoy’s Complaint, that he 
was able to “[free] himself of the voice that dominated Letting Go and When She Was 
Good, the measured voice of his ‘master,’ Henry James.”42
In an interview on the subject o f his time in Chicago, the period Solotaroff 
remembers as a time of shared ambitions of seriousness, Roth notes his awareness of 
the dangers of the “assimilation-by-culture trail.” “One had to be careful about the 
temptation to become a gentleman. So many bright Jewish boys of my 
generation—and background—gravitated to literature because it was a prestigious 
form of assimilation that didn’t look like assimilation.”43 Significantly, the way to 
avoid “becoming] a gentleman” was to affirm the elements that made the graduate 
school milieu so attractive to both Roth and Solotaroff, the clash o f seemingly unalike 
upbringings and interests, the collision o f provincial backgrounds and the wider 
world, the pleasures of “being the insider/outsider.” “We took a lot of pleasure in 
having humble origins and high-minded pursuits. Either without the other was boring 
and looked to us like an affectation.”44 Crucially, it was Roth’s ability to unite 
seemingly incongruent elements—the “assimilation-by-culture trail” and wild, 
irreverent, sixties-style comedy—that would lead to the success of Portnoy's 
Complaint.
*
Letting Go and When She Was Good, the two novels Roth published in 
between Goodbye, Columbus and Portnoy s Complaint, are works that noticeably 
play out under the shadow of James. Letting Go (1962), a very long, sombre, pain- 
filled novel, begins with a mention of The Portrait o f  a Lady, and Roth’s novel seems 
to be patterned after James’s fiction, which Gabe Wallach, the protagonist of Letting
41 Phillips, “Concentrated Rush,” 165, 174.
42 Shostak, Countertexts, Counterlives, 83.
43 Roth, “Just a Lively Boy,” 128.
44 Ibid., 124, 128.
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Go, succinctly summarizes as concerned with “heroes and heroines tempting one 
another into a complex and often tragic fate.”45 The novel is set in the academic 
world, and that world comes across as dreary and difficult as Solotaroff claims it was 
for Roth and himself at the University of Chicago. It exhibits a very Jamesian concern 
with moral decisions and how those decisions affect others; Wallach’s central 
dilemma is how much or how little he should involve himself in the lives of those 
around him, and it is unclear, at the novel’s end, whether he has figured this out or 
not. When She Was Good (1967) begins with this line, describing Willard Carroll, and 
echoing Solotaroff* s explanation o f the attraction of Henry James: “Not to be rich, not 
to be famous, not to be mighty, not even to be happy, but to be civilized—that was the 
dream o f his life.”46 The novel’s protagonist, Lucy Nelson, Willard’s granddaughter, 
has ambitions that go further than her grandfather’s: she pursues, with tragic 
consequences, something like moral perfection in a world that constantly thwarts her 
dreams. Set in Wisconsin, without any Jews, and without any o f the vibrant, comic, 
Jewish speech Roth made his name with in Goodbye, Columbus, it is as dreary and 
earnest as Letting Go. The characters’ desperate pursuit of civilization and justice, and 
their mid-western milieu, dictates a prose style that has no place for levity or colourful 
language. Both Letting Go and When She Was Good have moments of real power, but 
they are by no means easy books to like, with their unremitting tone of gloom. The 
two books are often seen as footnotes in Roth’s long career. From the present vantage 
point, they seem idiosyncratic amongst Roth’s other works—two somber, dreary, 
melodramatic novels set mostly in the mid-west. Although 1 do not want to spend 
much time on these books, it is important to emphasize that they are, if nothing else, 
serious books, in the sense that they demonstrate Roth’s continued allegiance to a 
difficult, complex, morally earnest art, and in the sense that they are distinctly non-
• 4 7  , ,comic. In 1967, perhaps not everyone liked Philip Roth’s books, but there was no 
question that he was a serious writer, with deeply intellectual concerns, who brought 
the highest scrutiny to the investigation o f those concerns.
45 Philip Roth, Letting Go (London: Corgi, 1972), 3.
46 Philip Roth, When She Was Good  (London: Corgi, 1979), 9.
47 For analysis o f these two novels, see Donaldson, “Philip Roth: The Meanings o f Letting Go ,” 21-35; 
Stanley Cooperman, “Philip Roth: ‘Old Jacob’s Eye’ With a Squint,” Twentieth Century Literature 19 
(July 1973): 203-16; James Atlas, “A Postwar Classic,” New Republic, 2 June 1982, 28-32; Sam B. 
Girgus, “Between Goodbye, Columbus and Portnoy: Becoming a Man and Writer in Roth’s Feminist 
‘Family Romance,”’ Studies in American Jewish Literature 8 (1989): 143-53; and I .aura Tanenbaum, 
“Reading Roth’s Sixties,” Studies in American Jewish Literature 23 (2004): 41-54.
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*In the summer of 1967, just one month after the publication of When She Was 
Goody Philip Roth, serious author, winner of the National Book Award, and 
distinguished contributor to such journals as Commentary, published a story in 
Partisan Review, the storied mainstay o f the New York Intellectuals. Entitled 
“Whacking Off,” it begins, in medeas res, with the following sentence:
Then came the years when half my waking life was spent locked 
behind the bathroom door, firing my wad down the toilet, or into the 
soiled clothes of the laundry hamper, or with a thick splat, up against 
the medicine chest mirror, before which I stood in my dropped drawers 
to see how it looked coming out.4*
Now this was certainly different. One o f four excerpts from Portnoy’s Complaint 
published in various magazines over the next year and a half, “Whacking O ff’ is a 
segment of the psychoanalytic monologue o f Alexander Portnoy, Jewish son of 
Newark, New Jersey, sex-obsessed chronic masturbator, guilt-filled bearer of his 
parents’ love and expectations, and the Assistant Commissioner of Human 
Opportunity for the City of New York. With each excerpt that was published, it 
became clearer and clearer that Portnoy's Complaint would be a marked departure 
from Roth’s earlier work. Filled with Portnoy’s graphic descriptions of his sexual 
exploits (both with women and on his own), written in the first-person, in prose 
equally informed by pop culture and Freud, and very, very funny, Roth’s fourth book 
was his big break—both in literary terms, as a break with the seriousness that had 
characterized his earlier writings, and in cultural terms, as the book that would make 
Roth a celebrity.
For, as each excerpt came out, the hype over Portnoy grew and grew. When 
the book was published in February 1969, it was already clear that it would not 
merely be a work of literature, it would be a cultural commodity, a pop artifact. 
Profiles of Roth appeared in major magazines and newspapers, each trumpeting the
48 Philip Roth, “Whacking Off,” Partisan Review 34 (Summer 1967): 385.
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book’s outrageous subject matter and sure commercial success. Most of these 
revealed that Roth had already made a million dollars from the book, and gushed 
about the royalty advances, paperback rights, movie rights, and book-club rights that 
now swirled around the author. In an interview six weeks before Portnoy's 
publication, Roth seemed resigned to the book’s fate. “‘The moment the book arrives 
on the scene it will be an event,’ he said, with a trace of resignation in his voice. ‘In a 
year or two it’ll be a book again.’” Random House, not minding that Portnoy was not 
yet a book, duly raised its price, from $5.95 to $6.95.49 The expectations were 
confirmed upon the book’s publication; it quickly climbed to the top of The New York 
Times best-seller list, and stayed there for fourteen consecutive weeks, until it was 
pushed to number two (where it stayed for some time), by Jacqueline Susann’s The 
Love Machine.™ By Roth’s own count, Portnoy sold 420,000 hardcover copies, more 
than seven times as many as his first three books’ combined hardcover sales.51 From 
January through May of 1969, there were no less than eleven pieces on Roth and 
Portnoy in The New York Times alone, including two reviews of the book, two 
parodies o f reviews of the book, two interviews with Roth, and a piece in which 
prominent Jewish mothers “wonder what Portnoy had to complain about.”52 All of 
this suggests that, aside from its break from the seriousness of prose style and subject 
matter that had characterized Roth’s earlier work, Portnoy was unserious in the role it 
played in the culture: a sensational, obscene best-seller, quite in tune with the ‘new 
sensibility’ that was apparently taking over America’s culture in the late sixties. 
Unsurprisingly, many reviewers saw Portnoy as part of the era’s apparent cultural 
conflicts: the ‘new sensibility’ versus tradition; blatant vulgarity versus decorum; and 
popular culture, with its commercial imperatives, versus serious literature.
J. Mitchell Morse, writing in The Hudson Review, derided Portnoy for its 
reliance on stereotypes—but also, one senses, for its commercial success. Portnoy is 
“the hottest brand name in the market. By now everybody knows about him, and I 
don’t find him worth discussing at length.” Roth is nothing but the “‘pimp of his
49 Henry Raymont, “To Philip Roth, Obscenity Isn’t a Dirty Word,” New York Times, 11 January 1969, 
20. See also Raymond A. Sokolov, “Alexander the Great,” Newsweek, 24 February 1969, 55-7; and 
Albert Goldman, “Wild Blue Shocker: Portnoy's Complaint,” Life, 7 February 1969, 56-65.
50 Susann put in another cameo appearance in the cultural event that Portnoy became when she 
appeared on Johnny Carson’s Tonight Show, saying that she would like to meet Roth, but wouldn’t 
want to shake his hand. Philip Roth, “Imagining Jews,” in Reading M yself and Others, 252-3.
51 Roth, “Imagining Jews,” 256.
52 Judy Klemesrud, “Some Mothers Wonder What Portnoy Had to Complain About,” New York Times,
31 March 1969,42.
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particularity,’ a professional Jew-boy [who] gets his kicks from catering to 
condescension.”53 An editorial in The New York Times, alluding to Portnoy, reminded 
its readers that:
the fact that the legally enforceable standards of public decency have 
been interpreted away by the courts almost to the point of no return 
does not absolve artists, producers or publishers from all responsibility 
or restraint in pandering to the lowest possible public taste in quest of 
the largest possible monetary reward.54
The same polarities were invoked by Portnoy's defenders, like Raymond A. Sokolov, 
who wrote in Newsweek that “Philip Roth at 35 is a serious writer of the first rank and 
no sales-hungry smut peddler.”55 Rather, bringing up Roth’s prior, serious, books, 
Sokolov claimed that with Portnoy, Roth had finally “let go” and found his voice.
Similarly, many commentators saw Roth and Portnoy as bearers of the new, as 
representative of the ‘new sensibility,’ as a product of the sixties’ apparent cultural 
shifts. Marya Mannes wrote that Portnoy’s sexual exploits were “one more noxious
instance of the writer-intellectual being ‘with it.’ [ ]A11 this comes under the heading
of the New Truth, the New Freedom, the end of hypocrisy, the nitty gritty, or 
whatever you want to call it.”56 Isa Kapp, in The New Leader, also saw Portnoy as a 
product of the age, and Roth as a leader of the new class. Roth’s novel “is here to tell 
us that the sexual revolution has triumphed, and to proclaim him leader of the Junta. 
[...] He reaps what our culture has sowed, and emerges in the limelight as the heir of 
his age.”57 And Sokolov called Portnoy “the most explosive example yet of the new 
permissiveness in language.” This “new permissiveness” is utilized in order “to probe
CO
at all of our half-stifled conflicts over an emerging ‘freer’ new morality.”
Furthermore, many critics, in casting Portnoy as a banner for the new 
sensibility, saw this ‘newness’ as against old ideas of literary seriousness. Anatole
53 J. Mitchell Morse, “Brand Names and Others,” The Hudson Review 22 (Summer 1969): 320.
54 “Beyond the (Garbage) Pale,” New York Times, 1 April 1969, 46. The editorial goes on to condemn 
“one current best-seller hailed as a ‘masterpiece,’ which, wallowing in a self-indulgent public 
psychoanalysis, drowns its literary merits in revolting sex excesses.”
5 Sokolov, “Alexander the Great,” 56.
56 Marya Mannes, “A Dissent from Marya Mannes,” The Saturday Review, 22 February 1969, 39.
57 Isa Kapp, “What Hath Philip Roth Wrought?”, The New Leader, 3 March 1969, 21.
58 Sokolov, “Alexander the Great,” 55, 56.
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Broyard claimed that Portnoy was part of a rebellion against “the old highbrow or 
‘orthodox’ Jewish novel of ideas,” like Bellow’s Herzog. This is a natural 
progression, though. “Like a statue in a public park, the Jew in literature is a prey to 
the climate. The climate now is sexy: Portnoy, then, is a sexual prodigy, a real 
(matzoh) ballsy guy.”59 Jay L. Halio saw the book as nothing more than “a tour de 
force , an inevitable and logical culmination of the fantasy life that Playboy magazine 
has so studiously fostered among us.” He contrasted this new, pop-informed fiction 
with the kind of writing that Iris Murdoch called for in a 1961 essay, with “a renewed 
sense of the difficulty and complexity of the moral life and the opacity of persons.”60 
In becoming a pied piper for the new, Roth, claimed Kapp, mentions the 
unmentionable “to liberate us not only from our sexual but also from our literary 
conventions.” He does away with literature’s “obligation to see life whole,” and wants 
us to throw away the “pieties” o f “manliness, discretion, and ethics.”61
*
In one interview upon the publication of Portnoy’s Complaint, George 
Plimpton asked Roth if the book was at all inspired by the stand-up comedy of Lenny 
Bruce. Roth, still, apparently, taking the high road, denied that Bruce was an 
influence, and instead declared that he was influenced by “a sit-down comic named 
Franz Kafka.”62 A few years previous, in the course of teaching Kafka, among other 
serious, gloomy masterpieces of European literature, he had begun to see the 
absurdity inherent in such books’ perpetual focus on guilt and persecution. He 
remembered hearing somewhere that Kafka used to giggle to himself while writing, 
and suddenly understood why :
Of course! It was all so funny , this morbid preoccupation with 
punishment and guilt. Hideous, but funny. Hadn’t I recently sat 
smirking through a performance of Othello? And not just because it 
was badly done either, but because something in that bad performance
59 Anatole Broyard, “A Sort o f Moby Dick,” The New Republic, 1 March 1969, 21.
60 Jay L. Halio, “Fantasy and Fiction,” Southern Review 7 (Spring 1971): 635-6, 639. Halio quotes 
from Iris Murdoch, “Against Dryness: A Polemical Sketch,” Encounter 16 (January 1961): 16-20.
61 Kapp, “What Hath Philip Roth Wrought?,” 21, 22.
62 Philip Roth, “On Portnoy s Complaint," in Reading Myself and Others, 18.
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revealed how dumb Othello is. Isn’t there something ludicrous about 
Anna Karenina throwing herself under that train? For what? What after 
all had she done?63
Sixteen years later, in a 1985 interview with Asher Z. Milbauer and Donald G. 
Watson, Roth explained the nature of the comedy of Zuckerman Bound:
What’s laughable in Zuckerman Bound is [Zuckerman’s] insatiable 
desire to be a serious man taken seriously by all the serious men like 
his father and his brother and Milton Appel. A stage direction that 
appears in The Prague Orgy could have been the trilogy’s title: Enter 
Zuckerman, a serious person. [...] His superseriousness is what the 
comedy’s about.64
Without making an equivalence between Anna Karenina and Zuckerman, I think 
Roth’s later, more explicit statement about his comic technique sheds light on his 
earlier remarks. For what is it about Othello, Anna Karenina, and Kafka’s heroes that 
Roth finds so funny, if not their seriousness? What is “ludicrous” about Tolstoy’s 
heroine is that she takes her predicament so very seriously. The comedy that lurks 
within man’s pretensions of seriousness, the absurdity of an unremitting focus on 
life’s difficulties and tragedies, the comedy that springs from a character’s explicit 
desire not to be comedic—this becomes an important aspect of Roth’s work, 
beginning with Portnoy's Complaint. For although the book is a comedic 
performance from the first page to the last, Portnoy wishes it wasn’t so funny: “I am 
the son in the Jewish joke—only it a in ’t no jo keT  {PC 36-7).
What the similarity in Roth’s two above explanations suggests, and what is 
often overlooked, is that much of the comedy in Portnoy’s Complaint, like that of 
Zuckerman Bound, springs from the protagonist’s desperate desire to be taken 
seriously. David Brauner has pointed this out, connecting it with Roth’s stated 
intention to move away from his earlier over-seriousness:
63 Ibid., 19. In Roth’s archive, preceding one o f  the early drafts o f Portnoy's Complaint, there is this 
epigraph from Kafka’s “Metamorphosis”: “ ...ought he really to call for help? In spite o f his misery he 
could not suppress a smile at the very idea o f  it.” Philip Roth, “Portnoy’s Complaint. Pages, n.d.,” Box 
186, Philip Roth Collection.
64 Philip Roth, “Interview on Zuckerman,” in Reading Myself and Others, 159.
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Whereas Roth was taking himself too seriously, Portnoy’s complaint is 
that no one (least o f all himself) will take him seriously at all. Like 
Roth, Alex seeks relief, but in his case it is relieffrom  comedy, from 
the absurd indignities o f his life, and from the ‘Jewish joke’ in which 
he feels he is trapped.
Brauner is most concerned with the interaction between what he sees as the novel’s 
two impulses, “to treat psychoanalysis comically, and to treat comedy 
psychoanalytically.”65 But it is worth looking more closely at the ways in which Roth 
has Portnoy seek “relief from comedy.” Portnoy’s pursuit of seriousness is 
consistently mediated through various encounters with a wide array of cultural 
reference points, both serious and ‘not so serious,’ suggesting that Portnoy’s dilemma 
is informed by Roth’s own experiences in the role of the serious intellectual and 
writer. In addition, Portnoy’s desire to be taken seriously exhibits something o f the 
“unstable amalgam of affect” that often characterized the New York Intellectuals’ 
pursuit of seriousness, but rarely showed itself in Roth’s own performed seriousness 
through much of the 1960s. There is no evidence that Roth felt, like Kazin, any 
alienation in aligning himself with a culture which often cast the Jew as the other, or, 
like Trilling, a desire to defy the image of the Jew as victim by embracing 
seriousness. But in Portnoy’s anguished and hilarious self-analysis, the emotional 
causes, and costs, of the pursuit o f seriousness often become fodder for Roth’s 
comedy. It is perhaps not as immediately apparent, but Portnoy, like Zuckerman, 
enacts the comedy that is always the paradoxical product of the desire to be taken 
seriously in Roth’s late 1960s America.
♦
In an essay detailing the genesis of the ideas that became Portnoy's 
Complaint, Roth explains that one of the many inspirations for the Portnoy family 
was his childhood memories of the Jewish families who lived in his neighborhood
65 David Brauner, “Masturbation and its Discontents, or, Serious Relief: Freudian Comedy in Portnoy ’s 
Complaint,” Critical Review 40 (2000): 76.
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during his childhood, “whose squabbles over French-fried potatoes, synagogue 
attendance, and shiksas were, admittedly, of an Olympian magnitude and splendor.”66 
The rhetorical technique used here, comparing the quotidian arguments of a family in 
Newark to the battles between Greek gods, is one that Portnoy utilizes within Roth’s 
fiction. Peppered throughout Portnoy’s childhood reminiscences are literary 
references that serve to indicate something of his ambitions of seriousness, while 
demonstrating, by means of the comical distance between his family and their literary 
analogues, the mix of shame and pride he feels for his uncultured origins. In addition, 
these allusions are Portnoy’s way o f demonstrating, to his psychoanalyst, that he is 
can be very serious indeed. Although growing up in the Portnoy household was not a 
bookish experience (their library, apart from schoolbooks, consisted of three distinctly 
non-literary works), Portnoy transforms his mother’s continual tales of the dangers of 
transgression into a literary production, “each an addition to that famous series of hers 
entitled, You Know Me, I'll Try Anything Once” (PC 93). In a more nostalgic mood, 
Portnoy casts his parents as poets, with the remembrance o f his mother’s “a real fall 
sky” and his father’s “good winter piney air” making him remark that “I couldn’t be 
more thrilled if I were Wordsworth’s kid!” (PC 28-9). Most of the time, this yoking of 
literary references to his memories of his family’s day-to-day life is used to humorous 
effect, emphasizing the outsized emotions and general lack of decorum in the Portnoy 
household. At the age of five, having misbehaved in some way, little Alex hid under 
the bed to escape punishment. Recounting this story, Portnoy suddenly remembers 
that his mother began swinging a broom under the bed to force the little boy out, 
causing the patient to exclaim, “Why, shades of Gregor Samsa! Hello Alex, goodbye 
Franz!” (PC 121). The ensuing shouted reproaches from his parents change the scene 
into “some farce version of King Lear, with me in the role of Cordelia!” (PC 123).
And remembering the many nicknames he earned during his childhood for his unruly 
temper, Portnoy makes a Flaubertian confession: “‘Mr. Conniption-Fit’—c ’est moiT  
(PC 229).
Portnoy sprinkles these literary references throughout his monologue, often 
demonstrating how woefully his parents fail to measure up to the grandeur and dignity 
of high culture, but also, more simply, demonstrating Portnoy’s learning and
66 Philip Roth, “In Response to Those Who Have Asked Me: ‘How Did You Come to Write That Book, 
Anyway?,”’ in Reading M yself and Others, 35.
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aspirations to seriousness (as well as his eagerness to show off his learning).
Portnoy’s mother may take his misbehavior overly seriously, but Portnoy knows that 
Gregor Samsa, and Cordelia, had it a little harder. For such a hip, slangy, ‘with-it’ 
book, Portnoy’s Complaint contains more literary references and allusions than most, 
perhaps indicating Roth’s inability to completely abandon his own literary 
seriousness. In addition to Kafka, Shakespeare, and Flaubert, Portnoy, in the course of 
what is meant to be an uninhibited and unadorned outpouring to his analyst, alludes to 
Dickens, Tolstoy, Dostoevsky, Homer, Beckett, Keats, Dos Passos, and Yeats, not to 
mention Marx and Freud. His aspirations to high culture reveal themselves through 
his allusive speech. The seriousness that Portnoy hopes to attain is, at least in part, a 
literary one, and, I would argue, deeply tied to his relationship with his father.
Because his father has “no schooling, no language, no learning, curiosity without 
culture, [...]what he had to offer I didn’t want—and what I wanted he didn’t have to 
offer” (PC 26-7). His father’s lack o f learning offends Portnoy’s sensibilities just as 
much as his lack of manners, and the two are tied together in Portnoy’s mind. He is 
stirred to anger whenever his father “ate from the serving bowl with his own fork, or 
sucked the soup from his spoon instead of politely waiting for it to cool,” but also 
when he “attempted, God forbid, to express an opinion on any subject whatsoever” 
(PC 41). This tying together of manners and decorum with intellectual prowess seems 
part of the New York Intellectuals’ version of Jamesian seriousness, a concept that 
springs from an idea of culture as a civilizing force. Portnoy, as much as Neil 
Klugman, pursues a version o f this seriousness, prompted in part by his shame over 
his father’s lack of both culture and manners. In a doubling back typical of Portnoy’s 
confusion, he exclaims, “If only I could have nourished myself upon the depths of his 
vulgarity, instead of that too becoming a source of shame” (PC 50).
His father’s vulgarity does become a source of shame, but also a source of 
sadness and sympathy. Just as his comparisons of his family to immortal literary 
characters simultaneously satirize their smallness and elevate them to something like 
grandeur, so Portnoy derides his father’s lack of learning and manners while 
expressing a deep-seated desire to pull him up to the heights of civilized culture. He 
remarks that, even at age thirty-three, there are still times when “upon reading in 
some book a passage that impresses me with its logic or its wisdom, instantly, 
involuntarily, I think, ‘If only he could read this. Yes! Read, and understand— !’” (PC 
9). Intriguingly, and perhaps indicative of the sort of seriousness Portnoy aspires to, in
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college he ordered an anonymous gift subscription of Partisan Review for his father. 
Partisan Review, the flagship journal of the New York Intellectuals, and the badge of 
honor for young American Jews with ambitions of literary seriousness in the forties 
and fifties, would grant Jake Portnoy access to the wondrous world of high culture.
But when I came sullenly home at Christmastime to visit and 
condemn, the Partisan Review was nowhere to be found. Collier’s 
Hygeia, Look, but where was his Partisan Review? Thrown out 
unopened— I thought in my arrogance and heartbreak—discarded 
unread, considered junk-mail by this schmuck, this moron, this 
Philistine father of mine! {PC 9)
The mix of “arrogance and heartbreak” is typical of Portnoy’s attitude toward his 
father, feeling superior to him, then wishing it weren’t so. He calls his father a 
philistine, but he also makes an effort to turn him on to this wonderful intellectual 
journal that has intoxicated the young Portnoy. Jake Portnoy never becomes a reader 
of Partisan Review; Portnoy claims that the only subject “into which he can really 
sink his teeth [is] the New Jersey Turnpike” {PC 35). How different this father is from 
the ideal husband and father that Portnoy projects himself to become: “a man 
guaranteed to give them kiddies to rear and Kafka to read” {PC 153).
Of course, one of the primary motivations behind Portnoy’s initial bids for 
seriousness is his pursuit of shikses, the Christian girls of Irvington, the town just 
outside of Newark filled with goyish girls “so gorgeous, so healthy, so blond” {PC 
145). He is obsessed by ways through which he can get these girls to take him 
seriously, as he is sure ““they’ll laugh and laugh, howl and hoot [...]Who do you 
think they’re always giggling about as it is?” {PC 150-51). As it is, Portnoy is a Jew 
with an inescapable ‘Jewish nose’ forever marking him off (in his mind, at least) as an 
undesirable alien. He is forever imagining the reproaches of his pursuit: “That ain’t a 
nose, it’s a hose! Screw off, Jewboy!” {PC 150). Within the ten-page section that 
introduces his obsession, Portnoy’s desperate desire to be taken seriously by shikses is 
mediated through images and strategies taken from pop culture and high culture alike. 
He is heartened by the thought that the goyish actress Debbie Reynolds married the 
Jewish pop singer and movie actor Eddie Fisher, but also that Marilyn Monroe fell in
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love with serious playwright Arthur Miller {PC 152). Because both Eddie Fisher and 
Arthur Miller ‘got the girl,’ they can both serve as models for Portnoy in his quest.
To be sure, Portnoy’s primary cultural reference point for shikses is the pop 
culture of the forties and fifties. Whereas for his parents and grandparents, the 
beckoning myth of America was embodied in “a chicken in every pot” or “gold in the 
streets,” for Portnoy, the attraction is the shikse, first encountered in his “earliest 
movie memories [...] o f Ann Rutherford and Alice Faye” {PC 146). The shikses and 
their gentile families are “the people for whom Nat ‘King’ Cole sings,” “the children 
from the coloring books come to life,” and “the kids who are always asking for ‘the 
jalopy’ and getting into ‘jams’ and then out of them again in time for the final 
commercial” {PC 145-6). He imagines their fathers straight out of the movies’ stock 
images of respectable paternal masculinity, “with white hair and deep voices who 
never use double negatives” {PC 145). And any of their mothers could be a “Gold 
Star Mom” introduced on “Truth or Consequences,” “who in just two minutes is 
going to get a bottle of seltzer squirted at her snatch, followed by a brand-new 
refrigerator for her kitchen” {PC 143). This image, strikingly similar to that o f the 
mother of the Grimes sisters presented in “Writing American Fiction,” is as familiar 
and intoxicating to Portnoy as it was sickening and stupefying to Roth. Portnoy, 
unlike the serious intellectual that Roth embodied through most of the sixties, is 
drawn to the world portrayed in American pop culture, and aspires to be a part of it, if
f\1only so that the shikses will take him seriously. But if it is through pop culture that 
Portnoy comes to know gentiles, it is also how he comes to know his difference from 
them. It is because “we ate our meals with that radio blaring away right through to the 
dessert” that Portnoy knows that he and his family are not “Americans just like they 
are” {PC 146). And so he dreams of being “‘Oogie Pringle’ who gets to sing beneath 
Jane Powell’s window in A Date with Judy,” or Jack Armstrong, hero of the radio 
show “Jack Armstrong, the All-American Boy” {PC 145-46).
But Portnoy also has another simultaneous strategy (no less doomed to fail) to 
attain this particular seriousness, much more in line with the sort of literary
67 That Portnoy’s attraction to pop culture represented a shift in Roth’s own sensibility is confirmed by 
Roth’s memories o f his friendship with the painter Philip Guston, begun just after Portnoy's 
publication. In a 1989 essay, Roth remembers that the two bonded over a shared interest in “crapola”: 
“billboards, garages, diners, burger joints, junk shops, auto body shops.” “Independently, impelled by 
very different dilemmas, each o f us had begun to consider crapola (...] a blunt aesthetic instrument 
providing access to a style o f representation free o f the complexity we were accustomed to valuing.” 
Philip Roth, “Pictures by Guston,” in Shop Talk (London: Vintage, 2002), 135.
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seriousness Roth seemed to be pursuing before he wrote Portnoy. This is a strategy of 
elevation, with an emphasis on language that belies the fact that unlike Zuckerman, 
Kepesh, and Tamopol, Portnoy is not a literary man. He invents an etymology for his 
name that will perhaps serve to hide his Jewishness. ‘“ Portnoy, yes, it’s an old French 
name, a corruption of porte noir, meaning black door or gate. Apparently in the 
Middle Ages in France the door to our family manor was painted . . . ’ et cetera and so 
forth” {PC 149). The pursuit o f gentile girls inspires Portnoy to something like poetic 
invention, as he wonders whether, at the skating rink, there is “a nosegay of shikses,” 
or, alliteratively, “a garland of gentile girls” {PC 144). “Maybe a pride of shikses is 
more like it—or is it a pride of shkotzimT’ {PC 145). The days spent gazing at these 
forbidden love-objects teach thirteen-year-old Alex the meaning of the words 
‘longing’ and ‘pang’ {PC 147). And it is very often the language that Portnoy 
imagines is spoken in the shikses’ houses that points up the difference between his 
social station and theirs. As the daughter o f a father “who never use[s] double 
negatives,” Portnoy imagines a shikse turning to him and saying, “And thank you ever 
so much for a wonderful wonderful evening” {PC 151). The pleasantness and 
modulation of this imagined gentile speech is contrasted with the wild and inventive 
(if less pleasant) language used in the Portnoy household, where “conversation [is] 
crossfire where you shoot and get shot at,” where people say, “ShahC and “I only 
hope your children will do the same to you someday!” {PC 221, 151). If only Portnoy 
could escape his undignified origins and be as respectable and eloquent as he 
imagines “Mr. Porte-Noir” to be, the shikses would take him seriously.
When Portnoy reaches maturity he realizes his adolescent dream of dating 
shikses; indeed, it seems he only dates non-Jewish girls. Within his monologue, he 
details his relationships with three o f these girls: “The Pumpkin,” Kay Campbell, 
whom he dates in college; “The Pilgrim,” Sarah Abbott Maulsby, a girlfriend in his 
early twenties; and “The Monkey,” Mary Jane Reed, whom he has just broken up 
with prior to his entering therapy. Looking at these relationships chronologically, it 
seems that Portnoy’s sense of inferiority in the face of these shikses’ seriousness 
(primarily exhibited through their language) rapidly develops into a sense of 
superiority, indicating both his eagerness to see himself as serious and his 
defensiveness over his ‘uncultured’ origins. As a fourteen year old, he agonized over 
the correct way of speaking to the ideal shikse he saw skating at Irvington Park: 
“Because I have to speak absolutely perfect English. Not a word of Jew in it” {PC
80
164). Nineteen years later, in therapy, reminiscing about his various relationships with 
shikses, he admits, “I’m always telling these girls how to talk right, me with my five- 
hundred-word New Jersey vocabulary” (PC  233).
Talking about Kay Campbell, whom Portnoy names “The Pumpkin,” “in 
commemoration of her pigmentation and the size of her can,” he describes his visit to 
her home in Iowa for Thanksgiving at the age of seventeen (PC 216). Utterly 
fascinated by the Campbells, in all of their gentile blandness, their perfectly dignified 
manners, he is even taken aback by the name of their street: Elm. “Elm! It is, you see, 
as though I have walked right through the orange celluloid station band of our old 
Zenith, directly into ‘One Man’s Family’” (PC 222). And indeed, the Campbells do 
act and speak as if they were characters in a cheery, likeable 1940s radio sitcom. It is 
the way they speak that Portnoy seizes on, their eternal politeness and equanimity.
The Campbells are the embodiment o f perfect gentile decorum—at least as Portnoy 
imagined it growing up watching movies and listening to the radio. Entering into a 
gentile home for the first time at age seventeen, confronted by his fantasy of Christian 
America, Portnoy is both attracted and made insecure by the Campbells. Their radio- 
ready speech brings to the surface Portnoy’s insecurity over his lack of culture, his 
status as a religious minority, even his class. Kay introduces Portnoy to her parents as 
a “weekend guest,” her “friend from school.” Portnoy is taken aback: “I am 
something called ‘a weekend guest’? I am something called ‘a friend from school’? 
What tongue is she speaking? I am ‘the bonding ‘the van/z,’ I am the insurance man’s 
son” (PC 220). The polite language reinforces Portnoy’s sense of difference, and he 
identifies himself through Yiddish, or through his lower-middle class origins, as 
someone who is not worthy o f such dignified descriptions. Even as he is a confident, 
headstrong seventeen year old with his parents, deriding them for their philistinism, 
rejecting their Judaism for “Dylan Thomas’ religion, Truth and Joy,” in the face of 
this gentile speech, the Campbell’s effortless dignity of expression, he is reduced to a 
caricature of the uncultured, uncivilized alien (PC 231). Whereas Alvy Singer, in 
Woody Allen’s Annie Hall, imagines himself as a Hasidic rabbi when confronted with 
the gentile decorum of the Halls’ dinner table, Portnoy casts himself as a different 
Jewish stereotype, that of the passionate, overemotional, unmannered Jewish 
immigrant just off the boaL In describing the impression that Kay’s modulation of 
speech and ability to keep her calm made on him, Portnoy incidentally provides a 
contrasting portrait of himself. She is: “unencumbered by the garbled syntax of the
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apocalypse or the ill-mannered vocabulary of desperation, without the perspiring 
upper lip, the constricted and air-hungry throat, the flush of loathing on the forehead” 
(PC 219).
Similarly, in describing the abundance of polite greetings dispensed within the 
Campbell household (“Good morning! Good morning! Good morning! Sung to a half 
a dozen different tunes!”), Portnoy portrays the communication in his own home as 
being almost devoid of all linguistic content (PC 221). He expresses amazement at the 
realization that “the English language is a form  o f  communication! [...] Words aren’t 
only bombs and bullets—no, they’re little gifts, containing meaningsT (PC 221-2). 
Although, as Brauner points out, the effect of Portnoy’s description of the Campbells’ 
radio-ready speech is “to highlight—comically—the conventionality, the banality of 
their language,” this effect is the product of Portnoy’s retrospective presentation of 
the scenes in the Campbell home.68 At the time, it is clear that Portnoy was impressed 
and attracted by the Campbells’ manners and decorum, and that his encounter with 
them inspires in him great insecurity and awareness of his status as unserious Jew.
The retrospective irony is an indication o f the sort of linguistic seriousness Portnoy 
has since attained (as evidenced by his treatment of The Pilgrim and The Monkey), 
but at the time could only desperately aspire to.
By the time Portnoy dates Sarah Abbott Maulsby, “The Pilgrim,” in his mid­
twenties, his confidence and sense of his own seriousness of purpose are much- 
improved. Flush from his success as a staff member of the House subcommittee 
investigating the TV quiz scandals, Portnoy no longer feels so much like a 
marginalised alien, the son o f Jake and Sophie Portnoy of Jewish Newark. Although 
Sarah, of “New Canaan, Foxcroft, and Vassar,” has all the credentials of WASP 
America, Portnoy now has some o f the self-assurance and superiority of a serious 
man with which he can criticize her way of speaking (PC 232). “Why didn’t I marry 
that girl?”, he asks himself, “Well, there was her cutesy-wootsy boarding school 
argot, for one. Couldn’t bear it. ‘B arf for vomit, ‘ticked o ff  for angry, ‘a howl’ for 
funny, ‘crackers’ for crazy, ‘teeny’ for tiny. Oh, and ‘divme’” (PC 233). Whereas, in 
the Campbell house, Portnoy reacted to their gentile speech with amazement and 
insecurity, with Sarah he is snide and superior. Upon hearing the nicknames Sarah 
gave to her college friends—“Poody and Pip and Pebble, Shrimp and Brute and
68 Brauner, “Masturbation and its Discontents,” 83.
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Tug”—Portnoy remarks that it was “as though she had gone to Vassar with Donald 
Duck’s nephews” {PC 233). No longer so intimidated by gentile speech, Portnoy has 
begun to judge the seriousness of others, a privilege not accessible to the immigrants’ 
children of his parents’ generation. And yet, there is still the bitterness and sense of 
inferiority that comes from Portnoy’s long-held view of himself as a Jewish other. 
The Pilgrim “could have been a Lindabury, don’t you see? A daughter of my father’s 
boss!” {PC 237). Still the insurance man’s son, Portnoy’s sense of superiority is 
fueled not only by his growing seriousness, but also by the lingering need to take 
revenge upon those by whom he and his family felt marginalised. Recounting his 
relationship with The Pilgrim, and his breaking of her heart, Portnoy remarks:
No, Sally Maulsby was just something nice a son once did for his dad. 
A little vengeance on Mr. Lindabury for all those nights and Sundays 
Jack Portnoy spent collecting down in the colored district. A little 
bonus extracted from Boston & Northeastern, for all those years of 
service, and exploitation. {PC 240-1)
And while Portnoy does extract this vengeance, does do what his father could not 
have done (“How could he oppress?— he was the oppressed. How could he wield 
power?—he was the powerless.”), it is clear that he is still driven by the insecurity 
that is the product of what he sees as his father’s inferiority {PC 40). He still sees The 
Pilgrim as a real American, with the uncontested birthright of the country’s spoils, 
and himself as “Not Quite Our Class, Dear, as they used to say on the Mayflower” 
{PC 8).
Continuing his development, when Portnoy, in his early thirties, dates Mary 
Jane Reed, “The Monkey,” he exhibits a superiority, an arrogance even, that is a far 
cry from the adolescent who dreamt o f shikses while believing that he was unworthy 
of them. He exhibits no insecurity in the face of this particular gentile. In this 
relationship, Portnoy is the serious one, and The Monkey is perpetually insecure 
about her status as the uneducated daughter of a West Virginia coal miner, and her 
suitability as a socially acceptable partner. Again, language plays an important role. 
Although Portnoy “forbade her ever again to say like, and man, and swinger, and 
crazy, and a groove,” she still doesn’t speak well enough to suit him {PC 155). He 
thinks of her speech as a series of ‘bits’ or routines, and when recounting their
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conversations, he often names her roles in a way that intimates his very low opinion 
of her: these include “Truck Driver,” “Dopey Southern,” and “Mortimer Snerd” (the 
‘country bumpkin’ ventriloquist’s dummy) {PC 193, 208). But more important even 
than the way she speaks is the way she writes. Stumbling upon a note that The 
Monkey has written to her cleaning lady, Portnoy is amazed and infuriated by her low 
level of literacy. Even her handwriting is unacceptable: “It looked like the work of an 
eight-year-old— it nearly drove me crazy! Nothing capitalized, nothing 
punctuated—only those oversized irregular letters of hers slanting downward along 
the page, then dribbling off.” Her spelling is no better. “A little word like ‘clean’ 
comes out three different ways on the same sheet of paper. You know, as in ‘Mr. 
Clean’?—two out of three times it begins with the letter k. K! As in ‘Joseph K’” {PC 
184). The Kafka reference points up just how far The Monkey is from the sort of 
girlfriend Portnoy, with his ambitions of seriousness, thinks he should have. As the 
Assistant Commissioner of Human Opportunity, Portnoy aspires to a dignity and 
public respectability that is perpetually undermined by his fears over The Monkey’s 
low origins. “On the night we are scheduled for dinner at Gracie Mansion— D! I! R! I 
mean, 1 just have to ask myself—what am I doing having an affair with a woman 
nearly thirty years of age who thinks you spell ‘dear’ with three letters!” {PC 184). 
The Monkey is a different species of shikse from the educated, well-mannered gentile 
girls Portnoy has been chasing and dating for all o f his life. But although he protests 
over The Monkey’s unsuitability, the relationship allows Portnoy to fulfill his dreams 
of seriousness, if only in comparison to this distinctly unserious woman. “This 
woman is ineducable and beyond reclamation. By contrast to hers, my childhood took 
place in Brahmin Boston” {PC 206).69
Portnoy’s relationship with The Monkey allows him to cast himself in the role 
of the serious Jew, and she is happy to help. She is eager to have someone to “pull her 
up from [the] abysses of frivolity and waste,” and he, of course, has always wanted to 
be seen as serious. The serious Jew has a sexual appetite, yes, but immediately after 
sex, he “begins talking and explaining things, making judgments left and right, 
advising her what books to read and how to vote, telling her how life should and
69 Ross Posnock argues that Portnoy punishes himself for his transgressions through his behavior with 
the Monkey: “He allows himself to enjoy her on the condition that he sternly sermonize, admonish, and 
educate, that he, in short, become his parents hocking their randy son.” In this reading, the Monkey 
becomes the id that Portnoy the superego must attempt to keep under control. Posnock, Philip Roth’s 
Rude Truth, 167.
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should not be lived” {PC 162). He has a commitment to learning, and understands 
both the dignity of suffering and the moral imperative of compassion. Portnoy 
projects The Monkey as dreaming of being the wife of “The Saintliest Commissioner 
of the City of New York [...Jseen here with his pipe and his thinning kinky Hebe hair, 
in all his messianic fervor and charm” {PC 163). It is when they fight, and The 
Monkey bitterly shouts at Portnoy, that the role he plays with her is spelled out. “‘The 
Great Humanitarian!’” “‘An intellectual! [...]An educated, spiritual person!’” “‘I 
thought you were supposed to be a superior person, you muff-diving, mother-fucking 
son of a bitch!’” {PC 134, 106). When he is not belittling her for her slangy speech 
and her lack of manners, he earnestly takes on the task of educating her, attempting to 
lift her up to his lofty heights. He gives her books to read, edifying books, as part of 
“Professor Portnoy’s ‘Humiliated Minorities, an Introduction’” {PC 209). Giving her 
Agee’s Let Us Now Praise Famous Men, Dos Passos’s U.S.A., and Du Bois’ The 
Souls o f  Black Folk, Portnoy plays the part of the arbiter and embodiment of 
seriousness, deciding which books she should read to attain the appropriate level of 
understanding.
The purpose? To save the stupid shikse-, to rid her of her race’s 
ignorance; to make this daughter of the heartless oppressor a student of 
suffering and oppression; to teach her to be compassionate, to bleed a 
little for the world’s sorrows. Get it now? The perfect couple: she puts 
the id back in Yid, I put the oy back in goy.” {PC 209)
But ultimately, The Monkey is just not serious enough for Portnoy. As he prefers to 
see himself (at age thirty-three), no amount of education can elevate this girl to the 
status of an appropriate partner. The teenager who embraced American pop culture as 
the means to the end that was a shikse, now disdains the commonness, the tawdriness, 
of that culture. “This is the kind of girl ordinarily seen hanging from the arm of a 
Mafioso or a movie star, not the 1950 valedictorian of Weequahic High! Not the 
editor of the Columbia Law Review! Not the high-minded civil-libertarian!” {PC 200- 
201). Having attained, by comparison to The Monkey, the seriousness that he has 
been desiring all his life, Portnoy finds that The Monkey is simply unsuitable. A 
comment directed to Dr Spielvogel makes this clear: “Doctor, I had never had
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anybody like her in my life, she was the fulfillment of my most lascivious adolescent 
dreams—but marry her, can she be serious?” {PC 106).
*
What 1 think emerges from Roth’s work between Goodbye, Columbus and 
Portnoy’s Complaint, is a very restricted conception of seriousness. A serious writer 
must be decorous, high-minded, dignified, and reserved. Highbrow literature is 
serious; pop culture, the mass media, and the comedic mode are no t Although 
Portnoy is not Roth, it is interesting to see that, in Portnoy’s Complaint, the limits of 
seriousness are widened to such an extent that they almost disappear. For Portnoy, it 
seems that anything that will take him out o f his parochial Jewishness will qualify as 
serious. The seriousness embodied by bland American culture, with its unquestioned 
confidence and polite manners, will do. The seriousness of highbrow literature, with 
its bestowal of learned superiority, will do. Even baseball and roadside diners, with 
their unquestioned American authenticity, will do. Anything that can help Portnoy 
overcome what he sees as a farce o f a household, impossible to be taken seriously by 
anyone, least of all by shikses, will serve his purpose in his desperate pursuit of some 
vague idea of seriousness. The fact that this idea of seriousness is so formless, so 
flexibly defined, only adds to Roth’s comedy. What we can see here, perhaps, is an 
example of Roth’s negotiation of inward and outward moves. To contemporary critics 
of Portnoy's Complaint, the book signalled a great move outward, a break from 
Roth’s earlier seriousness, a calculated departure from the affiliation with high culture 
associated with the New York Intellectuals towards the wild frontiers of the late 
sixties “new sensibility.” And indeed, as I discuss in Chapter Three, the New York 
Intellectuals, as represented in the pages of Commentary magazine, saw Portnoy in 
much the same way, with Irving Howe asking, “who can doubt that Portnoy’s cry 
from the heart—enough of Jewish guilt, enough of the burdens of history, enough of 
inhibition and repression, it is time to ‘let go’ and soar to the horizons of
70pleasure—speaks in some sense for Roth?” But in many ways, although Portnoy 
does show Roth seemingly breaking with his previously restrictive view of 
seriousness, Portnoy’s progress seems to mimic the cultural negotiations of Jews like
70 Irving Howe, “Philip Roth Reconsidered,” Commentary, December 1972, 75.
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the New York Intellectuals, who had their own “complaints” in their attempts to 
become Americanized figures on the cultural scene.
Louis Menand, in his review of American Pastoral, makes a similar point, but 
suggests that Portnoy's Complaint freed Roth to escape the polarity he introduced in 
“Writing American Fiction,” the banal bestsellers set in contemporary America or the 
serious books that spurn contemporary reality:
Roth didn’t think that Portnoy represented liberation. He thought that 
representing Portnoy represented liberation— liberation from what he 
regarded as the id-less stereotypes of Jewish characters in 
contemporary fiction, and from middlebrow notions of stylistic 
decorum. Roth didn’t think he was escaping from Newark. He thought 
he was escaping from Leon Uris.71
Although the nature of seriousness changes with the context—it depends, inexorably, 
on who is desired to be taken seriously by—whether it is Portnoy wanting the shikses 
to take him seriously, or Zuckerman, standing in for the young Roth, wanting the 
literary establishment to take him seriously, these pursuers of seriousness always 
embody the radical displacement Roth has claimed is at the center of his books: “I am 
not what I am— I am, if anything, what I am not!”72 This paradox—“I am what I am 
not”—reflects a typically two-faced strategy from Roth: looking outward to 
illuminate what is inside, and looking inward to reveal a culture. Portnoy’s desperate 
insistence that he is not who he is is the engine for much of the comedy of Portnoy’s 
Complaint. And perhaps the lesson Roth learned from the writing of Portnoy’s 
Complaint is that this sort o f comedy can be very serious indeed.
Louis Menand, “The Irony and the Ecstasy,” The New Yorker, 19 May 1997, 94.
72 Roth, “Interview with The Paris Review ,” 142.
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Chapter Three
After Portnoy I: Franz Kafka, Anne Frank, and Roth’s “Personal Culture”
In the Philip Roth Collection at the Library of Congress, amongst the notes for 
Roth’s 1973 essay-story “‘I Always Wanted You to Admire My Fasting’; or, Looking 
at Kafka,” there is a hand-written note page with the heading “Jewish Ghosts.” Listed 
there are six aspects of Kafka’s life that Roth would deal with in the piece, including 
“Last Year,” and “Had he lived.” Beneath a dividing line at the bottom of the list is 
written “Anne Frank.”1 There is no mention of Anne Frank in the published Kafka 
piece, but the presence of her name in the notes is telling. In the decade and a half that 
followed Portnoy’s Complaint, Franz Kafka and Anne Frank would become the two 
“Jewish Ghosts” who most haunted Roth’s writing, and would appear in perhaps the 
two most audacious pieces of writing Roth would publish in his entire career.
The first is “Looking at Kafka,” probably the most admired short story Roth 
would ever publish. It is not strictly a short story though—it is divided into two parts: 
the first an affectionate biographical sketch of Kafka’s last year, in which, almost 
unbelievably, the writer seemed on the cusp of happiness; and the second a fictional 
memoir in which a surviving Kafka emigrates to America only to become the Hebrew 
School teacher for one Philip Roth of Newark, New Jersey.
In The Ghost Writer (1979), it is Anne Frank who is imagined to have 
survived her ordeal and made it to America alive. The young writer Nathan 
Zuckerman, on a pilgrimage to his hero E. I. LonofT, imagines Amy Bellette, the 
mysteriously European girl who may or may not be in love with LonofT, to be Anne
1 Philip Roth, ‘““1 Always Wanted You to Admire My Fasting,” or Looking at Kafka' (essay/story), 
American Review and Lettre Internationale, 1973-1975, 1984,” Box 245, Philip Roth Collection.
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Frank, miraculously alive and living incognito. The brilliantly ambiguous narrative 
does not make clear to the reader that this is Zuckerman’s imagining until very late in 
the novel. Rather, we enter Zuckerman’s fiction and Anne Frank comes to life.
As the similar moves of bringing these two figures back to life within fiction 
may indicate, it is not strictly influence that will be investigated here. It cannot be said 
that any of Roth’s books are written in a Kafkan, or Frankian, style. Rather, Roth has 
brought Franz Kafka and Anne Frank into a relation with his work through quite 
conscious, even blatant, moves, inviting the reader (and the critic) to see the 
connection between Roth and these forebears. It is Roth who is in control here, 
importing two iconic Jewish writers and deciding upon their meaning within his own 
work. Consequently, this chapter aims to work towards an understanding of just what 
Kafka and Anne Frank do for Roth, or, rather, what he makes them do. By looking at 
the ways in which Roth uses these two figures, 1 hope to illuminate a significant, and 
interesting, apparent outward move in Roth’s career. Characteristically, it is often the 
case that the presence o f Franz Kafka and Anne Frank in Roth’s fiction tells us more 
about Roth himself than about those ostensible subjects.
♦
There is no question that the commercial and artistic success of Portnoy’s 
Complaint granted Roth a sort of freedom greater than any he had experienced before 
in his career. At the very least, the book made Roth a rich man—and although I do not 
want to suggest that he had tailored any of his earlier books for the demands o f a 
market—he must have felt the freedom which inevitably comes with a secure 
livelihood which does not depend on the sales of his next book. What’s more, the 
wide sales of Portnoy, quite above and beyond merely an intellectual class o f readers 
or a Jewish one, further freed Roth from any demands imposed upon him by a 
community’s mores. If he wanted to be, there was ample evidence that he was now a 
national writer, one whose books would receive attention on a national, and even 
international, scale, and there was more than a little commercial curiosity about what 
Portnoy's author would write next.
The three books that Roth wrote in the four years following Portnoy's 
publication can each be described as experimental. There was Our Gang (1971), a 
political satire o f Nixon and his administration, The Breast (1972), a fantastical tale of
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a man who is transformed into a breast, and The Great American Novel (1973), a 
wildly comic pastiche of tall tales and parodic storytelling about, of all things, 
baseball. Each of these books was like nothing Roth had written before, and, for the 
most part, they bear little resemblance to anything he has written since. These seemed 
to be the books of a writer who, once he had broken free of any bonds that may have 
confined him as a young writer, would do anything not to be jailed again. Roth has 
spoken of the creation of The Great American Novel as an escape from the rigid 
contraints he placed upon his writing, and Our Gang and The Breast seem to spring 
from a similar desire to be playful. “All sorts o f impulses that I might once have put 
down as excessive, frivolous, or exhibitionistic I allowed to surface and proceed to 
their destination.’ To many observers Roth, post-Portnoy, seemed, if not quite 
rudderless, unmoored from any consistent subject or direction for his work.3 After 
seemingly breaking free of his powerful allegiance to literary seriousness with 
Portnoy, where was he to turn now? Back to the Jewish Newark of his childhood? 
Back into the arms of Henry James and the New York Intellectuals? Or forward, to 
what?
These and other questions were raised, and urgently, by Irving Howe in a 
vicious reassessment of Roth’s work published in Commentary in 1972. “Philip Roth 
Reconsidered” is an excoriating, inflammatory piece, and when Roth had Zuckerman 
explode with rage at a similarly pointed essay by Milton Appel in The Anatomy 
Lesson, many readers saw the latter as Howe, thinly veiled.4 Howe was amongst those 
critics who had heaped praise upon Goodbye, Columbus in 1959, but now, in the light 
of Portnoy’s Complaint, Our Gang, and The Breast, saw Roth’s work to date as “in 
the grip of an imperious will prepared to wrench, twist, and claw at its materials in
2 Philip Roth, “After Eight Books,” in Reading M yself and Others, 96.
3 Thomas R. Edwards, reviewing The Great American Novel, noted that Roth “has lately seemed an 
author in search o f a subject,” whereas Marvin Mudrick merely stated that “Poor Roth has lost not only 
his bearings but his marbles.” For Sanford Pinsker, in the wake o f Portnoy, “it became increasingly 
difficult to find a congenial home for [Roth’s] sizable verbal talents.” Thomas R. Edwards, “The Great 
American Novel,” New York Times, 6 May 1973, sec. 7, p. 27; Marvin Mudrick, “Old Pros with News 
from Nowhere,” review o f The Great American Novel and others, Hudson Review, Vol. 26, No. 3 
(Autumn 1973): 547; Sanford Pinsker, The Comedy That “Hoits, ” 71.
4 Although there is no way o f knowing whether Zuckerman’s rage is a reflection o f Roth’s, it is 
interesting to find, amongst the correspondence in Roth’s archive, a friendly letter from Howe to Roth 
written less than a year before the Commentary piece. It hints at, at the very least, a casual friendship 
between the two (“Yes, let’s get together after your trip. By that time I will have, I hope, finished 
another story and will be in good spirits.”) that could only have increased the sting that Roth felt after 
reading Howe’s essay. Irving Howe to Philip Roth, 18 January 1972, “Howe, Irving; 1973-1975, 1986- 
1988,” Box 13, Philip Roth Collection.
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order to leave upon them the scar of its presence.”5 Much of the essay seems unduly 
harsh, full of resentment towards Roth’s success and the apparent counter-cultural 
import of Portnoy’s Complaint. But one of Howe’s points, although still quite 
ungenerous, is perhaps prophetic in its identification of Roth’s ‘th in  personal 
culture”:
When we speak o f a writer’s personal culture we have in mind the 
ways in which a tradition, if absorbed into his work, can both release 
and control his creative energies. A vital culture can yield a writer 
those details of manners, customs, and morals which give the illusion 
of reality to his work. More important, a vital culture talks back, so to 
say, within the writer’s work, holding in check his eccentricities, 
notions, and egocentrisms, providing a dialectic between what he has 
received and what he has willed.6
What Roth lacks, Howe claims, is a deeply felt and known tradition, Jewish or 
otherwise, to help him enrich and expand his own personal experience into something 
larger, something grander, something Howe was increasingly interested in thinking 
about.7 It is a severe assessment, but perhaps an understandable one at the time.
Roth’s two critical and commercial successes, Goodbye, Columbus and Portnoy ’s 
Complaint, each draw on, to a large extent, the Jewish milieu of Roth’s youth, the 
latter book seemingly almost to the point of exhausting the subject. Much of the 
critical reception of his other books, which draw on a variety of literary traditions and 
subjects, often claimed that Roth was misguided in pursuing these directions, or even 
out of his depth. None o f the three books that followed Portnoy s Complaint would do 
much to refute such criticism. Whereas the critical response was not wholly negative, 
Our Gang, The Breast, and The Great American Novel offered scant evidence as to 
where Roth’s career was headed. At the time, each seemed like an isolated 
experiment—and for the most part, they still appear as such today.
5 Howe, “Philip Roth Reconsidered,” 69.
6 Ibid., 73.
7 In 1969, Howe published A Treasury o f  Yiddish Poetry, and then in 1973 A Treasury o f  Yiddish 
Stories, anthologies that seemed to signal a reconciliation between the New York Intellectual and his 
own inherited “personal culture.”
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*Near the end of this period o f experimentation, though, in 1972, Roth travelled 
to Prague for the first time, and it is tempting to identify this trip as the catalyst for the 
direction that Roth’s career would next take, as he emerged from his experimental 
phase into a period in which he would write the books that would define the 
characteristic Rothian voice for years to come. It is as if, in the three books that 
followed Portnoy's Complaint—all, to some extent, moves outward— Roth was 
casting about to find an outward move that could suitably take him inward as well. He 
would soon find it. In many ways, My Life as a Man (published in 1974, but a book 
Roth had been working on from as early as 1968), The Professor o f  Desire, and the 
books that would eventually become Zuckerman Bound, still seem like the baseline 
Roth mode—realistic, comic, seemingly autobiographical novels of American men of 
a literary bent, with the faint echo (sometimes not so faint) of twentieth-century 
European history and culture ringing in the background. This echo, more often than 
not, seemed tied to the “Other Europe” Roth envisioned, of which Prague was the 
undisputed capital.
“It is Franz Kafka who was responsible for getting me to Prague to begin 
with.” So Roth explained in a short piece he published in the New York Times Book 
Review in 1976, “In Search o f Kafka and Other Answers.”8 The essay gives an 
account of that first trip to Prague, and begins by emphasizing the centrality of Kafka 
in Roth’s initial attraction to Prague. Roth spent nearly all of his visit “quite 
consciously trying to look at whatever Kafka might once have looked at, seeking out 
the places where he and his family lived, locating the streets and the sites that are 
mentioned in his letters and diaries, and in Max Brod’s biography.” In some respects 
Prague and Kafka were synonymous in Roth’s mind, and this instinctive identification 
of Prague with its most famous literary son would never quite be broken in Roth’s 
writing.
But Roth ended up finding more than just Kafka in Prague, as the essay goes 
on to disclose. The piece notes two other aspects of the city that would lead Roth to 
develop a deeper connection to Prague, each having an undeniable effect on his work
8 Philip Roth, “In Search o f Kafka and Other Answers,” New York Times Book Review, 15 February 
1976, 6.
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throughout the following fifteen years. The first is the inescapable imprint of the 
Holocaust on the Czech capital:
Never, in the lengthy visits 1 had made over the years to England, 
France and Italy, had I felt myself to be anything but an American 
passing through. But within the first few hours of walking in these 
streets between the river and the Old Town Square, I understood that a 
connection of sorts existed between myself and this place: here was 
one of those dense comers of Jewish Europe which Hitler had emptied 
of its Jews, a place which in earlier days must have been not too unlike 
those neighborhoods in Austro-Hungarian Lemberg and Czarist Kiev, 
where the two branches of my own family had lived before their 
emigration to America at the beginning of the century. Looking for 
Kafka’s landmarks, I had, to my surprise, come upon some landmarks 
that felt to me like my own.9
If the discovery of this first personal connection had to do with Roth’s identity as an 
American Jew, the second concerned Roth’s equally felt identity as an American 
writer. He met with the Czech publishers of his first two books to discuss with them 
the possibility of publishing Czech translations of Portnoy’s Complaint and Our 
Gang, only to find that neither book “was deemed suitable by the authorities for 
translation.”10 It was the differences between American cultural life, in which political 
controls hardly existed, and that o f Czechoslovakia, where every cultural product had 
to meet with the approval of “the authorities,” that deepened Roth’s interest in 
contemporary Prague.
Upon Roth’s return to the U.S., he immersed himself in the study of Czech 
culture. He read all the contemporary Czech writing that he could find in translation. 
He began attending Antonin Liehm’s classes on Czech history, literature, and film at 
CUNY Staten Island and befriended a number of Czech exiles. In the spring of the 
following year, 1973, he returned to Prague. It was the absurdly different 
consequences brought on by writing in Czechoslovakia, rather than America, that
9 Ibid.
10 Ibid.
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spurred on Roth’s interest. He explained to Liehm that his Nixon satire, Our Gang, 
was selling well, and “all that can happen to me is that I’ll get a little richer.” In 
Czechoslovakia, “writers that do the same thing can count on going to prison. And I 
have this need to understand why they do it.”11 Among the writers he befriended were 
Ivan Klima, Miroslav Holub, Ludvfk Vaculik, and Milan Kundera, the latter two 
becoming the first two authors published in Penguin’s “Writers from the Other 
Europe” series, of which Roth was the general editor. From 1975 until 1987, under 
Roth’s guidance, the series brought numerous writers from behind the Iron Curtain to 
the attention of Western readers. Roth’s initial trip to Prague, rather straightforwardly 
motivated by an earnest, literary love o f Kafka, had become the first of many annual 
visits, his focus shifting to the contemporary literary culture, under constant threat 
from the totalitarian government. “The purpose of my first visit to Prague had been to 
see where Franz Kafka had lived. I returned to Prague because I wanted to find out 
how the writers managed to live there now, working in conditions that were utterly
I ^
alien to my own writing experience.” He would return every spring until 1977, when 
he was denied an entry visa by the authorities.
The presence of Kafka and Prague in Roth’s work of the 1970s almost always 
reflects this combination of a deeply personal connection and a fascinated awareness 
of difference. The first aspect is bom out of a writer and teacher’s love of Kafka’s 
writings, as well as a Jew’s feeling o f ancestry. The second stems from a vivid sense 
of the crucial differences between writing in the West and writing in the East, and the 
difference between being bom a Jew in twentieth-century America or in twentieth- 
century Europe. In this way, what began as a rather straightforward literary 
appreciation of Franz Kafka becomes something more, and something more personal 
for Roth: the conscious use of a significant literary forebear to help define the 
particular writer Roth wants to be, or can not help but be. Throughout this era, Roth’s 
use of Kafka is a reaching outward, expanding his fictional worlds to include a very 
different writer’s experience. But although that difference is never forgotten nor 
denied, Kafka’s presence serves to illuminate Roth’s characters’ particular 
predicaments—predicaments that seem rooted in Roth’s own experience—while Roth
11 Antonin J. Liehm, ‘“ The Literature o f  the Other Europe’: A Bit o f Roth in Prague,” Du 740, “Philip 
Roth: Inventing America” (1998): 82.
12 Ibid., 6-7.
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keeps them firmly grounded in the experience of the American Jew in the late 
twentieth century.
*
In 1974, Roth would publish My Life as a Man, but in Roth’s archives, there 
are drafts dated as early as 1968, and Roth himself has said that he began working on 
it in 1964.13 It would eventually present the novelist Peter Tamopol’s anguished 
attempts to tell the story of his horrible marriage to a woman who essentially tricked 
him into their union. These attempts dictate the very structure of the book, which 
consists of two “Useful Fictions”— short stories written by Tamopol, fictionalizing 
his plight—and “My True Story,” Tamopol’s attempt to achieve some sort of 
catharsis through autobiography. In 1989, Roth’s memoir, The Facts, would reveal 
that the central event of this plot—the outrageous, incredible way in which the 
protagonist is taken in—had been the one incident from Roth’s own life that the 
writer had not needed to fictionalize, improve upon, or transform before including it 
in his fiction: Roth himself had been deceived into assenting to a short-lived, unhappy 
marriage as a young man in exactly the same manner. Margaret Martinson Roth’s 
deception “was a little gem o f treacherous invention, economical, lurid, obvious, 
degrading, deluded, almost comically simple, and best of all, magically effective. To 
reshape even its smallest facet would have been an aesthetic blunder.”14 The nearly 
endless pages of drafts for My Life as a Man currently residing in the Roth archive at 
the Library of Congress are a testimony to the difficulty Roth had finding a suitable 
fictional home for this obviously powerful and traumatic experience. In fact, the final, 
published version of My Life as a Man can be said to be more concerned with 
Tamopol’s desperate attempts to find the ‘correct’ way to tell the story of his 
marriage than with the marriage itself.15
Although Roth would, throughout his career, play games with known 
autobiographical events in his fiction, My Life as a Man is a particularly tempting 
book to look at autobiographically, because the events it mirrors from Roth’s life are
13 Roth, “Interview with The Paris Review," 137.
14 Philip Roth, The Facts (New York: Penguin, 1989), 107. Subsequent references will be noted 
parenthetically in the text
15 “No single interpretation,” Mark Shechner writes, “will explain the mess Tamopol is in, and nothing 
less than a symposium on the subject can begin to approach it.” Shechner, Up Society's 4ss, 55.
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so well documented.16 Just as Peter Tamopol would, Roth began teaching Kafka’s
works in the mid-sixties, in one of his courses at the University of Pennsylvania. In a
1969 interview, he notes, “When I look back now on the reading I assigned that year,
11I realize that the course might have been called ‘Studies in Guilt and Persecution.’” 
This period coincided with the stressful breakup of his marriage, and Roth has noted 
the effect the ordeal had upon his creative life; much like Tamopol, after Roth’s legal 
separation, “I was virtually unable to write for three or four years. From 1962 to 1967 
is the longest I’ve gone, since becoming a writer, without publishing a book. Alimony 
and recurrent court costs had bled me of every penny I could earn by teaching and 
writing.” He began to think o f himself as “a train that had been shunted onto the
I ftwrong track.” It was this period of personal anguish that led to a deeper 
understanding of Kafka’s fiction. Writing in 1976, he notes:
I began reading Kafka seriously in my early thirties at a time when I 
was enormously dismayed to find myself drifting away, rather than 
towards, what I had taken to be my goals as a writer and as a man— at 
a time, in other words, when I was unusually sensitized to Kafka’s 
tales of spiritual disorientation and obstructed energies.19
Struggling to find his way again through a difficult period in which the decision to 
marry the wrong person seemed to have deformed his very identity, Roth found that 
his predicament allowed him to understand Kafka in a way previously unavailable to 
him. “That those trying years provided me with a means of penetrating a great writer 
whose concerns had previously evaded me, makes me almost willing to be grateful 
for the obstruction and disorientation I had to experience to begin to get in touch with 
his fiction.”20 As Roth’s personal struggles would soon become the inspiration for his 
fiction, he soon discovered that Kafka could provide a corellative for his characters’ 
mystification at the hand life had dealt them.
Kafka is only mentioned a few times in My Life as a Man, but looking at those 
allusions, in addition to additional references in the drafts, can shed considerable light
16 As is The Ghost Writer, which I take up below.
17 Roth, “On Portnoy’s Complaint,” 19.
18 Roth, “Interview with The Paris Review,” 129.
19 Roth, “In Search o f Kafka and Other Answers,” 6.
20 Ibid.
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on Roth’s conception of Kafka in the years before he began visiting Prague. Peter 
TamopoFs marriage (like Roth’s) would last only a few years before he secured a 
legal separation, but the back-and-forth recriminations, both in the courtroom and out, 
would continue until Maureen, the demonized wife, dies in a car accident (just as 
Roth’s wife, Margaret Martinson Roth, did). Until her death, Tamopol, in turns 
enraged and unmanned, struggles to produce any fiction worth keeping. He earns his 
income (and hers) through teaching a couple of courses at Hofstra University. There 
is a very short passage in “My True Story,” in which he describes one seminar he 
gives, and its effect on him. The course, which includes The Trial, The Brothers 
Karamazov, Death in Venice, and Anna Karenina, “had an unusually powerful hold 
on me, and I taught the class with a zealousness and vehemence that left me limp at 
the end of my two hours.” At first he cannot understand why teaching this particular 
course should have such a strange power over him. It is only after some time that he 
realizes that the choice of works assigned “derived of course from the professor’s 
steadily expanding extracurricular interest in the subject of transgression and 
punishment.”21
In an earlier draft, dated 1969-1970, a version of this passage appears, in 
slightly different form, complete with an imagined course title:
Studies in Guilt and Persecution. Of Course. [...] He had not realized 
until this moment how, actually he was only giving them a high-class 
version of his domestic life: he had chosen each and every book for its 
relevance to his marriage! What a perspective on literature!22
In this version, it seems that Kafka plays a bigger role in the course than is intimated 
in the published book. Not just The Trial, but also “In the Penal Colony” and “The 
Metamorphosis” are on the syllabus, and it is through this last story that the 
protagonist, here called Abner Reingold (his wife is Lydia Cartwright), sees his fate. 
“‘As Abner Reingold awoke one morning from uneasy dreams he found himself 
transformed in his bed into Lydia Cartwright’s husband... What has happened to me,
21 Philip Roth, My Life as a Man (New York: Vintage, 1993), 235. Subsequent references will be noted 
parenthetically in the text.
Philip Roth, “Mv Life as a Man: Drafts; Early: Miscellaneous Pages and Notes, Set I; 1969-1970, 
n.d. (3 o f 4),” Box 144, Philip Roth Collection, 61.
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he thought. It was no dream.’” Kafka is used here as a correlative for Reingold’s 
ordeal. Tellingly, it is not just that Kafka illuminates his life; it is his life that 
illuminates his reading of Kafka. Reingold asks his students why Kafka writes that “it 
was no dream.” None of them can give a satisfactory answer, so Reingold answers 
himself:
“Because it wasn’t a dream! Because it isn’t a dream.” [...] How could 
anybody be expected to understand that it was no dream, that Kafka 
meant it, that Samsa was a cockroach, who had not the experience of 
living four years with Lydia?23
It is as if it is necessary to go through some horrible personal trauma before being 
able to understand and fully appreciate Kafka’s genius.
Roth’s own helplessness in the face of his ordeal seems to have survived in 
one of Tamopol’s central concerns in My Life as a Man. For at the center of his 
troubles is his utter disbelief that he has such troubles in the first place. Before his 
marriage, Peter Tamopol was a literary hotshot, a young man at ease with himself and 
his chosen vocation. After meeting and marrying Maureen, he is transformed into an 
impotent, neurotic, failed writer who cannot complete so much as a short story. That 
the struggle to accept the fact that he is who he has become—not who he thought he 
would become— is significant to the book is signalled strongly in the book’s final 
line, in which he despairs at “this me who is me being me and none other!” (MLM 
334). As early as 1968, this focus on the unreckoned consequences of life, and the 
inability to predict or control those consequences, was to be a part of the book:
It was comic really to think of the Will working and whittling away at 
one’s character, at Conscience giving orders, and Ambition laying 
down programs and manifestos, all the while Experience was silently 
making the man, causing one inevitably to become a creature of a 
somewhat different order than one’s desired, or imagined, self. Wasn’t 
that, in a way, the subject of Kafka’s Metamorphosis? Things never 
turn out as you expect, signed Franz Kafka. You become what you
23 Ibid., 61-62.
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become. You happen to yourself.24
It is certainly interesting to note that, throughout the many drafts of My Life as a Man, 
nearly every mention of Kafka (and there are quite a few) relates to this particular 
preoccupation of Roth’s—the inevitable and seemingly random ways in which “you 
happen to yourself.”
1972’s The Breast is, at first glance, a recognizably Kafkan fantasy— a man is 
transformed into a hundred and fifty-five pound breast—and Roth’s central concerns, 
and his use of Kafka, seem cut from the same cloth as those in My Life as a Man, 
which he was struggling with while writing The Breast. Naturally, turning into a 
breast is of a different order of catastrophe from entering into a disastrous marriage, 
but at heart, Kepesh is a man confronted with a reality, and truths about himself, that 
he is hard-pressed to accept and understand. So even though Kepesh suspects at one 
point that his predicament is the result o f having taught too much Kafka—“‘I have 
out-Kafkaed Kafka. He could only imagine a man turning into a cockroach. But look 
what I have done’”—on the whole his rather unusual situation becomes a stand-in for 
all o f the unusual transformations that life forces us to go through, often against our 
will.25 So while Tamopol cries out repeatedly, “HOW COULD SHE? TO ME!”, 
Kepesh screams, “WHAT DOES IT MEAN? HOW HAS IT COME TO PASS? AND 
WHY? IN THE ENTIRE HISTORY OF THE HUMAN RACE, WHY DAVID 
ALAN KEPESH?” In the end, all either man can do is accept what has happened to 
him. Kepesh rather sensibly explains that:
What had happened to me had happened to me and no one else because 
it could not happen to anyone else, and even if I did not know why that 
was so, it was so, and there must be reasons to make it so, whether I 
was ever to know them or not.
Tamopol, at least until Maureen dies, has no choice but to follow his psychoanalyst, 
Dr. Spielvogel’s, advice: “Tolerate it.” For both men, Kafka can serve merely
24 Philip Roth, “Mv Life as a Man: Drafts; Early: Copy A; 1968, Nov. 28 (2 o f 3),” Box 142, Philip 
Roth Collection, 360.
25 Philip Roth, The Breast (London: Vintage, 1995), 73.
26 Roth, My Life as a Man, 210; The Breast, 23.
27 Roth, The Breast, 28.
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illustrative, or even ironic, purposes, on the way to an understanding that what is 
happening is happening because it is happening.
*
Roth’s use of Kafka in these books largely reflects the former’s 
preoccupations with characters astonished and impotent in the face of the 
inescapability of their particular identities and fates. In ‘“ I Always Wanted You to 
Admire My Fasting’; or, Looking at Kafka,” Roth writes of two escapes for Kafka 
himself, one real and one imagined, with the latter an escape into the world of Roth’s 
childhood. The implicit collapsing of Kafka’s life and work (Roth sees a doomed 
obsession with entrapment and obstruction in both Kafka’s fiction and in his diaries 
and letters) is characteristic of the way in which Roth writes about Kafka here. The 
man and his work are one (of course, in the mid-1970s, the same could justifiably be 
said of Roth). Roth had been teaching some of Kafka’s works as a part of a broader 
course of European masterworks at the University of Pennsylvania since the late 
1960s. In 1971 he began teaching a course wholly devoted to Kafka, and explained to 
Antonin Liehm that “for years I told my students that The Trial or The Castle were 
written by an author who had really never traveled anywhere, never experienced 
anything, that everything took place inside him, in his imagination.” As might be 
expected, his first pilgrimage to Kafka’s Prague in 1972 had a great effect on his 
teaching. “After I got back I said to my students: Forget everything I told you. Kafka 
had no imagination whatsoever. He only had to go downstairs and out onto the street 
and describe what he saw.” That Roth at least partly understands Kafka’s fiction as a 
description of “what he saw” on the streets of Prague seems apt for a writer 
increasingly fascinated by the interaction between his own life and fiction, as the 
Zuckerman books would soon show. “Looking at Kafka” carries a dedication to the 
students of Roth’s Kafka class, and the first half of the piece, a biographical essay on 
the last year of Kafka’s life, 1924, “as sweet and hopeful a year as he may ever have
28 Liehm, ‘“The Literature o f the Other Europe,’” 82-83.
29 Theodore Weinberger sees a connection between Roth’s literary reading o f Kafka’s biography and 
the former’s own increasing interest in playing with his own autobiography in fiction: “Kafka’s life and 
work become a touchstone for Roth’s own admixture o f fact and fiction. [...] Roth is perpetually 
amazed by the fact that what he pointedly sets out to do is done to Kafka. The story o f one Franz Kafka 
and his literary reputation is quite Kafkaesque.” Theodore Weinberger, “Philip Roth, Franz Kafka, and 
Jewish Writing,” Literature and Theology 7 (1993): 250.
100
known as a man, and the year of his death,” reads like a university lecture, albeit an 
elegant, personal, and passionate lecture (“Kafka” 281).
The biographical section of the essay-story is prefaced by a page or so of 
Roth’s musings on Kafka, introducing two motifs that foreshadow the direction the 
piece will take in its second part. The first is a subtle attempt to tie Kafka to Roth 
himself. The very first sentence, with its use of the first person and a telling 
parenthetical comment, suggests that this will be a piece about both Kafka and Roth: 
“I am looking, as 1 write of Kafka, at the photograph taken of him at the age of forty 
(my age)” (“Kafka” 281). In addition, as part of a detailed description of Kafka’s 
features in the photograph, Roth notes that his nose “is long and weighted slightly at 
the tip—the nose of half the Jewish boys who were my friends in high school.” 
Already, the reader is drawn to the commonalities between the writer and his 
subject—their age, their Jewish physiognomy. But the very next sentence changes 
tack, emphasizing a major difference between the two. “Skulls chiseled like this one 
were shoveled by the thousands from the ovens; had he lived, his would have been 
among them, along with the skulls o f his three younger sisters” (“Kafka” 282). 
Whatever personal significance Roth finds in Kafka’s life for his own, the differences 
in their milieus cannot be denied. Although Kafka died almost a decade before 
Hitler’s rise to power, the Holocaust necessarily hangs over any imagining of a 
European Jew in the first half of the twentieth century, casting its shadow both 
backwards and forwards in history. Roth was bom in the safety of America, avoiding 
the fate of six million of his fellow Jews, and it is this crucial difference, and the 
consequent multiplication of differences that spring from it, that will be a significant 
element of Roth’s use of Kafka.30
The second motif introduced in this opening is the supposition of alternate 
fates that Kafka might have met “had he lived.” Perhaps, Roth suggests, Kafka might 
have escaped with his friend Max Brod to Palestine. “But Kafka escaping? It seems 
unlikely for one so fascinated by entrapment and careers that culminate in anguished 
death” (“Kafka” 282). Or maybe, like the hero of Amerika, Karl Rossmann, Kafka
30 Michael Rothberg argues that “it is less the Holocaust and its impact on American life that obsesses 
Roth than the unbrideable distance between the Holocaust and American life— and the inauthenticity o f  
most attempts to lessen that distance [...] [the Holocaust’s] singularity is precisely not American.” 
Rothberg, “Roth and the Holocaust,” 53. It is along the same lines that Roth reverses his fantasy of  
Kafka’s escape in The Plot Against America (2004) in which he imagines a world in which America 
did not escape the threat o f the Nazis.
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could have fled to America, and taken up a post at a university. This possibility seems 
no more likely, and even then, perhaps Kafka would have destroyed his manuscripts, 
as he famously bid Brod to do. Rather than the Kafka, he would have been “just a Jew 
lucky enough to have escaped with his life” (“Kafka” 283).
But an escape does become the subject of Roth’s version of Kafka’s last year, 
in which he finally makes a successful escape from the oppressive environments of 
his father’s house and Prague. He has found love in the arms of Dora Dymant, a 
nineteen-year-old Jewish girl with whom he moves in to two rooms in a Berlin 
suburb. Even though Dora’s father forbids her from marrying the tubercular, forty 
year old bachelor—as Irving Malin has pointed out, Kafka can never truly escape 
Prague because “he carries his family on his back and his illness in his lungs”— Roth 
is still fascinated by the prospect o f such a miraculous escape for a man in whose 
fiction escape is usually presented as a cruel joke.31 Roth writes, with some 
amazement, about this last year o f Kafka’s life, in which the latter, flush with the love 
of Dora, finally publishes a volume of his stories, begins to take an earnest interest in 
the study of Hebrew, and becomes a sort of father to his young companion. This 
metamorphosis, however brief (for he dies within a year), is perhaps as unlikely as 
Gregor Samsa’s is: “As Franz Kafka awoke one morning from uneasy dreams he 
found himself transformed in his bed into a father, a writer, and a Jew” (“Kafka”
289).
The idea of an escape and transformation for Kafka is taken even further in the 
second part of “Looking at Kafka,” this time through fiction. In this section, Roth 
takes Kafka and conjures him into the Newark of his childhood, an environment 
already familiar to the many readers of Goodbye, Columbus and Portnoy’s Complaint. 
It is 1942. Kafka has survived his illness, escaped the Nazis, and come to America; he 
is the fifty-nine year old Hebrew-school teacher of Philip Roth, age 9. It is a fantasy 
of influence, making literal the familiar metaphor of receiving lessons from the 
masters. It is perhaps the paradigmatic writer’s fantasy: ‘Imagine me, Kafka’s 
protege!’ The fact that Roth has Kafka as his Hebrew-school teacher suggests that it is 
a particularly Jewish influence, that Kafka has particularly influenced Roth as a 
Jewish writer. This idea, though, is quickly made ironic, as Roth and his classmates
31 Irving Malin, “Looking at Roth's Kafka; or Some Hints about Comedy,” Studies in Short Fiction 14 
(1977): 273.
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resent Dr. Kafka for making them “learn an ancient calligraphy at the very hour we 
should be out screaming our heads off on the ball field.” In addition, to the young 
Roth’s embarrassment (for he is essentially a very good boy), the other kids have 
taken up Philip’s nickname for their teacher, “Dr. Kishka.” And Philip delights his 
friends on their walk home “with an imitation of Kishka, his precise and finicky 
professional manner, his German accent, his cough, his gloom” (“Kafka” 291). Even 
as Roth conjures Kafka into the world o f his formative years, it is the impossibility of 
such an unproblematical appropriation, the contrast between the boys’ vivid American 
mischief-making and Dr. Kafka’s European sobriety, that comes across most clearly.
But if Kafka, as a Hebrew-school teacher, doesn’t quite become young 
Philip’s mentor, a variation on the fantasy is soon resurrected. As soon as Philip tells 
his parents that he has heard his teacher lives “in a room,” they decide to invite him 
over to dinner, and plans are hatched to fix him up with Philip’s Aunt Rhoda. “The 
massive machinery of matchmaking has been set in motion by my undiscourageable 
father, and the smooth engines o f my proud homemaking mother’s hospitality are 
already purring away” (“Kafka” 293). If Kafka marries Aunt Rhoda, he will almost 
certainly exert a great influence on Philip’s formative years. Young Philip Roth could 
be Kafka’s nephew! But, almost from the moment this idea is conceived, Roth pokes 
holes through the fantasy, deflating the dreamy idea of being related to Kafka with 
comic reminders of how alien Kafka is to the world of 1940s America. When Philip, 
after class, invites Kafka to dinner, “he replies, with a formal bow that turns me 
scarlet—who has seen a person do such a thing outside of a movie house?—he replies 
that he would be honored to be my family’s dinner guest” (“Kafka” 293). Then, to 
Philip’s shock, Kafka writes down the Roths’ address in his notebook, “and beneath 
it, some words in German” (“Kafka” 294). Aunt Rhoda, to her nine-year-old nephew, 
is a thoroughly modem woman, an “interior decorator” at a department store called 
the “Big Bear,” spending “hours in the bathroom every day applying powder and 
sweeping her stiffish hair up into a dramatic pile on her head.” And so, immediately 
after inviting Kafka to dinner, Philip wonders how he will warn his aunt “about his 
sour breath, his roomer’s pallor, his Old World ways, so at odds with her up-to- 
dateness” (“Kafka” 294). With echoes of “Eli, the Fanatic,” Kafka seems to represent 
all that these American Jews wished to leave behind.
In the end, it seems that the gaps between Roth’s world and Kafka’s cannot be 
bridged even by “the massive machinery of matchmaking.” The relationship between
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Dr. Kafka and Aunt Rhoda is short-lived, and ends predictably, with Kafka unable to 
fulfill his husbandly duties in a hotel room in Atlantic City. This fate allies Kafka 
with his heroes yet again, another individual doomed to be defeated by forces beyond 
his control. But beyond the typically Kafkan outcome, Roth has fun along the way 
with the juxtaposition of the frail and sensitive Prague writer and the Newark o f his 
childhood. This is a comedy o f absurd displacement, with Kafka starring as the fish 
out of water. There’s Kafka in the Roth home, the recipient of a “sales pitch” by 
Philip’s father on the subject o f “familial bliss.” He looks through photo albums, 
hears about the Roths’ extensive “family association,” sees the children demonstrate 
what good boys they are. “‘Alone,’ says my father, in conclusion, ‘alone, Dr. Kafka, 
is a stone.’ Dr. Kafka, setting the book gently down upon my mother’s gleaming 
coffee table, allows with a nod that this is so” (“Kafka” 295). When Kafka visits 
Rhoda at the “dry-goods” department of the Big Bear, Roth gives us a journal entry 
from the obsessive diarist:
“With the customers she is forthright and cheery, and so managerial 
about ‘taste’ that when I hear her explain to a chubby young bride why 
green and blue do not ‘go,’ I am myself ready to believe that Nature is 
in error and R. is correct.” (“Kafka” 297)
And the climactic weekend in Atlantic City occurs because “ever since he arrived on 
these shores Dr. Kafka has wanted to see the famous boardwalk and the horse that 
dives from the high board” (“Kafka” 299).
Here is yet another failed Kafkan escape attempt: Josef K. cannot avoid the 
tribunal, Samsa cannot undo his transformation, and Kafka cannot find love and 
happiness in New Jersey. As for Philip Roth becoming Kafka’s student or nephew, 
the outcome is similarly unsuccessful, but perhaps not disappointingly so. Roth is 
ineluctably the product of his own environment, a writer who often draws upon his 
deeply felt memories of and connections to the Jewish Newark of his upbringing, not 
the oppressive household of Kafka’s Prague. At the end of “Looking at Kafka,” Roth 
tells how he learns, years later, o f Dr. Kafka’s death. Philip’s mother sends him the 
obituary, for he has stayed on at college over the summer, unwilling to go home 
where fights with his father have become frequent and maddening. Philip cannot 
understand it, but he finds himself resenting his father for his love and affection; it is
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his independence that he so earnestly fights for. “Others are crushed by paternal 
criticism—I find myself oppressed by his high opinion of me! Can it possibly be true 
(and can I possibly admit) that I am coming to hate him for loving me so?” (“Kafka” 
301). The implicit comparison to Kafka’s crushingly critical and actively oppressive 
father is telling. That the worst family conflicts Philip has had to suffer through were 
the common arguments of an American adolescence speaks volumes as to the huge 
gulf that separates Roth’s world and Kafka’s. But Roth could no more escape his 
circumstances than Kafka could, and those circumstances would necessarily inform 
his writing, making him a very different sort of writer than Kafka.
*
Roth’s 1977 novel, The Professor o f  Desire, is the book in which Roth’s visits 
to Prague first make a deep imprint on his work. It tells the story of David Kepesh, the 
protagonist o f The Breast, before he is beset by his fantastical transformation. As 
Kepesh, a literature professor, sees it, his life has always been a battle between two 
divergent tendencies. The first is to be the good boy, to do what is respectable, sober, 
and sane. The second, of course, is to be the bad boy, to pursue his wildest fantasies 
of erotic desire, to fulfill his taste for adventure, to yield to the temptations of ‘moral 
delinquency,’ as his psychiatrist, Dr. Klinger calls it. He is seeing Dr. Klinger 
because, after his divorce from the beautiful adventuress Helen, he is impotent, 
depressed, and near-suicidal: “fastened to no one and to nothing, drifting, drifting, 
sometimes, frighteningly, sinking.” What’s more, he is characteristically unable to 
decide whether he is adrift because he has yielded too much to temptation, or because 
he has not yielded enough. For the book’s first half, then, this is a familiar tale for 
Roth: like Tamopol, Kepesh is a literary Jewish-American man who feels like a train 
“shunted onto the wrong track”; like Portnoy, Kepesh is unsure whether he is held 
back by his conscience, or whether he has no conscience at all. And whereas The 
Professor o f  Desire's focus on the unreckoned consequences of male desire sets it 
apart from the earlier books, there is a sense, in the first half, of Roth covering similar 
ground. These concerns are dispelled, however, with the arrival of Claire Ovington,
32 Philip Roth, The Professor o f  Desire (London: Vintage, 2000), 103. Subsequent references will be 
noted parenthetically in the text.
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Kepesh’s vitality-restoring new love, and the couple’s trip to Prague. The prospect of 
a satisfying, lasting relationship, and the opening up of the setting to include the 
world behind the Iron Curtain go a long way to making this a different, and in some 
ways more interesting, book than My Life as a Man. The Prague section allows Roth 
to investigate his long-held fascination with the difference between life in the West 
and life in the East, and offers yet another opportunity for Kafka to play an active role 
in the definition of a Roth hero.
Kepesh and Claire spend a few days in Prague as a stopover on the way to 
Bruges, where Kepesh is to give a paper on “Kafka’s preoccupations with spiritual 
starvation,” a telling subject given the way Roth often utilizes Kafka in his fiction 
(PD 165). The account of Kepesh’s trip to Prague echoes Roth’s account of his own 
first trip there in 1972. Shown around by a Czech professor of literature, they take the 
Kafka tour: his school, his father’s office, the house in which he wrote, the cemetery 
in which he is buried. When Kepesh and Claire visit Kafka’s grave, Roth executes a 
rhetorical move that recalls the passage in “Looking at Kafka,” in which Roth is 
looking at Kafka’s photo. Just as he does in the earlier work, here Roth moves swiftly 
from a personal connection, this time between Kepesh and Kafka, to an 
acknowledgment of massive historical difference:
The dark rectangular slabs beyond Kafka’s grave bear familiar Jewish 
names. I might be thumbing through my address book, or at the front 
desk looking over my mother’s shoulder at the roster of registered 
guests at the Hungarian Royale: Levy, Goldshmidt, Schneider, Hirsch. 
(PD 175)33
Kepesh places a pebble on the graves of Kafka and his friend Max Brod. “Then for 
the first time I notice the plaques affixed to the length of the cemetery wall, inscribed 
to the memory of Jewish citizens of Prague exterminated in Terezin, Auschwitz, 
Belsen, and Dachau. There are not pebbles enough to go around” (PD 176). As in 
“Looking at Kafka,” Roth presents a Kafka with whom he (or his protagonist) shares,
33 The importance o f this scene, and Kafka’s role for Kepesh, is prefigured very early in the book, 
when Kepesh, age 9, carries around an obscene letter from his first “tempter,” Herbie Bratasky.
Paranoid that he will be discovered with the disgusting letter, he predicts that, if caught, “Probably I 
will not be allowed to be buried within the cemetery walls with the other Jews” (PD  8). Yielding to 
temptation, it seems, is a surefire way to complete ostracization.
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at the very least, an undeniable Jewishness. This is the Jewishness of descent, not 
assent, having nothing to do with either religious practice or Jewish self- 
identification; rather it is Kafka’s physiognomy or the Jewish last names surrounding 
the writer’s grave that usher in feelings of kinship.34 But the distance between Roth 
and Kafka is just as immovable. The Holocaust must be acknowledged in any 
exploration of twentieth-century Jewishness, and the Nazis did not discriminate 
between those Jews who felt themselves to be Jewish and those who did not.
In addition to the specter of the Holocaust, the differences between 
contemporary Prague—to which both Roth and Kepesh are drawn to seek out 
Kafka—and the West become another contextual contrast to be investigated, and 
illuminated, by Roth’s use of Kafka. In The Professor o f  Desire, competing claims on 
Kafka’s resonance become a catalyst to explore Roth’s admitted fascination with the 
way his own experience wildly diverges from that of his Czech counterparts. The 
Czech professor who shows Kepesh and Claire around Prague was forced into 
retirement at age 39, when the Russian tanks invaded Prague, crushing the Prague 
Spring movement of 1968. Kepesh asks him how he survives, how he keeps his 
sanity, living on a tiny government pension, forbidden to publish anything under the 
totalitarian regime. He responds: ‘“ Kafka, of course.’”
“Yes, this is true; many of us survive almost solely on Kafka.
Including people in the street who have never read a word of his. They 
look at each other when something happens, and they say, ‘It’s Kafka.’ 
Meaning, ‘That’s the way it goes here now.’ Meaning, ‘What else did 
you expect?”’ {PD 169)
In Roth’s contemporary Prague, Kafka becomes synonymous with intellectual life 
behind the Iron Curtain, with Kafka’s forever-stymied protagonists the precursors to 
modem day K.s, faced with the obstructions and absurdities imposed by the Soviets. 
The Czech professor goes on to explain that, in the months after the Russian invasion, 
he was tireless in his resistance. He attended secret meetings, passed along petitions,
34 I take the descent/assent distinction from Michael Krausz, in his essay, “On Being Jewish,” in Jewish 
Identity, ed. David Theo Goldberg and Michael Krausz (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1993), 
264-78.
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wrote analyses and circulated them in samizdat—giving himself an ulcer, but failing, 
of course, to bring down the all-powerful government.
“What will I do when I stop bleeding? Return to playing K. to their 
Castle and their Court? This can all go on interminably, as Kafka and 
his readers so well know. Those pathetic, hopeful, striving K.’s of his, 
running madly up and down all those stairwells looking for their 
solution, feverishly traversing the city contemplating the new 
development that will lead to, of all things, their success.” (PD 170)
Fearing that a life of futile, Kafkan striving will lead to no less than physical 
disintegration, the professor now spends his days translating Moby Dick into Czech, a 
project that is perhaps equally futile, as there already exists a fine translation, and 
nothing the professor writes is allowed to be published anyway. Nonetheless, he 
continues on, drawn to the fierce ambition, and the rage, of Melville’s protagonist: 
“‘The appetite to set things right, to emerge at the top, to be declared a “champ”’”
(PD 170). It is this sustained appetite, in the face of an unbeatable adversary, that 
separates Ahab from Kafka’s disillusioned protagonists, and that, one suspects, 
attracts the professor to the translation.
Naturally, after talking to Kepesh about his personal connection to Kafka, the 
Czech professor asks Kepesh what drew him to the writer. It was not “political 
hopelessness,” Kepesh explains, but rather, “‘sexual despair, [...] vows of chastity 
that seem somehow to have been taken by me behind my back, and which I lived with 
against my will. Either I turned against my flesh, or it turned against me— I still don’t 
know how to put it’” (PD 171). Again, like Roth, and like Tamopol, here is a man 
who turns to Kafka when his life seems to have been “shunted onto the wrong track.” 
For Kepesh, Kafka’s stories furnish a correlative for his despair and disbelief at 
failing to reach what seems to be an ordinary, yet thoroughly unattainable, goal.
“What I started to say about Kafka, about reading Kafka, is that stories 
of obstructed, thwarted K.’s [sic] banging their heads against invisible 
walls, well, they suddenly had a disturbing new resonance for me. It 
was all a little less remote, suddenly, than the Kafka I’d read in 
college.” (PD 172)
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What is interesting is that, in addition to associating his sexual troubles with Kafka’s 
protagonists, he also takes the Czech professor’s experience with totalitarianism as an 
analogy for his predicament.
“I can only compare the body’s utter singlemindedness, its cold 
indifference and absolute contempt for the well-being of the spirit, to 
some unyielding, authoritarian regime. And you can petition it all you 
like, offer up the most heartfelt and dignified and logical sort of 
appeal—and get no response at all.” {PD 172)
We are certainly meant to take seriously Kepesh’s ordeal with impotence, the 
unmanning, mystifying battle against an unwilling body. Yes, it is understandable that 
Kepesh sees his body as an authoritarian regime. But juxtaposed, through their 
differing claims on Kafkan experience, with the Czech professor’s impoverished life 
under an actual authoritarian regime, Kepesh’s predicament pales a little by 
comparison. Kepesh himself can’t quite avoid slipping into a tummler’s patter in 
describing his difficulties to the Czech: ‘“ You think poor K. is clever—you should 
have heard me trying to outfox impotence’” {PD 172).
What I think we see coming into Roth’s work here is a complex, yet 
unapologetic, defense of his own concerns as a writer. Kepesh’s impotence may not 
compare in significance or misery to the suffering of the Czechs, but it is a subject for 
fictional representation nonetheless, and it is a subject that Roth is much more 
qualified to explore. By placing these two very personal readings of Kafka side by 
side, Roth seems to find room for both.35 In a 1984 interview, Roth spoke of 
American writers working in a society in which “everything goes and nothing 
matters,” whereas in Czech society, “nothing goes and everything matters.” 
Nonetheless, he did not envy the Czech writers their political oppression and weighty 
topics. Harking back to his perennial interest in seriousness, he contends:
35 Mark Shechner argues that Kafka “does dual service for Roth, standing as a metaphor for marital 
entrapment and sexual failure in some writing and elsewhere a metaphor for life under totalitarianism.” 
I would merely add that, in many places, Kafka’s presence works to both ends, simultaneously. 
Shechner, Up Society’s Ass, 63.
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To write a serious book that doesn’t signal its seriousness with the 
rhetorical cues or thematic gravity that’s traditionally associated with 
seriousness is a worthy undertaking too. To do justice to a spiritual 
predicament that is not blatantly shocking and monstrously horrible, 
that does not elicit universal compassion, or occur on a large historical 
stage, or on the grandest scale of twentieth-century suffering—well, 
that’s the lot that has fallen to those who write where everything goes 
and nothing matters.36
In this way, Kafka serves Roth’s purpose of investigating, and legitimizing, his own 
particular concerns as a Jewish writer, bom and bred in America, and living in a free 
society without oppressive political constraints. Whereas the claustrophobic 
atmosphere and personal paranoia of Kafka’s fictional world can easily be seen as a 
precursor to life under the totalitarianism of the twentieth century, Roth’s work in the 
1970s demonstrates that Kafka is perhaps equally evocative when used to illustrate 
smaller-scale—yet no less maddening—problems of powerlessness and bewilderment 
in the face of a personal reality.37
*
As Roth’s 1979 novella, The Ghost Writer, begins, Nathan Zuckerman, a 
serious and talented young Jewish writer, arrives at the isolated home of one of his 
literary idols, E. I. Lonoff, way up in the Berkshire mountains. Zuckerman has come 
to “submit myself for candidacy as nothing less than E. I. LonofTs spiritual son, to 
petition for his moral sponsorship and to win, if I could, the magical protection of his
36 Roth, “Interview with the Paris R eview ” 145.
371 cannot, for reasons o f space, discuss them fully here, but Kafka has made a number o f other 
appearances in Roth’s writing. In 1974, prompted by President Ford’s pardon o f Nixon, Roth wrote an 
essay for the Village Voice, comparing contemporary America to the world o f Kafka’s The Castle. 
Philip Roth, “Our Castle,” in Reading M yself and Others, 229-31. In The Professor o f  Desire, Kepesh 
dreams one night o f going to meet “Kafka’s whore,” a seeming parody o f his literary tourism o f Prague 
(PD 187-93). And in The Prague Orgy, the final installment in Zuckerman Bound, Zuckerman travels 
to Prague; Olga, the desperate Czech woman who tries to seduce the American author, asks him,
“‘Why are you in Prague? Are you looking for Kafka? The intellectuals all come here looking for 
Kafka. Kafka is dead. They should be looking for Olga.’” Philip Roth, The Prague Orgy, in Zuckerman 
Bound (London: Vintage, 1998), 529.
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advocacy and his love.” In the very first sentence of the book, Zuckerman compares 
himself to a Bildungsroman hero, and he rather self-consciously sees this visit as part 
of his literary education, the young apprentice seeking knowledge and wisdom at the 
foot of the master. But, as his ambition to be LonofFs “spiritual son” suggests, he is 
also looking for a more personal sort of father figure, as, in the book’s first chapter, he 
hints at a wounding dispute with his own father from which he is fleeing. But before 
he can tell the reader more about this quarrel, he is immediately distracted by the girl 
he sees sitting in the next room when LonofFs wife opens the door. She has a strange 
and enchanting beauty, with a head that seemed “conceived on a much grander and 
more ambitious scale than the torso,” and Zuckerman wonders “where 1 had seen that 
severe dark beauty before” (GW  17, 12). Is she LonofFs daughter? His 
gram/daughter? His concubine? All o f these thoughts pass through Zuckerman’s head 
before Lonoff introduces them. She is Amy Bellette, a former student of LonofFs, 
attempting to sort through LonofFs manuscripts to give them to the Harvard library.
After agreeing to stay over for the night in LonofFs study, Zuckerman finds 
he cannot sleep. His head is swimming from LonofFs praise for his literary potential, 
and from the presence of the mysterious and bewitching Amy. Upon hearing voices in 
the room above him, he stands up on the bed to be able to make out the words. Still 
not close enough to the ceiling to hear, he gets up on LonofFs desk, but finds he 
needs to get a few inches closer. Without making a sound, he inserts between his feet 
and the desk a volume of short stories by Henry James. In the room above,
Zuckerman can now make out the voices. It is Lonoff and Amy. She is crying, and 
begging him to leave his wife for her. She calls him Dad-da, he imitates Jimmy 
Durante for her—there is a history here that Zuckerman can only guess at. In the end, 
despite her best efforts, Lonoff shows the restraint that Zuckerman so admires in the 
great man’s writing, and refuses her. “Oh,” Zuckerman thinks, after getting down 
from the desk, “if only I could have imagined the scene I’d overheard! If only I could 
invent as presumptuously as real life! If one day I could just approach the originality 
and excitement of what actually goes on!” (GW  87). It is with Zuckemnan’s
38 Philip Roth, The Ghost Writer, in Zuckerman Bound, 7. Subsequent references will be noted 
parenthetically in the text. Lonoff, whom Zuckerman tells us is seen as “an out-of-step folklorist 
pathetically oblivious o f the major currents o f  literature and society,” whose “‘translated’ English” 
lends “a mildly ironic flavour to even the most commonplace expression,” certainly bears some 
resemblance to Bernard Malamud, as many have remarked (GW  8,10). Zuckerman tells us o f a LonofT 
short story collection entitled I t’s Your Funeral, which is a line taken from Malamud’s The Assistant. 
Bernard Malamud, The Assistant (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1959), 67.
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astonishment over what he has heard, and his desperate desire to prove himself as a 
writer of great fiction that the chapter ends.
The next chapter begins: “It was only a year earlier that Amy had told Lonoff 
her whole story” (GW  88). “Her whole story” is that she is Anne Frank, the famous 
diarist of the Second World War. She did not die at Belsen, as is commonly believed. 
Instead, in the chaos that followed the liberation of the camps, she made her way to 
England, and after writing to Lonoff, gained his sponsorship to come study at Athene, 
the small liberal arts college where he teaches. There she has lived for more than five 
years as Amy Bellette, keeping her secret from everyone, most torturously from her 
father, who, in the years since the war, has labored to keep her diary and her memory 
alive in the public imagination. It is only in 1955, after taking the bus to New York, 
and seeing the Broadway production of the play adapted from her diary, that she 
finally breaks down and tells Lonoff her secret. The whole of this, the third chapter of 
The Ghost Writer, is devoted to telling Anne’s story. It is only afterwards, in the next 
chapter, that we learn that this section is a figment of Zuckerman’s imagination, his 
attempt to “invent as presumptuously as real life,” spurred on by his own personal 
turmoil and the conversation he overheard. Amy Bellette is really Amy Bellette, and 
Anne Frank is dead.
*
To begin to understand why and how Zuckerman imagines Amy as Anne 
Frank, we must first look at the situation that Roth puts Zuckerman in at the 
beginning of The Ghost Writer. Nathan Zuckerman, full of earnest literary ambitions, 
has published a handful of short stories in prominent magazines, and, at twenty-three, 
has just completed his longest, most ambitious story to date. Entitled “Higher 
Education,” it retells an old family dispute, in which two of Zuckerman’s relatives 
fought over their mother’s inheritance money. As he has with each of his previous 
stories, he sends a manuscript to his father, expecting praise and admiration in return. 
Instead, his father expresses anger and surprise that Nathan would portray the family 
in such a bad light, engaging in a vicious, petty squabble. What’s more, there is also 
the matter of how gentiles will read the story. In the midst of their big argument, 
Nathan’s father tells him, “your story, as far as Gentiles are concerned, is about one
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thing and one thing only. [...] It is about kikes. Kikes and their love of money” (GW  
68).
In the ensuing weeks, while Zuckerman is staying at a writer’s colony, his 
father gives the story to Judge Leopold Wapter, one of Newark’s most esteemed and 
respected Jewish figures, to elicit his opinion. Judge Wapter sends a letter to 
Zuckerman, explaining that he understands that great artists throughout history have 
been persecuted by their communities for their idiosyncratic work. Nonetheless, he 
goes on, an artist does have “a responsibility to his fellow man,” and to “the cause of 
truth and justice.” With that in mind, the judge has enclosed with the letter a 
questionnaire—“serious and difficult questions to which Mrs Wapter and I would like 
you to give just one hour of your time.” Among the ten questions included are:
“If you had been living in Nazi Germany in the thirties, would you 
have written such a story? [...]
What in your character makes you associate so much of life’s ugliness 
with Jewish people? [...]
Can you honestly say that there is anything in your short story that 
would not warm the heart of a Julius Streicher or a Joseph Goebbels?” 
(GW  74-5)
As a postscript to the letter, Judge Wapter has added this seemingly benign remark:
“If you have not yet seen the Broadway production of The Diary o f  
Anne Franks I strongly advise that you do so. Mrs Wapter and I were 
in the audience on opening night; we wish that Nathan Zuckerman 
could have been with us to benefit from that unforgettable experience.” 
(GW  74)
Almost needless to say, Judge Wapter’s letter does nothing to bridge the gap between 
Nathan and his father, and Nathan is restlessly going over their fight, and their 
estrangement, in his mind in the hours before he overhears Lonoff and Amy in the 
room above him.
Speaking of the Zuckerman trilogy, of which The Ghost Writer is the first 
book, John Updike has stated that “Roth’s inventing what looks like a roman-a-clef
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but is not.”39 Zuckerman is Roth’s alter ego, and by placing him in situations from his 
own biography, as he does throughout the trilogy, Roth can alter and refine those 
situations for better fictional effect. Reading The Ghost Writer upon its publication in 
1979, most readers could be expected to be aware of the autobiographical source 
material of Zuckerman’s ordeal. The controversy that sprung up around the 
publication of the stories of Goodbye, Columbus, the angry letters that rolled in to 
Roth and the publications that first printed the stories, and the denouncing rabbis all 
contributed to the defining event o f Roth’s early career. Although Roth vigorously 
defended his work and motives in “Writing About Jews,” in subsequent interviews he 
let on just how surprised and taken aback he had been by the angry Jewish critics of 
his early work. He explained that he had “imagined fiction to be something like a 
religious calling, and literature a kind o f sacrament.” Having decided that he would be 
a serious artist in the vein of Tolstoy, James, and Flaubert, he didn’t imagine that his 
motives, and particularly his attitude towards Jews, would be called into question:
I had gravitated to the genre that constituted the most thoroughgoing 
investigation of conscience that I knew of—only to be told by more 
than a few Jews that I was a conscienceless young man holding 
attitudes uncomfortably close to those promulgated by the Nazis.40
It is this situation from his own biography that Roth takes as the starting point for The 
Ghost Writer. Nathan Zuckerman is a young American Jewish writer with serious 
literary ambitions who, upon writing a story about American Jews, finds, to his 
surprise, that some American Jewish readers are more sensitive about the subject than 
expected. But whereas, for Roth, criticism came from leaders of the Jewish 
community and ordinary readers, in the fictional version, Roth increases the force of 
the blow by putting the objections into the mouth of Zuckerman’s own father.
This sharpening and refining of Roth’s own experience for his fiction can also 
be seen in the role the Holocaust plays in Judge Wapter’s letter to Zuckerman. For, 
although scarcely mentioned in any of the angry letters and rabbi’s sermons, it was 
clear to Roth that it was the Holocaust which hung over the impassioned response
39 Quoted in Roth, “Interview on Zuckerman ” 150.
40 Roth, “On the Great American Novel," 68.
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from Jewish readers of his early stories. Roth has written that the attacks on his work 
seemed to “imply that the sufferings of the Jews throughout history, culminating in 
the murder of six million by the Nazis, have made certain criticisms of Jewish life 
insulting and trivial.”41 This position is concretized in Judge Wapter’s questionnaire 
for Nathan, with its questioning o f whether he would write such a story in Nazi
•  * 42 *Germany, and the insinuating mention of Streicher and Goebbels. It is further 
emphasized by the Judge’s recommendation that Zuckerman go see the Broadway 
adaptation of the diary of Anne Frank. By implication, the Judge is suggesting that, 
after seeing the play, Nathan will think twice before writing such things about Jews. 
Anne Frank, in her Broadway incarnation, is invoked here as a constant reminder of 
the need to be careful, not to give Gentiles any more reason to hate or persecute Jews. 
It is this suggestion that triggers Zuckerman’s imagining of Amy Bellette as Anne 
Frank, and his version of Anne competes with that proposed by Judge Wapter (and, it 
is implied, Zuckerman’s father) in the book’s central conflict. The battle dramatized 
in The Ghost Writer, a fictional version of the battle over Roth’s early work, centers 
on a difficult question: in the wake of the Holocaust, how do you write about Jews? 
That this battle rests on differing interpretations of Anne Frank is a reflection of just 
how central a figure she was in post-war American apprehension of the Holocaust. In 
a 1984 interview, Roth stated that, in his early career, “1 knew less about anti-Semitic 
repression from personal experience than I did about the repressions Jews practiced 
upon themselves, and upon one another, as a consequence of the history of anti- 
Semitism.”43 Anne Frank’s presence in The Ghost Writer, imaginary though it is, is 
Roth’s way of retrospectively offering up to his younger self the realities of the 
Holocaust, or at least concretizing the complicated history and issues that lay behind 
his detractors’ objections.
*
The Anne Frank chapter of The Ghost Writer, entitled “Femme Fatale,” is 
written in the third person, but filtered through Amy/Anne’s point of view. In a long
41 Roth, “Writing About Jews,” 193-4.
42 The judge also echoes Marie Syrkin, who famously characterized Portnoy's Complaint as being 
“straight out o f the Goebbels-Streicher script.” Marie Syrkin, “The Fun o f Self-Abuse,” Midstream , 
April 1969, 64-8.
43 Roth, “Interview with The Paris Review ,” 140.
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interview with The Paris Review, Roth has said that when he started writing the 
section,
I was somehow revering the material. I was taking a high elegiac tone 
in telling the story of Anne Frank surviving and coming to America. I 
didn’t know where I was going so I began by doing what you’re 
supposed to do when writing the life of a saint. It was the tone 
appropriate to hagiography.
It was only after struggling with the draft for some time that he realized that he was 
going about it all wrong. “The victim wasn’t herself going to talk about her plight in 
the voice of ‘The March of Time.’ She hadn’t in the Diary, so why should she in 
life?” It is telling that Roth also adds that “[i]n retrospect, my difficulties look 
somewhat bizarre, because just what Zuckerman was fighting against, I was in fact 
succumbing to—the officially authorized and most consoling legend.”44 Indeed, it is 
the fact that Zuckerman imagines Anne Frank as a fully, and particularly, human 
character, not as a saint out of Jewish history to be piously worshipped, that sets him 
apart from his critics in the ideological landscape of the book. Zuckerman’s Anne 
Frank is nothing like the saint that Roth describes writing about in his early drafts. 
She is fiercely independent, determined to succeed in life on her own merits, often 
angry with the world, and unafraid of sexual desire. Reinvented as Amy Bellette, she 
becomes an aspiring writer much like Zuckerman; when she finally rereads her diary 
once it is published, she reads it calmly and critically, as if it were just another piece 
of juvenilia. She has come to America because “after Belsen, she figured it might be 
best to put an ocean the size of the Atlantic between herself and what she needed to 
forget” (GIT 91). In Zuckerman’s imagining, Amy’s need to forget overpowers even 
her need to see her father again, and she is determined to live with her choice.
It is the Broadway play that finally triggers her breakdown; only then does it 
become horribly clear to her that she can never see her father again. After seeing the 
play, she takes a hotel room and calls Lonoff, weeping uncontrollably until he drives 
down to New York to see her. When he arrives, she tells him that “of course it 
happened. It had to happen. It’s what happens there. The women cried. Everyone
44 Ibid., 143-4.
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around me was in tears. Then, at the end, in a row behind me, a woman screamed,
‘Oh, no.’ That’s why I came running here” (GW  88). She realizes that it is too late 
now to be Anne Frank ever again; Anne Frank must be dead for the world to have her 
and her powerful story. She imagines an actor coming out onto the stage after each 
performance and announcing, “‘But she is really alive. You needn’t worry, she 
survived, she is twenty-six now, and doing very well’” (GW  89). Even if she could 
convince her father to keep her survival a secret, what if he were found out? She has 
become an icon, a symbol of the six million murdered, a figure invested with so much 
cultural weight that asserting her continued existence is unthinkable. Anne Frank will 
forever be the fifteen-year old girl whom the world knows from the remarkable diary 
she kept, and from the enormously successful play and movie adapted from that diary.
“They wept for me,” said Amy; “they pitied me; they prayed for me; 
they begged my forgiveness. I was the incarnation of the millions of 
unlived years robbed from the murdered Jews. It was too late to be 
alive now. I was a sain t” (GW  107-8)
Around the breakfast table on the morning after Zuckerman’s imaginative 
night are Zuckerman, Lonoff, his wife, and Amy. But initially, Zuckerman cannot 
keep from seeing Amy as he has imagined her, as Anne Frank. As he narrates the 
rather uneventful breakfast conversation, he keeps slipping into an unruly internal 
monologue, in which the fantasy is taken even further:
I kept seeing myself coming back to New Jersey and saying to my 
family, “I met a marvelous young woman while I was up in New 
England. I love her and she loves me. We are going to be married.” 
“Married? But so fast? Nathan, is she Jewish?” “Yes, she is.” “But 
who is she?” “Anne Frank.” (GW  112-13)
He imagines the look on his parents’ faces when they comprehend just who 
Zuckerman’s young love really is. He sees himself instantly forgiven for his literary 
sins. “Anne, says my father—the Anne? Oh, how /  have misunderstood my son. How 
mistaken we have beenH (GW  114). This suggests that Zuckerman’s imagining of
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Amy as Anne is part of a fantasy in which he proves to his father that he is a good 
Jewish boy after all.45
As Michael Rothberg convincingly argues, “Nathan’s absurd fantasy reveals 
how the Holocaust, far from evoking anxiety, as it did in the Jews of Woodenton [in 
“Eli, the Fanatic”], has come to fortify an acceptable Jewish identity.”46 Seen this 
way, the similarities between Zuckerman’s Anne and Zuckerman himself take on new 
resonance. In some ways, Zuckerman has imagined Anne Frank to be his double, a 
Jewish writer much like himself. Like Zuckerman, literature is more truly her religion 
than Judaism; whereas her sister Margot dreamt of becoming a midwife in Palestine, 
she read Goethe and Dickens and dreamt of growing up to be a writer. Both 
Zuckerman and Anne look to Lonoff as a surrogate father, one who will nurture their 
literary talents. And, late in the book, when Zuckerman acknowledges, finally, that 
Amy could no more be Anne Frank than he could be, he draws a parallel between her 
relationship with her father and his: “No, the loving father who must be relinquished 
for the sake of a child’s art was not hers; he was mine” (GW  120). While the fantasy 
is alive, it is implied that Anne’s similarities to Zuckerman will help him appease his 
father. His imagined Anne is the impossible ideal that would suit both Zuckerman’s 
and his father’s ideas of what a Jewish writer should be: at once an ambitious artist in 
thrall to the great books as well as a noble, suffering Jew whose very experience 
speaks of the gravity of twentieth century Jewish history. It is a mixture that would 
allow Nathan, if he could marry her, to be true to his vocation while still pleasing his 
parents, and it is an impossibility. For Amy is not Anne, and Nathan cannot be the 
writer his father wants him to be.
*
45 Many contemporary critics found fault with Roth’s use o f Anne Frank in The Ghost Writer, often 
seeing in Zuckerman’s desire to be vindicated through a marriage a cheap ploy to further shock Roth’s 
Jewish critics. Jack Beatty asked, “Is it worth bringing in the most famous symbol of the Holocaust just 
to add a clever touch, one, moreover, with a patently autobiographical reference? [...] Am I being a 
literary rabbi in saying that this use o f Anne Frank seems to me a lapse o f taste, a failure o f aesthetic 
judgment?” John Leonard accused Roth o f  using Anne Frank “as a sex object, as a wet dream, as a joke 
on his family. The chutzpa o f it, appropriating the Ophelia o f the death camps for his dark, libidinal 
purposes, his angry punch line.... He just can’t help himself.” For Joseph Epstein, this is evidence that 
Roth “wants to shock yet still be adored,” and the section “seems to call out for admiration— to want 
points for cuteness. See how clever I am, how imaginative!, it seems to say. Roth really ought to be 
better than this.” Jack Beatty, Review o f The Ghost Writer, The New Republic, 6 October 1979, 39; 
John Leonard, “Fathers and Ghosts,” New York Review o f  Books, 25 October 1979, 6; Joseph Epstein, 
“Too Much Even o f Kreplach,” Hudson Review 33 (1980): 100.
46 Rothberg, “Roth and the Holocaust,” 59.
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The Ghost Writer is set in 1956, whereas Roth’s own conflicts with his Jewish 
critics occurred in 1959. This is not autobiography, and a number of other facts have 
been changed to suit Roth’s fictional aims, but the change of date is not arbitrary. 
Frances Goodrich and Albert Hackett’s adaptation of The Diary o f  Anne Frank 
opened at the Cort Theatre on Broadway in October of 1955, and by setting the book 
in 1956, when the play was still running, Roth can incorporate it into his story. The 
Broadway adaptation of the Diary looms large in The Ghost Writer, both as the event 
that finally convinces Amy that she can never reclaim her original identity in 
Zuckerman’s fantasy, and as the prescriptive work of art that Judge Wapter, and by 
extension, Zuckerman’s father, recommends that Zuckerman partake o f to cure his 
unacceptable fictional approach to portraying Jews. The play opened to almost 
unanimously positive reviews, and a packed house every night. It went on to win the 
Critics’ Circle Award and the Pulitzer Prize. It is a result of the play’s success, and 
the Hollywood film adapted from the play that followed in 1959, that Anne Frank’s 
diary became perhaps the primary symbol of the Holocaust for Americans. But the 
adaptation of the diary into a play was specifically tailored for American audiences of 
the 1950s, and it is the nature of that tailoring, much discussed in recent years, that I 
would like to look at in relation to The Ghost Writer.
In 1950, Meyer Levin, a moderately successful Jewish-American novelist 
living in Paris, was given a copy of The Diary o f  a Young Girl in its French 
translation. As a war reporter in 1945, he had been one of the first to witness, and 
report back to the world, the horrific details of the concentration camps. After reading 
the Diary, he became convinced that it was a hugely significant book and could fully 
communicate the human side of the atrocity if made into a powerful play. He 
contacted Otto Frank, and volunteered to help him find an American publisher. In 
exchange, he asked that Frank allow him to attempt a dramatization of the Diary. 
Levin did play some part in securing the book’s American publication in 1952, and 
contributed enormously to its commercial success with a front-page rave review in the 
New York Times Book Review on the weekend before it was published. But Frank 
could not guarantee that a Broadway producer would take on Levin’s adaptation, and 
the eventual producer, Kermit Bloomgarden, decided to commission Albert Hackett 
and Frances Goodrich Hackett, a husband-and-wife screen writing team, whose credits 
included I t ’s a Wonderful Life and Seven Brides for Seven Brothers, to write the
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play’s script. Levin, for his part, protested the decision through all means 
possible—the media, the courts, petitions— and fighting to produce what he saw as an 
adaptation truer to the spirit of the Diary would become an obsession that dominated 
his life until his death in 1981. Although I do not want to spend a lot of time on the 
Levin case, much of the recent scholarship on the adaptation of the Diary has used the 
controversy as a starting point to a fuller investigation of the universalizing aspects of 
the adaptation.47 Levin’s central claim over the years was that his play was rejected 
because it was too Jewish; he continually maintained that the Hacketts were brought 
in because they would downplay the Jewishness of the attic’s inhabitants in the 
pursuit of a more universal ‘message’ to attract a bigger audience. And while the 
Hacketts’ sincerity and good faith in approaching the adaptation is well documented, 
it is clear that, in many instances, they opted for the universal instead of the particular 
(and particularly Jewish) in adapting the Diary.
The pursuit of a truly universal appeal in adapting the play seemed to be 
endorsed by all o f the players involved in the production, including Otto Frank. The 
Hacketts’ play went through a series of drafts, and after each one, they would give it 
to a number of people for their input. These people included Frank, the producer 
Bloomgarden, and the American playwright Lillian Heilman, who Levin was 
convinced led the charge to erase Anne’s Jewishness from the play. After receiving 
the Hacketts’ fourth draft, Otto Frank communicated his criticisms back to them in a 
letter:
Having read thousands of reviews and hundreds of personal letters 
about Anne’s book from different countries in the world, I know what 
creates the impression of it on people and their impressions ought to be 
conveyed by the play to the public. Young people identify themselves 
very frequently with Anne in their struggle during puberty and the 
problems of the relations mother-daughter are existing all over the 
world. These and the love affair with Peter attract young people, 
whereas parents, teachers and psychologists learn about the inner
47 Much o f my brief portrait o f Meyer Levin’s involvement with the Diary is by now well-covered 
ground. For a fuller investigation, see Meyer Levin, The Obsession (New York: Simon and Schuster, 
1973); Lawrence Graver, An Obsession with Anne Frank: Meyer Levin and the Diary (Berkeley: 
University o f California Press, 1995); and Judith Doneson, The Holocaust in American Film, 2nd ed. 
(Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2002).
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feelings of the young generation.48
With the encouragement of Frank, in addition to Heilman and the play’s producers, 
the Hacketts eventually produced a play that has much in common with many 
conventional Broadway plays of the 1950s. Scenes of alarm are mixed in with 
comedic incidents, a romance blossoms between two adolescents, and there is little 
explicit mention of why precisely these people are in hiding. A comparison between 
the Hacketts’ play and the Diary shows that the Hacketts excised or changed the 
emphasis of much of the book’s Jewish content in an attempt to increase the 
(presumably Gentile) audience’s identification with the characters.
On April 11,1944, after a burglary downstairs caused the inhabitants of the 
attic to fear that they would be discovered, Anne Frank wrote in her diary:
Who has inflicted this upon us? Who has made us Jews different from 
all other people? Who has allowed us to suffer so terribly up till now? 
It is God that has made us as we are, but it will be God, too, who will 
raise us up again. If we bear all this suffering and if there are still Jews 
left, when it is over, then Jews, instead of being doomed, will be held 
up as an example. Who knows, it might even be our religion from 
which the world and all people learn good, and for that reason only do 
we suffer now.49
This passage, in the Hacketts’ play, became: “We’re not the only people that’ve had 
to suffer. There’ve always been people that’ve had to—sometimes one 
race— sometimes another—and y e t . . .’,50 Instead of an anguished attempt to 
understand why the Jews have suffered so, the play has Anne actually playing down 
the suffering of the Jews, and essentially equating European Jews in the Holocaust 
with all persecuted groups throughout history. The play’s director, Garson Kanin, 
defending the above change, is astonishingly on record as calling Anne’s passage “an
48 Otto Frank, Letter to the Hacketts, 14 June 1954, Wisconsin Center for Film and Theater Research, 
Goodrich-Hackett File. Quoted in Doneson, The Holocaust in American Film, 69.
49 Anne Frank, The Diary o f a Young Girl: The Definitive Edition, ed. Otto H. Frank and Miijam 
Pressler (New York: Anchor Books, 1996), 261.
50 Frances Goodrich and Albert Hackett, The Diary o f  Anne Frank (London: Samuel French Limited, 
1958), 88.
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embarrassing piece of special pleading. [...] The fact that in this play the symbols of 
persecution and oppression are Jews is incidental, and Anne, in stating the argument 
so, reduces her magnificent stature.”51 Suffering is suffering, the new passage implies, 
and throughout the play, such vague ideas of tolerance and understanding trump 
historical specificity.
In keeping with such an approach, the play also radiates an optimism that is 
surprising for a story with so grim an ending. This was reflected in many of the play’s 
contemporary reviews; it was called “a moving document about the durability of the 
young in spirit,” or, similarly, “a story of the gallant human spirit.’ Perhaps the most 
famous contributor to this sense of optimism is the play’s final scene. After the 
families are discovered by the Nazis and taken away to the camps, the play jumps 
forward to after the war, when Otto Frank returns to Amsterdam and learns that his 
daughter’s diary has been found. He opens the diary, and the audience hears Anne’s 
disembodied voice speaking: “In spite of everything, I still believe that people are 
really good at heart”53 As the curtain falls, the audience is left with this inspiring, and 
reassuring, image: even right up to her doom, Anne maintained her innocent belief in 
the basic goodness of humanity. The line is indeed in the Diary, but the play lifts it 
out of its complicating and ambiguous context. Anne follows that line with an 
impassioned acknowledgement of the horror that awaits her and her fellow Jews upon 
discovery:
It’s a wonder I haven’t abandoned all my ideals, they seem so absurd 
and impractical. Yet I cling to them because I still believe, in spite of 
everything, that people are truly good at heart.
It’s utterly impossible for me to build my life on a foundation of 
chaos, suffering and death. I see the world being slowly transformed 
into a wilderness, I hear the approaching thunder that, one day, will 
destroy us too. I feel the suffering of millions.”54
51 Quoted in Cynthia Ozick, “Who Owns Anne Frank?,” in Quarrel and Quandary (New York: 
Vintage, 2000), 96.
52 “Still Young in Spirit,” Newsweek, 30 March 1959, 98; John Chapman, Review o f The Diary o f  
Anne Frank, The New York Daily News, date unknown. Both quoted in Graver, An Obsession with 
Anne Frank, 94.
53 Goodrich and Hackett, The Diary o f  Anne Frank, 91.
M Frank, The Diary o f a Young Girl, 332.
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Lawrence Graver has reported that the play has made such an impact that both the 
Oxford and Cambridge reference books on American theatre, at least in 1995, still 
mistakenly stated that the play’s last line is also the closing line of the diary.55 
Tellingly, in The Ghost Writer, Zuckerman’s Anne comments on this famously 
optimistic sentiment. After reading and rereading the diary, she reflects upon the 
differences between her younger self and who she has become, after the horrors of the 
concentration camps.
She was not, after all, the fifteen-year-old who could, while hiding 
from a holocaust, tell Kitty, I  still believe that people are really good 
at heart. Her youthful ideals had suffered no less than she had in the 
windowless freight car from Westerbork and in the barracks at 
Auschwitz and on the Belsen heath. She had not come to hate the 
human race for what it was—what could it be but what it was?— but 
she did not feel seemly any more singing its praises. (GW  105)
This passage illustrates the willful reorientation being performed by the placing of the 
line at the end of the play; by emphasizing Anne’s optimism while scarcely 
mentioning just how that optimism was snuffed out, the play turns a blind eye to the 
horrors of the Nazis’ final solution.
In a letter to Otto Frank, explaining why they did not want the song in the 
play’s Hanukkah scene to be sung in Hebrew, the Hacketts wrote,
It would set the characters in the play apart from the people watching 
them [...] for the majority o f our audience is not Jewish. And the thing 
that we have striven for, toiled for, fought for throughout the whole 
play is to make the audience understand and identify themselves [...] 
to make them feel “that, but for the grace of God, might have been I.”56
But the problem with this perhaps admirable ambition is, as Judith Doneson has 
pointed out, that “it was not by chance that Anne was hiding but by Nazi
55 Lawrence Graver, An Obsession with Anne Frank, 95.
56 Frances Goodrich and Albert Hackett, Letter to Otto Frank, 3 July 1956, Wisconsin Center for Film 
and Theater Research, Goodrich-Hackett File. Quoted in Doneson, The Holocaust in American Film,
70.
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design—and, specifically, because she was Jewish.”57 And, Zuckerman might add, it 
was not just because she was Jewish, but because she was a Jew bom in Europe in 
1929, not in Newark, New Jersey in 1933. The play’s tendency to universalize aspects 
of Anne Frank’s story is reflected in Judge Wapter’s invocation of the play in The 
Ghost Writer. For he is engaging in another sort of universalization, one that 
downplays the specific historical milieu from which Anne and her family were hiding. 
In the wake of the charges against him in 1959, Roth argued that:
The success of the struggle against the defamation of Jewish character 
in [America] has itself made more pressing the need for a Jewish self- 
consciousness that is relevant to this time and place, where neither 
defamation nor persecution are what they were in the past. For those 
Jews who choose to continue to call themselves Jews, and find reason 
to do so, there are courses to follow to prevent it from ever being 1933 
again that are more direct, reasonable, and dignified than beginning to
CO
act as though it already is 1933— or as though it always is.
The Judge seems to suggest that the lesson to be taken from the Holocaust is that 
American Jews must always be fearful, must always be careful, for the smallest 
mistake on their part might precipitate another such catastrophe. When Nathan’s 
mother tries to explain Judge Wapter’s invocation of Streicher and Goebbels by 
pointing out what Jews had only recently suffered through, Nathan is not as sober and 
articulate as Roth was: ‘“ In Europe— not in Newark! We are not the wretched victims 
of Belsen! We were not the victims of that crime!”’ (GW 77). Throughout the book, 
and especially in his imagining o f Anne Frank, Zuckerman counters the approach to 
Jewish writing suggested by his father and Judge Wapter by always emphasizing the 
particular context that is relevant.59
57 Doneson, The Holocaust in American Film, 70-71
58 Roth, “Writing About Jews,” 208.
59 Sander L. Gilman, writing about the concept o f the “self-hating Jew,” argues that a crucial strand of 
Roth’s thinking involves the distinction between American Jews’ European past and their American 
prsent: “Roth sees the problem as one with the myths of Jewish identity imported from Europe, myths 
that are inappropriate to the formation o f the identity o f the American Jew, especially the American 
Jew as writer.” Sander L. Gilman, Jewish Self-Hatred (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1986), 355.
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In 1997, on the occasion of a revival of the Hacketts’ Diary o f  Anne Frank on 
Broadway, Cynthia Ozick wrote a scathing essay in The New Yorker, entitled “Who 
Owns Anne Frank?” In her impassioned summary of, and repudiation of, all of the 
ways in which Anne Frank’s diary has been put to use over the years, Ozick is tireless 
in her insistence on the diary’s utter singularity as a historical document. She argues 
that, because Anne’s diary ends before she is discovered, because it could not record 
the events that led to her doom, the diary has lent itself to appropriation:
The diary in itself, richly crammed though it is with incident and 
passion, cannot count as Anne Frank’s story. A story may not be said 
to be a story if the end is missing. And because the end is missing, the 
story of Anne Frank in the fifty years since The Diary o f  a Young Girl 
was first published has been bowdlerized, distorted, transmuted, 
traduced, reduced; it has been infantilized, Americanized, 
homogenized, sentimentalized; falsified, kitschified, and, in fact, 
blatantly and arrogantly denied. [...] Almost every hand that has 
approached the diary with the well-meaning intention of publicizing it 
has contributed to the subversion of history.60
And every hand that has approached the diary is met here with Ozick’s fiercely 
argued disdain: the Hacketts, Meyer Levin, even Otto Frank. She criticizes the 
perceived optimism and hope embodied in Anne Frank’s story as “nonsensical,” 
calling the diary “a story of fear.”61 The adapted play and film have created the 
world’s Anne Frank, transforming her into something that does a great disservice to 
her memory. The Anne Frank industry has made of her perhaps the primary conduit 
through which Americans understand the Holocaust, magnifying the damage done by 
these appropriations. But mostly, it is the fact of appropriation, any appropriation, that 
Ozick condemns. These, “whether cheaply personal or densely ideological, whether 
seen as exalting or denigrating, have contributed to the conversion of Anne Frank into 
usable goods. There is no authorized version other than the diary itself.”62 It is not for 
us, the living, to tell Anne Frank’s story, and perhaps we should not have been given
60 Ozick, “Who Owns Anne Frank?,” 77-78.
61 Ibid., 77.
62 Ibid., 100.
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the temptation to do so. Ozick closes the essay with this dramatic and emotional 
response:
It may be shocking to think this (I am shocked as I think it), but one 
can imagine a still more salvational outcome: Anne Frank’s diary 
burned, vanished, lost—saved from a world that made of it all things, 
some of them true, while floating lightly over the heavier truth of 
named and inhabited evil.63
Ozick’s wish is for an Anne Frank who is allowed to maintain her 
particularity, a specific and circumscribed individual vanquished by a very real and 
unalterable force of evil. In some ways, although Zuckerman himself (and Roth) is 
engaging in an appropriation o f Anne Frank, imagining her so as to prove his 
legitimacy as a Jewish writer, his Anne dramatizes Ozick’s passionately argued plea. 
The reason Zuckerman’s Anne breaks down after seeing the play that has been made 
of her diary is that she has been robbed of her particularity, of her individuality. 
Aimee Pozorski has drawn parallels between the question of the representation of 
Anne Frank and the argument over Zuckerman’s story, “Higher Education,” seeing 
both as concerned with ‘The conflict o f idealization versus reality.” Zuckerman’s 
father is sure that all gentile readers will see in his son’s story is “Kikes and their love 
of money,” rather than “the scientists and teachers and lawyers they become and the 
things such people accomplish for others” (GW  68). As a barrier against anti- 
Semitism, he wants an idealized picture of Jews put across, much as the dramatization 
of Anne Frank’s diary was intended to universalize and idealize her story, seemingly 
for the sake of gentile theatre-goers. Pozorski continues:
Although Nathan’s family and community criticize him for not 
considering the history of the Jews and its vexed relation to “Higher 
Education,” Nathan’s position, like Ozick’s, is actually more historical
63 Ibid., 102.
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than the ideal representations of Jews advanced by his father, Doc 
Zuckerman, and the heartened readers of The Diary o f  Anne Frank.6*
Zuckerman, in both the writing of his story, and in his imagining of Amy Bellette as 
Anne Frank, reasserts particularity in the face of this idealizing instinct. Allegiance to 
the particular nature of reality is portrayed as a significant part of Zuckerman’s 
newfound literary principles.65 In his fantasy, the production and great success of the 
Hacketts’ play effectively means that Anne Frank can no longer be Anne Frank; 
American culture has usurped her identity and made of it something determined by its 
own need to draw certain lessons from the Holocaust66 And yet, that need, 
particularly in American Jews, is entirely understandable and perhaps even necessary.
The difficulties and crises of identity facing American Jewry after the 
Holocaust were complex and manifold; the problem of how to continue writing about 
Jews in this changed landscape was an aspect with particular resonance for Roth as a 
young Jewish writer. In an honest appraisal of his early battles, Roth expressed his 
understanding of the complexity of post-war American Jewish experience:
What makes [writing about Jews] problematical is that Jews who 
register objections to what they see as damaging fictional portrayals of 
Jews are not necessarily philistine or paranoid. If their nerve endings 
are frayed, it is not without cause or justification. They don’t want 
books that will wound the feelings of Jews already victimized, if not 
by anti-Semitic persecution in one form or another, by the distaste for 
Jews still endemic in pockets of our society.”67
64 Aimee Pozorski, “How to Tell a True Ghost Story: The Ghost Writer and the Case o f Anne Frank,” 
in Philip Roth: New Perspectives on an American Author, ed. Derek Parker Royal (Westport, CT: 
Praeger, 2005), 90.
65 As I Married a Communist informs us, a few years prior to the events o f The Ghost Writer, Leo 
Gluckman, one o f  E.I. LonoflPs predecessors in the education o f Nathan Zuckerman, enchants the 
young Zuckerman with the credo that: “‘literature is the great particularizer [...] As an artist the nuance 
is your task. Your task is not to simplify.’” Philip Roth, I Married a Communist (New York: Houghton 
Mifflin, 1998), 223. Subsequent references will be noted parenthetically in the text.
66 R. Clifton Spargo is convincing in his assertion that “the invention o f Anne Frank is only seemingly 
Nathan’s peculiar trespass. At a deeper level the novel recalls several layers o f cultural memory 
through which Anne Frank has been made a property o f the American popular imagination.” R. Clifton 
Spargo, “To Invent as Presumptuously as Real Life: Parody and the Cultural Memory o f Anne Frank in 
Roth’s The Ghost Writer,” Representations 76 (Fall 2001), 89.
67 Philip Roth, “Interview with Le Nouvel Observateur," in Reading Myself and Others, 108-109.
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For the members of Roth’s generation, bom in America, and come of age in the 
aftermath of the Holocaust, the need to move forward and forge a collective identity 
appropriate to the present was always informed by the utter inescapability of the past, 
of the devastating collective trauma suffered only recently. Without this 
understanding, the objections expressed by Zuckerman’s father and Judge Wapter in 
The Ghost Writer would carry no dramatic weight; they would be mere paper tigers, 
philistine arguments to be easily rebuked by Zuckerman, the hero in pursuit of truth 
and justice. As it is, the conflict is much more nuanced and complicated; Zuckerman’s 
fantasy of Anne Frank is not mere one-upmanship, it is a fantasy in which he himself 
becomes implicated, drawn into the tortured and unresolvable questions that the 
Holocaust has left for all surviving Jews. By appropriating Anne Frank into his life, 
he demonstrates that she, and the catastrophe in which she perished, are as 
inescapable for him as they are for his elders.68
In addition to her condemnation of the appropriations of Anne Frank, Cynthia 
Ozick has stated in many forums her opposition to fictional representations of the 
horrors of the Holocaust She argues that the overwhelming supply of documentary 
evidence and memoirs are the only morally justifiable way we should comprehend the 
atrocities; all else is a sort of deformation of the truth.69 And yet, one of the best 
known of her fictions is the short story “The Shawl,” itself a fictional tale of a woman 
whose baby is thrown by a concentration camp guard against an electrified barbed- 
wire fence. She has said that she regrets having written the story, but ‘the idea came
68 She is inescapable for Roth as well; Anne Frank makes a number o f other cameo appearances in his 
fiction, beginning with the original 1972 drafts o f  American Pastoral, which includes a fictional diary 
entry from Frank, who has fallen in love with Milton Levov (the precursor to the Swede, Seymour 
Levov). Philip Roth, “American Pastoral: Drafts, Original Version: Copy B (1 o f 2); 1972,” Box 39, 
Philip Roth Collection. For a fuller account o f these drafts, see Shostak, Countertexts, Counterlives, 
123-5. Peter TamopoL, in My Life as a Man, has an early story called “The Diary o f Anne Frank’s 
Contemporary” (itself one o f the proposed titles found in the American Pastoral drafts), which 
fictionalizes a traumatic incident from his childhood, culminating in his relief that “we are Jews who 
live in the haven o f Westchester County, rather than in our ravaged, ancestral, Jew-hating Europe”
(MLM 248). And two books in Zuckerman Bound, Zuckerman Unbound and The Prague Orgy, each 
feature an actress who has performed in the role o f Anne in The Diary o f  Anne Frank. When 
Zuckerman learns that Caesara O’Shea, the glamourous Irish movie star with whom he has a brief 
affair in Zuckerman Unbound, played Anne Frank, he thinks, “That Anne Frank should come to him in 
this guise. [...] life has its own flippant ideas about how to handle serious fellows like Zuckerman.” 
Philip Roth, Zuckerman Unbound, in Zuckerman Bound, 1%.
69 For example, she has stated that “I am not in favor o f making fiction o f the data, or o f mythologizing 
or poeticizing it.” Cynthia Ozick, “Roundtable Discussion,” in Writing and the Holocaust, ed. Berel 
Lang (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1988), 284.
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7ftover me, and it wrote itself.” A similar sentiment was expressed by Roth when 
asked if he took the Holocaust as a subject in the Zuckerman books: “For most 
reflective American Jews, I would think, [the Holocaust] is simply there, hidden, 
submerged, emerging, disappearing, unforgotten. You don’t make use of it—it makes 
use of you.”71 For American Jewish writers such as Ozick, Roth, and Zuckerman, the 
choice to deal with the Holocaust in their fiction is no choice at all— it is always there, 
informing their very identities and literary sensibilities. In this sense, Anne Frank can 
truly be seen as a ghost writer haunting these authors’ pages, a Jewish writer whose 
masterpiece will forever be defined by the cataclysm that extinguished her life, and 
continues to haunt ours.
*
Although, on the surface, it appears that Roth’s use of Anne Frank and his 
most notable use of Kafka employ very similar mechanisms of imagined return, it is 
clear that these two figures have served Roth’s work in different ways. Roth seems to 
have been drawn to Kafka’s work first, finding something intriguing and haunting in 
the Czech writer’s life and fiction that rang particularly true in the light of his early 
struggles to define himself as a writer and as a man. He seems less drawn to Anne 
Frank by choice; rather, her story is one that inescapably comes with being an 
American Jew in the twentieth century. As perhaps the central American Holocaust 
narrative, Anne’s diary becomes a metonym for the catastrophic event with which all 
Jews, and in particular Jewish writers, must grapple. But as figures from the recent 
past against whom Roth defines his protagonists, and, in turn, himself, as a particular 
writer with a particular history, writing in a particular time and place, Kafka and Anne 
Frank can be seen as doing similar work in Roth’s fiction. Perhaps, in the end, these 
two monumental Jewish writers serve as part of the “personal culture” that Irving 
Howe claimed Roth was lacking. “When we speak of a writer’s personal culture we 
have in mind the ways in which a tradition, if absorbed into his work, can both release 
and control his creative energies. [...] A vital culture talks back, so to say, within the 
writer’s work, [...] providing a dialectic between what he has received and what he
70 Calev Ben-David, “Guardian Angel,” Jerusalem Post Magazine, 1 June 2001; available from 
http://www.biu.ac.il/Spokesman/Stories/jun_01 2001 .htm.
71 Roth, “Interview with the Sunday London Times,” 118.
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has willed.”72 It is difficult to say whether Roth’s use of these two figures would have 
satisfied Howe’s requirements for a vital personal culture. But by allowing both 
Kafka and Anne Frank to talk back within his work, and by talking back to them, 
Roth has turned outward in order to better explain his own circumstances, the endless 
series of influences that go in to making a person, and a person’s world, what it is. In 
doing so, Roth places himself within a tradition that is bigger, and more unwieldy, 
than he could have merely willed into being.
72 Howe, “Philip Roth Reconsidered,” 73.
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Chapter Four
After Portnoy II: “Oh Freud, do I know!”
In the last chapter, we saw how Roth’s readerly connection to Kafka, 
apparently borne out of his sense of dislocation and rudderlessness in the mid-1960s, 
came to color much of his fiction throughout the 1970s as it grew into a fascination 
with “the other Europe.” The 1960s also saw Roth enter into psychoanalysis, an 
experience which provided him with another rich body of ideas that would 
immeasurably inform his fiction over the next decade and a half O f course, the most 
noticeable, and most immediate fictional product of this experience was Portnoy's 
Complaint. In a 1974 essay entitled “In Response to Those Who Have Asked Me: 
‘How Did You Come to Write That Book, Anyway?,’” Roth details the circuitous 
path that eventually led to the writing of Portnoy. The novel famously portrays 
Alexander Portnoy’s struggle to reconcile his rebellious, outlandish sexual urges with 
his repressive Jewish conscience. But, as the essay explains, between 1962 and 1967, 
Roth went through a struggle of his own, writing drafts that were either overly 
fantastical (a tone well suited to the protagonist’s acting out) or overly realistic (which 
suited the stereotypically obedient childhood), failing to find a form that could 
simultaneously express the two poles of Portnoy’s predicament. It was only when 
Roth took inspiration from a crucial element of his own 1960s experience— his 
psychoanalysis—that the correct presentation of the problem became clear to him: 
“The psychoanalytic monologue—a narrative technique whose rhetorical possibilities 
I’d been availing myself for years, only not on paper—was to furnish the means by 
which I thought I might convincingly draw together the fantastic element [...] and the
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realistic documentation.”1 This formulation, offering a conception of psychoanalysis 
as a form ripe for exploitation by the writer of fiction, provides a key to Portnoy’s 
Complaint, as well as a large part of the fiction Roth would write over the ensuing 
sixteen years.
This chapter will explore the many ways in which Roth has taken advantage of 
Freud’s theories for his own ends in the books written from Portnoy’s Complaint, 
published in 1969, up until the conclusion of Zuckerman Bound (which brought 
together in one volume The Ghost Writer, Zuckerman Unbound, The Anatomy Lesson, 
and The Prague O rgy) in 1985.2 I hope to show that, apart from being a commercial 
and creative breakthrough in unleashing Roth’s comic talents into his fiction,
Portnoy’s Complaint also signals the beginning of a period of Roth’s career in which 
an understanding of psychoanalysis becomes almost essential to an understanding of 
the fiction.3 As evidenced mainly in Portnoy’s Complaint, My Life as a Man, and The 
Anatomy Lesson, Freud seems to have served Roth’s work in three important ways. 
First, Roth has taken advantage o f the narrative possibilities inherent in the 
psychoanalytic therapy session as a site of self-storytelling. This is most clearly 
apparent in Portnoy’s Complaint, for which the importance of the central conceit (a 
Jewish analysand’s monologue) cannot be overstated, but Peter Tamopol’s attempts 
to tell his self's story in My Life as a Man also demonstrate this strategy. Secondly, 
most significantly in My Life as a Man, the first of Roth’s many books to feature a 
novelist as a protagonist, Roth explores the idea that the particular introspection called 
for in psychoanalysis is comparable to, and perhaps a catalyst for, the act of writing 
fiction. Finally, the extensively defined, immutable self that Freud proposes provides 
an assumption that conflicts with Roth’s characters, most notably in The Anatomy
1 Roth, “In Response to Those Who Have Asked Me,” 36.
2 The title o f Zuckerman Bound, ostensibly a play on both Zuckerman Unbound and the fact that it 
binds together all o f the Zuckerman books to date into one book, also reflects something that I will 
discuss in this chapter: the increasing sense that Zuckerman is bound by his constricting (Freudian) 
view o f his self. Zuckerman Bound was, in fact, one o f  the early titles for what would become My Life 
as a Man (before settling on Peter Tamopol, Roth considered naming his character either Zuckerman 
or Zuckerbom). Other potential titles found in the early drafts point to Roth’s interest in his characters’ 
captivity and desire for freedom: “Zuckerman Unbound,” “Zuckerbom Bound + Unbound,” and 
“FREE ZUCKJERBORN FROM HIS CAGE!”. Philip Roth, “Mv Life as a Man: Drafts; Early; 
Miscellaneous Pages + Notes, Set I; 1969-1970, n.d. (2 o f 4),” Box 144, Philip Roth Collection.
3 In discussing psychoanalysis, I am concerned with Freud’s writings and therapeutic project, and not 
the many ways in which psychoanalysis has evolved in practice over the past century. As Jeffrey 
Berman points out, “[Roth’s] psychoanalysts seem frozen in time, imprisoned by a rigid Freudian 
ideology that most analysts have long ago abandoned or sharply revised.” Jeffrey Berman, “Revisiting 
Roth’s Psychoanalysts,” in The Cambridge Companion to Philip Roth, 106.
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Lesson. Throughout this period, Freud’s reality principle could be said to be the 
ultimate problem for each of Roth’s protagonists, who characteristically move toward 
a resignation to the utter immutability of the self.
This constricting aspect of the Freudian conception of the self becomes more 
and more apparent in Roth’s work as the Zuckerman saga moves towards its 
conclusion. Whereas at the beginning of this period, Roth tends to focus on the 
possibilities for comedy (in Portnoy’s Complaint) or creativity (in My Life as a Man) 
that Freudian self-interpretation provides, by the time of The Anatomy Lesson and The 
Prague Orgy, it is the restrictions of a Freudian mindset that are most emphasized. As 
Roth’s alter ego Nathan Zuckerman outlandishly attempts to escape his identity as a 
writer chained to mining his own self, Roth himself seems to be straining at the limits 
that a Freudian conception of the self imposes on his characters. This suspicion is 
strengthened by the book that follows Zuckerman Bound, The Counterlife, in which 
Zuckerman is not granted the impossibility of a new self, but instead a new way of 
conceiving of the self, seemingly breaking with a Freudian sensibility. The specific 
nature of that break, and the ways in which psychoanalysis may actually sow the 
seeds for such a change, gestures toward the adventurous path that Roth’s work would 
take following The Counterlife.
*
Freud famously called his most central developmental mechanism the Oedipus 
complex, taking its name from Sophocles’ play Oedipus Rex. This literary analogue is 
hardly incidental to Freud’s overall work; he points out that the play’s gradual 
revealing of climactic events is “a process that can be likened to the work of a 
psychoanalysis.”4 Indeed, psychoanalysis can be seen as a process in which stories of 
the self are told. Just as Sophocles artfully reveals to the audience the true account of 
Oedipus’s past, so the analyst suggests the stories that may lie behind a patients’ 
dreams, symptoms, or even choice of words. To pursue this parallel between a work 
of literature and the therapeutic process of psychoanalysis, one must focus on the 
ways in which Freudian interpretation proceeds: it is always retrospective, working
4 Sigmund Freud, The Interpretation o f  Dreams, in The Standard Edition o f  the Complete 
Psychological Works o f  Sigmund Freud, Vol. 4, trans. and ed. James Strachey (London: The Hogarth 
Press, 1958), 262.
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backward from a symptom (or any psychical production), to its proposed causes or 
antecedents. A patient’s verbal tics, for example, are not symptomatic of anything 
until, through the process of analysis, their hidden sources are revealed. Likewise, in 
the Freudian conception, dreams do not communicate meaning in themselves, but 
must be elucidated, their meaning created by the analyst. It is the fact that dreams and 
symptoms are theoretically construed as inscrutable to the dreamer or the sufferer that 
necessitates the analyst’s interpretation.
In this sense, the analyst plays the role of the storyteller, fashioning new tales 
of the patients’ self. But, as Philip RiefF points out, the analyst is not the only 
storyteller. First, the patient must tell his own story. “[MJeaning does not emerge out 
of the raw material of incident and language in a piece, at once. [...] the patient offers 
the dream (or fantasy or random number or name), and is then asked by the analyst to 
associate around it, and thereby make it symptomatic.”5 The process of free 
association, one way in which the analyst procures the patient’s story, replaced 
hypnosis in Freud’s fundamental revision of Josef Breuer’s cathartic treatment of 
hysteria. Whereas, for Breuer, the patient can hardly be said to be the author of his 
own stories (they emerge only in a hypnotic state, prompted by the analyst’s 
suggestion), Freud emphasizes the patient’s freedom and authority to express 
anything, whether he thinks it relevant or not:
[H]e [the analyst] admonishes them to relate everything that passes 
through their minds, even if they think it unimportant or irrelevant or 
nonsensical; he lays special stress on their not omitting any thought or 
idea from their story because to relate it might be embarrassing or 
painful to them.6
Although it must be emphasized that Freud privileges the analyst’s story over the 
patient’s (he claims that a patient cannot analyze himself), psychoanalysis nonetheless 
grants the patient the freedom to tell his own story. It is this freedom and the absolute 
candor that this freedom entails that appeals to Roth and can account for his use of 
psychoanalysis as the template for Portnoy’s Complaint.
5 Philip RiefT, Freud: The Mind o f  the Moralist (London: Victor Gollancz, 1959), 118.
6 Sigmund Freud, “Freud’s Psycho-Analytic Method,” in Collected Papers, Vol. 1, trans. Joan Riviere 
(London: The Hogarth Press, 1956), 267.
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An investigation of Freud’s presence in Roth’s work naturally begins with 
Portnoy’s Complaint. The novel takes the form of an extended comic monologue 
delivered, in therapy, by a psychoanalytic patient. Alexander Portnoy suffers from a 
“disorder,” defined in a mock encyclopedia entry on the book’s opening page as a 
condition “in which strongly-felt ethical and altruistic impulses are perpetually 
warring with extreme sexual longings, often of a perverse nature” {PC 1). The reader 
is, from this point onward, in a Freudian world, populated by its language, theories, 
and therapeutic practice.
In the psychoanalytic process, in its inherent potential for storytelling, Roth 
sees a ready-made structure to be exploited for its literary possibilities. To take full 
advantage of these possibilities, especially for their comic effects, Roth creates 
Portnoy, who seems an exaggeratedly imagined ideal for Freud’s therapeutic 
measures. Portnoy certainly seizes upon the opportunity for the patient to tell his 
story; his monologue goes on for close to three hundred pages, detailing, in 
chronologically erratic anecdotes appropriate to the psychoanalytic process, his 
various problems. An unquenchable id warring with an authoritarian superego; a 
fixation on his mother compounded by an emasculated father; early sexual experience 
that seems the root of all of his behavior: Portnoy has it all. That these neuroses are 
evident to the reader is perhaps unexpected, for, until the novel’s final line, the analyst 
remains silent. As Freud states, the analyst is necessary to unearth such buried tales of 
the patient’s self; “the situation of analysis involves a superior and a subordinate.”7 
Without any interaction between the subordinate patient and the superior analyst, how 
does Roth take advantage of the particular storytelling opportunities granted by 
psychoanalysis?
Roth fills this absence in two main ways. First, Portnoy is a patient with a 
remarkable knowledge of Freud’s writings and theories. As an explanation of his 
perpetual desire for sexual adventure, he remarks that “all the unconscious can do 
anyway, so Freud tells us, is want. And want! And WANT! Oh Freud, do I know!”
{PC 103). Likewise, when ranting about the feelings of guilt he has inherited from his 
overbearing parents, he singles out the representative of parental authority in Freud’s 
conception of the mind: “That tyrant, my superego, he should be strung up, that son of
7 Sigmund Freud, “On the History o f the Psycho-Analytic Movement,” in Collected Papers, Vol. 1, 
337.
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a bitch, hung by his fucking storm-trooper’s boots till he’s dead!” (PC 160-61). And, 
like any good student of Freud, when he realizes that most of his girlfriends have had 
small breasts, he asks, “is there an essay somewhere I can read on that?” (PC 216). 
Portnoy, though at times seemingly desperate for the psychoanalyst’s help, essentially 
diagnoses himself. In addition, as David Brauner has argued, “Portnoy uses Freudian 
ideas as a means of anticipating and deconstructing possible interpretations o f his own
o
behavior.” His knowledge of psychoanalysis is a protective weapon, allowing him 
both to sing of his suffering and to ridicule the way it fits into a psychoanalytic 
pattern, essentially preempting any interpretation from the analyst. Although Freud 
may have argued with Roth’s conception of a man who can detect the processes that 
formulate his self, Freud’s theories have permeated the culture to such an extent that 
the reader does not doubt Portnoy’s analysis. Philip Rieff, writing in 1959, noted that 
Freud’s “insistence that the unconscious has its own laws, and that no psychic product 
is without meaning, tends to make analysts of us all.”9 Roth, by giving Portnoy the 
analytical tools that Freud insisted could only be wielded by a trained analyst, is using 
Freud for his own purposes, but in a way that pays tribute to the pervasive cultural 
influence of Freud’s theories. This influence allows Roth to fully exploit 
psychoanalysis as a site of stories of the self while skirting Freud’s credo of the 
analyst as necessary for interpretation. Throughout his work, Roth gives his characters 
these Freud-derived interpretive tools to analyze themselves, to tell their own versions 
of the stories of their selves.10
The second way in which Roth succeeds in making Portnoy a recognizable 
psychoanalytic case without the benefit of the analyst’s interpretation is made clear in 
an assertion Portnoy makes toward the end of the book. Remarking on yet another 
ridiculous turn of events in his exasperating life, he remarks: “Doctor, maybe other 
patients dream— with me, everything happens. I have a life without latent content.
The dream thing happens/” (PC 257). Indeed, much of the comic effect of Portnoy’s 
Complaint lies in the way Roth makes manifest that which Freud proposes lies 
beneath the surface. Whereas Freud theorizes an implicit fear of castration that drives
8 David Brauner, ‘“Getting in Your Retaliation First’: Narrative Strategies in Portnoy s Complaint,” in 
Philip Roth: New Perspectives on an American Author, 46.
9 Rieff, Freud: The Mind o f  the Moralist, 103.
10 And yet it should be remembered that Dr Spielvogel’s famous closing line: “Now vee may perhaps 
to begin. Yes?” (PC  274) suggests that Portnoy’s version o f his story may be only part o f the story—or 
only the start o f the story.
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the individual from the Oedipal stage, Portnoy’s mother actually threatens him with a 
knife when, as a child, he doesn’t want to eat his dinner {PC 16-17). A psychoanalyst 
might suggest that a man, such as Portnoy, with an inability to settle down with one 
woman, has an incestuous fixation on his mother. But in Portnoy’s case, the analyst is 
not necessary to make such a claim, not with Portnoy’s mother greeting her son on the 
phone: “‘Well, how’s my lover?’” {PC 97). When Portnoy, after years and years of 
rebelling against his overbearing Jewish parents by pursuing gentile women, finally 
seduces a Jewish one, and in Israel no less, it is only Freudian that he finds himself 
sexually impotent {PC 256-57). These examples give a sense of how Roth can allow 
Portnoy, the analysand, to so completely dominate his own therapeutic sessions. 
Roth’s prerogative as a novelist allows him to create a character in which Freud’s 
buried motives are plainly apparent. This also serves to create a satire o f Freud, as 
“Portnoy implicitly criticizes the tendency of psychoanalysis to incorporate all events 
into a phallocentric narrative. Once Portnoy has preempted a Freudian reading of his 
psyche [...] such a reading loses its potency and immediately seems reductive and 
redundant” 11 With no latent content to uncover, what is left for the analyst to do?
If Portnoy analyzes himself, leaving the reader wondering what, if anything, 
the analyst will have to say about his case, at least his monologue appropriately takes 
place in psychotherapy. To take advantage of the idea that all of us, after Freud, are in 
some way psychoanalysts, Roth isolates this interpretive mindset from the therapeutic 
setting in one of the stories embedded within My Life as a Man (1974). The novel has 
an idiosyncratic make-up, beginning with two “Useful Fictions,” short stories written 
by the character Peter Tamopol, followed by Tamopol’s attempted autobiography.
The second story, “Courting Disaster (or, Serious in the Fifties),” recounts the 
unexpected troubles that greet Nathan Zuckerman, a budding writer and literature
•  •  •  17instructor, in his twenties. Included in these troubles are the terrible migraine 
headaches that lead him to be granted medical discharge from the army. Unable to 
find any explanation from doctors, Zuckerman obsesses over finding the cause of the
11 Brauner, ‘“Getting in Your Retaliation First,”’ 46.
12 It is difficult to claim that the Nathan Zuckerman who appears in Tamopol’s stories is the same 
character who is the protagonist or narrator o f nine o f Roth’s following books (the trilogy and epilogue 
of Zuckerman Bound, The Counterlife, American Pastoral, I Married a Communist, The Human Stain, 
and Exit Ghost). His biographical details, which vary between Tamapol’s two tellings, are modified 
again for Zuckerman Bound, and remain consistent throughout Roth’s ensuing Zuckerman books. In 
this chapter, unless specifically noted, “Nathan Zuckerman” refers to Roth’s Zuckerman, not 
Tamopol’s.
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debilitating headaches, suspecting that they may be the psychosomatic product of his 
desire to leave the army. His neurologist mentions to him that he may want to enter 
himself into a study in psychosomatic medicine, as he seemed to have a ‘“ Freudian 
Orientation’ in the questions I asked him and in the manner in which I had gone about 
presenting the history of the disorder” {MLM 55).
Zuckerman himself doesn’t see his approach as particularly Freudian, but 
rather a product of his literary mindset. He is analyzing himself like he would analyze 
one of the characters in the books he studies.
Whereas an ordinary man might complain, ‘I get these damn 
headaches’ (and have been content to leave it at that), I tended, like a 
student of high literature or a savage who paints his body blue, to see 
the migraines as standing fo r  something, as a disclosure or ‘epiphany,’ 
isolated or accidental or inexplicable only to one who was blind to the 
design of a life or a book. What did my migraines signify? {MLM 55)
This suggestion, that there is a great similarity between a Freudian mindset and a 
literary one, has important implications for Zuckerman, for all of My Life as a Man, 
and for much of Roth’s work. It is reinforced by Zuckerman’s account of the change 
in his writing that accompanies his migraines. Whereas previously he had only written 
critical articles, he now begins working on what becomes his first published short 
story. “[I]n the hospital, where in six weeks’ time I had written my second and third 
stories, I could not help wondering if for me illness was not a necessary catalyst to 
activate the imagination” {MLM 55). It is his headaches or, more accurately, his 
search for the meaning underlying his headaches, that initially sparks his creativity as 
a writer of fiction.13 This realization, coming as it does in a story written by Tamopol, 
prefigures the way in which psychoanalysis is set up as an alternative to writing in his 
“autobiographical” portion of My Life as a Man.
13 We are reminded again of Lionel Trilling, whose inability to successfully move from critical work to 
fiction writing is figured by Adam Phillips as an attempt to sidestep his “conscious effort for dignity.” 
Phillips suggests that Trilling was only able to accomplish this required self-exposure in his 
psychoanalytic sessions. Phillips, “Lionel Trilling’s Concentrated Rush,” 174. Similarly, in The Human 
Stain (2000), Zuckerman muses that Coleman Silk is unable to write his story because “[wjriting 
personally is exposing and concealing at the same time, but with you it could only be concealment and 
so it would never work.” Philip Roth, The Human Stain (London: Vintage, 2000), 345. Subsequent 
references will be noted parenthetically in the text.
138
“My True Story,” Peter Tamopol’s “nonfictional” text that follows his two 
“Useful Fictions” in My Life as a Man, begins with a short, italicized blurb, 
mimicking (and parodying) the concise authorial biographies found on book jackets. 
Written by Tamopol, it briefly describes his early literary success, before detailing the 
seven years of personal tumult that followed, in which he struggled with a 
nightmarish marriage, an unsuccessful love affair, and an extended period of therapy 
at the hands of the psychoanalyst Dr Otto Spielvogel. Still lost and confused, unable 
to overcome his problems by channeling them through his fiction, Tamopol turns to 
autobiographical writing in an attempt to come to terms with the disastrous marriage 
that seemingly wrecked his secure sense of self. The blurb closes with this telling 
disclaimer: “// remains to be seen whether his candor, such as it is, can serve any 
better than his art (or Dr. Spielvogel’s therapeutic devices) to demystify the past and 
mitigate his admittedly uncommendable sense o f  defeat’ {MLM 100-101). This 
formulation, placing autobiographical writing, fiction writing, and psychoanalysis on 
the same level as tools to help better understand the self, further illuminates Roth’s 
frequent use of Freud. Psychoanalysis, as a process that attempts to verbalize the 
stories of the self, seems a parallel structure to the writing life that Roth, beginning 
with My Life as a Man, takes as his main subject of investigation in his work over the 
next decade. Tamopol’s account of his time in therapy, and especially the event that 
eventually leads to his abandonment o f his treatment, further reinforces this parallel.
The event in question is Dr Spielvogel’s publication of an article which 
includes a thinly veiled depiction of Tamopol’s case, an article that sends Tamopol 
into a fury.14 It is not so much that Spielvogel has betrayed Tamopol’s confidence by 
revealing so much of his case (although that certainly irks him as well), but that 
Spielvogel has gotten so much of his case wrong. It is not Tamopol’s sensibilities as a 
patient that are offended, so much as his sensibilities as a writer. “1 could not read a
14 Both Jeffrey Berman and Debra Shostak have pointed out that this episode is based upon a 
remarkably similar article, published by Roth’s analyst Hans KJeinschmidt in 1967, titled “The Angry 
Act: The Role of Aggression in Creativity.” The piece, although it never names Roth (just as 
Spielvogel’s article never mentions Tamopol by name), nonetheless recounts a number o f anecdotes 
from Roth’s analysis that Roth would go on to fictionalize in Portnoy’s Complaint, thus potentially 
exposing Roth, just as Tamopol feels Spielvogel exposes him. If Roth was angered like Tamopol is, 
there is no evidence of it in Kleinschmidt’s letters to Roth in Roth’s archive. A letter thanking Roth for 
an advance copy o f My Life as a  Man, makes no mention o f any conflict, in the past or present, and 
includes Kleinschmidt’s assessement o f the novel: “The book reads like a charm and shows you in top 
form.” Berman, “Revisiting Roth’s Psychoanalysts,” 94-110; Shostak, Countertexts, Counterlives, 163- 
4; Hans Kleinschmidt to Philip Roth, 9 June 1974, “Kleinschmidt, Hans J.; 1964-1984, 1991, n.d.,”
Box 17, Philip Roth Collection.
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sentence in which it did not seem to me that the observation was off, the point missed, 
the nuance blurred” {MLM 243). The ensuing argument between writer and doctor 
points to one of the integral features of the novel, and highlights one of Roth’s stated 
obsessions throughout his career: “the relationship between the written and the 
unwritten world.”15 What they are arguing about, essentially, is the correct telling of 
the story of TamopoFs self—the crux of the novel itself, in which fiction, 
autobiography, and psychoanalysis are placed in the balance to see which is best 
suited to represent the ‘unwritten world.’ As Mark Shechner has written, Tamopol 
had given “Spielvogel his best lines and Spielvogel had botched them.” After giving 
up on his analysis, he retreats to Quasay, a writer’s colony, where he embarks upon 
the composition of his autobiography, which becomes the bulk of My Life as a Man. 
Shechner claims that Tamopol “takes his lines back and takes charge of his own story, 
laboring to show how, with sensitivity, imagination, and a flair for le mot juste , it 
might properly be told.”16 Unfortunately (for Tamopol), at the end of the novel, it is 
not at all clear that this project—properly telling his own story so that he can 
comprehend what has happened to him and move on—has succeeded. Rather, Roth 
leaves unresolved whether fiction, non-fiction, or psychoanalysis are adequate on 
their own to fully exorcise his demons.
When, in The Anatomy Lesson, the more fully-formed Nathan Zuckerman is 
confronted with chronic, unexplainable pain just as Tamopol’s Zuckerman is, he casts 
about for psychosomatic interpretations in much the same way. Far from igniting his 
creativity, however, this Zuckerman’s search for the meaning that may or may not 
underlie his pain is accompanied by an inability to write, a drying up of his creative 
capacities. His exasperation with his condition leads to a disavowal of interpretation 
that, in its contrast to the younger Zuckerman’s attitude, suggests that Roth’s attitude 
towards Freudianism has significantly changed from 1974 to 1983:
Everybody wants to make pain interesting— first the religions, then the
poets, then, not to be left behind, even the doctors getting in on the act
with their psychosomatic obsession. They want to give it significance.
What does it mean? What are you hiding? What are you showing?
15 Roth, Reading Myself and Others, xiii.
16 Mark Shechner, After the Revolution: Studies in the Contemporary Jewish American Imagination 
(Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1987), 221-22.
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What are you betraying? It’s impossible just to suffer the pain, you 
have to suffer its meaning. But it’s not interesting and it has no 
meaning—it’s just plain stupid pain.17
The connection of the younger Zuckerman’s search for the meaning of his pain with 
the birth of his career as a writer suggests that the revelations of the self that Freudian 
interpretation provides have great value for the writer o f fiction. What does it mean 
then, when the Zuckerman of The Anatomy Lesson, himself a writer who has built his 
career upon the fictionalization of his self, renounces such interpretation?
Zuckerman’s chronic pain in The Anatomy Lesson does not occur within a 
vacuum. It is merely the final (he hopes) blow to his already reeling self-confidence 
as a man, and, more significantly, as a writer. The death of his parents, combined with 
a falling out with his brother, has cut him off from his identity as a son and a brother, 
aspects of his self so central to his writing. Similarly, mining the fictional possibilities 
of his childhood in the Jewish Weequahic section of Newark, New Jersey now seems 
irrelevant, with Newark almost completely transformed into an African-American 
city, the Jews almost all gone. He feels as if the story of his self, which he has 
continually relied upon as a starting point for his fiction, has dried up. “Zuckerman 
had lost his subject. His health, his hair, and his subject. Just as well he couldn’t find a 
posture for writing. [...] Everything that galvanized him had been extinguished, 
leaving nothing unmistakably his and nobody else’s to claim, exploit, enlarge and 
reconstruct” (AL 323). This Zuckerman offers a stark contrast to Tamopol’s younger 
Zuckerman, so eager to delve into the unexplored regions of his self for imaginative 
inspiration. The latter is at the start of his career as a writer, and believes that his self 
will provide him with ample material for his life’s writing. The elder Zuckerman is in 
quite a different place. He feels he has no more self to explore, that self-interpretation
1 fidoes not lead anywhere, that, in fact, he has exhausted his self. He desires to escape 
his self, prompting a decision to enter medical school and become a doctor. This 
decision, following from his suffering from this unexplained pain, seems an 
acknowledgement, by an older, more jaded Zuckerman, of the tyranny of the body,
17 Philip Roth, The Anatomy Lesson, in Zuckerman Bound, 439. Subsequent references will be noted 
parenthetically in the text.
18 Roth, o f course, will return to Zuckerman when he is older still, and his characterization in Roth’s 
“American Trilogy” is o f a man seemingly content to be without a story o f the self—“I’ve had my 
story,” he remarks in /  Married a Communist—this will be taken up in my sixth chapter (IMAC 71).
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and the often paltry resources that the mind can muster to combat that tyranny. Debra 
Shostak, in her discussion of Roth’s focus on embodiment, writes that Zuckerman’s 
pain “gives the lie to the possibility of pure, unfleshed consciousness and therefore to 
the myth of a subject or self as divisible from the body as object.”19 The idea of the 
self as subject that can be isolated and profitably mined seems a necessary one for 
Zuckerman’s sense of himself as a writer. “If you get out of yourself you can’t be a 
writer because the personal ingredient is what gets you going, and if you hang on to 
the personal ingredient any longer you’ll disappear right up your asshole” (AL 399). 
Zuckerman desires to leave behind the writing life because it necessitates a self- 
interpretation that he feels he can no longer practice.
The contrast between the two Zuckermans highlights an important aspect of 
Freud’s work. That there are many benefits to Freud’s psychoanalytic process of 
interpretation of the self cannot be denied. In uncovering those aspects of identity that 
the individual cannot know (or is unwilling, or unable, to acknowledge) on his own, 
the ultimate aim of psychoanalysis is a more complete self-knowledge. With this new 
knowledge, it is hoped, the patient can better manage his psychical resources. Ricoeur 
emphasizes the modesty of this aim, stating that “what Freud desires is that the one 
who is analyzed, by making his own the meaning that was foreign to him, enlarge his 
field of consciousness, live better, and finally be a little freer and, if possible, a little 
happier.”20 Likewise, for a young writer such as Tamopol’s Zuckerman, Freudian 
interpretation can open up the self, exposing its possibilities for fictional 
transformation. But a focus on these benefits of the interpretive process can obscure 
the ultimate resignation to reality that is at the center of Freud’s great project.
The central function that the resolution of the Oedipal complex serves is that it 
dictates that the ego “no longer lets itself be governed by the pleasure principle, but 
obeys the reality principle”21 Neuroses result when this process is incompletely 
resolved, when the individual fails to wholly submit to the unalterable limitations of 
reality. Similarly, Freud insisted throughout his life that although psychoanalysis can 
illuminate the self, it cannot fundamentally change it. The implicit product of Freud’s 
demystification of “false consciousness” is the acknowledgement of underlying
19 Shostak, Countertexts, Counterlives, 42.
20 Paul Ricoeur, Freud and Philosophy, trans. Denis Savage (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 
1970), 35.
21 Sigmund Freud, The Complete Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis, ed. and trans. James 
Strachey (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1971), 357.
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reality, and of man’s obligation to live with that reality. “Over against illusion and the 
fable-making function, demystifying hermeneutics [like Freud’s] sets up the rude 
discipline of necessity.” In other words, according to Freud, we must not delude 
ourselves into thinking that we are the authors of our selves, or that we can ever 
escape our selves. All we can hope for is a better understanding of our selves, and a 
sober consciousness with which to interact with the world. As Philip Rieff argues, for 
Freud, “man is tied to the weight o f his own past, and even by a great therapeutic 
labor little more can be accomplished than a shifting of the burden.” Zuckerman 
comes to a realization that Freudian interpretation of the self, which has been so 
important to his creativity, cannot help him in his current situation, in which he feels 
he knows his self all too well, and desires to escape it.
Roth concludes The Anatomy Lesson on a note of resignation. Zuckerman, 
having broken his jaw in a drug- and alcohol-fueled fall in a Jewish cemetery, now 
roams the halls of the hospital as a patient, following the doctors around, dreaming of 
becoming a doctor himself. His desire to escape his self and create a new one—to 
enter medical school and leave the writing life behind—is still alive at the end of the 
book, but Roth’s final sentence indicates the ultimate hopelessness of this enterprise. 
Zuckerman wanders through the hospital, “as though he still believed that he could 
unchain himself from a future as a man apart and escape the corpus that was his” (AL 
505). The dual connotation of “corpus”— suggesting both body and body of 
work—reinforces the fact that Zuckerman is as tied to his identity as a writer as he is 
tied to his own humanity, and as tied to his unreasoning body as well. But whereas, in 
“Courting Disaster,” Roth suggests that Freudian self-interpretation could be a great 
boon to a writer’s creativity (a suggestion confirmed by the many ways Roth has used 
Freud throughout this period), now, in The Anatomy Lesson, he suggests its 
limitations. Zuckerman cannot escape his identity as a writer, but, as a writer, he 
cannot write without some method of self-reflection. What Roth seems to be rejecting 
is not self-interpretation in itself—since without that, a writer cannot be a writer—but 
the Freudian framework for that interpretation. Zuckerman cannot escape his self, yet 
feels that he has exhausted it of its fictional possibilities. What is needed, therefore, is
22 Ricoeur, Freud and Philosophy, 35.
23 Rieff, Freud: The Mind o f  the Moralist, xi.
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not the impossibility of a new self, but a new way of conceiving of the self, a way to 
grant the self new possibilities for fictional transformation.
In The Prague Orgy, the epilogue to Zuckerman Bound which continues 
Zuckerman’s story after The Anatomy Lesson, similar themes of the desire to escape 
the self are present. Zuckerman sees, in the literary reclamation project that sends him 
to Prague, a chance to break away from “the narrative encasing me,” only to realize, 
again, that “one’s story isn’t a skin to be shed— it’s inescapable, one’s own body and 
blood.”24 This vision of the self as a story is an interesting conception, one that hints 
at the new directions that Roth soon takes, but, keeping within an essentially Freudian 
worldview, it is the story that authors Zuckerman, rather than the other way around. It 
is not until The Counterlife (which follows The Prague Orgy) that Roth finds a way 
for Zuckerman to escape the strictures of the self as Freud conceives it: unified, 
unchangeable, forever tied to the events of the past.
*
Zuckerman Bound follows Nathan Zuckerman’s path, from his young idealism 
in The Ghost Writer, to his disillusioning brush with fame in Zuckerman Unbound, to 
his exhaustion with his self in The Anatomy Lesson, concluding with his ultimately 
fruitless search for a different story in Prague in The Prague Orgy. It is not surprising, 
then, that The Counterlife features characters attempting to change radically their 
lives, to change the essence of what was thought to be their selves. Both Nathan and 
his brother Henry decide to risk their lives for their sexual potency. Henry leaves his 
comfortable New Jersey existence to become a Zionist militant in the West Bank. 
Nathan, who has never been able to settle down with a woman for more than a few 
years, and depends upon America for the subject of his fiction, decides to marry 
Maria, have a child with her, and move to London. He explains that his desire to 
finally start a family is an extension of his general desire to escape his self: “As a 
writer I’d mined my past to its limits, exhausted my private culture and personal 
memories [...] I wanted [...] to break away and take upon myself a responsibility 
unlike any bound up with writing or with the writer’s tedious burden of being his own
24 Roth, The Prague Orgy, 568.
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cause.”25 This explanation sounds as if it could have been voiced by Zuckerman to 
justify his desire to become a doctor in The Anatomy Lesson. But whereas that book 
ends with the implicit resignation that Zuckerman cannot unchain himself from his 
identity as a writer, here Roth has Zuckerman follow through on his desire to escape 
his self, and explores the consequences thereof. Zuckerman will still have a self, of 
course, but he will no longer be professionally required to endlessly interpret it for his 
fiction. Instead, he looks to the twinned hope of a new love and a new family to draw 
his attention away from his self alone.
Similarly, Henry’s new identity in the West Bank (or Judea) seems to 
represent the opposite of everything he was in New Jersey. Nathan travels to Israel to 
talk to Henry, prompted by brotherly concern, but also by a writerly curiosity in 
Henry’s transformation. Most of his time in Israel is spent trying to understand just 
how his brother has so completely altered his life story. “I could not grasp this 
overnight change so against the grain o f what I and everyone took to be the very 
essence of Henry’s Henryness” (C 122-23). Henry, never before religious, has now 
taken the Hebrew name of Hanoch, and refuses to talk with Nathan about anything 
not related to Israel and his new life. The Zionist fight seems infinitely more tied up 
with the sweep of history than his dentist’s office, and calls for a near total 
selflessness in the service of the cause. In response to Nathan’s questions about the 
motives for his remarkable reinvention, Henry tellingly replies: “‘The hell with me, 
forget me. Me is somebody 1 have forgotten. Me no longer exists out here. There isn’t 
time for me, there isn’t need of me—here Judea counts, not me!”’ (C 109). Henry’s 
emphatic statement seems to be a denial of his self, but it is more accurately a 
rejection of self-reflection, of time and energy spent trying to figure out what the self 
is. He is more interested in how his self can be useful for the Zionist cause than in the 
nature of his self.
The Counterlife's preoccupation with radical change, with characters in flight 
from the long-accepted versions of their selves, signals an important change in the 
way Roth conceives of his characters. Portnoy’s fundamental predicament is that he 
desires to break free of the restrictions imposed upon him by his parents: “to be 
bad—and to enjoy it!” (PC 124). But he never quite succeeds at this project, hemmed
25 Philip Roth, The Counterlife (London: Jonathan Cape, 1987), 287-88. Subsequent references will be 
noted parenthetically in the text.
145
in as he is by continual feelings of guilt. Similarly, Tamopol cannot break free from 
his obsession over his disastrous marriage. Far from moving on, he cannot even 
decide upon an acceptable version of what has happened to him. And Zuckerman, in 
The Anatomy Lesson, can no longer stand to be chained to the writer’s life of self­
reflection, but cannot be anything else either. For each character there is a sort of 
reality principle: the essentially unchangeable facts of himself from which he feels he 
cannot escape. The action of these books consists of these characters pushing up 
against these facts, straining to defy them, but ultimately, necessarily, accepting them.
This acceptance is underlined in the last line of The Anatomy Lesson, 
indicating the fruitlessness of Zuckerman’s desire to become a doctor. It is similarly 
highlighted in the final line of My Life as a Man, in which Tamopol realizes the fact 
that he is “this me who is me being me and none other!” {MLM 330). This statement 
is rooted in a particularly pessimistic version of Freud’s conception to the self, 
essentially unchangeable and determined by the past. Each character in The 
Counterlife, by contrast, could very well exclaim that he is “this me who is being me 
and anotherV\ signalling that Roth has exchanged Freud’s model of the self for 
something more fluid, more easily changed. One psychotherapeutic approach that 
may shed some light on what Roth has adopted is referred to as narrative therapy.
Narrative therapy is a psychotherapeutic approach that, although dependent on 
the work of many earlier theorists and therapists, was first outlined in its entirety in 
Michael White and David Epston’s 1990 book Narrative Means to Therapeutic Ends. 
White and Epston recognize that, in psychoanalysis and, in fact, all methods of 
psychotherapy, what is being interpreted is not actually the self, but the necessary 
representation of the self in language. Thus, “in order to make sense of our lives and 
to express ourselves, experience must be ‘storied’ and it is this storying that 
determines the meaning ascribed to experience.”26 Whereas, for Freud, the stories of 
the self told in therapy are a necessary means to uncover the ‘true’ self that underlies 
them, for White and Epston, unconvinced of any objective knowledge of the self 
beyond its representation in language, the stories are the self:
26 Michael White and David Epston, Narrative Means to Therapeutic Ends (New York: Norton, 1990), 
9-10.
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If we accept that persons organize and give meaning to their 
experience through the storying of experience, and that in the 
performance of these stories they express selected aspects of their lived 
experience, then it follows that these stories are constitutive— shaping 
lives and relationships. [...] Thus, the text analogy is distinct from 
those analogies that would propose an underlying structure or 
pathology in families and persons that is constitutive or shaping of 
their lives and relationships.
Freud conceives of the self as an undeniable entity, shrouded in the shadows 
of the patient’s often illogically coded stories, that, even when uncovered by a trained 
analyst, cannot be fundamentally altered. White and Epston, by contrast, posit a much 
more apparent, fluid self, made up of the stories the patient tells about herself. It 
follows, then, that narrative therapy is much more optimistic in its efforts to effect 
change in the patient. By working with the patient, the narrative therapist attempts to 
restory her experience, shaping the story of her self into one better suited to her 
current situation. “The core of the therapeutic technique they [White and Epston] 
describe consists of composing written interventions that tell different stories about
7o
their clients’ lives and their future course.” The Counterlife can be read as a series of 
such ‘written interventions’ about the lives and future course of Nathan and Henry 
Zuckerman. It is almost a natural progression for Roth, who has made so much use of 
the opportunities for self-storytelling within the Freudian model, to be drawn to a 
conception of the self similar to that put forth by narrative therapy, which privileges 
such storytelling above all other explanations of the self.
Narrative Means to Therapeutic Ends was published in 1990, three years after 
The Counterlife, making it difficult to claim that Roth was familiar with the practices 
of narrative therapy while writing his novel. It is certainly possible, however, that 
Roth was familiar with many of the theorists that White and Epston cite as 
forerunners to the ideas that fuel narrative therapy, such as Michel Foucault, Jacques
27 Ibid., 12.
28 Michele L. Crossley, Introducing Narrative Psychology: Self, Trauma and the Construction o f  
A/eaw>ig (Philadelphia: Open University Press, 2000), 60.
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Derrida, and the anthropologist Edward Bruner.29 Regardless of Roth’s familiarity 
with its methods, in delineating a practical therapeutic approach that uses a model of 
the self as narrative, the theories of narrative therapy can provide a contrast to 
psychoanalysis, which so permeated Roth’s previous work.
Keeping the ideas of narrative therapy in mind, it is notable how often the self 
is conceived of as a text or a narrative in The Counterlife. At Henry’s funeral in 
“Basel,” Henry’s wife Carol delivers a eulogy in which she states that “Henry died to 
recover the fullness and richness of married love” (C 30). Nathan, who knows that 
Henry’s surgery was prompted by his desire to continue his extramarital affair with 
his assistant, wonders if Carol believes what she is saying, or whether she is “a subtle 
and persuasive writer of domestic fiction, who had cunningly reimagined a decent, 
ordinary, adulterous humanist as a heroic martyr to the connubial bed” (C 52). 
Comparing Henry’s flight to Israel with his earlier love affair for which he nearly left 
his wife, Nathan is forced to admit: “Certainly the rebellious script he had tried 
following ten years back could hardly touch this one for originality” (C 85). And 
Maria, questioning Nathan’s intentions to marry her and start a family in England, 
tells him, “You do want to make a narrative out of it, with progress and momentum 
and dramatic peaks and then a resolution. You seem to see life as having a beginning; 
a middle, and an ending, all of them linked together with something bearing your 
name” (C 195). Domestic fiction, a script, a narrative: each character’s actions are 
depicted in textual terms, pointing to their wilful origins. Throughout the novel, the 
self is conceived of as a narrative, and each character becomes the author o f his or her 
own story. In his previous work, Roth had often depended upon Freudian language 
and theories for the formulation o f his characters’ selves. But in The Counter life, 
along with a newfound freedom to change one’s self, Roth has granted his characters 
a new way of thinking about the self. As narrative therapy claims, these two concepts 
go hand in hand; a conception of the self as narrative lends itself more easily to 
practical change—changing the self becomes as easy as revising a story. As Maria 
seems to imply, seeing the self as a narrative is an all too appropriate concept for a
29 David Brauner reminds us that Roth’s depiction o f  “the self as contingent, mutable, provisional, 
perenially improvised— as a performance and/or rhetorical construction— cannot be so readily 
associated with one particular figure or school. Nonetheless it has coincided with work by many 
theorists across a range o f disciplines (sociology, philosophy, psychology, anthropology, linguistics, 
gender studes) that challenges and deconstructs the idea o f a unified, sovereign, stable, core Cartesian 
self.” Brauner, Philip Roth, 116.
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writer like Zuckerman, or, like Roth. Ignoring Freud’s vision of man tied to the 
weight of his past, the characters in The Counterlife all act like novelists, writing the 
stories of their selves as they choose to.
The five chapters of The Counterlife, a series of often contradictory variations, 
constitute Roth’s exploration of the consequences of the various narratives that these 
characters might choose to enact. Thus, in “Basel,” Henry attributes the cause of his 
heart disease to the stress caused by his failure to pursue what he desired ten years 
earlier: to leave his wife and move to Switzerland with his mistress Maria. “7/ was the 
consequence o f  failing to find  the ruthlessness to take what he wanted instead o f  
capitulating to what he should do” (C 15). In “Judea,” by contrast, his account of his 
disease is just the opposite— it was brought on by his adulterous desire itself, ‘“ the 
original Jewish dream of escape [...] Switzerland with the beloved shiksa’” (C 115).
Although the fact of Hemy’s heart disease is undeniable in each case—the 
body is reality for Roth—its meaning is determined by the particular story that Henry 
chooses to tell about himself.30 Rather than utilizing a Freudian mindset, in which 
events have a definite significance that the analyst can reveal, here the meaning of 
past events can change as the individual’s story of his self changes. In “Basel,” 
distraught because his impotence condemns him to a life without adultery, Henry 
construes his heart disease as a product of his submission to the responsibilities of a 
good husband and father. In “Judea,” however, with Henry eager to see himself as a 
devout Jew fighting for the noble cause of his religion, the disease becomes a product 
of the infidelities themselves, his failure to submit to his responsibilities as a good 
Jew.
Although Roth explores many alternative stories of the self in My Life as a 
Man, Tamopol, in that book, is confined to relative inaction due to Roth’s conception 
of his self along Freudian lines, and Tamopol’s reliance on psychoanalysis for one of 
those stories. In The Counterlife, having abandoned Freud and adopted a more fluid, 
narrative form, Roth pursues these various stories with all o f their ramifications for 
the self. This is similar to the process pursued by narrative therapists. They start with 
the assumption that “one’s past events cannot be changed. [...] However, the 
interpretation and significance of those events can change if a different plot is used to
30 For an excellent analysis o f Roth’s treatment o f embodiment, see Shostak, Countertexts, 
Counter lives, 20-65.
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configure them.”31 Working with the patient, they hope to tell a new story, in line 
with how the patient would like to see himself, that necessarily alters the meaning of 
some past events. Thus, the meaning of Henry’s heart disease changes completely as 
he creates, as Nathan observes, “the sense of himself he would now prefer to effect” 
(C 117).
*
In Reading for the Plot, his landmark study of the narrative workings of 
fiction, Peter Brooks evokes Freud as a model that can illuminate the way plots 
proceed and function. He explains:
If we turn toward Freud, it is not in the attempt to psychoanalyze 
authors or readers or characters in narrative, but rather to suggest that 
by attempting to superimpose psychic functioning on textual 
functioning, we may discover something about how textual dynamics 
work and something about their psychic equivalences.
Like Brooks, my intention in this chapter has been neither to psychoanalyze Roth, nor 
his readers or characters. Rather, I am more interested in how Roth makes use of 
Freud, how concepts of psychoanalysis have seeped into his work, coloring how he 
creates his characters and how those characters make sense of their lives. I see this 
reliance on psychoanalytic thinking waning in The Counter life, but it would be a 
mistake to suggest that Roth’s new conception of his characters’ selves is a complete 
abandonment or refutation of psychoanalytic thought. Rather, it might be better to 
think of it as an extension of, or supplement to, this long period of immersion in 
Freud’s theories of the self and its analysis. Whereas the radical mutability of the self 
implied by the chaotic narratives of The Counterlife seemingly contradicts Freud’s 
ultimate resignation to his vision of man tied to the weight of his past, it is possible to 
see the seeds of narrative therapy—the transformative possibilities of narrative and 
interpretation—within Freud’s writing.
31 D. P. Polkinghome, Narrative Knowing and the Human Sciences (Albany: SUNY Press, 1988), 182.
32 Peter Brooks, Reading for the Plot (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), 90.
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One strand of what we might call the interpretive possibilities of Freud’s 
psychoanalysis can be elucidated through reference to his famous case history of the 
“Wolf Man.” Freud traced the origins of the Wolf Man’s neuroses to a childhood 
dream, in which the patient saw six or seven white wolves perched in a tree outside of 
his window, staring at him. He awoke terrified from the dream, and quickly 
developed a fear of animals that lasted for years. Freud theorized that this dream, and 
the resulting phobia, was the result of the patient seeing his parents having sex when 
he was a year and a half old—an event that the patient did not remember. From all of 
the various recollections, associations, and symptoms the Wolf Man exhibited to 
Freud, this early event was posited as the primal scene, the initiating and motivating 
incident that set the patient’s entire narrative in motion. Freud stakes the entire 
analysis on the truth value of this particular construction; after reviewing the case, he 
states: “either the analysis based on the neurosis in his childhood is all a piece of 
nonsense from start to finish, or everything took place just as I have described it 
above.”33
The Wolf Man’s first course of treatment, which is the subject of the case 
histoiy “From the History of an Infantile Neurosis,” concluded in July 1914. Freud 
finished the piece in November of that year, but did not publish it until 1918. The 
piece remains unchanged from its 1914 version, except for two long passages that 
Freud has inserted, in brackets in order for the reader to see what has been added. In 
what Brooks calls “one of the most daring moments of Freud’s thought, and one of 
his most heroic gestures as a writer,” Freud allows for the possibility that the patient 
did not witness his parents having sex after all; perhaps he merely saw two animals 
copulating and subsequently constructed a fantasy about his parents.34 As many 
commentators have noted, this is a significant moment in the evolution of Freud’s 
thought. It suggests that the actual occurrence of events constructed within the 
analysis need not have taken place to retain their explanatory and persuasive power. 
Keeping in mind the absolute necessity that Freud assigns to the primal scene in the 
original draft, it is astonishing to read in the second bracketed passage:
33 Sigmund Freud, “From the History o f  an Infantile Neurosis,” in The Standard Edition o f  the 
Complete Psychological Works o f  Sigmund Freud. Vol. 17, trans. and ed. James Strachey (London: 
The Hogarth Press, 1955), 56.
34 Brooks, Reading fo r  the Plot, 277.
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I should myself be glad to know whether the primal scene in my 
present patient’s case was a phantasy or a real experience; but, taking 
other similar cases into account, I must admit that the answer to this 
question is not in fact a matter o f very great importance.35
The implication of this addition is that narratives can retrospectively create meanings 
for past events (or non-events), rather than merely following ffom significant events 
in a fixed and causative sequence. The past no longer necessarily determines 
succeeding events; sometimes the meaning of past events can be determined by the 
present—of course, this is essentially the guiding principle of narrative therapy.
But this apparently substantial change in Freud’s thinking did not compel him 
to go back and revise his conclusions about the Wolf Man’s early experience in the 
piece. Rather, Freud leaves everything in, and supplements his original case history 
with the bracketed material— leaving both his certainty and his doubts to remain in 
the finished product D. P. Polkinghome argues that that the apparent contradiction 
left for the reader is indicative of a new complexity in Freud’s thought. “He 
maintained that the two logics—one which insists on the causal efficacy of origins 
and the other which treats events as the products of meanings—must exist side by 
side.”36 Brooks, ever on the lookout for implications within Freud’s thought for the 
ways in which narratives work, sees in the Wolf Man case history similarities to the 
open-ended narratives found within modernist and post-modernist fictions:
A narrative account that allows the inception of its story to be either 
event or fiction [...] perilously destabilizes belief in explanatory 
histories as exhaustive accounts whose authority derives ffom the force 
of closure, from the capacity to say: here is where it began, here is 
what it became.37
This sounds very much like the “narrative account” offered within The Counterlife— 
the reader is never sure which set of events ‘actually happened,’ and Roth continually 
refuses the satisfaction that comes from the neat solutions and definite conclusions of
35 Freud, “From the History o f an Infantile Neurosis,” 97.
36 Polkinghome, Narrative Knowing and the Human Sciences, 121.
37 Brooks, Reading for the Plot, 277.
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traditional realist narratives. In an interview just before the book’s publication, Roth 
posed questions ffom an imagined reader to himself to illustrate the strategies at work 
here: “Which is real and which is false? All are equally real or equally false. Which 
are you asking me to believe m? All/none.” Whatever his motivations for doing so, 
Freud’s inclusion of the bracketed material creates a narrative in which the 
relationship between origins and subsequent events are called into question, 
undermining the assumption that there is always a definite motive or starting point to 
be uncovered. A belief in such uncertainty would eventually become one of the 
central tenets of narrative therapy.
The American psychoanalyst Donald Spence, in his Narrative Truth and 
Historical Truth, offers up a critique o f Freud that nonetheless argues that the 
“narrative tradition” has always been a part of psychoanalysis. Spence distinguishes 
between narrative truth, “the persuasive power of a coherent narrative,” and historical 
truth, a set of events that actually happened. He argues that Freud’s insistence, until 
the end of his life, that the analyst is a sort of archaeologist, uncovering buried pieces 
of the patient’s past, was very often a necessary bulwark against the charges of 
charlatanism that plagued psychoanalysis in its early years. “To function in this 
tradition was, as we shall see, not only to function as a dispassionate scientist; it also 
provided the best protection against the charge of suggestion and the best defense 
against the doubts of the incredulous nonbelievers.”40 But Freud’s desire to portray 
psychoanalysis as a scientific pursuit led him to confuse and conflate narrative truth 
with historical truth, overlooking the ways in which the particular context of 
interpretation within analysis necessarily dictates the ways in which the patient’s 
history is constructed, and overlooking the fact that a successful interpretation may 
have more to do with its persuasiveness as a good story with explanatory power than 
with its status as historical truth. “Interpretations are persuasive, as we shall see, not 
because of their evidential value but because of their rhetorical appeal; conviction 
emerges because the fit is good, not because we have necessarily made contact with 
the past.”41 Spence’s argument is that psychoanalysts have always been engaged in 
the construction of narrative truth, going all the way back to Freud. What is important
38 Roth, “Interview on Zuckerman,” 161.
39 Donald Spence, Narrative Truth and Historical Truth: Meaning and Interpretation in 
Psychoanalysis (New York: Norton, 1982), 21.
40 Ibid., 32.
41
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is that analysts understand the difference between narrative truth and historical truth, 
and keep in mind the necessary work that is done in putting a patient’s experiences, 
dreams, and memories into language—work that is always colored by the particular 
desires and motivations of both the analyst and the patient, and by the particular 
context of the ‘analytic space’. It is no surprise that Spence’s book is one of a very 
few psychoanalytic texts to be referenced in some of the seminal works of narrative 
therapy; he seems to provide a valuable link between the two practices.42
Serge Viderman, the French psychoanalyst, expresses similar views in his 
skepticism of the definite, historical truth that can be interpolated ffom any one 
interpretation. After considering an interpretation in a case study by Melanie Klein, 
Viderman responds:
this is a perfectly likely interpretation but [...] it conforms to a model 
that is only one among other possible interpretations, a model chosen 
according to the Kleinian system of interpretation for tactical reasons; 
and it cannot lay claim to any other truth than the one created for it in 
the analytic space by the speech which formulates it.43
It is the confidence in the rightness of an interpretation that can never be proven, a 
confidence assumed to be inherent in psychoanalysis, that sets Henry off on a 
scathing denunciation of his brother Nathan’s psychoanalytic worldview in the second 
chapter of The Counterlife. Nathan has come to Israel to try to understand why Henry 
has given up his respectable, conventional life in New Jersey for the life of a pious 
warrior in the West Bank; Henry seems to resent any assumption of, or search for, his 
motives.
“let me tell you something—you can’t explain away what I’ve done by 
motives any more than I can explain away what you’ve done. Beyond
42 See Polkinghome, Narrative Knowing and the Human Sciences; Martin Payne, Narrative Therapy: 
An Introduction for Counsellors (London: Sage Publications, 2006); and Lynne E. Angus and John 
McLeod, eds,. The Handbook o f  Narrative and Psychotherapy: Practice, Theory, and Research 
(London: Sage Publications, 2004).
43 Serge Viderman, “The Analytic Space: Meaning and Problems,” The Psychoanalytic Quarterly 48, 
no. 2 (1979): 263.
154
all your profundities, beyond the Freudian lock you put on every single 
person’s life, there is another world, a larger world, a world of 
ideology, of politics, of history—a world o f things larger than the 
kitchen table! [...] There’s a world outside the Oedipal swamp,
Nathan, where what matters isn’t what made you do it but what it is 
you d o r  (C 144)
It is the idea of a “Freudian lock” that Henry protests most—that Freudian 
interpretation’s assumption of historical truth is reductive, and restrictive of the ways 
in which people shape their lives. He is drawn to “another world,” in which motives 
cannot always be pinned down, or explained in a logical, consequential way. Any 
interpretation that Nathan may offer up is only one interpretation, and can never fully 
exist as an objective explanation of why Henry has done what he has done. In having 
Henry deliver this critique of a psychoanalytic, archaeological view to his novelist 
brother, Roth is doing more than merely “giv[ing] the other guy the best lines,” as he 
has said he is wont to do.44 It is perhaps a message to himself, informing Roth the 
writer that there are, and always have been, many ways o f telling a story, of creating 
character, plot, possibility, and consequence. The Roth who had always given his 
characters firm and fixed (if often unknown) motivations becomes a Roth who would 
continually emphasize the essentially mysterious and unknowable nature of human 
behavior.
I’d argue that it is this “Freudian lock,” the rigidity of the Freudian 
explanation of the self, that can account for Roth’s apparent break with 
psychoanalysis in The Counterlife. Jeffrey Berman, writing about the psychoanalysts 
in Roth’s fiction, has noted that Roth does not understand psychoanalysis “as a 
narrative strategy similar to fiction making, with both the analyst and the fiction 
writer creating as opposed to discovering truth. [...] His psychoanalysts seem frozen 
in time, imprisoned by a rigid Freudian ideology that most analysts have long ago 
abandoned or sharply revised.” Unable to say whether “psychoanalysis failed Roth or 
whether he failed psychoanalysis,” Berman nonetheless identifies an important aspect 
of Roth’s Freudian thinking.45 Unlike Brooks, Spence, and Viderman, Roth does not
44 Roth, “Interview with The London Sunday Times,” 113.
45 Berman, “Revisiting Roth’s Psychoanalysts,’’ 106.
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envision psychoanalysis as a body o f knowledge that can create truths about the self. 
Rather, Freud becomes something o f a strawman for Roth to fight against, a rigid 
structure constricting his characters, as they attempt to conceive of the self as 
something freer. In the end, this became too much of a straightjacket for Roth’s 
enduring need to make of his career a “self-conscious and deliberate zigzag.” A new 
sense of the self was needed. As he has Zuckerman say in The Counterlife, “The 
burden isn’t either/or, consciously choosing from possibilities equally difficult and 
regrettable—it’s and/and/and/and/and as well. Life is and: the accidental and the 
immutable, the elusive and the graspable, the bizarre and the predictable, the actual 
and the potential” (C 310).
Nonetheless, I don’t want to suggest that The Counterlife shows Roth’s 
characters escaping the inflexibility of the Freudian self for some sort of ultimate 
freedom from the determining forces of their own pasts, their bodies, history, or 
ethnicity. Despite the characters’ seeming freedom to write new stories for 
themselves, none of the new directions can be said to end well. In particular, the 
conclusion of the novel’s final chapter, “Christendom,” in which Zuckerman sets off 
for a new life in England with his new wife Maria, pregnant with his child, points to a 
caveat to The Counter life's abandonment of a rigid Freudian model. It is the specter 
of anti-Semitism, in the guise of Maria’s unhinged sister, her prejudiced mother, and a 
rude woman in a restaurant, that fuels a vicious row that threatens to undo their happy 
future together. Less shocked by the continued existence of anti-Semitism in England 
than by his own sensitivity to the issue, Zuckerman sees the eruption of marital strife 
as the intrusion of history and ethnic identity into their idyll. Even though he is “[a] 
Jew without Jews, without Judaism, without Zionism, without Jewishness,” 
Zuckerman is a Jew nonetheless, and there is no escaping the historical inheritance, 
however figured, that marks him from birth (C 328). In an imagined letter to Maria, 
Zuckerman makes the case for the circumcision of their impending child, arguing that 
the act is the ultimate reminder that the dream of life as an idyll—the pastoral— is a 
dangerous and unattainable goal:
Circumcision makes it clear as can be that you are here and not there, 
that you are out and not in— also that you’re mine and not theirs. There 
is no way around it: you enter history through my history and me. 
Circumcision is everything that the pastoral is not and, to my mind,
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reinforces what the world is about, which isn’t strifeless unity. Quite 
convincingly, circumcision gives the lie to the womb-dream of life in 
the beautiful state o f innocent prehistory, the appealing idyll o f living 
“naturally,” unencumbered by man-made ritual. (C 327)
The dream that Zuckerman and Maria pursued, an idyllic ascent into the untroubled 
happiness of true love, is deflated here, refigured as an unattainable delusion of 
“strifeless unity.” “We couldn’t just be ‘us’ and say the hell with ‘them’ any more 
than we could say to hell with the twentieth century when it intruded upon our idyll” 
(C 312). Zuckerman’s critique of the pastoral, a fiercely argued reminder of all that 
we cannot control, offers a balancing restriction to the psychological freedom Roth 
grants his characters in the novel. Explaining the lack of a single, unified reality in 
The Counterlife, Roth stated that the book’s unusual form is intended to emphasize 
the ways in which people construct their selves, and their reality, out of narrative. He 
claims: “We are writing fictitious versions of our lives all the time, contradictory but 
mutually entangling stories that, however subtly or grossly falsified, constitute our 
hold on reality and are the closest thing we have to the truth.”46 But these “fictitious 
versions” do not take place within a vacuum, and Zuckerman’s realization at the end 
of The Counterlife is that the reality of the world continually works to restrict and 
impede the stories we might tell. As many critics have noted, this stance colors much 
of Roth’s work after The Counter life, as Roth “examines the seduction, delusion, and 
power of antitragic ‘utopian thinking.’”47 Indeed, Roth’s “American Trilogy” in many 
ways investigates the tragedies of men whose failures are tied to pastoral dreams of 
innocence and individuality, as they try in vain to set their own course amidst the 
turmoil of American history. In some ways, the four books that immediately followed 
The Counterlife, books that I take up in the next chapter, each can be seen to work to 
undermine a sort of pastoral version of autobiography, one that proposes that one can 
write truthfully about the self without writing about, and thus exposing, other people.
46 Roth, ‘interview on Zuckerman,” 161.
47 Posnock, Philip Roth’s Rude Truth, 103. For more on Roth’s treatment of the pastoral, see Brauner, 
Post-War Jewish Fiction, 74-77; Brauner, Philip Roth, 148-85; Monika Hogan, “‘Something so 
Visceral in with the Rhetorical’: Race, Hypochondria, and the Un-Assimilated Body in American 
Pastoral,” Studies in American Jewish Literature 23 (2004): 1-14; Bonnie Lyons, “En-Countering 
Pastorals in The Counterlife,” in Philip Roth: New Perspectives on an American Author, 120-7; Derek 
Parker Royal, “Pastoral Dreams and National Identity in American Pastoral and I Married a 
Communist," in Philip Roth: New Perspectives on an American Author, 185-207.
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The Counterlife explores a series of imaginative possibilities for Roth’s 
characters, and, considering his work thereafter, seemingly opened up a range of 
possibilities for Roth as a writer. The increasingly adventurous narrative strategies of 
The Facts, Deception, and Operation Shy lock, calling into question any accurate 
representation of reality as well as anything like an authentic self, are testaments to 
The Counterlife as a watershed in Roth’s career. And Nathan Zuckerman’s 
reappearance in American Pastoral, I  Married a Communist, and The Human Stain, 
this time a storyteller on the sidelines of the action, signals that Roth has moved 
beyond the problem of Zuckerman’s exhaustion with his self with great success. 
These books almost seem to be the product of a different writer than the Roth so 
conspicuously aligned with the Freudian view of the self. It is certainly tempting, 
ffom this vantagepoint, to commit the sin of confusing Roth with Zuckerman, and 
imagine a writer, exhausted with his tried and true fictional methods, who granted 
himself a counterlife as a novelist who keenly appreciates his life and his self as a 
series of fictional possibilities.
158
Chapter Five
“I am a thief and a thief is not to be trusted”
In 1989, thirty years into a career that had already been characterized by its 
willfulness, its urge to subvert expectations, and its range of preoccupations, Roth 
published what must have seemed a truly strange book: an autobiography. Titled The 
Facts: A Novelist’s Autobiography, this was a memoir of Roth’s life up to the 
publication of Portnoy's Complaint in 1969. It’s a rather prosaic and straightforward 
look back on the author’s coming of age in America: his upbringing, his college days, 
his disastrous first marriage. It would have seemed quite a conventional, almost 
boring, book from such a notoriously adventurous writer, had it not been for its 
prologue and epilogue. The book is prefaced by a brief letter from Roth to his most 
recent fictional protagonist, Nathan Zuckerman, asking him to read the ensuing 
memoir and let him know what he thinks o f it. Naturally, the book’s epilogue is 
Zuckerman’s response to Roth, a thirty-five page excoriation of the book we’ve just 
read, urging Roth not to publish it: “you are far better off writing about me than 
‘accurately’ reporting your own life” (F  161). These bracketing letters throw a wrench 
into the seemingly clear logic of Roth’s apparent autobiographical move. It’s as if, 
even when he’s abandoning fiction, it refuses to abandon him. The presence of the 
letters, especially Zuckerman’s concluding riposte, serves to make autobiography 
itself a subject of inquiry, as Roth’s alter ego calls into question the genre’s veracity, 
literary merit, and usefulness. The subject would preoccupy Roth for some time, as 
The Facts was the first of four books, published consecutively, each of which 
contained, at least in part, non-fictional accounts of the author’s life. Deception
(1990) is subtitled “A Novel,” but it is in the form of the notebooks of an author
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named Philip, one who, in all personal details, resembles Philip Roth. Patrimony
(1991) is a memoir of Roth’s father’s final two years, as he suffered through the 
illnesses which would take his life. And Operation Shylock (1993) is subtitled “A 
Confession,” with Roth telling the “true,” though outlandish and generally regarded as 
fictional, story of an impostor calling himself “Philip Roth,” wreaking havoc in Israel 
with Roth’s identity.
Roth’s adoption of autobiography as a mode to be examined seems a move 
inward, prompted in part by a mid-career desire for retrospection and a looming sense 
of his own mortality triggered by a series o f terrifying health scares. But the move 
also seems to be the product of a career’s worth of accusations from critics that he 
insufficiently fictionalizes: as Philip says in Deception, “I write fiction and I’m told 
it’s autobiography, I write autobiography and I’m told it’s fiction, so since I’m so dim 
and they’re so smart, let them decide what it is or it isn’t.”1 The move to tell the truth 
about his own life, or at least to seem to be telling the truth about his own life, was a 
new one for Roth. Even though many of Roth’s works of fiction have openly courted 
autobiographical readings through a variety of strategies, and even though, as the 
above quote from Deception attests, these “autobiographical” works play with the 
boundaries between fact and fiction, I would argue that these four books, to varying 
extents, reveal their author as he has never seen fit to be revealed before. Furthermore, 
Roth’s decision to write about himself leads him to a consideration and exploration of 
the effects autobiographical writing has on others. The truth-value implied by the 
autobiographical pact brings Roth into new ethical territory: it is impossible to write 
truthfully about yourself without writing about, and thus, exposing, others as well.
The conflict that springs from this territory—the rights of the writer to tell his own 
story versus the rights of those unwillingly exposed through the process—is one that 
is highlighted in all four of these books, and will be the main subject of this chapter. 
This conflict in some ways returns to the conflict over Goodbye, Columbus: the right 
of the novelist to tell his artistic truth versus the rights of the real community 
portrayed within that telling.
*
1 Philip Roth, Deception (London: Vintage, 1990), 184. Subsequent references will be noted 
parenthetically in the text.
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From the start, Roth was well-versed in writing about himself, particularly, as 
we have seen in “Writing About Jews,” when he felt forced to defend himself over 
accusations of the betrayal of his community. In addition to “Writing About Jews,” 
Roth wrote a handful of autobiographical essays for magazines in the late 50s and 
early 60s, including a humorous piece about being recognized as a member of the 
“cultural elite” (“The Kind of Person I Am”), a brief memoir of childhood 
(“Recollections From Beyond the Last Rope”), and an essay on his time spent at the 
Iowa Writer’s Workshop (“Iowa: A Very Far Country Indeed”).2 In 1975, Roth 
published Reading Myself and Others, a collection divided up into a section of 
interviews he had given on his work, and a number of essays on other writers’ work 
(including “Writing American Fiction”). And in 2001, Roth would publish Shop Talk, 
a collection of interviews with other writers, including Primo Levi, Isaac Bashevis 
Singer, and Milan Kundera. But The Facts marks the first extended work of 
autobiography in his oeuvre. In his prefatory letter to Zuckerman, Roth wonders if his 
motivation might stem from his critical reception: “Why? To prove that there is a 
significant gap between the autobiographical writer that I am thought to be and the 
autobiographical writer that I am? To prove that the information that I drew ffom my 
life was, in the fiction, incomplete?” (F  3). He quickly dismisses this explanation, 
doubting that he would have gone to so much trouble just to appease readers not 
“thoughtful” enough to understand the way a novelist transforms his life’s experience 
into fiction. But it is telling that this is the first reason proposed. Clearly the long- 
running critical insinuations that Roth too often writes about Roth had had their effect 
on him.4 Critical reception, it would seem, is never too far ffom Roth’s mind, as he 
then connects the autobiographical impulse with his earliest critics: “[N]o one sent
2 Philip Roth, “The Kind of Person I Am,” The New Yorker, 29 November 1958, 167-72;
“Recollections From Beyond the Last Rope,” H arper’s Magazine, July 1959,42-48; “Iowa: A Very 
Far Country Indeed,” Esquire, December 1962, 19-32.
3 For more on Roth’s non-fiction writing, see Darren Hughes, “The ‘Written World’ o f Philip Roth’s 
Nonfiction,” in Philip Roth: New Perspectives on an American Author, 255-70; and Hana Wirth- 
Nesher, “Roth’s Autobiographical Writings,” in The Cambridge Companion to Philip Roth, 158-72.
4 Of course, Roth is well known for dramatizing these critical insinuations in his fiction. In addition to 
The Ghost Writer's, recreation o f the critical firestorm over Goodbye, Columbus, Zuckerman Unbound 
particularly tackles the accusation that his protagonists are nothing more than thinly veiled (if that) 
versions o f  himself, as Zuckerman cannot walk down the street without passersby calling out to him as 
Camovsky, the hero o f his sensational Portnoy-Wke bestseller. Roth, Zuckerman Unbound, 135-9. For 
discussion of Roth’s frequent autobiographical references in his fiction, see Alan Cooper, Philip Roth 
and the Jews (Albany: State University o f New York Press, 1996), 51-71; and Joe Moran, Star 
Authors: Literary Celebrity in America (London: Pluto Press, 2000), 100-15.
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down for an autobiography from Roth. The order, if  it was ever even placed, went out 
thirty years ago, when certain of my Jewish elders demanded to know just who this 
kid was who was writing this stuff’ (F  4). Again, even though the idea is dismissed as 
Roth’s motivation, a conception of autobiography as explanation, as an attempt to set 
the record straight to those who have misunderstood you, is floated here.
But no, Roth insists, this is not what has prompted this unexpected bout of 
truth-telling; The Facts is much more the product o f a particularly debilitating mid­
life crisis, triggered by a series of physical and mental calamities.
I was all at once in a state of helpless confusion and could not 
understand any longer what once was obvious to me: why I do what I 
do, why I live where I live, why I share my life with the one I do [...] 
I’m talking about a breakdown. [.. .]in the spring of 1987, at the height 
of a ten-year period of creativity, what was to have been minor surgery 
turned into a prolonged physical ordeal that led to an extreme 
depression that carried me right to the edge of emotional and mental 
dissolution. (F 4-5)
Having barely survived the worst ordeal of his life, Roth claims that he started writing 
a memoir not to explain himself to his critics, but, at a time of great confusion, 
distress, and uncertainty, to attempt to explain himself to himself again. This accounts 
for the book’s rather quotidian recounting of Roth’s happy childhood and 
adolescence, his discovery of world literature at university, and his quick (and, as 
described here, relatively easy) early success. “I suppose I wanted to return to the 
point when the launch was the launch of a more ordinary Roth [...] back to the 
original well, not for material but for the launch, the relaunch—out of fuel, back to 
tank up on the magic blood” (F  6). This is autobiography as therapy, the recital of the 
story of the self, so as to be reminded of the continuity of the se lf s narrative. It is an 
odd sort of therapy for a writer such as Roth, who has long seemed to cast doubt upon 
the fixity of the factual, taking his own personal details and experiences and 
transforming them—often subverting them— into the impure concoctions of 
remembered and imagined characteristics that are his fictional creations. He has 
thrived for decades upon playing with the temptation of readers to read his 
protagonists as thinly veiled autobiographical portraits of himself. Updike’s
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characterization of the Zuckerman books as a project that “looks like a roman-a-clef 
but is not,” hits upon what is certainly one of the most intriguing aspects of those 
books, and o f much of Roth’s written output.5 Neil Klugman, Portnoy, Kepesh, 
Tamopol, and Zuckerman all share a certain amount of biographical detail with their 
creator, and, since Roth became an established literary figure, with more and more 
known about his own biography, he has, as Joe Moran has claimed, “created a kind of 
‘hall o f mirrors’ effect which has only added to the public confusion about the 
relationship between the author and his characters.”6 In his desperation to find himself 
again, to regain a strong sense of identity in the wake of a “breakdown” which 
seemed to rob him of all self-certainty, Roth writes the story of who he was before he 
became the Philip Roth who so publicly played with such ideas o f identity. In his 
combined introduction and explanation of this move, Roth implies that, after years of 
constructing this “hall of mirrors,” he began to feel trapped in it himself:
I was depleted by the rules I’d set myself—by having to imagine 
things not quite as they had happened to me or things that never 
happened to me or things that couldn’t possibly have happened to me 
happening to an agent, a projection of mine, to a kind of me. If this 
manuscript conveys anything, it’s my exhaustion with masks, 
disguises, distortions, and lies. (F  6)
So far, so straightforward—when the self feels burned out, when the long-practiced 
strategies of fictionalization and projection and transformation fail to aid recovery 
from a self-annihilating breakdown, there’s nothing left to do but tell the truth. And 
yet, an early draft of the manuscript which Roth claims conveys his “exhaustion” with 
“distortions” begins with the following, distinctly Rothian, line: “Here is the 
distortion called fidelity.”7
If these four “autobiographical” books were ever to be packaged in one 
volume, like Zuckerman Bound, “The Distortion Called Fidelity” might very well be 
the title. The permeability of the borders between fact and fiction, the ways in which
5 Quoted in Roth, “Interview on Zuckerman,” 150.
6 Moran, Star Authors, 104.
7 Philip Roth, “‘A Counterbook (Portrait o f the Artist as a Young American),’ Copy A, Part I, Dec. 
1986,” “The Facts', Drafts; Early Versions,” Box 85, Philip Roth Collection.
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non-fiction may be just as unreliable a representation of reality as fiction, the games 
Roth plays with his readers’ expectations of divulgence: these are inevitably questions 
taken up in these four “autobiographical” books. These are also the questions most 
often taken up by studies of these books, and while I do agree with Debra Shostak’s 
assertion that these books continue Roth’s project of making “capital out of his 
readers’ inclinations toward biographical interpretations of his work,” this is not the 
area on which I will focus here. There have been sufficient inquiries into Roth’s 
puncturing of the myth of non-fictional transparency (not least by Roth himself), and 
there is no need for yet another look at the ways in which Roth plays with “the facts,” 
or generic distinctions, or his readers’ beliefs about him.9
In addition to this common academic reading, the popular press unsurprisingly 
cast these four books as the continuation—perhaps the culmination—of a popular 
critical narrative: Roth is always writing about himself. Justin Kaplan wrote that 
Zuckerman’s critical skewering o f Roth in The Facts “suggests that for Roth his life 
and his work, his ‘facts’ and his ‘fiction,’ are virtually identical,” and hoped that the 
book would be “a final turn of the screw to his proprietary materials, the Philip Roth 
megillah.” In a review of Deception, Christopher Lehmann-Haupt mused that Roth’s 
readers “must surely be growing impatient for the author to stop analyzing his 
imagination and start exercising it, if he hasn't dissected it beyond repair by now.”
The reviews of Operation Shylock mostly stuck to the same script, seeing the book 
caught in “the centrifugal force of its narrator’s self-absorption.” Hillel Halkin 
summed up what seemed a common sentiment, writing that “some men are naturally 
monogamous, and Roth is naturally monographous; the only subject that has ever 
genuinely interested him as an author is the self that he is trapped in.”10 As I have 
claimed, Roth is never content to choose one extreme without entertaining its
8 Shostak, Countertexts, Counterlives, 158-9. David Brauner writes that the four books, as well as The 
Plot Against America, “constitute a sustained interrogation o f the relationship between these two labels 
[fiction and non-fiction].” Brauner, Philip Roth, 80. See also Richard Turek, “Caught Between The 
Facts and Deception,” in Philip Roth: New Perspectives on an American Author, 129-42; and Eugene 
Goodheart, Novel Practices: Classic Modern Fiction (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 2004), 161-74.
9 In the letter that closes The Facts, Roth puts words into Zuckerman’s mouth that would anticipate 
much o f the investigation o f these books: “With autobiography there’s always another text, a 
countertext, if you will, to the one presented. It’s probably the most manipulative o f all literary forms” 
(F I 72).
10 Justin Kaplan, “Play it Again, Nathan,” New York Times, 25 September 1988, 3; Christopher 
Lehmann-Haupt, “So is the Hero Really Philip Roth, or Not?”, New York Times, 5 March 1990, C, 16; 
Michiko Kakutani, “Of a Roth Within a Roth Within a Roth,” New York Times, 4 March 1993, C, 17; 
and Hillel Halkin, “The Traipse o f Roth,” Jerusalem Report, 8 April 1993, 54.
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opposite, and it is worth questioning the simplified reading that equates 
autobiographical reference with solipsism. In an early draft of Operation Shylock 
(then called Duality) from 1990, there is evidence that Roth did play with the idea of 
publishing these four books in one volume; there is a title page for just such a 
potential collection:
TWO-FACED
An Autobiography in Four Acts
1. The Facts, a Novelist’s Autobiography
2. Deception, a Novel
3. Patrimony, a True Story
4. Duality, a Novelist’s Fantasy11
Two-Faced would be a wholly appropriate title for the series, if it indeed were a 
series, for it suggests Roth’s simultaneous inward and outward gaze, of which these 
four books provide a particularly good example. While Roth is ostensibly writing 
about himself, this chapter will argue, he finds himself inevitably writing about other 
people, and the consequent ethical dilemmas lend these books a significant shared 
concern. Two-Faced also suggests deception and betrayal, the attendant accusations 
always tempted by writing non-fictional depictions of other people. I find in Roth’s 
investigation into autobiography found in The Facts, Deception, Patrimony, and 
Operation Shylock, not a solipsistic exercise of self-absorption, but instead evidence 
of a renewed concern with the responsibilities of writing about others, and with the 
differing, and often conflicting, claims that aesthetics and ethics can exert upon the 
writer.
*
I begin with Patrimony, Roth’s memoir of his dying father’s final year, 
because, in contrast to the other three books discussed here, its status—whether it is 
non-fiction, or fiction, or some admixture— is never in question. There are no games
11 Philip Roth, “Operation Shylock: Drafts; First, Copy A; 1990, March 25,” Box 155, Philip Roth 
Collection.
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being played here, no teasing hints that the author should not be trusted, no web of 
textual reference to penetrate: it is, very simply, a faithful account of a father’s illness 
and death by a loving and loyal son. That Roth should leave aside, for the moment, 
the self-conscious courting of generic confusion seems appropriate given the subject 
matter. As Mark Shechner points out, “Dissolving reality and speaking only through 
masks is fine, when the subject is yourself, [...] but your father is your father, and 
postmodernism and magic realism simply won’t do.”12 Patrimony stands apart from 
the other “autobiographical” books in its seemingly unquestioned belief in the 
transparency of non-fiction writing; nowhere does Roth raise doubts as to whether his 
version of the events narrated here is trustworthy. Clearly, the shock and significance 
of a father’s death trumps all such writerly games (for one book, at least).
In addition, Patrimony differs from the other books of the period in that the 
subject is someone other than Philip Roth. The book’s first words are “My father,” 
and its focus is trained upon Herman Roth throughout:
My father had lost most of the sight in his right eye by the time he’d 
reached eighty-six, but otherwise he seemed in phenomenal health for 
a man his age when he came down with what the Florida doctor 
diagnosed, incorrectly, as Bell’s palsy, a viral infection that causes 
paralysis, usually temporary, to one side of the face.13
It turns out that the facial paralysis has been caused by a “massive tumor” in 
Herman’s brain, and the book details the nearly two years between this diagnosis and 
his death, in October 1989. Philip is with his father through most of the hellish ordeal; 
the book is both an account of those two years and an appraisal of his father’s whole 
life. It is a loving, clear-eyed portrait of a man as stubborn and uncompromising as he 
was devoted and generous. Roth writes, with equal parts admiration and criticism,
“He could never understand that a capacity for renunciation and iron self-discipline 
like his own was extraordinary and not an endowment shared by all” (P 79). But as 
well as paying tribute to the father, the book is also, inevitably, a picture of the son. In 
her study of memoirs of the deaths of parents, Bequest and Betrayal, Nancy K. Miller
12 Shechner, Up Society's Ass, Copper, 127.
13 Philip Roth, Patrimony (New York: Vintage, 1991), 9. Subsequent references will be noted 
parenthetically in the text.
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notes that: “Producing an account o f another’s life normally belongs to the domain of 
biography [...] But when the biographical subject is a member of one’s own family, 
the line between genres blurs.”14 Patrimony is not a biography of Herman Roth, but 
then again, it is not just another installment in Philip Roth’s autobiography either. It 
tells readers something about both of them, often at the same time. Naturally, a son’s 
portrait of his father will tend to highlight those aspects of the father that have 
influenced and formed the son’s character; this book is no different. Throughout his 
life, Herman Roth drew from a seemingly inexhaustible well of stories about 
Newark’s past, telling anyone who would listen the tales of the community that used 
to thrive there. Philip is undoubtedly appreciative of this urge to narrate, telling a 
friend, “H e’s the bard of Newark. That really rich Newark stuff isn’t my story— it’s 
his” (P 125). And yet the cover of the book reads: Philip Roth.15
Paul John Eakin, in his work on life writing, has discussed a “relational 
concept of selfhood,” in which the self cannot be conceived as completely 
autonomous, self-determining, or free from encroachment on, and by, others’ selves. 
If we accept that our lives are inevitably tied up with those of others, writing 
truthfully about oneself will always require writing truthfully about others. “Because 
our own lives never stand free of the lives of others, we are faced with our 
responsibility to those others whenever we write about ourselves. There is no 
escaping this responsibility.”16 Writing non-fiction, especially autobiographical 
writing, therefore inevitably invites ethical considerations that do not apply to fiction. 
When an author purports to tell the truth, and that true story involves people other 
than himself, he takes it upon himself to expose others in ways of his choosing. This 
exposure can, of course, be benign, and no one would deny a writer’s right to tell a 
story from his perspective. This right, however, must be weighed against the rights of 
those exposed, who have no control over the way that they are portrayed. As Richard 
Freadman has remarked, “Writers have a right to write. But how far into the privacy
14 Nancy K. Miller, Bequest and Betrayal: Memoirs o f  a Parent’s Death (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1996), 2.
15 Paul John Eakin points out that “the signature on the title page,” in a “proximate collaborative 
autobiography” like Patrimony, “reflects the necessarily unequal distribution o f power in situations of 
this kind: once the narrative has been published, whatever the terms o f the collaboration may have 
been, an act o f appropriation has occurred, and the self who signs may well be led to reflect on the 
ethical responsibilities involved.” Paul John Eakin, How Our Lives Become Stories: Making Selves 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999), 176.
16 Ibid., 161, 159.
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17of others does that right extend?” These considerations figure in all four of the 
books discussed in this chapter, but Patrimony, perhaps because Philip’s and his 
father’s selves are so clearly interconnected, provides a particularly interesting 
illustration of the ethical issues which must be faced when writing non-fiction.
Both Eakin and Miller have written about Patrimony in their discussions of 
the ethics of life writing; for each of them, one scene in particular stands out.18 After a 
stint in the hospital for a biopsy on his tumor that has left him weakened and 
constipated, Herman excuses himself from a lunch with Philip, Claire Bloom, and 
Philip’s nephew and niece to try to move his bowels again. After some time passes 
with Herman still upstairs, Philip goes up to check on his father. Detecting the 
“overwhelming” smell halfway up the stairs, Philip finds his father naked, stepping 
out of the shower, and near tears. “In a voice as forlorn as any I had ever heard, from 
him or from anyone, he told me what it hadn’t been difficult to surmise. ‘I beshat 
m yself”:
The shit was everywhere, smeared underfood on the bathmat, running 
over the toilet bowl edge and, at the foot of the bowl, in a pile on the 
floor. It was splattered across the glass of the shower stall from which 
he’d just emerged, and the clothes discarded in the hallway were 
clotted with it. (P 171-2)
After helping his father back into the shower, bagging up the soiled clothes, and 
drying him off with a clean towl, Philip gets him into bed.
“Don’t tell the children,” he said, looking up at me from the bed with 
his one sighted eye.
“I won’t tell anyone,” I said. “I’ll say you’re taking a rest.”
“Don’t tell Claire.”
“Nobody,” I said. (P 173)
17 Richard Freadman, “Decent and Indecent: Writing My Father’s Life,” in Paul John Eakin, ed., The 
Ethics o f Life Writing (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004), 123.
18 Eakin, How Our Lives Become Stories, 182-6; and Miller, Bequest and Betrayal, 24-29.
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The scene is important for Eakin and Miller because “it poses so starkly the ethical 
dilemmas of life writing.”19 Herman is mortified by his ‘accident’, and is absolutely 
clear in telling his son that this is an event he wishes no one to ever know about. And 
yet, even as he portrays his father’s shame, as well as his own promise to not tell,
Roth includes it in his book, making of it, in fact, a central scene. Roth’s disobeyal of 
his father’s wishes is blatant—as Adam Phillips points out, “it is the novelist-son, not 
the father, who demands, by promising, the larger reticence”—as he exposes his 
father’s most private embarrassment to an audience that numbers in the thousands.
On what grounds can this exposure—this betrayal—be justified?
Roth, for his part, seems to justify the scene’s inclusion by making it central to 
the book’s narrative. The idea of patrimony, what a child inherits from a father, as the 
title suggests, looms large in the book. As it becomes clearer that the tumor in his 
father’s brain will soon kill him, Philip considers what his patrimony ultimately is. 
Some years earlier, Philip had told his father to cut him out of his will, reasoning that 
he had enough money, and that the inheritance could really help his brother Sandy’s 
children if it were to be divided amongst a smaller number of benificiaries. As his 
father nears death, however, Philip realizes that he regrets his earlier decision: “I 
wanted it because it was, if not an authentic chunk of his hard-working hide, 
something like the embodiment of all that he had overcome or outlasted” (P 104-5). 
Unable to swallow his pride and admit to his father that he did, in fact, want to be 
included in the will, Philip does not mention it. After hearing that his father, in a fit of 
unburdening, has left his tefillin—the trappings of Orthodox Jewish prayer—in an 
unused locker at the YMHA, Philip wonders why he didn’t give them to one of his 
sons: “I wouldn’t have prayed with them, but I might well have cherished them, 
especially after his death” (P 96). Instead, his father gives him his own father’s 
shaving mug, which Philip had been fascinated by since he was a child. These 
potential inheritances are on his mind as he cleans up the bathroom after his father’s 
accident there: “There was my patrimony: not the money, not the tefillin, not the 
shaving mug, but the shit.” Cleaning up the shit becomes Philip’s patrimony, he 
claims, “not because cleaning it up was symbolic of something else but because it 
wasn’t, because it was nothing less or more than the lived reality that it was” (P 176).
19 Eakin, How Our Lives Become Stories, 185.
20 Adam Phillips, “Philip Roth s Patrimony,” in On Flirtation (London: Faber and Faber, 1994), 167.
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Roth sees significance in this scene because it is free of the sentimental, mediated 
ideas of what a son gets ffom his father—he critiques his own imagining of the tefillin 
as patrimony as “a scene out of some Jewish parody of Wild Strawberries” {P 94). 
Cleaning up after your father when he can no longer do it himself is a son’s duty; 
being able to take care of he who raised you is perhaps all we can ever hope for by 
way of repayment. Of course, claiming that “the shit” is the patrimony because it isn’t 
symbolic paradoxically makes it symbolic; making the incident part of a book, instead 
of merely part of his life, allows Roth to grant it narrative meaning.21
Granting narrative meaning to actual events may be exactly what non-fiction 
writing always entails. But Roth, as someone who has spent a lifetime writing novels, 
is particularly attuned to the demands of writing fictional narratives, and seems most 
comfortable in that realm. For Roth, it seems, deciding what to put in or leave out of a 
work of fiction is substantially easier than making those decisions when writing non­
fiction. After finding out ffom the neurosurgeon about his father’s tumor, Philip 
drives from the hotel in Manhattan where he is staying to his father’s apartment in 
Elizabeth, New Jersey, to break the news to him. Except, on the way there, he takes a 
wrong turn, and accidentally ends up driving directly to the cemetary where his 
mother is buried, and where his father will be buried after his death. Even though “I 
didn’t believe there was anything mystical about how I’d got there,” he writes, “I was 
still glad I wound up there” (P 19, 74). He is glad, however, not because, after 
standing at his mother’s grave for a few minutes, he felt “comforted or strengthened 
by her memory or better prepared somehow to help my father through his affliction” 
(P 20). No, reflecting back on the accidental visit, he attributes his satisfaction
to the fact that the cemetary was narratively right: paradoxically, it had 
the feel of an event not entirely random and unpredictable and, in that 
way at least, offered a sort o f strange relief from the impact of all that 
was frighteningly unforeseen. (P 74)
21 This is reminiscent o f a scene from the first installment o f Nathan Zuckerman’s “autobiography,”
The Ghost Writer, as he gets on the bus to leave his father, with whom he’s been quarreling over a 
short story that fictionalizes an old family dispute: “behind me the pneumatic door, with its hard rubber 
edge, swung shut with what I took to be an overly appropriate thump, a symbol o f the kind you leave 
out o f fiction” (GW  69). Zuckerman tells us that the “thump” is a symbol he would not put into his 
fiction, even as Roth includes it in his, with Zuckerman’s description paradoxically strengthening the 
sound’s symbolic value.
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What is “frighteningly unforeseen,” of course, is the nature of his father’s impending 
death, and it is understandable that Roth takes comfort in a wrong turn that seems to 
give some familiar shape to a terrifying and uncontrollable reality. But there’s also, 
in Roth’s apt construction “narratively right,” a telling sign of a novelist’s comfort 
zone: the compass needed for writing fiction determines what is appropriate for the 
story, not what is right or wrong in an ethical sense. Roth’s conception of fiction has 
always seemed consistent with Milan Kundera’s edict that the novel is “a realm where 
moral judgment is suspended,” and in Zuckerman’s letter at the end of The Facts, 
Roth has his alter ego instruct him on the different guiding considerations that apply 
to fiction and non-fiction:
What one chooses to reveal in fiction is governed by a motive 
fundamentally aesthetic; we judge the author of a novel by how well 
he or she tells the story. But we judge morally the author of an 
autobiography, whose governing motive is primarily ethical as against 
aesthetic.23 (P 163)
Roth’s pleasure at having ended up at his mother’s grave as he was to tell his father 
about the tumor which would kill him seems connected to these differing means of 
evaluation. The “fundamentally aesthetic” considerations that go into the writing of 
fiction —deciding what is “narratively right”—are far more familiar than the ethical 
and moral considerations which must be taken into account when writing non-fiction.
22 The phrase also foreshadows a summary passage in Roth’s alternative history The Plot Against 
America, in which the young Philip Roth, terrified over the changes he has witnessed after Charles 
Lindbergh has been elected president, reflects upon the “relentless unforeseen”: “Turned wrong way 
round, the relentless unforeseen was what we schoolchildren studied as ‘History,’ harmless history, 
where everything unexpected in its own time is chronicled on the page as inevitable. The terror o f the 
unforeseen is what the science o f history hides, turning a disaster into an epic.” Philip Roth, The Plot 
Against America (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2004), 113-4. Similar ideas are expressed by Philip’s 
lover in Deception: ‘“ What happens in history is that it’s dotted with disasters, and when you study 
history, you go ffom one disaster and you look forward to the next [...] The trouble with life is you 
don’t really know if this is a downward process. The trouble with life is you don’t really know what’s 
going on at all’” (D 126). In both passages, as in Patrimony, narrative—history— is figured as a respite 
ffom the unforeseen, although also, crucially, as a lie.
23 Milan Kundera, Testaments Betrayed: An Essay in Nine Parts. Trans. Linda Asher. (New York: 
Harper Collins, 1996), 7. See also Roth’s explanation o f the concerns o f fiction in 1962: “generally 
speaking, what draws most readers and writers to literature is [...] all that is beyond simple moral 
categorizing. [...] The world o f fiction, in fact, ffees us ffom the circumcriptions that society places 
upon feeling; one of the greatnesses o f the art is that it allows both the writer and the reader to respond 
to experience in ways not always available in day-to-day conduct [...]” Roth, “Writing About Jews,” 
195.
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It may be “narratively right” to include the scene of his father’s embarrassment in the 
bathroom —indeed, it is a powerful evocation of a father’s vulnerability and a son’s 
devotion—but is it ethically right to expose your father to the book’s many readers? 
Doing so, including the scene in the published book, seems a willful assertion of the 
importance of the aesthetic over the ethical.
Although, in the narration of the “shit” scene, Roth gives no indication of the 
discomfort that may have accompanied his betrayal of his father’s privacy, the closing 
pages of the book point to the unavoidability of these issues. About six weeks after 
his father’s death, Roth dreams that his father, dressed in a white shroud, reproaches 
him: “‘I should have been dressed in a suit. You did the wrong thing’” (P 237). Some 
pages earlier, Roth describes how he and his brother had decided to bury their father 
in a shroud—the traditional Jewish burial garb—instead of his insurance man’s suit. 
After he wakes from the dream, however, Roth realizes that it had nothing to do with 
his father’s apparel in the grave: “he had been alluding to this book, which, in keeping 
with the unseemliness of my profession, I had been writing all the while he was ill 
and dying” (P 237). This is the first mention of the necessary “unseemliness” that 
goes into the making of a book like this: writing everything down, thinking about a 
book while thinking about your father, “mak[ing] autobiographical literature out of a 
parent’s intimate suffering.”24 Roth reports that he had misgivings about burying his 
father in the shroud, even before the dream, but “I hadn’t the audacity to say, ‘Bury 
him naked’” (P 234). In the book, which Roth takes his dream-father’s protest to be 
about, Roth is audacious enough to leave his father naked—he depicts him naked, 
near tears, and exceedingly vulnerable after having “beshat” himself: “as he was 
nearly blind and just up out of a hospital bed, in undressing himself and getting into 
the shower he had managed to spread the shit over everything” (P 172). Suffering his 
father’s condemnation in a dream is the reckoning Roth must face for leaving the 
realm of fiction and entering the ethical and moral dimensions of non-fiction.
*
Whereas Patrimony, through its focus on Roth’s father’s life and death, blurs 
genre distinctions between biography and autobiography, The Facts, published two
24 Miller, Bequest and Betrayal, 24.
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years earlier, seems to want to be read as a traditional, conventional autobiography. 
This sense only holds, however, if we consider the opening letter ffom Roth to 
Zuckerman, and Zuckerman’s response at the end of the book, to be mere 
brackets—supertextual additions pasted onto the ‘real’ book that resides in between. 
The letters’ form and content encourages such a reading; the correspondence is 
prompted by, and discusses, “the book” itself. Roth writes to Zuckerman to ask him 
what he thinks of the manuscript he has enclosed, and Zuckerman responds, having 
“read the manuscript twice,” urging Roth not to publish it (F  161). The conceit serves 
to privilege the chapters that separate the two letters as the primary text, reducing the 
letters to the status of commentary. It is a mistake, however, to assume that this is the 
case, especially when one remembers that Zuckerman’s lines, which make up the 
final thirty-five pages of the book, are written by Roth. Whatever Roth’s motivation 
for their inclusion was, the letters are a significant part o f the book, and make Roth’s 
autobiography distinctively discursive and doubly self-reflexive: “two-faced,” to use 
his own term. If we read the letters as carrying equal weight as the autobiographical 
“manuscript,” the book becomes a critical text, highlighting the unavoidability of 
ethical dilemmas in life writing.
The letter to Zuckerman with which Roth begins the book works mainly to 
justify the writing of an autobiography. As discussed above, Roth explains that he has 
written the “manuscript” for the most part as a sort of self-therapy, to recover ffom a 
series of medical misfortunes and a mental breakdown, “so as to fall back into my 
former life, to retrieve my vitality, to transform myself into myself ’ (F  5). Briefly, 
near the end of the letter, Roth notes that writing an autobiography for the first time 
led him to consider the effect the published text would have upon those written about, 
“the problem of exposing others”:
While writing, when I began to feel increasingly squeamish about 
confessing intimate affairs of mine to everybody, I went back and 
changed the real names of some of those with whom I’d been involved, 
as well as a few identifying details. This was not because I believed 
that the rerendering would furnish complete anonymity (it couldn’t 
make those people anonymous to their friends and mine) but because it 
might afford at least a little protection ffom their being pawed over by 
perfect strangers. (F  9-10)
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This is all Roth says on the matter before getting on with the ‘‘true story” of the 
autobiography; note, however, the visceral language he uses to describe the potential 
for exposure: he feels “squeamish,” wanting to protect those close to him ffom being 
“pawed over” in the public domain. Already this seems a different Roth from the one 
who writes novels. Nonetheless, the passage reads as a relatively familiar sort of 
disclaimer, and I think, for most readers, makes little difference in the apprehension 
of the book. The chapters that follow give an interesting, if a bit prosaic, account of 
Roth’s upbringing, marriage, and early notoriety as a writer, and few would argue 
that, by changing the names of a few private individuals, Roth is telling less than the 
whole truth. But this is precisely Zuckerman’s protest after reading Roth’s 
manuscript; he doesn’t like the book—“this isn’t you at your most interesting”—and 
the reason the book fails, in Zuckerman’s opinion, has its roots in Roth’s changing of 
names to protect the innocent (F  162).
It is something of a joke that Zuckerman, a character whose existence depends 
upon Roth writing fiction, would self-interestedly try to convince his creator that non­
fiction is not his forte. “I owe everything to you,” he admits, “while you, however, 
owe me nothing less than the freedom to write freely” (F  161). But it is telling that 
this “freedom to write freely,” or the lack thereof, is the fulcrum on which 
Zuckerman’s argument—given to him by Roth—rests. Why is Roth better off 
impersonating Zuckerman than impersonating himself? Because “I am your 
permission, your indiscretion, the key to disclosure” (F  161-2). It is precisely because, 
when writing the story of an alter ego, “a being whose experience [is] comparable to 
my own and yet registers] a more powerful valence,” Roth does not need to worry 
about exposing others, nor about exposing himself (F  6). In Zuckerman’s view, in The 
Facts, Roth is worrying far too much about both, crippling his ability to write 
interestingly, to see others clearly, and to depict himself fully. “[T]o tell what you tell 
best is forbidden to you here by a decorous, citizenly, filial conscience. With this 
book you’ve tied your hands behind your back and tried to write it with your toes” (F 
169). Zuckerman doesn’t let Roth off the hook and suggest that perhaps he’s more 
comfortable writing fiction simply because he is well-practiced at it; no, the freedom 
from the ethical considerations that we must ordinarily shoulder is a central ingredient 
in Roth’s fiction-making process.
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“What you choose to tell in fiction is different from what you’re permitted to 
tell when nothing’s being fictionalized” (F  162). Zuckerman’s construction 
emphasizes that Roth is active, choosing what goes in, when writing fiction, and 
passive, constricted by pre-established conventions, mores, and ethics, when writing 
non-fiction. What’s more, these restrictions stem from a realization that what he 
writes about real people in an apparently factual work may expose or hurt them:
“kind, discreet, careful—changing people’s names because you’re worried about 
hurting their feelings—no this isn’t you at your most interesting. In the fiction you 
can be so much more truthful without worrying all the time about causing direct pain” 
(F  162). Roth’s decision to include the scene depicting his father’s shame in 
Patrimony, published two years later, would invite criticism over the ethics of his 
decision to violate his father’s explicit wish for privacy. Here, Roth has Zuckerman 
criticize his writing for precisely the opposite reason: that Roth is so aware of the 
effects of non-fiction writing that he has handicapped himself aesthetically, instead of 
ethically, thus preventing himself from giving a true sense of his life.
One specific example Zuckerman gives is Roth’s depiction of May Aldridge 
(whose real name Zuckerman assumes has been changed), who, as Roth’s lover in the 
late 1960s, offered comfort, tenderness, and calm to the writer in the wake of his 
disastrous marriage. In The Facts, she by no means plays a large part, but is depicted 
as a balm to Roth, the opposite of Margaret Martinson Roth: “the loveliest-looking 
woman I’d ever known, [...] sweet-tempered [...] accommodating” (F  131-5). 
Zuckerman, in his anger, takes umbrage at this portrayal of May. It’s simply too 
pretty a picture, too admiring, too romanticized to be true. He suggests that because 
May is still alive, Roth can not bring himself to show all sides of her, not wanting to 
hurt or expose her. “You [...] don’t begin to give a proper portrait of her. You don’t 
appear to have the heart—the gall, the guts—to do in autobiography what you 
consider absolutely essential in a novel” (F  183). What’s more, Zuckerman implies, 
Roth may not even be aware that he is not telling the whole story. If he were, he 
might have reported the reason for his reticence to the reader:
You won’t even say here, as you might so easily, in a footnote or just 
in passing, “I find it inhibiting to write about May. Even though her 
name has been changed, she’s still alive and I don’t want to hurt her, 
and so her portrait will have an idealized cast to it. It is not a false
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portrait but it is only half a portrait.” Even that is beyond you, if it has 
even occurred to you. She is so vulnerable, this May, that even saying 
that might wound her horribly. (F  183)
This is surely one point at which the reader is particularly aware that Zuckerman is a 
fictional character; for even as Roth has his alter ego chastise him for not being able 
to insert a disclaimer attesting to his inhibition, he is inserting the disclaimer 
nonetheless. And so Roth gets to have it both ways, it seems, presenting an idealized 
portrait of “May Aldridge” (and thus protecting the real woman who might read the 
book), while apologizing to his other readers (and perhaps to his conscience), 
explaining that he is too hemmed in by restraint and decorum to tell the whole story.
But the issue of May Aldridge is not left at that. Zuckerman goes further, 
asking Roth, “what didn 7 you like about May?” (F 181). He then guesses at some of 
the things Roth may have left out o f his portrait. Responding to Roth’s description of 
May’s apartment as reflecting “the traditional tastes of her class,” Zuckerman 
inteijects, “The awful tastes of her class. There is nothing worse than the taste of the 
American WASP upper class” (F  134, 181). Philip comes off as too taken with her 
background, especially for a son of the proudly liberal, working class Herman Roth:
“I suspect a lot about her class and her background and her taste, far from impressing 
you, positively disgusted you.” What’s more, Zuckerman wonders if she was a drug 
addict: “Was she a pill popper like Susan McCall, her obvious embodiment in My Life 
as a Man? Surely Susan’s pill popping is meant to stand for some addiction, if it isn’t 
simply the flat-out truth.” The relationship must have ended, Zuckerman infers, 
because “you didn’t want another broken woman” {F 182). Again, it is instructive to 
remember that Roth is writing Zuckerman’s lines. If, as Zuckerman has argued, Roth 
is too concerned with not hurting May to include the good with the bad in his 
depiction of her, why would he put these words into Zuckerman’s mouth? The reader, 
who is aware that Zuckerman is a fictional character, can surely be forgiven for 
thinking that Roth wants it to be known that May’s background did disgust him, that 
she was an addict, that she was a broken woman. And so, what is the point of all of 
this? If Roth really is inhibited by his concern for May, why include what can be seen 
as pretty hurtful accusations? If Roth wants to give a full portrait of May, regardless 
of whether she’s hurt by it, why not paint that picture in the first place? Regardless of 
Roth’s intentions, what the bizarre treatment of May Aldridge does, I think, is
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dramatize the ethical conflict that arises when entering into life writing. The Facts, 
with its two versions of May Aldridge, enacts what might be thought of as two voices 
inside the writer’s head: one that argues for ethical consideration of those written 
about, even at the expense of the full truth, and one arguing that the writer of an 
autobiography must tell the story of his life as truthfully, or at least as fittingly, as 
possible, damn the consequences. In a 1984 interview, Roth noted that “It often 
happens, at least with me, that the struggles that generate a book’s moral life are 
naively enacted upon the body of the book during the early, uncertain stages of 
writing.”25 Roth was talking about fiction writing, but it certainly seems possible that 
the struggle between Roth and his character over the correct presentation of May 
Aldridge reflects Roth’s discovery, once he set himself to writing an autobiography, 
of the very different considerations that a memoirist must face.
*
Deception (1990) is the book Roth published between The Facts and 
Patrimony, and although it is subtitled “a novel,” it is by no means the return to 
straightforward fiction that that might suggest. Its oblique strategies of tempting the 
reader to read this work of fiction as non-fiction eventually culminate in a dramatic 
rendering of battles fought over the ethics of writing, making it very much of a piece 
with the works of non-fiction published before and after it. Deception reads like a 
writer’s notebook. More specifically, it reads like the transcriptions of conversations 
between a writer named Philip—one who seems to be, by all given details, Philip 
Roth—and his British mistress, who comes to visit him in his writer’s studio in 
London. Interspersed with these conversations are more conversations between Philip 
and other, mostly Eastern European, women, who also come to his studio. There is 
little in the way of exposition, description, or attribution of dialogue; the book is 
almost entirely made up of dialogue between Philip and these women. As far as plot 
goes, there isn’t much of one; the affair waxes and wanes—she wants to leave her 
husband, she wants to stay with him and make it work; sometimes they have sex, 
sometimes they just talk.
25 Roth, “Interview with The Paris R e v i e w 144.
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As interesting as some of the writing is, the book’s dramatic interest—and 
relevance to this chapter—doesn’t really take hold until after the first 170 pages. The 
final thirty pages of the book are taken up by two long conversations that essentially 
justify the existence of the work as a novel, giving shape to what is, up to that point, 
quite a shapeless, seemingly artless series of conversations, the equivalent to an 
extended glimpse through a keyhole. The first o f these final conversations is between 
Philip and his unnamed wife, who has found his notebook—which is what we have 
been reading up to now—and accuses him of cheating on her with the women 
depicted therein.26 She guesses that the British woman is the model for the British 
female character in the novel Philip has been working on (although it is not named, 
this novel is very clearly meant to be The Counterlife). He tells her that what she has 
read is all fiction, that he has been “imagining myself, outside of my novel, having a 
love affair with a character inside my novel” (D 176). She is not exactly convinced, 
but the argument swiftly moves on to the question of whether Philip will publish the 
notebook as it is or not. In some ways, Philip and his wife replay the implied conflict 
between Roth and Zuckerman over May Aldridge sketched above, except here Philip 
is the one arguing against discretion while his wife tries to convince him to at least 
change some names: “‘Because what you’ve got a portrait of is adulterous love, and 
consequently, it might be advisable to take your name out—don’t you think? “Philip, 
do you have an ashtray?” You would change that to “Nathan,” would you not?’” (D 
183). But it’s not Nathan, Philip claims, it’s an imagined version of himself, not a 
character. In what must be read as a prospective justification for Deception itself, 
Philip explains his need to insert himself into his writing:
“I portray myself as implicated because it is not enough just to be 
present. That’s not the way I go about it. To compromise some 
‘character’ doesn’t get me where I want to be. What heats things up is 
compromising me. It kind of makes the indictment juicier, besmirching 
myself.” (D 177-8)
26 The device o f the “found notebook” was also used in The Counterlife, in which Henry Zuckerman 
comes upon his brother Nathan's manuscripts after the latter’s death. As in Deception, the notebooks 
contain a draft o f the first three chapters o f a book that readers know to be The Counterlife.
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Philip’s words are reminiscent of Roth’s visceral fears for those he wrote about in The 
Facts, desiring to be “compromised” and “besmirched,” for a “juicier” “indictment.” 
Wanting to be “pawed over,” Philip is anything but “squeamish” about the possibility 
for self-exposure. The legal language is also reminiscent of remarks Roth gave in an 
interview in 1984, when speaking of the writerly skill o f impersonation. He speaks 
admiringly of Witold Gombrowicz who, in Pomografia, “introduces himself as a 
character, using his own name—the better to implicate himself in certain highly 
dubious proceedings and bring the moral terror to life.”27 But while readers of 
Gombrowicz and Roth may be intrigued and excited by the implication of the author 
in his books, what Philip seems unconcerned by are the other people who may be 
implicated as well. This is Philip’s wife’s concern, naturally, especially as she 
suspects that the notebook is not as fictional as Philip is claiming.
“‘What about humiliating me?”’, she asks, clearly worried that readers will 
take Philip for his word and believe that he is cheating on his wife (D  184). She begs 
him to, at the very least, change his name to make the book seem more like fiction.
He refuses, claiming that, “somebody telling me what to write happens to drive me 
absolutely nuts” (D 185). By writing a work of fiction that aims to at least resemble 
non-fiction, Philip finds himself caught between the differing considerations that 
guide the two modes: his declaration that “T write what I write the way I write it, and 
if and when it should ever happen, I will publish however I want to publish and I’m 
not going to start worrying at this late date what people misunderstand or get 
wrong!”’ assumes the freedom from ethical considerations that is a fiction writer’s 
perogative (D 185-6). This is the familiar posture of Zuckerman, only beholden to the 
strictures of literature, owing “no explanations” to his family, nor to his community, 
about the way he chooses to write fiction (GfV 79). But whereas Zuckerman’s early 
battles turn upon the general question of how a book portrays the Jewish community, 
Philip’s wife is concerned with the more specific issue of being personally exposed in 
Philip’s book. To this, Philip answers, arguing much like Zuckerman does in his letter 
to Roth in The Facts, “‘I cannot and do not live in the world of discretion, not as a
2/ “Interview with The Paris Review,” 125. In the same interview, Roth explicitly ties the novelist’s 
talent for impersonation to adultery: “Think o f  the art o f the adulterer: under tremendous pressure and 
against enormous odds, ordinary husbands and wives, who would freeze with self-consciousness up on 
a stage, yet in the theater o f the home, alone before the audience o f the betrayed spouse, they act out 
roles o f innocence and fidelity with flawless dramatic skill. [...] People beautifully pretending to be 
‘themselves’” (124). David Brauner has written about Roth’s tendency to use legal language and 
metaphors in much of his work; see Brauner, Philip Roth, 21-8.
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writer, anyway. I would prefer to, I assure you—it would make life easier. But 
discretion is, unfortunately, not for novelists’” (D 184). The extremity of this 
statement, the absolute refusal to even entertain the possibility of being discreet, 
points up the centrality of these issues to the novel. And as Deception's final 
conversation shows, concerns over exposure and betrayal are not confined to books in 
which the names are left unchanged.
This conversation takes place some time later, after “the novel”— The 
Counterlife—has been published. It is between Philip and his British mistress again, 
after he has moved back to America, and some time since they have last spoken. The 
novel, and her place in it, dominates their discussion:
“Ever since I read your book I haven’t known whether to call or not. I 
thought about it a lot.”
“I’ll bet you did. I thought about it too. I thought about its effect on 
your marriage.”
“Oh, well, he didn’t read it.”
Laughing. “Wonderful. O f course. All that worrying for nothing.”
(D 188)
Immediately we see that Philip’s wife’s initial accusations—that his notebook records 
his affair with the woman who inspired the British character in his novel—are in fact 
correct, highlighting perhaps the central deception referred to by the book’s title. We 
also begin to see clearly the overall method of the book, that the first 170 pages of 
endless conversation exist primarily to provide the central piece of material evidence 
to be taken up in the book’s final thirty pages. The recognizable character in “the 
novel” has not ruined Philip’s mistress’s marriage, but the potential effect o f exposing 
someone in a published work—no matter how fictionalized—is still the matter at 
stake both here and in Philip’s conversation with his wife. The unnamed mistress 
expresses mixed feelings over having recognized herself in the novel, first professing 
bafflement over Philip’s cavalier exposure of what was, naturally, a secret affair:
“[W]hy, why do you do that? Why do you take life like that? And 
especially considering that you wanted secrecy—and our relationship 
was distorted by secrecy, by your almost paranoid efforts to keep the
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whole thing hidden. For the sake of your wife. Why did you then write 
a book which she, I’m sure, can’t help but think is based on a real 
person?” (D 193)
Philip’s answer is much like the justification he gives his wife for the potential 
publication of his notebook: “‘Because it’s what I do’” (D 193). She threatens, half- 
jokingly, to write and publish a book of her own, titled Kiss and Tell, potentially 
exposing him in the same way that he has exposed her. He tells her that he is in no 
position to stop her, especially as he may write another book about her, presumably 
the book we hold in our hands now. Deception ends on this note, with both final 
conversations portraying Philip as resolute in his belief in the writer’s right to write 
what he wants, regardless of whether his books expose reed people with no control 
over their entrance into public view. But an earlier version of the book, with a 
different ending, shows a more conflicted protagonist, again suggesting that these 
issues were not so easy to resolve.
In the second draft of Deception, dated February 1989, the closing 
conversation between Philip and his mistress is present almost exactly as it would be 
in the published version. But whereas, in the final version, that conversation closes 
the book, here it is followed by a further seven handwritten pages, with an indication 
that they be “italicized throughout.”28 The passage begins: “What he did not tell her 
was that much had happened to him too and much of it painful. He had—there wasn’t 
any better expression for it—hit bottom.”29 What had happened to him was a 
breakdown exactly like the one Philip Roth suffered, the breakdown recounted in The 
Facts, and eventually further fleshed out in Operation Shylock. Minor surgery gone 
wrong, and extreme side effects from sleeping pills, led to something akin to mental 
dissolution. As Philip tells it here, however, in the depths of his breakdown, he 
attributes this catastrophe to his use of his mistress in his novel:
even though he felt his mind disintegrating, whirling itself into a chaos 
of mental rubble, he was able to understand with the utmost clarity that 
his suffering was a punishment for having betrayed her. He could
28 Philip Roth, “Deception: Drafts, Second, Copy A, with notes; 1989, Feb. (1 o f 2),” Box 79, Philip 
Roth Collection, 83a.
29 Ibid.
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imagine how her presence in his novel, however disguised, had been 
recognized by her husband and had ruined her marriage once and for 
all, leaving her the adultress, alone and destitute with her child.30
In this version of Deception, the consequences of writing about others, and the 
questions around the ethics of writing in general, take on an even more significant 
role. The sense of the notebook as a series of transcriptions (“‘Listen, you can’t take 
down everything someone says like that,”’ the mistress tells Philip at one point), the 
personal biographical details left intact that might expose a couple’s privacy, the 
recognizable flaunting of a secret affair in a published novel: the book is concerned 
with the transfer of words and deeds from the unwritten to the written world (D 195). 
The fallout from this transfer is explored over the book’s final thirty pages, and, in 
this early draft, pursued even further. Philip’s anguish is the result o f some sort of 
divine retribution for exposing another through his writing. This is reminiscent o f one 
of the many explanations Zuckerman entertains for his chronic pain in The Anatomy 
Lesson: that he is being punished for the sin of having written his Portnoy-like 
Carnovsky, for exposing his family and “his tribe”:
Zuckerman was taking ‘pain’ back to its root in poena, the Latin word 
for punishment: poena for the family portrait the whole country had 
assumed to be his, for the tastelessness that had affronted millions and 
the shamelessness that had enraged his tribe. The crippling of his upper 
torso was, transparently, the punishment called forth by his crime: 
mutilation as primitive justice.31
As far as Philip’s remorse over exposing his mistress goes, it lasts only as long as his 
debilitating ordeal does. After his recovery, when he begins to write again, he 
discovers that he is soon able to leave discretion and inhibition behind. “Divulging, 
exposing—as she saw it, betraying—that’s how he knew that the terrible interruption 
was finally over and that, at least for now, he was fully recovered.”32 The healthy
30 Ibid., 83d-83e.
31 Roth, The Anatomy Lesson, 319.
32 Philip Roth, “Deception: Drafts, Second, Copy A, with notes; 1989, Feb. (1 o f 2),” Box 79, Philip 
Roth Collection,, 83f-83g.
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novelist, it seems, does not let such ethical considerations get in the way of his art; 
discretion is a form of illness, hampering the writer’s freedom, and thus debilitating 
the faculties of fiction-making.
Another layer of complication was revealed in 1996, with the publication of 
Leaving A Doll’s House, Claire Bloom’s memoir, which divulged the details of her 
long relationship with Roth. The book’s depiction of Roth as a difficult partner and 
misogynist caused an uproar in gossip-hungry literary circles.33 But Bloom’s account 
of the creation of Deception suggests that the ethical considerations that accompany 
writing about others were not merely addressed in the book’s pages. Bloom writes of 
reading a completed draft of Deception, and being startled at the book’s descriptions 
of “Philip” seducing a number of Eastern European women in an accurately described 
version o f Roth’s writing studio. This she could accept as part of Roth’s 
“‘performance’ as a writer.”
Finally, I arrived at the chapter about his remarkably uninteresting, 
middle-aged wife, who, as described, is nothing better than an ever- 
spouting fountain of tears constantly bemoaning the fact that his other 
women are so young. She is an actress by profession, and—as if 
hazarding a guess would spoil the incipient surprise lying in store—her 
name is Claire.
Bloom reports that she was furious at Roth’s use of her name in referring to Philip’s 
wife in the book. She explains that her anger stemmed from the fact that “he would 
paint a picture of me as a jealous wife who is betrayed over and over again. I found 
the portrait nasty and insulting, and his use of my name completely unacceptable.”
She confronted him, and “reminded him that, like him, I was a public figure also and 
would seek any means at my disposal—even legal means—to have my name 
removed.”34 Note how easily a discussion of the ethical responsibilities of writing can 
shade into questions of legality. As she tells it, Roth eventually acquiesced, and 
agreed to take her name out of the book—the wife in the published version indeed 
remains nameless, and, in fact, is not described as Bloom claims she was in the draft.
33 Dinitia Smith, “Claire Bloom Looks Back in Anger at Philip Roth,” New York Times, 17 September, 
1996, C, 11.
34 Claire Bloom, Leaving A D oll’s House: A Memoir (London: Virago, 1996), 201-2.
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One wonders whether the book’s attention to these ethical dilemmas would have been 
present if not for Bloom’s intervention, or if this incident spurred Roth to bring 
matters of disclosure and exposure to the fore.
*
Operation Shylock is subtitled “A Confession,” and the first line of its preface 
places the book firmly within the conventions of non-fiction, as well as immediately 
introducing issues concerning the ethical treatment of those real people written about 
within: “For legal reasons, I have had to alter a number of facts in this book” (OS 13). 
This disclaimer carries none of the visceral phrasing used in the similar statement in 
the opening letter in The Facts; the tone is formal, impersonal, and concise, 
suggesting that more may be at stake here than whether or not the feelings of one of 
Roth’s former lovers may be hurt by his portrait. Operation Shylock as a whole is 
neither formal, impersonal, nor concise— it is intensely personal, expansive, and 
embraces the vernacular—but as the opening disclaimer seems to indicate, the book is 
very much concerned with the ethical, even legal, ramifications of claiming to tell the 
truth, whether that claim is written or spoken. Both the subtitle and the opening of the 
preface also indicate that Roth is working very hard here to convince; this is meant to 
be read as non-fiction, and the first-person narrator throughout is manifestly identical 
with the book’s author. And yet the plot of the book is so wild, so ridiculous, so
c
contrived even, as to defy belief in its basis in fact.
While Philip Roth is in New York, still shaky after surviving the mental 
breakdown touched upon in The Facts, another man is in Israel, promoting a bizarre 
political program he calls “Diasporism,” calling for the return of Israel’s Ashkenazi 
Jews to Europe, in order to prevent a “second Holocaust” at the hands of Israel’s Arab 
enemies (OS 43). What’s more, this man—an American who happens to resemble 
Roth—claims to be Philip Roth, and is using the author’s fame to advance his cause. 
Already planning to travel to Israel to interview the novelist Aharon Appelfeld, the 
“real” Philip finds himself caught up in a reality consistently proving to be stranger
35 David Remnick recounts a visit by Roth to a Columbia University graduate seminar, at which one of 
the students asked him if Operation Shylock was ‘true’: “No, it isn’t, he said gently: ‘None o f this 
seems like autobiography to me. It seems like fiction. Not to say that one doesn’t draw on one’s 
experiences, but what counts is the use you make o f it.’” David Remnick, “Into the Clear,” The New 
Yorker, 8 May 2000, 76.
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than fiction.36 In between confrontations with the impostor—whom he names Moishe 
Pipik, a Yiddish nickname from his childhood—Philip attends the trial of John 
Demjanjuk, the man accused of being Treblinka’s Ivan the Terrible; meets and 
eventually sleeps with Pipik’s girlfriend, a vivacious nurse and a “recovering anti- 
Semite”; runs into an old friend from college, who is now an outspoken anti-Zionist in 
Palestine; is entrusted with the diaries of Leon Klinghoffer, the Jewish pensioner 
killed during the Palestinian hijacking of the Achille Lauro; and apparently goes on a 
top-secret mission to Athens for the Israeli secret service, the Mossad. Mark 
Shechner’s initial reaction to Operation Shylock was that it “‘is a reckless, windy, 
overstated, improvident, and paranoid book about Israel, and therefore must be 
true.”’38 Other recent commentators have similarly focused on the book’s 
excesses— its litany of exhaustively talkative characters, endless monologues and 
shouted disputes, and proliferation of doubles—as elements of a work that seems to 
be playing familiar postmodern games. For Josh Cohen, the book’s “contending 
voices constantly attest to the inventive power of language, its capacity, rooted in the 
essential ambiguity of speech, to produce and perform, rather than merely represent,
TO •truth.” These voices also reflect upon the make-up of the self in the book: Ross 
Posnock claims that Operation Shylock is “where Roth characterizes Jews as 
disputation incarnate,” echoing Debra Shostak’s statement that the book “externalizes 
and dramatizes the self-dividedness of the Jew.”40 For David Brauner, this “self­
dividedness” extends to the book itself, as “the tension between the two modes of 
narration [realism and postmodernism] becomes its subject,” leading to “a parody of 
both realism and postmodernism.”41 While these comments certainly ring true to me, 
and I’d agree that Operation Shylock extends The Counterlife's investigation into the 
performative nature of the self, as well as enacting “a blurring of artifice and life that 
permanently fractures any reliable boundary between the two,” I feel these issues 
have been sufficiently covered in recent years to obviate the need to further explore
36 Roth’s interview with Applefeld, excerpts o f which are included in Operation Shylock, did actually 
take place, and was published in the New York Times on March 11, 1988. The interview is reprinted in 
Philip Roth, “Conversation in Jerusalem with Aharon Appelfeld,” in Shop Talk, 18-39.
37 In an attempt to avoid confusion, 1 will follow other commentators in calling the author o f Operation 
Shylock “Roth,” the narrator “Philip,” and the impostor “Pipik.”
38 Shechner, Up Society’s Ass, Copper, 132.
39 Josh Cohen, “Roth’s Doubles,” in The Cambridge Companion to Philip Roth, 84-5.
40 Posnock, Philip Roth’s Rude Truth, 143; Shostak, Countertexts, Counterlives, 142.
41 Brauner, Philip Roth, 95, 101.
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them here.42 Rather, I will argue that, seen through the lens of the ethical issues that 
surround The Facts, Deception, and Patrimony, Operation Shylock seems a 
continuation of sorts, an investigation of the potential costs and conflicts that arise 
from non-fiction writing. Seen this way, Pipik’s “plot,” rather than a representation of 
the divided self of “Philip Roth,” becomes a dramatization of a text claiming to be 
factual, thus implicating, exposing, and invading the privacy of Philip Roth.
Almost from the first appearance of Pipik in the book’s pages, he is figured as 
a text. Philip first learns o f his existence when his cousin Apter phones him from 
Israel to tell him that Israeli radio is reporting that Philip Roth is attending the 
Demjanjuk trial. The impostor’s presence is confirmed a few days later when 
Appelfeld calls, reporting the same news. Appelfeld reads to Philip an article in the 
Israeli press, detailing this other Roth’s recent meeting with Polish prime minister 
Lech Walesa to push his program of Diasporism. After telling Philip the details of the 
plan to resettle more than a million Ashkenazi Jews on the continent from which they 
fled to Israel, Appelfeld says, “‘Philip, I feel that I’m reading to you out of a story you 
wrote’” (OS 31). Philip, trying to get a handle on the situation, has similar thoughts on 
the matter: “It’s Zuckerman, I thought, whimsically, stupidly, escapistly, it’s Kepesh, 
it’s Tamopol and Portnoy— it’s all of them in one, broken free of print and mockingly 
reconstituted as a single satirical facsimile of me” (OS 34). Throughout Philip’s 
bizarre time in Israel, as he tries to get to the bottom of the ludicrous events set in 
motion by his impostor, he continually refers to those events as a plot, and seems 
more affronted by the plot’s poor construction and lack of literary merit than anything 
else. He speaks of wanting to escape the plot “on the grounds of its general 
implausibilty, its total lack of gravity, its reliance on unlikely coincidence, the 
absence of inner coherence, and of anything resembling a serious meaning or 
purpose” (OS 317). But, as Philip’s qualifiers above—“whimsically, stupidly, 
escapistly”—suggest, if Pipik’s plot is a text, it is not a fictional one, nor is it one 
written by Philip Roth. In fact, the very threat of Pipik’s plot stems from his claim 
that he is telling the truth, that he is Philip Roth—this is precisely the root of Philip’s 
fears; he worries that people will believe these claims, and confuse the “Diasporist” 
with the author. What’s more, Pipik is a real person, not some JekyIlian aspect of 
Philip come to life to torment the author. It is this fact that leads Philip to come up
42 Posnock, Philip Roth’s Rude Truth, 144.
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with Moishe Pipik as a name for his tormentor, so as not to continue confusing the 
issue by calling him “the other one,” “the double,” or “the impostor.” “I was being 
confounded by somebody who, very simply, was not me, who had nothing to do with 
me, who called himself by my name but had no relation to me” (OS 115). But the fact 
that Pipik does call himself by Philip’s name shows Operation Shylock to have 
concerns similar to its predecessors.
Just as the claim to, or appearance of, non-fiction opens up the possibilities 
that The Facts could expose “May Aldridge,” that Deception could expose Claire 
Bloom, and that Patrimony could expose Herman Roth, Pipik’s assertion that his 
narrative is nothing other than the truth threatens to expose, to implicate, and to 
invade the privacy of Philip Roth. Roth, who, in his past three books, had examined 
the consequences of this sort of exposure from the position of the writer, now finds 
himself on the other side of the conflict, powerless to determine the way his story is 
told. His concerns, at first, are clear. After Pipik’s girlfriend comes to Philip, begging 
him to avoid legal action, to have some sympathy for Pipik, who is in remission from 
cancer, and “‘whose thoughts are only for saving others,”’ Philip responds that his 
only interest is “his entangling our two lives and confusing people about who is who. 
What I cannot permit and what I will not permit is his encouraging people to believe 
that he is me” (OS 98-9). Philippe Lejeune, one of the foremost theorists on 
autobiography, identifies a central, and basic, issue in thinking about the ethics of life 
writing: “Everyone thinks he is more or less the owner of his name, of his person, of 
his own story (and even of his image).”43 When your name, story, or image is 
included in somebody else’s non-fiction work, it can easily feel like a theft, like an 
infringement upon your rights of ownership. Summing up the history o f legal 
conceptions of privacy, Paul John Eakin notes that privacy has often been equated 
with nothing less than the fact of personhood, and so “when privacy is abridged, [...] 
the result [is] that the integrity of the person is breached or violated.”44 In her memoir, 
Claire Bloom threatened legal action if Roth would publish Deception with her name 
included. Philip makes a similar threat to Pipik at their first meeting, appealing to 
“[t]he law that says that a person’s identity is his private property and can’t be 
appropriated by somebody else” (OS 75). Pipik, obviously better prepared for such an
43 Philippe Lejeune, MoiAussi, trans. by Paul John Eakin (Paris, 1986), quoted in Eakin, Hoy.v O ur 
Lives Become Stories, 142.
44 Eakin, How Our Lives Become Stories, 161.
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argument than Philip is, demonstrates his thorough knowledge of privacy law, giving 
a quick summation of William Prosser’s work on the subject: “‘The prima facie case 
is defined as follows: “One who appropriates to his own use or benefit the name or 
likeness of another is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy.” Let’s 
have lunch’” (OS 75-6). Interestingly, the same work that Pipik brashly quotes from is 
referred to in Eakin’s legal history of privacy, a primary source for his discussion of 
the ethical issues that life writing invites.45
Although Philip never does take legal action against Pipik, the question of 
who shall have the right to tell the story of Philip Roth underlies their struggle over 
authorial power. Appelfeld, whom Philip meets with after his initial confrontation 
with Pipik, sees the nature of the conflict right away. “‘It’s perfect [...] You are going 
to rewrite him’” (OS 107).46 After a few days in Jerusalem, contending with the utter 
absurdity of Pipik’s plot (as well as the temptation of Pipik’s girlfriend, the madness 
of Philip’s old friend George Ziad, and the grave drama of the Demjanjuk trial),
Philip explicitly conceives of the conflict with his impostor as a “narrative contest,” 
one that, considering his profession, he should expect to win:
It would be comforting, it would be only natural, to assume that in a 
narrative contest (in the realistic mode) with this impostor, the real 
writer would easily emerge as inventive champion, scoring 
overwhelming victories in Sophistication of Means, Subtlety of 
Effects, Cunningness of Structure, Ironic Complexity, Intellectual 
Intrest, Psychological Credibility, Verbal Precision, and Overall 
Versimilitude [...] (O S246-7)
Instead, Philip finds himself undone in Jerusalem as the one written about, “without 
the least control over this narrative Ping-Pong in which I appear as the little white 
ball,” rather than his usual role as the man composing the narrative at his typewriter 
(OS 358). He longs for the power to rewrite the story—a longing especially
45 Eakin, How Our Lives Become Stories, 162-3.
46 Appelfeld is particularly responding to being shown the “Ten Tenets of Anti-Semites Anonymous,” 
something of a manifesto for Pipik’s nascent plan to rehabilitate those anti-Semites who would provide 
an obstacle to his massive resettlement project. After Pipik’s girlfriend, Wanda Jane “Jinx” Possesski, 
gives Roth the document, the latter almost immediately starts making notes in the margins, beginning 
to edit it for concision and effect (OS 107-8).
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maddening as it is his story—which leads him eventually to impersonate his 
impersonator, spewing out long monologues for whomever will listen about the 
urgently necessary repatriation of the Jews in Europe. “[I]nstead of disowning the 
doctrine of Diasporism, he becomes its advocate, out-Pipiking Pipik. By shifting the 
battleground from the personal to the professional, the question becomes not ‘who is 
the real Philip Roth?’ but ‘who is the more persuasive author?’”47 This tack, however, 
rather than rewriting Pipik’s plot, merely ventriloquizes what Pipik has already 
written, leading Philip to wonder if it is not the product of a mind “too unhinged by 
the paranoid threat to be able to think out an effective counterplot in which to 
subsume the Pipikesque imbecility” (OS 246). If only Philip’s considerable powers of 
narrative composition could defeat this very real adversary. At one point, when Philip 
and Pipik are together in Philip’s hotel room, the former, in an attempt to interrupt 
Pipik’s narrative, tells the latter a story of his Great Aunt Gitcha, which calms down 
the exasperated impostor, who soon falls asleep:
I had put my sonny boy to sleep, with my story anesthetized him. I 
remained in the chair by the window wishing that it had killed him. 
When I was younger my Jewish betters used to accuse me of writing 
short stories that endangered Jewish lives—would that I could! A 
narrative as deadly as a gun! (OS 186)
Here, as he longs for the authorial power to take back his story, Philip connects this 
conflict with his earliest battles with Jewish readers over his initial published work; 
this connection will be further highlighted in the book’s denouement.
*
About halfway through the book, Pipik, somewhat implausibly (in the already 
implausible world of this book), disappears from the plot, and the focus shifts to a 
different ethical conundrum, one that restores Philip to the position of author, as it
47 Brauner, Philip Roih, 103.
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centers on the contents of Operation Shylock itself.48 In The Facts, Deception, and 
Patrimony, Roth (or the Roth-figure) seems to remain insistent in his belief in the 
writer’s right to tell his story without having his “hands tied behind your back” by 
ethical considerations. At the end of Operation Shylock, however, Philip seems to 
allow those considerations to guide his authorial decisions. The conclusion of 
Operation Shylock shows a change in the way that these ethical questions have been 
dramatized in this period, with the Roth-figure apparently opting for restraint and 
discretion in the final reckoning.
Soon after Pipik and Jinx disappear from Israel, but not from Philip’s mind, 
Philip is abducted and taken to an abandoned schoolhouse, in the classroom of which 
he sits and waits, not knowing what new calamity awaits him. This new situation is 
more frightening than the mere worry about an impostor smearing his good name: 
“Would that I were still a ludicrous character in his lousy book!” (OS 317). With 
Pipik gone, Philip eases back into the role of the writer, and for that task, continuing 
the book’s seemingly endless succession of impassioned monologues, he finds 
himself lectured on the writer’s ethical responsibilities. Enter Louis B. Smilesburger, 
an elderly agent for the Mossad, Israel’s secret service, who had previously 
masqueraded as a Holocaust survivor wishing to contribute to the cause of 
Diasporism. Before telling Philip why he has been abducted, why he has been chosen, 
Smilesburger launches into an extended monologue—a seeming non sequitor—on the 
Chofetz Chaim and loshon hora. The Chofetz Chaim, of whom Smilesburger claims 
to be a disciple, was a Polish rabbi and scholar who devoted his life to the eradication 
of loshon hora, or “evil speech.” “‘The Chofetz Chaim formulated [...] the laws that 
forbid Jews’ making derogatory or damaging remarks about their fellow Jews, even if 
they are true’” (OS 333). As Smilesburger continues, it becomes clear that this 
prohibition extends far and wide, and that few utterances, unless wholly positive, can 
be deemed acceptable:
There is nothing about loshon hora that the Chofetz Chaim did not 
clarify and regulate: loshon hora said in jest, loshon hora without 
mentioning names, loshon hora that is common knowledge, loshon
48 David Brauner notes that, at this point, Philip does defeat Pipik, by writing him out of the book, 
reclaiming his own novel, and authoring new developments that are perhaps even more absurd than 
those prompted by Pipik’s presence. Brauner, Philip Roth, 104.
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hora about relatives, about in-laws, about children, about the dead, 
about heretics and ignoramuses and known transgressors, even about 
merchandise—all forbidden. (OS 333-4)
Josh Cohen, writing about the convolution of these prohibitions, notes that “this 
intricacy stems from the difficulty of containing the unintended effects of even the 
most minimal of speech.”49 It is an attempt to formulate an ethics of speaking that 
eventually comes to the conclusion that it is better, in the end, to keep your mouth 
shut. What’s more, the prohibition of loshon hora even extends to “evil speech” 
directed at yourself, for, in the parable that Smilesburger tells to illustrate this 
wrinkle, even denigrating only yourself can end up hurting others (OS 338-9).
What Smilesburger’s monologue seems to outline is a set of religious 
injunctions that stem from an adoption of something very close to what Eakin terms 
the “relational concept of selfhood”: “in contrast to the supposedly self-determining 
model of identity that autonomy predicates, a relational concept of selfhood stresses 
the extent to which the self is defined by—and lives in terms of—its relations with 
others.”50 Another suggestion of the relational self comes from the Hebrew words that 
Philip sees on the blackboard as he sits and waits in the classroom for Smilesburger’s 
eventual arrival. Philip copies the words down, even though he does not know what 
they mean. Nonetheless, these words, along with their English translation, become 
one of Operation Shylock’s epigrams. The epigram reveals the passage to be taken 
from the book of Genesis: “So Jacob was left alone, and a man wrestled with him 
until daybreak” (OS 9). After Philip expresses his outrage at having been kept in the 
schoolroom to be battered by Smilesburger’s words, Smilesburger lets him go, erasing 
some writing from the blackboard, but “the Hebrew words that someone else had 
written he let stand untouched” (OS 352). The implication of the epigram, both in its 
place at the beginning of the book and on the classroom’s blackboard, seems identical 
to the implication of Smilesburger’s exposition of the Chofetz Chaim’s prohibitions 
of loshon hora. They both suggest that we are not alone, that the attempt to escape the 
responsibilities we have toward others—the attempt to escape the man wrestling with 
you—is an impossible one. The epigram’s pride of place at the beginning of the book
49 Cohen, “Roth’s Doubles,” 85.
50 Eakin, How Our Lives Become Stories, 161.
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and the revelations of the book’s epilogue both suggest that Smilesburger’s lessons on 
the relational concept of selfhood have sunk in, and that those lessons, in Philip’s 
mind, are relevant to the ethical aspects of writing.
Operation Shylock's epilogue contains an argument that should be familiar to 
readers of The Facts and Deception: the argument centers on what is ethical for the 
writer to put in or leave out of the book itself. Just as Zuckerman argues with Roth in 
The Facts over whether to include the whole truth about “May Aldridge,” and Philip 
argues with his wife about the revelations of Deception, here Philip and Smilesburger 
grapple over how much Roth puts in or leaves out about his adventures in Operation 
Shylock. Philip describes how, when he finished writing the book, some years after 
the events described, he sends the manuscript to Smilesburger, even though he was 
under no obligation to do so. The question of obligation is raised, we learn, because of 
what Philip recounts in the manuscript’s final chapter, which has been ultimately cut 
out of the published version of Operation Shylock'.
I have elected to delete my final chapter, twelve thousand words 
describing the people I convened with in Athens, the circumstances 
that brought us together, and the subsequent expedition, to a second 
European capital, that developed out of that educational Athens 
weekend. (OS 359)
His trip to Athens was, presumably, as an operative for the Mossad, on a mission to 
identify Jewish traitors to Israel—contributors to the PLO—so that they can be 
assassinated. He is able to perform this mission by posing as Moishe Pipik (who, of 
course, had been posing as him), whose proposed program of exporting Israel’s Jews 
back to Europe makes him an ally of the anti-Zionists. Under the oversight of 
Smilesburger, “I undertook to give the most extreme performance of my life and 
seriously to mislead others in something more drastic than a mere book” (OS 359).
But Smilesburger, who meets Philip in New York sifter reading the manuscript, 
indicates to Philip that the matter of the “mere book” is not as trifling as Philip seems 
to think. Claiming to have retired from the Mossad, Smilesburger advises Philip out 
of personal concern, but nonetheless is unwavering in his message: Philip must not 
publish his account of his secret mission, for the sake of the integrity of the Israeli 
state, and for his own safety. Naturally, Philip has no intention of bowing to
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Smilesburger’s arguments: “‘I went where I went, did what I did, met whom I met, 
saw what I saw, learned what I learned—and nothing that occurred in Athens, 
absolutely nothing, is interchangeable with something else’” (OS 383). Here, Philip is 
absolutely committed to telling the whole truth of what happened to him, regardless 
of the effect his published work might have on the security of the Jewish state—or on 
his own security. And yet, Operation Shylock, as it is, contains no chapter detailing 
Philip’s mission for the Mossad.
Philip is deliberately ambiguous about why he excises the chapter on his 
Athens mission from Operation Shylock. The book ends, after Philip has categorically 
refused Smilesburger’s entreaties, with the latter advising Philip to “‘Let your Jewish 
conscience be your guide’” (OS 398). It is natural to assume, considering the make-up 
of the published book, that Philip’s “Jewish conscience” is behind his decision to bow 
to Smilesburger’s pressure and consider the effects of his proposed candor. Of course, 
Roth’s “Jewish conscience” was called into question from the very beginning of his 
career, and references to the battles between Roth and the Jewish critics of Goodbye, 
Columbus are made frequently in the epilogue, reminding readers of the birth of his 
stubborn insistence on writing as he will write, damn the consequences. As he drives 
down to New York to meet Smilesburger, Philip reflects that “Never in my life had I 
submitted a manuscript to any inspector anywhere for this sort of scrutiny.”51 He 
continues, narrating the familiar construction of his adversarial defense of the writer’s 
rights:
To be degenerating into an acquiescent Jewish boy pleasing his law- 
giving elders when, whether I liked it or not, I had myself acquired all 
the markings of a Jewish elder was more than a little regressive. Jews 
who found me guilty of the crime of ‘informing’ had been calling for 
me to be ‘responsible’ from the time I began publishing in my middle 
twenties, but my youthful scorn had been plentiful and so were my 
untested artistic convictions, and [...] I had been able to hold my 
ground. I hadn’t chosen to be a writer, I announced, only to be told by 
others what was permissible to write. (OS 377)
51 Philip is forgetting, o f course, that he submitted the manuscript to The Facts to Zuckerman, for just 
this sort o f scrutiny.
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This illuminating passage reveals the connection between the ethical considerations 
confronted in Roth’s ‘autobiographical period’ and the considerations Roth was 
accused of disregarding in his earliest fiction about Jews. In both cases the choice is 
figured as between being “acquiescent” to what others define as “permissible,” and 
“holding your ground,” and standing by your “artistic convictions.” In both of these 
specific cases, the Jewish community makes up these “others,” ostensibly asking Roth 
to consider the effects his writing may have on the community’s interests and 
security—remember that many of Roth’s early detractors claimed that his work would 
give succour to enemies of the Jews. The difference here, of course, is that Operation 
Shylock purports to be a true story. One o f Philip’s early adopted “artistic 
convictions” was the belief that “nothing need hide itself in fiction,” that literature is a
• o  .realm apart from the moral and ethical demands imposed by others. But as he drives 
down to New York to meet the Mossad agent for whom he risked his life, Philip asks 
himself a question that could be seen to be underlying all four of the books covered in 
this chapter: “Nothing need hide itself in fiction but are there no limits where there’s 
no disguise?” {OS 377).
52 This statement is another prefiguring o f Zuckerman’s apostrophe to Coleman Silk in The Human 
Stain, “(wjriting personally is exposing and concealing at the same time, but with you it could only be 
concealment and so it would never work” (HS 345).
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Chapter Six
“You flood into America and America floods into you”
It is now a critical commonplace that with the publication of American 
Pastoral (1997), I  Married a Communist (1998), and The Human Stain (2000), 
known as the “American Trilogy,” Roth began a “career resurgence” that ushered in a 
late period of productivity and significance that now rivals that of Henry James.1 For 
many critics, the trilogy’s situation of its three protagonists in three different eras of 
American history, with Roth interrogating the historical forces that bring each man 
down, showed Roth indisputably moving into the ranks of the major novelists, no 
longer “bogged down in self-indulgent game playing,” but instead investigating “the 
larger ironies and tragedies of the American communal experience.’ This polarity 
invokes the long-running critical narrative that Roth has for much of his career been 
concerned mostly with himself, writing solipsistic riffs on his autobiography that 
forsake the wider world in favor of an unremitting inward focus, endless variations 
that tell us more about Philip Roth than anything else. In this formulation, the trilogy 
represents the long-wished-for break, its foregrounded historical focus signalling 
Roth’s move beyond self-absorbed game-playing, finally doing what novelists should 
do: engaging with the culture around them. “What happened?”, Ken Gordon asked 
facetiously, “The new books seem to recognize the existence of other people. Or,
1 “At age 73, Philip Roth is in the midst o f what might be the most stunning “late period” by an 
American writer since Henry James.” Cornel Bonca, “Roth, Waxing,” OC Weekly, 29 June, 2006. Ross 
Posnock makes the same point, claiming that “Late Roth is now beginning to deserve comparison with 
what is usually regarded as the summit o f late turns o f novelistic genius— Henry James’s major phase 
at the start of the century.” Posnock, Philip Roth’s Rude Truth, 5.
2 Dan Cryer, “Investigation o f Life’s Brevity too Shallow,” Atlanta Joumal-Constitution, 28 May, 
2006, 4K.
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rather, the fact that other people can be as endlessly fascinating and unknowable as 
Nathan Zuckerman.”3 Of course, it has long been assumed by many that Nathan 
Zuckerman is merely a version of Philip Roth, and many critics have echoed Gordon 
in their assessments of the trilogy. Michiko Kakutani saw the trilogy as an 
abandonment of Roth’s “long obsession with alter egos and mirror games,” his 
“narcissistic pyrotechnics,” and a move beyond “the solipsistic presentations of self 
he had been practicing for years to create a capacious chronicle of American 
innocence and disillusion.”4 With a similarly clear value judgment, Christopher 
Tayler noted that, before the trilogy, “there was definitely a feeling that he'd staked 
out his territory and settled down for good. The territory in question was the land of 
novelistic self-scrutiny.” The trilogy, in contrast, “turned the received wisdom inside 
out and catapulted their ageing author well beyond the first rank of American 
novelists.”5
The novels that make up the trilogy do indeed seem a monumental 
achievement, with their self-conscious wide-angle lens turned upon three important 
American eras, but it is worth countering this critical consensus. As I have argued 
throughout this thesis, Roth has consistently balanced inward and outward moves, 
always resisting the choice between one or the other. I would argue that, far from 
breaking with his previous work, the “American Trilogy” shows many continuities 
with the rest of Roth’s work, exhibiting preoccupations that have drawn Roth’s 
scrutiny for more than forty years. Zuckerman’s role as observer in the trilogy, the 
imaginer of other people’s stories, for example, continues the movement that runs 
through Zuckerman Bound and The Counterlife, with Nathan seemingly moving from 
a Freudian concept of the self as rigidly defined, to a more fluid sense of the self as 
narrative, to, finally, something of a renunciation of his own self s story (which turns 
out to be, as we will see, ultimately futile). Zuckerman’s uncertainty as to how much 
or how little he should involve himself in the lives of others shows a concern first 
taken up in Letting Go. The Counterlife's introduction of the dangers of a pastoral 
vision of the world is continued here as well, with all three books dangling pastoral
3 Ken Gordon, “Philip Roth: The Zuckerman Books,” Salon.com, 26 March, 2002. 
http://www.salon.com/ent/masterpiece/2002/03/26/zuckerman/index.html.
4 Michiko Kakutani, “A Postwar Paradise Shattered From Within,” New York Times, 15 April 1997, C, 
11; and “Confronting the Failures o f a Professor Who Passes,” New York Times, 2 May 2000, E, 1.
5 Christopher Tayler, “America’s Flight From Freedom,” Sunday Telegraph, 28 September 2004, 
Review, 11.
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dreams in front of their protagonists.6 Both I  Married a Communist and The Human 
Stain feature memoirs that threaten or enact exposure and betrayal, echoing a central 
concern of Roth’s ‘autobiographical’ books of the late 80s and early 90s. And the 
trilogy’s focus on the validity of ever accurately putting a life into words continues a 
preoccupation that Roth has mined since My Life as a Man. Perhaps most 
significantly, though, one of the central concerns of the “American Trilogy” is the 
interaction between self and society, between the individual and his community, 
between self-determination and social determination, issues first explored by Roth in 
his debut collection, Goodbye, Columbus, and it is this connection that will be my 
subject in this chapter. For all that the trilogy seems a new chapter in Roth’s long and 
varied career, I hope to show that, rather than breaking with what has come before, 
the series continues and deepens Roth’s investigation into one of his most enduring 
concerns.
In my first chapter, I discussed Goodbye, Columbus in the context of the 
changing terrain of postwar liberal thought. Roth’s early stories were informed by the 
dominant liberal discourse of the 1950s, in which the individual was esteemed instead 
of the mass, which offered a seemingly chastened, realistic view of the world in place 
of naive visions of collective harmony, and in which the ambivalence and 
contradictions of modernism were favored over the deterministic worlds of 
naturalism.7 Eli Peck, Nathan Marx, Ozzie Freedman, and Neil Klugman each attempt 
to maintain their independence and penchant for self-questioning in the face of a 
community that has other ideas. Roth’s heroes in these stories seem younger cousins 
to the protagonists of Invisible Man (1952), The Catcher in the Rye (1951), and The 
Adventures o f Augie March (1953), each identified by R.W.B. Lewis in 1955 as part 
of the “Adamic tradition” in American literature: “the hero is willing, with 
marvellously inadequate equipment, to take on as much of the world as is available to
o
him, without ever fully submitting to any of the world’s determining categories.’ 
Whereas Roth’s early protagonists cannot be said to have the world-digesting energies 
of Augie March or Invisible Man, each occupies a place of resistance, opposing the 
persuasive certainty of their (American Jewish) communities with “inadequate
6 For a discussion o f the ways in which American Pastoral continues The Counterlife's focus on the 
pastoral, see Hogan, ‘“ Something so Visceral in with the Rhetorical,”’ 1-14.
See Schaub, American Fiction in the Cold War, and Wald, The New York Intellectuals.
8 Lewis, The American Adam, 199.
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equipment”: ambivalence, curiosity, and a paradoxical blend of self-questioning and 
self-belief. The stories of Goodbye, Columbus demonstrated that Roth’s sensibility 
and allegiances fell in line with the mainstream of liberal intellectual thought in the 
1950s—a mainstream shaped by a common narrative of disillusionment with the 
politics of the left, leading to a skeptical distrust of collective action, and thus to a 
veneration of the individual who must operate within, and often against, society. The 
stories, uncannily foreshadowing the controversy they would ignite amongst the 
book’s Jewish readers, also show Roth’s keen and specific understanding of the 
American Jewish community in flux, highly sensitive to individuals who would 
threaten its newfound, and ostensibly fragile, security and prosperity.
Whereas the “American Trilogy” does not focus on individuals and their 
communities in quite the same way as Roth’s debut, each novel does feature a 
protagonist who attempts to “spring the historical lock,” to set his own course in the 
face of “determining categories” which would restrict and impede his self-authored 
story, suggesting that Roth is still a product of the fifties sensibility that helped to 
form his literary character (HS 335). American PastoraVs Seymour Levov strives for 
a post-ethnic American paradise, free from “that resentment stuff,” the claims of 
ethnic belonging.9 Ira Ringold, in I  Married A Communist, escapes his modest 
beginnings as a Newark ditchdigger and hoodlum to become a celebrity of sorts, a 
radio star married to a movie star, and a Lincoln-esque socialist and proselytizer for 
the common man. Coleman Silk makes the most dramatic escape of all in The Human 
Stain, dodging the restrictions of the race he was bom into. However, Roth’s 
treatment of each protagonist is characteristically “two-faced,” even more so than in 
Goodbye, Columbus, and, as David Brauner points out, the audacity and ingenuity of 
each man’s escape cannot erase the costs incurred along the way, nor prevent each 
man’s tragic end:
their attempts to recreate themselves are represented ambivalently: on 
the one hand as heroic feats of liberation, epitomising the 
quintessentially American ideal of the self-made man and the 
immigrant dream of successful assimilation; on the other hand as futile
9 Philip Roth, American Pastoral (London: Vintage, 1998), 311. Subsequent references will be noted 
parenthetically in the text.
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fantasies of escape, illustrating the limitations of American social 
mobility and the impossibility of transcending historical 
circumstances.10
As in Goodbye, Columbus, the “American Trilogy” shows Roth again concerned with 
the complex of issues that grow up out of the individual who remains, in Brian 
McDonald’s words, “ensnared in the conflict between the claims of self and social 
determination.”11 But because the canvas of the trilogy is much wider than that of 
Roth’s debut, because it so deliberately and programmatically invokes three eras of 
American history, the conclusions to be drawn—and questions to be raised— from 
these individuals have a greater resonance, suggesting, sometimes explicitly, that the 
tragedies of these three protagonists may be the tragedies of twentieth century
19America itself.
*
Roth begins The Human Stain, in Nathan Zuckerman’s voice, with an 
invocation of the mania sweeping America in the summer of 1998, a two-page 
editorial on the scandal prompted by Bill Clinton’s extramarital affair, and the revival 
of “America’s oldest communal passion [...] the ecstasy of sanctimony” (HS 2). 
Paralleling the censorious campus community that would end Coleman Silk’s career, 
Zuckerman depicts an America o f collective idiocy, of puritanical moralizing, 
everyone up in arms over the sexual activity of a man elected to lead the country’s 
executive branch. As extraordinary evidence, Zuckerman quotes the conservative 
columnist William F. Buckley, who wrote of Clinton, “When Abelard did it, it was 
possible to prevent its happening again” (HS 2-3). Whereas Zuckerman draws a 
comparison between Buckley’s implicit call for blood and Khomeini’s fatwa on 
Salman Rushdie, 1 hear echoes instead of one of Roth’s earliest critics, a rabbi who
10 Brauner, Philip Roth, 151.
11 Brian McDonald, ‘“The Real American Crazy Shit’: On Adamism and Democratic Individuality in 
American Pastoral,” Studies in American Jewish Literature 23 (2004): 28.
12 For reasons o f space, I will not take up Roth’s Sabbath's Theater (1995) in this thesis, although it is 
undoubtedly one o f his best works. Happily, there has been much excellent work on the novel in recent 
years; see Brauner, Philip Roth, 122-47; Mark Krupnick, “‘A Shit-Filled Life’: Philip Roth’s Sabbath’s 
Theater,” in Jewish Writing and the Deep Places o f  the Imagination, ed. Jean Carney and Mark 
Shechner (London: University o f  Wisconsin Press, 2005), 15-39; Posnock, Philip R oth’s Rude Truth,
155-92; and Shostak, Countertexts, Counterlives, 46-59.
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wrote to the Anti-Defamation League after reading Goodbye, Columbus, asking, 
“What is being done to silence this man? Medieval Jews would have known what to 
do with him.”13 From the beginning of his career, Roth was made personally familiar 
with the extremity of such sanctimony; the conservative communitarian desire to 
subdue the individual whose independence might threaten the purported interests of 
that community is a force with few limits. As detailed in my first and second chapters, 
the fight against this powerful opposition became a defining battle for Roth in his 
early career, and he found himself forced “to assert a literary position and to defend 
my moral flank the instant after I had taken my first steps.”14 Transmuted into 
opposition from Zuckerman’s family, the coercive power of a community’s interests 
was nonetheless recognizable as the force which Zuckerman had to reckon with from 
the outset of his career, as narrated in The Ghost Writer. And it is a similar force that 
renders Coleman Silk nearly paralyzed with rage on the occasion when he first comes 
over to Zuckerman’s house in The Human Stain. Having spoken seemingly innocuous 
words about two absent students in his class (“‘Does anyone know these people? Do 
they exist or are they spooks?”’), Coleman has been pilloried by the Athena College 
community, understandably sensitive over any perceived racism among its faculty, for 
the outdated pejorative term he used to refer to what turned out to be two black 
students (HS 6). What Zuckerman eventually learns is that this force—“the tyranny of 
the we”—is one that Coleman has attempted to evade his whole life, self-authoring a 
narrative that would leave him free of the nets of community demands (HS 108).
The secret of The Human Stain, Coleman Silk’s secret, is that he is not, as 
everyone thinks, a Jew, but was bom a light-skinned African-American. For 
Zuckerman, who only learns this after Coleman’s death, the revelation of this secret, 
told to him by Coleman’s sister Ernestine, leads directly to the writing of Coleman’s 
story, which we are encouraged to believe is The Human Stain (HS 337).15
13 Roth, “Writing about Jews,” 204.
14 Roth, Reading Myself and Others, xiii.
15 It is important to remember that both The Human Stain and American Pastoral are, each to a 
different extent, Zuckerman’s suppositional attempts at telling the accurate stories o f Coleman Silk and 
Seymour Levov, respectively. In American Pastoral, having heard about Levov’s death at his forty- 
fifth high school reunion, Zuckerman “dream[s] a realistic chronicle” o f Levov’s life that takes up the 
final three hundred and fifty pages o f the novel {AP 89). Zuckerman’s attempt at a written recreation of 
Coleman’s life in The Human Stain is also prompted by his subject’s death, with Zuckerman “standing 
alone in a darkening graveyard and entering into professional competition with death” {HS 338). In /  
Married a Communist, by contrast, the story o f Ira Ringold is told to Zuckerman by Ira’s brother 
Murray, and Zuckerman fills in Murray’s narrative with his own memories o f Ira from his youth. For 
an analysis o f these narrative strategies, see Royal, “Pastoral Dreams and National Identity,” 185-207;
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Zuckerman’s narrative of Coleman’s life depicts an individual who quite blatantly and 
extraordinarily strives for self-determination. As Zuckerman tells it, growing up in 
East Orange, New Jersey as an exceptional student and athlete (he is a boxer and a 
track star), Coleman never experienced his race as a hindrance, or something to fight 
against: “he was of course a Negro, very much of their small community of five 
thousand or so, but boxing, running, studying, at everything he did concentrating and 
succeeding, [...] he was, without thinking about it, eveiything else as well” (HS 108). 
When he goes off to Howard University, however, he experiences the twin forces of 
racism and collective racial identity, two strong “determining categories” that threaten 
to subsume, and thus blot out, his individuality. First, upon his arrival in Washington,
D.C., he is refused service at a Woolworth’s and called a nigger. Immediately the 
effect is devastating, particularly due to the remark’s inherent assumption about 
Coleman’s individual identity: “At East Orange High the class valedictorian, in the 
segregated South just another nigger. In the segregated South there were no separate 
identities, not even for him and his roommate” (HS 102-3). What’s more, in addition 
to the prejudice of white Southerners that would deny him his “separate identity,” the 
university community works to take away his individuality in a different way. If in 
Washington, D.C., he is “a nigger,” at Howard, an all-black college, he learns that “he 
was a Negro as well” (HS 108). To Coleman, “the greatest of the great pioneers of the 
I,” this is unbearable. To be stubbornly, uncompromisingly singular, to resist the 
claims of the plural nouns “they” and “we,” to evade all collective interests that would 
attempt to force him off of his own track, this is, in Zuckerman’s imagination, to be 
Coleman’s great project:
You can’t let the big they impose its bigotry on you any more than you 
can let the little they become a we and impose its ethics on you. Not 
the tyranny of the we and its we-talk and everything that the we wants 
to pile on your head. Never for him the tyranny of the we that is dying 
to suck you in, the coercive, inclusive, historical, inescapable moral we 
with its insidious Epluribus unum. Neither the they of Woolworth’s 
nor the we of Howard. Instead the raw I with all its agility. (HS 108)
and Derek Parker Royal, “Plotting the Frames o f Subjectivity: Identity, Death, and Narrative in Philip 
Roth’s The Human Stain,” Contemporary Literature 47, 1 (2006): 114-39.
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Coleman soon decides, upon signing up for the army, that he would “play his 
skin however he wanted, color himself just as he chose” (HS 109). For the rest of his 
life, he would keep this secret from the whole world, the lightness of his skin allowing 
him to escape the conditions faced by all others bom to his race in America. Back 
before he went to Howard and discovered that the color of his skin subjected him to 
the “tyranny of the we,” as a young boxer auditioning for a scholarship to the 
University of Pittsburgh, it is Coleman’s Jewish coach, Doc Chizner, who first puts 
the idea in his head that he could be seen as something other than black. Crucially, 
Doc does not suggest that Coleman tell the Pittsburgh coach that he is white; rather, 
“‘If nothing comes up [...] you don’t bring it up. You’re neither one thing or the 
other. You’re Silky Silk’” (HS 99).16 Doc’s argument pays tribute to Coleman’s 
singularity—he doesn’t need to be black or white, just Coleman. Coleman rejects both 
the ‘we’ and the ‘they,’ only embracing ‘the raw I’; what’s at stake is not the matter 
of race, only the desire for total self-determination. “All he’d ever wanted, from 
earliest childhood on, was to be free: not black, not even white—just on his own and 
free” (HS 120).17 But if Coleman will be neither black nor white, what will he be? His 
decision to pass as a Jew is a curious one; as David Brauner points out, if Coleman 
wishes to avoid the conditions facing a minority in America, “surely it would have 
made more sense to become part o f the WASP establishment.”18 But no, as 
Zuckerman imagines it, it is the milieu of Greenwich Village in the 1950s, and the 
flowering of the New York Intellectuals, which triggers Coleman’s choice:
16 Coleman’s boxing nickname, reflecting as it does Coleman’s smoothness and agility in the ring, 
carries connotations as well for his seemingly effortless escape from racial identity; the chapter that 
narrates Coleman’s decision to pass is called “Slipping the Punch.” It also has connotations o f  Silk’s 
youthful sexual prowess, and might remind us that one o f Portnoy’s nicknames for his penis is “the 
silky monster” (PC  127).
17 As Ross Posnock points out, this is in some way Faunia Farley’s project as well: “Analogously [to 
Coleman], Faunia is a middle-class woman who refuses to be one, a Yankee daughter o f the Puritans 
who insists on a white-trash life. Her rejection o f  her original class membership is not an act o f  
political solidarity with the lumpen but an act o f aggressive disaffiliation from any collective ‘we’ with 
its expectations about ‘what you’re supposed to be . . .  supposed to do.’” Posnock, Philip Roth's Rude 
Truth, 221.
18 Brauner, Philip Roth, 173-4. Both Brauner and Posnock point out the incongruity o f this decision, 
and remind us that anti-Semitism was by no means a thing o f the past in post-war America. Posnock 
further suggests that Roth’s decision to have Coleman pass as a Jew “makes credible Coleman’s belief 
that his decision is more about freedom than race.” See Posnock, Philip Roth’s Rude Truth, 204-6.
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this was a moment when Jewish self-infatuation was at a postwar 
pinnacle among the Washington Square intellectual avant-garde, when 
[...] an aura of cultural significance emanated as much from their jokes 
and their family anecdotes, from their laughter and their clowning and 
their wisecracks and their arguments—even from their insults—as 
from Commentary, Midstream, and the Partisan Review [...] (HS 131)
This is the same milieu that, I argue, prepared the ground for Roth’s early fictional 
representations of the individual and community.19 Even more than their “self­
infatuation,” “cultural significance,” and their journals, it is perhaps the difficult 
cultural negotiation made by many of these figures that draws Coleman to them. To 
return to Jonathan Freedman’s assessment, discussed in Chapter 1 above, the “earnest 
attempt” of the New York Intellectuals “to slough off immigrant garb and beliefs in 
order to pass as ‘real’ Americans,” and their attraction to high culture as “a place 
where they could stake their own fates, make their own futures, outside the constraints 
both within and without the Jewish community” makes apparent what their appeal 
would be to Coleman.20 For a man whose project entails self-transformation in the 
pursuit of self-determination, there were few better models than the Jewish members 
of the New York Intellectuals.
Alexander Portnoy, a highly self-conscious Jew in pursuit of the holy grail of 
gentile women, finds himself simultaneously attracted to and repulsed by the gentile 
culture he comes in contact with. Visiting “The Pumpkin” at her family’s house in 
Iowa, Portnoy is both covetous and disdainful of the family’s genteel manners and 
speech, feeling at once inferior and superior. Freedman names this negotiation, in
19 It is also the same milieu where Anatole Broyard, whom many commentators see as the model for 
Coleman Silk, made his mark. Broyard, the long-time book reviewer for the New York Times, was of 
mixed-race descent, but passed as white his whole life. Henry Louis Gates, Jr., in an essay which 
revealed Broyard’s secret after his death, paints a picture o f Broyard in Greenwich Village in the late 
forties and early fifties that corresponds with Roth’s portrait o f the young Coleman Silk: “In the 
Village, where Broyard started a bookstore on Cornelia Street, the salient thing about him wasn't that 
he was black but that he was beautiful, charming, and erudite. In those days, the Village was crowded 
with ambitious and talented young writers and artists, and Broyard— known for calling men "Sport" 
and girls "Slim"— was never more at home. He could hang out at the San Remo bar with Dwight 
Macdonald and Delmore Schwartz.” Gates’s estimation o f Broyard’s passing is also telling: “Broyard 
was bom black and became white, and his story is compounded o f equal parts pragmatism and 
principle. He knew that the world was filled with such snippets and scraps o f paper, all conspiring to 
reduce him to an identity that other people had invented and he had no say in. [...]Society had decreed 
race to be a matter of natural law, but he wanted race to be an elective affinity, and it was never going 
to be a fair fight.” Henry Louis Gates, Jr., “White Like Me,” The New Yorker, 17 June, 1996, 66.
20 Jonathan Freedman, The Temple o f  Culture, 164, 166-7.
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referring to the Jews who became known as the New York Intellectuals, an “unstable 
amalgam of affect,” describing the often tangled set of emotions that accompanied 
those Jews’ entry into the world of high culture. For Coleman Silk, the entry into the 
white world is even more fraught, because the fact that he is a black man wishing to 
be accepted as an equal is a secret known to no one but himself. The psychological 
difficulty of gaining entry into the dominant culture is compounded by all the effort it 
takes to keep his secret. At first, he is “surprised at how easy it was. What was 
supposed to be hard and somehow shaming or destructive was not only easy but 
without consequences, no price paid at all” (HS 112). For an extraordinarily self- 
possessed character like Coleman, self-determination may be easy in and of itself, but 
it is in going out into the world, Zuckerman suggests, facing all that is outside of his 
control, that chinks in the armor start to show. It soon becomes clear that the effort 
(“the diligence, the discipline, the taking the measure of every last situation”) to keep 
at bay the forces of social determination cannot succeed all o f the time (HS 179). The 
fear of exposure comes to the surface, when he misreads his college girlfriend’s 
poetic tribute to the back of his neck as “the back o f  his negro f  and when each of his 
children are bom—“[w]ith not a sign of his secret” (HS 112, 177). When a boxing 
promoter asks him to go easy on a black opponent in the early rounds of a fight, to 
“‘give the people their money’s worth,’” Coleman refuses, knocking him out in the 
first round, and snapping to the promoter, “‘I don’t carry no nigger’” (HS 116-7).21 
Although, for Zuckerman, this is evidence of how committed Coleman is to his 
radical project of transformation, David Brauner points out that it is “precisely 
because Coleman is carrying the identity of a ‘nigger’ with him—that is to say, the 
consciousness of belonging to an ethno-racial group historically perceived as
subhuman by many white Americans” that he lets the invidious term (Freudianly) slip
22out. Similarly, in the wake of his dismissal from Athena, erupting with rage at his 
unhelpful lawyer, Coleman shouts, “I never again want to hear that self-admiring
21 Timothy Parrish sees The Human Stain as “a loose sequel to Ralph Ellison’s Invisible Man," and 
sees in Coleman’s reply to the promoter a recasting of Invisible Man's famous “Battle Royal” scene: 
“Coleman’s use o f a racial slur is intentionally ironic. It expresses his victory over the racial trap 
Ellison’s Battle Royal represented. Unlike the invisible man’s last boxing opponent, Tatler, Coleman 
does not direct his rage at his black opponent (just another boxer) and refuses to gratify the white 
audience. By making his white manager complicitous with an act the manager cannot comprehend, 
Coleman makes the manager the unwitting dupe o f his own unexamined racism.” Timothy Parrish, 
“Becoming Black: Zuckerman’s Bifurcating Self in The Human Stain,” in Philip Roth: New 
Perspectives on an American Author, 211,217.
22 Brauner, Philip Roth, 158.
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voice of yours or see your smug fucking lily-white face” (HS 81). It follows that 
Coleman’s use of the outdated racist terminology ‘spooks’ to refer to two absent 
students who later turn out to be black—an utterance that sets in motion his tragic 
fall—may be more than a cruelly ironic fate. It may be, as both Brauner and Mark 
Shechner suggest, the return of the repressed, the socially determined self returning 
with a vengeance.23 That his words trigger the full force of another tyrannical 
‘we’—the politically correct campus community of Athena College—signals the 
beginning of the end of Coleman’s great self-making project.
On the second page of The Human Stain, Zuckerman makes reference to 
Nathanial Hawthorne, “who, in the 1860s, lived not many miles from my door,” 
claiming that the country’s sanctimonious interest in the Clinton scandal was another 
example of what the nineteenth-century author called “the persecuting spirit” (HS 2). 
Still, it seems, Roth is interested in “Studies in Guilt and Persecution.” Coleman 
Silk’s downfall, as it is engineered by a censorious campus community only too 
happy to ostracize the distinguished professor for his apparent transgression of the 
laws of political correctness, has been compared by a number of commentators to the 
fate of Hester Prynne in The Scarlet Letter?* Even if he is not paraded through town 
with a shaming letter sewn into his clothing, Coleman’s experience at the hands of the 
eagerly judgmental faculty members and student organizations—“the charges, 
denials, and countercharges, the obtuseness, ignorance, and cynicism, the gross and 
deliberate misinterpretations, the laborious, repetitious explanations, the prosecutorial 
questions”—echoes Hester’s at the hands of her neighbors (HS 12).25 Elaine B. Safer
23 Ibid., 159, and Shechner, Up Society’s Ass, Copper, 191. Shechner has also described the Swede’s 
downfall in American Pastoral in similar terms; here it is his daughter Merry who is the return o f the 
repressed, representing the “Jewish fanaticism” that is her family inheritence, but that the Swede 
somehow escapes. Mark Shechner, “Roth’s American Trilogy,” in The Cambridge Companion to 
Philip Roth, 146-7. In addition, Debra Shostak spots the return o f Ira’s repressed in /  Married a 
Communist in the form o f Sylphid, Eve Frame’s vindictive and vengeful daughter. Shostak, 
Countertexts, Counterlives, 253.
24 See Brauner, Philip Roth, 118; James Duban, “Being Jewish in the Twentieth Century: The 
Synchronicity o f Roth and Hawthorne,” Studies in American Jewish Literature 21 (2002): 1-11; Safer, 
Mocking the Age, 121-2; and Shechner, Up Society’s Ass, Copper, 188. Ross Posnock also connects 
The Human Stain to The Scarlet Letter, but draws parallels instead between Coleman, a man who lives 
his entire adult life with a crucial secret, and Arthur Dimmesdale, whose “vigilance in maintaining his 
double life is strained near breaking.” Posnock, Philip Roth’s Rude Truth, 235.
25 Also echoed, o f course, is the fate o f Bill Clinton. Speaking o f  his decision to set The Human Stain 
when he did, Roth has stated, “In 1998 you had the illusion that you were suddenly able to know this 
huge, unknowable country, to catch a glimpse o f its moral core. What was being enacted on the public 
stage seemed to have the concentrated power o f a great work o f literature. The work I'm thinking o f is 
The Scarlet Letter.” Charles McGrath, “Zuckerman’s Alter Brain,” New York Times Book Review, 7 
May 2000, 7, 8.
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invokes the scene in The Scarlet Letter when Hester is taken out from the prison to be 
brought in front of the crowd with her letter; for one matron in the crowd at least, this 
is not punishment enough: “At the very least, they should have put the brand of a hot 
iron on Hester Prynne’s forehead.”26 Branding, Timothy Parrish reminds us, although 
not with an iron or a scarlet letter, was also at the heart of a 1962 symposium on “The 
Crisis of Conscience in Minority Writers of Fiction,” at which Roth was “grilled” 
with “inquisitorial pressure” by a crowd o f Jewish readers ready to tar and feather him 
for his portrayal of Jews in Goodbye, Columbus. Roth describes the incident in The 
Facts, claiming that the confrontation with the symposium audience left him
OH“branded” as a Jewish writer. Roth spoke about being branded again in a 1981 
interview, and, although he is using a different connotation of the term, the sense of 
reduction and constraint remains—the definition of the self by society. Asked what 
changed for him after the huge commercial success of Portnoy’s Complaint, Roth 
responds, “To become a celebrity is to become a brand name [...] Ivory is the soap 
that floats; Rice Krispies the breakfast cereal that goes snap-crackle-pop; Philip Roth 
the Jew who masturbates with a piece of liver.’ In both cases, Roth’s desire to 
define himself as a writer, to retain the freedom to write however he wants, is 
countered by a societal desire to brand the individual, to pin him down, to restrict his 
freedom of self-determination. The branding of Philip Roth did not undo him—it 
was never a tight enough straightjacket to confine him for very long—but it does 
undo Coleman Silk, whose boldly constructed identity depends upon his self- 
determination remaining inviolate. His fate will resemble Hester Prynne’s, for whom 
“[t]he effect of the symbol [...] was powerful and peculiar. All the light and graceful 
foliage of her character had been withered up by this red-hot brand, and had long ago 
fallen away, leaving a bare and harsh outline.”30
At the funeral of Faunia Farley, the lover with whom Coleman finds solace 
after the cataclysm of his resignation—a relationship seized upon as exploitative by 
the same community that ostracized him as a racist—Zuckerman reflects upon the
26 Nathaniel Hawthorne, The Scarlet Letter (New York: Modem Library, 2000), 46. Quoted in Safer, 
Mocking the Age, 122.
27 Timothy Parrish, “Roth and Ethnic Identity,” in The Cambridge Companion to Philip Roth, 131;
Roth, The Facts, 127-30.
28 Roth, “Interview with Le Nouvel Observateur,” 98.
29 Circumcision, in The Counterlife, as an antidote to the pastoral, is also figured as a brand, “the mark 
of [Jewish] reality [...] The heavy hand o f  human values falls upon you right at the start, marking your 
genitals as its own” (C 327).
0 Hawthorne, The Scarlet Letter, 147-8.
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“public stoning” that led up to both Coleman’s and Faunia’s deaths (HS 289). In the 
aftermath of the car accident that killed them both (in Zuckerman’s imagining, caused 
by Faunia’s insane, and anti-Semitic, ex-husband Les), Zuckerman reads an 
anonymous editorial on an internet bulletin board that amplifies the whispering 
campaign that labeled Coleman both a racist and an abusive misogynist; he is furious 
at the stupidity and illogic of the persecuting community. “Only a label is required. 
The label is the motive. The label is the evidence. The label is the logic. Why did 
Coleman Silk do this? Because he is an x, because he is ay, because he is both. First a 
racist and now a misogynist” (HS 290). The branding that Coleman is subject to in his 
final years, and after his death, should remind us of the branding that he fled from in 
his youth. Branding, whether it be ‘nigger’ or ‘Negro’ or ‘racist’ or ‘misogynist,’ is a 
telling way that the ‘we’ imposes its tyranny on the ‘I’. This sort o f labelling, by its 
very nature, is a restrictive and limiting force, aiming to deny the self-determining 
individuality that Coleman seeks. Seeking to flee from the historical and social forces 
that would determine him as a black man, he is mostly successful, save for the 
occasions, noted above, when he unwittingly betrays his own secret But, and this is 
inevitable in the world of Roth’s trilogy, he soon comes up against the tyranny of 
another ‘we’, suggesting the inescapability of such plural nouns.
Zuckerman’s focus on labeling points to one powerful way that communities 
function to restrict the individual—a subject of Goodbye, Columbus as well. Living 
within a community—living in society—involves being subject to claims from that 
community, and escaping from one community will only lead you into yet another. 
One version of the American dream, Lewis’s mythic figure of the Adamic individual, 
seems embodied by all three protagonists in Roth’s trilogy, but even more than the 
Swede and Ira, it almost exactly describes the ideal to which Coleman Silk aspires:
an individual emancipated from history, happily bereft of ancestry, 
untouched and undefiled by the usual inheritances of family and race; 
an individual standing alone, self-reliant and self-propelling, ready to 
confront whatever awaited him with the aid of his own unique and 
inherent resources.31
31 Lewis, The American Adam, 5.
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But from Zuckerman’s perspective, no individual can be “emancipated from history,” 
nor from ancestry, nor from society. In Zuckerman’s imagining of Coleman’s story 
(as well as that of the Swede and Ira), this particularly American tragedy follows from 
the pursuit of this impossible ideal. To live outside of history, to be without parents, 
children, colleagues—to be without entanglement with other people—is a pure 
distillation of the oft-represented American dream of innocence and individuality, 
and, in Zuckerman’s estimation, it is a dream o f not living in the world at all. Being in 
the world in any real way involves membership in at least some communities, and 
therefore necessitates subjection to the claims of those communities.
*
When Zuckerman narrates Coleman’s initial resistance to the claims of his 
racial identity, and introduces the book’s central trope for belonging to a community, 
he tellingly reminds us of the first community we are bom into, the community of our 
immediate family. In Coleman’s exasperated tones, the family is figured as the first in 
a series of plural nouns that imposes its demands on the individual: “You finally leave 
home, the Ur of we, and you find another we? Another place that’s just like that, the 
substitute for that?” (HS 108). In I  Married a Communist, the book that immediately 
precedes The Human Stain, the conflict between self-determination and social 
determination is explicitly framed in these terms, suggesting that the individual’s 
susceptibility to the claims of pernicious social forces is directly connected to the 
individual’s early experience in the nuclear family. Ira Ringold, the emotionally 
volatile former ditchdigger who makes himself into a famous radio star in public and 
a steamrolling activist for socialism in private, would seem to be, following the 
pattern of the trilogy, the book’s tragic figure, and thus the individual whose attempts 
at self-determination are thwarted by forces beyond his control. And in some ways, he 
is, sharing with Coleman and the Swede “a life and career that rises on an edifice
32whose foundations are then undermined by the exposure of its faulty materials.”
Debra Shostak highlights Ira’s self-transformative urge, his continual attempts to 
remake himself—and to remake everyone around him in his image—reminding us 
that, when Zuckerman first meets Ira, he is not one man, but three: Abraham Lincoln,
32 Brauner, Philip Roth, 157.
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whom he impersonates to great effect on stage; Iron Rinn, his incarnation on the 
airwaves as an American model of patriotism and self-reliance; and Ira Ringold, “the 
redeemed roughneck from Newark’s first ward” {IMAC 23).33 But perhaps because so 
much of Ira’s created identity derives directly from his mentor, the austere and 
demanding Communist Johnny O’Day, another American in a shack in the woods, 
because, as Mark Shechner points out, “Ira is the most unreflective of all Roth’s 
unreflective characters,” the individual whose negotiation of the claims of self and 
society is most illuminated in the novel is not Ira, but Nathan Zuckerman himself.34 
Conceiving of the battle to establish selfhood as an engagement with a series of 
allegiances, a series of substitutes for the original allegiance to family, Zuckerman 
eventually sees Ira as an illuminating contrast to his own path through the world.
It is Zuckerman’s unexpected reunion with Ira’s brother Murray, Nathan’s 
high school English teacher, that sets in motion the narrative of I  Married a 
Communist. Murray, now ninety years old, comes to Nathan’s isolated cabin in the 
mountains for six consecutive nights, telling Nathan all the latter doesn’t know about 
Ira’s rise and fall. Interspersed with Murray’s narrative are Zuckerman’s own 
memories of his experiences with Ira, who was one of Zuckerman’s first mentors. 
Mentors—especially Zuckerman’s—fill the book. Both Murray, who first teaches 
Zuckerman that “‘Cri-ti-cal think-ing [...] is the ultimate subversion,”’ and Ira, in 
whom “the America that was my inheritence manifested itself,” help to shape 
Zuckerman’s nascent character as he comes of age {IMAC 2, 189). “The Ringolds 
were the one-two punch promising to initiate me into the big show, into my beginning 
to understand what it takes to be a man on the larger scale” {IMAC 32). It is surely 
significant that this “one-two punch” takes the form of two figures who seem to 
represent the warring sides of the literary debates of the 1950s: high modernism and 
proletarian naturalism. Other mentors that Zuckerman tries out include Thomas Paine,
33 Shostak, Countertexts, Counterlives, 151.
34 Shechner, Up Society’s Ass, Copper, 176. It’s also worth considering the role o f socialism in 
differentiating Ira from Coleman and the Swede. Remember that the New York Intellectuals’ faith in 
the figure of the individual derived from a common narrative o f disillusionment with the utopian ideals 
of socialism. Likewise, Roth’s continued attention to the fate o f the individual should alert us to a 
deep-seated skepticism in the solutions offered by collective harmony and cooperation. The failed 
utopia o f Ira’s self-making project should, however remind us that the projects o f both Coleman and 
the Swede, although ostensibly brought down by simplifying, totalizing visions o f the world, are 
themselves utopian schemes, envisioning a pastoral o f the inviolate self, cut off from “the jumble, the 
mayhem, the mess” that is American society and history. For more on the role of the pastoral in the 
trilogy, see: Royal, “Pastoral Dreams and National Identity,” 185-207; Brauner, Philip Roth, 148-85; 
Posnock, Philip Roth's Rude Truth, 101-14; and Shostak, Countertexts, Counterlives, 247-9.
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35and the patriotic historical writers Norman Corwin and Howard Fast. The 
combination of influences from the Ringolds and these three writers leads the budding 
novelist to write highly derivative radio plays which pay tribute to the American 
common man, plays that are, in turn, condemned for their simplemindedness and 
political intent by another of Zuckerman’s mentors, his college English instructer Leo 
Glucksman. It is Leo who, echoing Murray, tells Zuckerman, ‘“ You want to rebel 
against society? I’ll tell you how to do it—write we//’” {IMAC 218). And, for a brief 
period, Zuckerman considers making himself a disciple to Ira’s monopolizing mentor, 
Johnny O’Day, whose commitment to the socialist cause is so total as to blot out all 
other of life’s concerns.36
The mentor-disciple relationship, and the very concept of swearing allegiance 
to someone else, is central to the novel, as is hinted at the first time Zuckerman meets 
Ira. Ira picks up Nathan’s copy of Howard Fast’s Citizen Tom Paine, and quotes a 
passage in which Paine discusses George III: “I should suffer the misery of devils, 
were I to make a whore of my soul by swearing allegiance to one whose character is 
that of a sottish, stupid, stubborn, worthless, brutish man” {IMAC 27). Nathan, who 
had already written down and memorized the passage, admits that he particularly likes 
the phrase “a whore of my soul.” The question of to whom allegiance should be 
sworn, the dangers of submitting yourself to the wrong master, is one that hangs over 
the novel, providing the terms for the book’s dramatization of the conflict between 
self-determination and social determination. Zuckerman, like Augie March, is 
“[ajlways making [himself] eminently adoptable,” and is initiated into becoming an 
American man through these educational transactions with his mentors {IMAC 106). 
Later in life, of course, as narrated in The Ghost Writer, E.I. Lonoff would become 
another of Zuckerman’s mentors, the natural successor to Leo Glucksman, who, 
Lonoff-like, tells Zuckerman that ‘“ [y]ou must achieve mastery over your idealism, 
over your virtue as well as over your vice, aesthetic mastery over everything that 
drives you to write in the first place’” {IMAC 219). The role that Zuckerman’s 
mentors in I Married a Communist play in making Zuckerman into an American also 
calls to mind the Swede, who, as Zuckerman recounts in American Pastoral, is “the
35 Both Corwin and Fast are heroes to the young Alexander Portnoy as well, with Portnoy, like 
Zuckerman in I Married a Communist, writing radio plays in the style o f Corwin (PC 169, 130).
36 Tellingly, the claims of family life are explicitly anathema to O’Day’s self-determining project:
“O’Day was unmarried. 'Entangling alliances,’ he told Ira, ‘is something I don’t want any part o f at no 
time. I regard kids as hostages to the malevolent’” {IMAC 35).
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boy we were all going to follow into America, our point man into the next 
immersion,” and thus a sort of wished-for mentor for the young Zuckerman (AP 89).
In contrast to Zuckerman’s mentor-promiscuity, Ira has only O’Day, who becomes his 
one and only mentor, telling Ira what to read, giving him twenty “Concrete 
Suggestions” for the writing of polemics, and telling him everything he needs to know 
about the socialist cause (IMAC 36). Ira’s tragedy, Zuckerman eventually suggests, 
stems from his thralldom to a single mentor, the total control that he unthinkingly 
cedes to O’Day, instead of cycling through a number of such instructors, as 
Zuckerman does.
When Ira invites the young Zuckerman to spend a week with him out at his 
isolated shack in the New Jersey hills, Zuckerman’s father insists upon meeting the 
radio actor before granting his permission. This permission is given after Ira reassures 
Dr Zuckerman that he is not a Communist (he is lying) and that he is no threat to his 
son. At first the incident seems a great relief to Nathan, ecstatic that he is allowed to 
go. But soon he sees a “wound inflicted upon my father’s face,” and understands 
implicitly “the sense of betrayal that comes of trying to find a surrogate father even 
though you love your own” {IMAC 105, 106). After all that his father had done for 
him, Zuckerman is now “running off with another man” {IMAC 106). The exchange, 
one father figure for another, echoing Coleman Silk’s comprehension of the black 
community at Howard as a substitute for his family, points to Zuckerman’s eventual 
realization of Ira’s shortcomings. A line is drawn between Nathan and Ira as 
contrasting figures on the spectrum that spans between self-determination and social 
determination. The week Zuckerman spends at Ira’s shack is wonderful; Ira entrances 
his young disciple with tales of his youthful adventures as a rugged American 
roaming all over the country. But when Zuckerman returns the following summer for 
another week, Ira seems a different version of himself: paranoid and impotent with 
rage, he repeats over and over again his litany of warnings about America’s foregone 
path to fascism. Zuckerman suddenly realizes that he is “savagely bored” by Ira and 
likewise feels “so much smarter than he” {IMAC 216). He finally comes to understand 
what Ira’s vividness and grandeur obscured: that Ira’s early orphaning—his mother 
died when he was a child and his father was as good as absent, leading him to leave 
home at fifteen—has made him into, in Debra Shostak’s words, “a giant suffering
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from stunted growth.”37 The betrayal that Nathan feels upon implicitly choosing Ira 
over his father points to the reason for the former’s deformation:
If you’re orphaned as early as Ira was, you fall into the situation that 
all men must fall into but much, much sooner, which is tricky, because 
you may either get no education at all or be oversusceptible to 
enthusiasms and beliefs and ripe for indoctrination. {IMAC 216)38
The situation that all men must fall into, it seems, is being forced to make connections 
in the world after you leave the original web of connections. This is the bruising entry 
into the world that all three of the would-be self-determining protagonists of the 
trilogy must negotiate. Because Ira never had the security that comes with the original 
family community, he is “an easy mark for the utopian vision” {IMAC 217). Utterly 
on his own, he was free “to connect with whatever he wanted but also left [...] 
unmoored enough to give himself to something almost right off the bat, to give 
himself totally and forever” {IMAC 216). This is the fatal mistake, in Zuckerman’s 
telling. To give yourself “totally and forever” to a single person, idea, or ideal, is to 
surrender any possibility for self-determination.
Zuckerman comes to this realization as someone healthily socialized by a 
stable family home. Having never been abandoned as a child, never completely on his 
own, he was able to grow up normally, to be nurtured into his adolescence and then 
be “let go, ready to be a man, ready, that is, to choose allegiances and affiliations, the 
parents of your adulthood, the chosen parents whom [...] you either love or don’t, as 
suits you” {IMAC 217). Zuckerman’s ideal of manhood, as put forth here, is an active 
attempt at a partial self-determination in a world in which totally escaping the forces 
of social determination is impossible— unless your life is to resemble Johnny 
O’Day’s. It is an active ideal, the individual attempting to set his own path after 
passively accepting the one given to him by his parents. For, although Zuckerman 
conceives of these mentors and allegiances as substitute parents, they can, crucially, 
be picked up and put down at will. They are:
37 Shostak, Countertexts, Counterlives, 255.
38 This is quite a contrast to Roth’s experience o f writing Goodbye, Columbus, which he remembers as 
being full o f “the exuberance of being a literary orphan.” Roth, “The Story o f Three Stories,” 213.
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personalities to contend with, mentors who embodied or espoused 
powerful ideas and who first taught me to navigate the world and its 
claims, the adopted parents who also, each in his turn, had to be cast 
off along with their legacy, had to disappear, thus making way for the 
orphanhood that is total, which is manhood. When you’re out there in 
this thing all alone. {IMAC 217)
This is as close to a credo for Zuckerman’s brand of self-making as you’re likely to 
find in Roth’s fiction: a willed engagement with a series of allegiances, a continued 
attention to the active work that is “navigat[ing] the world and its claims,” ever 
mindful of the responsibilities of selfhood that ultimately cannot be evaded.
In his first appearance in Roth’s fiction, in The Ghost Writer, Nathan 
Zuckerman flees the protection offered by his father—to whom he shouts, “‘I am on 
my own!”’— only, immediately, “to submit myself for candidacy as nothing less than
E. I. LonofTs spiritual son” (GW  78, 7). Zuckerman’s sustained and particular pursuit 
of self-determination as outlined in I  Married a Communist, his recruitment of “all 
those extra fathers like a pretty girl gets beaux,” only to abandon each father as it suits 
him, should come as no surprise to readers who know his history {IMAC 106). His 
refusal of the sort of abiding allegiance that Ira adopts has allowed him to set his own 
path, for better or worse, since the youthful days documented in The Ghost Writer. 
But, his admission that he understands manhood as being “out there in this thing all 
alone,” points to the dangers of such a rigorous promiscuity.39 At the end of the title 
novella of Goodbye, Columbus, Roth leaves Neil Klugman unsure of what path to 
follow, having abandoned both the provincial world of Jewish Newark embodied by 
his Aunt Gladys and the vividly materialistic new world of the Jewish suburbs 
embodied by Brenda Patimkin. Roth does not tell us where Neil goes from this 
solitary position, instead ending the novella with an ambiguous image of Neil gazing 
at the window of the Harvard library, looking both inward (at his reflection), and 
outward (through the window to the books inside). It is left to the reader to decide 
whether Neil is free and therefore ascendent, or rudderless and alone. Having
39 Ross Posnock sees “a promiscuous mingling” in the way Roth has played “the appropriation game” 
(the phrase is from Ellison) throughout his career, with a “freewheeling approach to culture that 
rewrites heritage not as passive inheritance but as an assemblage produced by the act o f seizing or 
appropriating from the past and present.” Posnock, Philip Roth’s Rude Truth, 91-2.
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delineated a similar path for Zuckerman, here Roth has Murray Ringold comment on 
the result.
Zuckerman’s two-room cabin in the Berkshires—where he’s written the three 
books of the trilogy—is his retreat from the world, the physical representation of his 
realization that he “[doesn’t] want a story any longer. I’ve had my story” {IMAC 71). 
This retreat from the narratives of the self directly leads to his undertaking to tell the 
stories of the Swede, Ira Ringold, and Coleman Silk, but it also seems a continuation 
of the exhaustion with the self detailed in Zuckerman Bound, a different sort of 
solution than the exploration of the multifarious narratives of the self offered up in 
The Counterlife. The cabin is:
The place where you disrobe, molt it all, the uniforms you’ve worn and 
the costumes you’ve gotten into, where you shed your batteredness and 
your resentment, your appeasement of the world and your defiance of 
the world, your manipulation of the world and its manhandling of you. 
{IMAC 12)
What exactly Zuckerman is fleeing from is never made clear, but his utter seclusion is 
apparent to his old teacher. And after six nights of telling Ira’s story, Murray’s not 
sure the lessons to be learned from Ira’s unwavering devotion to a doomed cause have 
sunk in for his pupil. As the two men ready themselves to say goodbye (for the last 
time, it turns out, for Murray dies two months later), Murray imparts a warning to 
Zuckerman: ‘“Beware the utopia of isolation. Beware the utopia of the shack in the 
woods, the oasis defense against rage and grief. An impregnable solitude’” {IMAC 
315). What Murray recognizes is that Zuckerman’s isolation, ostensibly a retreat from 
the expenditure of energy that self-making in the world requires, is just another 
utopian attempt at total self-determination. He recognizes that Zuckerman’s cabin is 
an “upgraded replica” of Ira’s shack in the woods, his “beloved retreat,” the symbol 
of Ira’s utterly unrealistic vision of himself as a morally pure dissenter from the evils 
of capitalism {IMAC 71).40 Earlier, Zuckerman narrates his visit to Johnny O’Day’s
40 Zuckerman mentions in passing that, after spending night after night sitting outside Ira’s shack 
listening to Ira’s stories, surrounded by citroneiia candles, “the lemony fragrance of citronella oil 
would forever after recall Zinc Town [where Ira’s shack was] to me” (IMAC 188). Near the book’s 
end, after driving Murray to his residence, thus signalling the end of his story, Zuckerman returns to his
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austere room, “the spiritual essence of Ira’s shack” (IMAC 228). “What O’Day’s 
room represented was discipline, that discipline that says however many desires I 
have, I can circumscribe myself down to this one room” {IMAC 227). Seemingly, 
Zuckerman has accomplished this difficult task, blocking out all of his desires to 
concentrate all of his energies on his writing. His existence is reminiscent of another 
secluded Berkshire figure from his past, E.I. Lonoff, whose own self-imposed 
asceticism makes its impact on Zuckerman in The Ghost Writer: “Purity. Serenity. 
Simplicity. Seclusion. All one’s concentration and flamboyance and originality 
reserved for the grueling, exalted, transcendent calling. I looked around and I thought, 
This is how I will live” (GW  4). Now living like Lonoff, like O’Day, like Ira, 
Zuckerman finds that, having realized that Ira’s mistake was to have given himself 
“totally and forever,” he has himself given himself over to a singular version of the 
world. The implicit conclusion is that although Zuckerman has seemingly succeeded 
in his self-determination, in cutting himself off from all claims other than his own 
(unlike Coleman and the Swede, who discover that their self-determining projects are 
impossible), he is living a life that is no life at all.
I have suggested that the final image of “Goodbye, Columbus” offers up the 
community of literature as a refuge for those individuals, like Neil Klugman, who 
cannot reconcile the claims of unsatisfactory communities with their own desires for 
self-determination. No such balm is offered to the characters in the “American 
Trilogy.” As we will see, the Swede, in American Pastoral, is a man without 
literature—he defines himself through sporting triumph and hard work—and it seems 
unlikely that high culture would save him from the cataclysm provoked by his 
daughter. Coleman Silk, of course, is a classics professor, a man devoted to the 
culture and literature of the ancient Greeks and Romans; this seems to offer him no 
protection against “the antagonism that is the world” {HS 315-6). As for Zuckerman, 
The Human Stain continues on from the end of I Married a Communist in suggesting 
that his willed solitude—a project specifically conceived as a retreat from life into a 
world of only reading and writing books—is untenable. His realization is triggered by 
the fact that he “had, without figuring or planning on it, fallen into a serious 
friendship with Coleman Silk {HS 43). Having found that “the secret” to maintaining
cabin to see that “[o]n the deck, the citronella candle was still burning in its aluminum bucket when I 
got back, that little pot o f fire the only light by which my house was discernible, except for a dim 
radiance off the orange moon silhouetting the low roof’ (IMAC 320).
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his solitude was “to find sustenance in people like Hawthorne, in the wisdom of the 
brilliant deceased,” Zuckerman now finds that the entrance of Coleman Silk, with 
Silk’s own brand of brilliance, into his life has made him “lonely [...] For life. The 
entanglement with life” (HS 44). Perhaps Murray Ringold’s criticisms at the end of I  
Married a Communist are still ringing in his ears, or perhaps he’s learned a lesson 
from the Swede, Ira, and Coleman about the dangers of utopian thinking, or perhaps, 
as is suggested at the end of The Human Stain, he simply fears for his life—Faunia 
Farley’s ex-husband Les is still alive, and Zuckerman’s book imagines that it is Farley 
who killed Coleman and Faunia—but the trilogy ends with Zuckerman resigned to the 
fact that “my five years alone in my house here were over” (HS 360).
*
As Brian McDonald points out, the chapter headings of American Pastoral— 
“Paradise Remembered,” “The Fall,” and “Paradise Lost”—immediately recalls the 
Adamic narrative.41 And indeed, Seymour Levov, the novel’s protagonist seems, even 
more than Coleman Silk, to be the embodiment of the “individual emancipated from 
history, happily bereft of ancestry, untouched and undefiled by the usual inheritances 
of family and race.”42 Unlike Coleman, Levov has no need to radically re-author 
himself to achieve this ideal of self-determination. As Zuckerman narrates Levov’s 
presence as the neighborhood celebrity of his childhood memories, he appears as a sui 
generis Adam, bom with the looks, the confidence, and the grace to appear untouched 
by all outside contingency. He acquires the nickname “the Swede,” due to his 
strangely un-Jewish looks in a predominantly Jewish neighborhood, the “steep-jawed 
insentient Viking mask of this blue-eyed blond bom into our tribe” setting him apart 
from his darker complexioned peers (AP 3). More than seeming to come from 
Sweden, the Swede seems totally alien and superior to everyone around him, “if not 
divine, a distinguished cut above the more primordial humanity of just about 
everybody else” (AP 5). His easy virtuosity in three sports, the way he seems to 
dominate every contest without even trying, becomes a microcosm of the ease with 
which he negotiates all of the world’s claims, coasting through life on nothing more
41 McDonald, ‘“The Real American Crazy Shit,’” 28.
42 Lewis, The American Adam, 5.
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than an extraordinary “talent for ‘being himself.’”43 To Zuckerman, the Swede as an 
adolescent was “someone for whom there were no obstacles, who appeared never to 
have to struggle to clear a space for him self’ {AP 19). This portrait of effortless self- 
determination, of an individual who does not even have to fight off the hindrances of 
society, history, or ancestry, is not refuted by Zuckerman’s reconstruction of the 
Swede’s ascent into untroubled manhood. Happily taking the reins at his father’s 
glove factory, marrying Dawn Dwyer, a gentile candidate for Miss America, and 
moving out of Newark to the American pastoral setting par excellence, rural Old 
Rimrock, New Jersey, the Swede is “the man not set up for tragedy” {AP 86). 
Throughout this uninterrupted ascendancy, the Swede carries his nickname “like an 
invisible passport, all the while wandering deeper and deeper into an American’s life, 
forthrightly evolving into a large, smooth, optimistic American such that his 
conspicuously raw forebears [...] couldn’t have dreamed of as one of their own” {AP 
207-8). The “invisible passport” he carries is not merely his community’s enthralldom 
to his goyish looks or extraordinary prowess in sporting events—what the Swede 
carries is his unthinking talent for self-determination: his inherent ability to be 
unaffected—undeterred, undeformed—by the social conditions around him. He is a 
man who with “this ability to imagine himself completely,” and then miraculously— 
but easily—live as he imagines {AP 190-1).
Following the design of all three books in the trilogy, this picture of the easily- 
achieved pastoral of self-determination is, as Zuckerman’s description of the Swede 
as “the man not set up for tragedy” suggests, ripe for destruction at the hands of the 
exigencies of American reality. The Swede’s pastoral, as David Brauner asserts, is “a 
mythical realm removed from—indeed specifically conceived as an escape from—the 
historical realities of American life.”44 The historical reality that is most explicitly 
evaded, at least as recounted in the years before Merry Levov plants her bomb, is the 
reality of ethnicity, the inherited condition that outlasts even the attachment to 
parents. The American ideal that the Swede so effortlessly pursues—and seemingly 
achieves—is explicitly post-ethnic, as embodied for the Swede by the rural splendor
43 The Swede’s stardom in sports recalls the Patimkins o f Goodbye, Columbus, with their “sporting- 
goods tree,” and specifically Brenda’s older brother Ron, an athlete who is certain that he will father a 
boy: ‘“and when he’s six months old I’m going to sit him down with a basketball in front o f him, and a 
football, and a baseball, and then whichever one he reaches for, that’s the one we’re going to 
concentrate on’” (GC 56).
44 Brauner, Philip Roth, 169.
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of Old Rimrock. In trading in the Jewish Newark neighborhood of Weequahic—and 
bypassing his father’s preference, the comfortable new suburb of South Orange—for 
Old Rimrock, the town and the hundred year old house in which he lives with his wife 
Dawn—herself fleeing her provincial Irish-American background—become a 
synecdoche for America itself, an America without ethnic identity. The Swede’s 
project, in his attempt to leave the old neighborhood behind, surpasses even that of 
the Patimkins in Goodbye, Columbus. “Out in Old Rimrock, all of American lay at 
their door. That was an idea he loved. Jewish resentment, Irish resentment—the hell 
with it” {AP 310).45 He becomes a “frontiersman,” going beyond his father’s 
trajectory, unconstricted by the claims of either ethnic belonging and ethnic 
discrimination—the tyranny of the ‘we’—to a new world in which “[njobody 
dominates anybody anymore [...] This is a new generation and there is no need for 
that resentment stuff from anybody, them or us” {AP 310, 311). Ecstatically 
exclaiming to his wife, “‘Dawnie, we’re free!”’, the Swede has seemingly fulfilled the 
American dream, discovering a paradise of absolute individual freedom, which is only 
as it should be: “‘Isn’t that what this country’s all about? I want to be where I want to 
be and I don’t want to be where I don’t want to be. That’s what being an American 
is—isn’t it?”’ {AP 308, 315). Of course, prefiguring the stories told 'm l Married a 
Communist and The Human Stain, this pastoral is soon destroyed, as the Swede’s 
ingenuous question is unambiguously answered in the negative by his adolescent 
daughter Merry.
For Merry Levov, being an American is not about escape but about 
engagement, about being caught up in American history. Unlike her father, who 
seems to control his destiny without any effort at all, Merry is a passive object for 
conditions and forces outside of her control. Of her persistent and ineradicable 
stuttering, which the Levovs expend all of their resources of attention and money 
trying to remedy, Zuckerman notes that “[s]he was simply in the hands of something 
she could not get out of,” a situation that, before his daughter’s bomb, the Swede 
never finds himself in {AP 99). Never even noticing the obstacles that others have to 
negotiate in the establishment of selfhood, the Swede is wholly unprepared for the
45 In its formulation o f a westward move to escape the claims o f ethnic belonging, this passage 
confirms a bitter prediction made by Neil Klugman, reflecting upon the great Jewish migration out of 
the cities: “someday these streets [...] would be empty and we would all o f us have moved to the crest 
of the Orange Mountains, and wouldn’t the dead stop kicking at the slats in their coffins then?” (GC 
83).
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ease with which his daughter is taken from him. Foreshadowing Zuckerman’s ideal of 
self-determination as outlined in I  Married a Communist, Merry works her way 
through a series of allegiances throughout her childhood: a “Catholic phase,” picked 
up from her maternal grandmother, is replaced by the 4-H Club, which in turn falls to 
astronomy and then Audrey Hepburn {AP 93). “She was a perfectionist who did 
things passionately, lived intensely in the new interest, and then the passion was 
suddenly spent and everything, including the passion, got thrown into a box and she 
moved on” {AP 94).46 Although this series of fascinations initially seems to follow 
Zuckerman’s pattern of allying himself with a substitute father, only to run off with 
another as it suits him, it turns out that Merry more closely resembles Ira.
Like Ira, she is “ripe for indoctrination,” “an easy mark for the utopian 
vision.” For the next passionate subject she is seized by, the replacement for the 
harmless fantasy of emulating Audrey Hepburn, is the “terrifyingly pure” dogma of 
the anti-war movement, soon leading her to the radical realm of domestic terrorism 
{AP 254). It is from this allegiance that she will not return, for all intents and purposes 
it is the allegiance to which she, like Ira, “givefs] [herjself totally and forever,” for the 
bomb that she leaves outside of the local post office explodes and kills an innocent 
man dropping off his mail. It explodes, as well, the perfect life that the Swede had so 
effortlessly inhabited. To continue the analogy between Merry and Ira, both 
unprepared to fend off an allegiance that will deform or destroy their lives, is to be led 
to the question of why, if Merry was not an orphan, not “unmoored” like Ira, but 
instead the child of two seemingly faultless, loving parents, why does this happen? 
This question, actually a torrent of questions all probing the same mystifying 
problem, haunts the Swede for the rest o f his life. “Once the inexplicable had begun, 
the torment of self-examination never ended. However lame the answers, he never ran 
out of questions, he who had nothing of consequence really to ask himself’ {AP 92). 
For Brian McDonald, the question that hangs over the book centers on the connection 
between the Swede’s pastoral innocence, his life set apart from the conditions of 
society, and his daughter’s susceptibility to the tidal wave of history that carries her
46 Timothy Parrish asserts that “[w]hat her father might dismiss as adolescent role-playing is thus a 
more extreme version o f how he invents his life. Where Swede creates his self by imagining a single 
narrative future o f Edenic bliss, Merry extends and multiplies her father’s logic o f self-identification 
and fulfillment. [...] An extreme version o f her father’s self-experimentation, Merry's innate curiosity to 
explore the outer limits o f the selfs possibilities aligns her with the novelistic sensibility o f Zuckerman 
and Roth.” Timothy Parrish, “The End o f Identity: Philip Roth’s American Pastoral,” Shofar 19 (Fall 
2000): 91-2.
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away from her father. “The issue which lies at the heart of American Pastoral is not 
the illusory nature of the Swede’s innocence [...] but rather determining what role, if 
any at all, the Swede’s innocence plays in his own tragedy.”47 For Zuckerman’s part, 
a definitive answer to this question is never reached, as the book’s final line, the last 
of the book’s multitude of unanswered questions, asks, “What on earth is less 
reprehensible than the life of the Levovs?” {AP 423).
Merry’s predisposition to the utopian vision of anti-war terrorism, although it 
is the engine of the plot, is not the story of American Pastoral. This is the Swede’s 
story, as imagined by Nathan Zuckerman. Zuckerman “lift[s] the Swede up onto the 
stage,” to try to understand “[t]he brutality of the destruction of this indestructible 
man” {AP 88, 83). The Swede’s story, as Zuckerman tells it, is, like Coleman Silk’s 
story, the story of a failed project of self-determination. The Swede “was fully 
charged up with purpose long, long before anyone else he knew, with a grown man’s 
aims and ambitions, someone who excitedly foresaw, in perfect detail, the outcome of 
his story” {AP 192). And his greatest pleasure in life derives from the fulfillment of 
that purpose, the happy and wholly certain authorship of his own story. Authoring his 
daughter, however is another matter entirely. As Johnny O’Day suggests in I  Married 
a Communist, children introduce the uncontrollability of other people into the 
individual’s immediate narrative, thus endangering the self-making project. Merry 
enacts upon the Swede’s life what Coleman always fears his own children will do to 
his: if any of his children are bom with signs of his (and thus their) African-American 
heritage, his self-determining project will be undone. He is saved from that fate, saved 
from his children dragging him back into the claims of historical conditions, but the 
Swede is not so lucky. It is his inability to author his daughter’s narrative—his 
inability to grant her the same freedom from the forces of social determination that he 
enjoyed—that is his downfall. No longer Seymour, or the Swede, or even the husband 
of Miss New Jersey, he is permanently transformed into the father of the Rimrock 
bomber, his free and easy flight above the fray brought down with terrible violence.
In the long recounting of a dinner party, held at the Levovs’ house, that brings 
American Pastoral to a close, the table’s conversation settles on the subject of the 
direction American culture had followed since the 1960s (the scene takes place in 
1973). The Swede’s father, a lifelong advocate of the value of hard work and moral
47 McDonald, ‘“The Real American Crazy Shit,’” 37.
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rectitude, is predictably up in arms over the presumed relaxing of cultural norms: the 
rising divorce rate, Deep Throat, and the Newark riots all come in for his 
condemnation. What is unspoken, but firmly on the minds of both the Swede and the 
reader, is Merry Levov’s place in this narrative of cultural decline. Mr Levov declares 
that “[y]ou don’t have to revere your family, you don’t have to revere your country, 
you don’t have to revere where you live, but you have to know you have them, you 
have to know you are part of them” {AP 365). Brian McDonald rightly points out that 
Mr Levov is protesting against the apparent lack of limits in progressive politics and 
culture, pointing to the selfishness inherent in the radical movement Merry is caught 
up in: “a doctrine of individualism that seems to have absolutely no regard for the 
values which define his way of life, for his sense of decency, responsibility, 
patriotism, and respect for hard work.”48 Picking up on the sentiment expressed in Mr 
Levov’s words, there were some critics for whom American Pastoral was a political 
shift for Roth, a sort of mea culpa for the apparent allegiance to the permissive spirit 
of the new left expressed in Portnoy's Complaint.49 But just as it is dangerous to see 
Alex Portnoy’s complaint about the way he lives his life as a sign of support for any 
ascendant strain of the culture, I’d hesitate before assuming that Mr Levov speaks for 
Philip Roth. The passage quoted above resonates as a statement about the mystifying 
destruction that Merry introduces to her seemingly unassailable home, but also, I 
think, as a warning—imparted too late—from a father to a son. The Swede, although 
he does revere his family and his country, seems to be caught unaware that he is a part 
of the dynamic country in which he lives, unaware that to live in America is to be 
subject to American history, to the inescapable conditions of living in American 
society. Like Coleman, the Swede seemingly escapes the condition of social 
determination, only to be blindsided by the forces of another in an endless series of 
tyrannical ‘we’s.
*
The three novels of the “American Trilogy” are, in this reading, not a break 
from Roth’s earlier work, but a continuation, a deeper investigation of issues that have
48 McDonald, ‘“The Real American Crazy Shit,”’ 35.
49 See Norman Podhoretz, “The Adventures o f Philip Roth,” Commentary, October 1998, 25-36; 
Edward Alexander, “Philip Roth at Century’s End,” New England Review 20 (1999), 183-90.
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preoccupied him from the very start of his career. The conflict that springs up 
between the American ideals of innocence and individualism and the decidedly 
human need for community is one that Roth has explored throughout his career, and 
the similarities between the concerns of Goodbye, Columbus and those of these later 
works should make us skeptical of readings that posit late Roth as a changed man, a 
sort of late convert to the significant themes o f the great novelists. And yet,
Roth—and his reception—has certainly changed in the nearly forty years between the 
publication of his debut and that of American Pastoral. Although the trilogy shares 
similar concerns with Goodbye, Columbus, the scope of the later works and their 
foregrounded focus on American history have worked to brand Roth yet again, this 
time as a grand old man of American letters. No longer branded as a purely Jewish 
writer, or “the Jew who masturbates with a piece of liver,” Philip Roth is now 
introduced in article after article in the mainstream media as “America’s greatest 
living writer.”50 Seemingly confirming this new standing, in 2005, the Roth became 
just the third living author (after Eudora Welty and Saul Bellow) to have his entire 
oeuvre published in a “definitive edition” by the Library o f America (the last o f eight 
volumes is scheduled to be published in 2013). Although this new sense of Roth in 
the public imagination certainly fits into the narrative described above, in which the 
solipsistic, self-obsessed writer finally looks out at the world around him, it is also 
certain that the books of the “American Trilogy” themselves helped to create this new 
brand.
From much of his career, Roth has insisted that he is an American writer 
rather than a Jewish-American one; he claimed, in a 1981 interview that “what the 
heart is to the cardiologist, the coal to the miner, the kitchen sink to the plumber, 
America is to me.”51 And yet, this formulation’s implication—that Roth takes 
America as the subject of his fiction—was not truly confirmed until the “American 
Trilogy.” Certainly, most of Roth’s novels could have only taken place in America, 
and tell us much about the nation over the past fifty years. But it is only beginning 
with American Pastoral that it can be said that Roth has taken America as a subject, 
with the trilogy’s conceptual plan of tying the three protagonists to three eras of
50 Bob Thompson, “His Life as a Writer,” Washington Post, 12 November 2006, D01; Stephen 
Amidon, “A Guide to Philip Roth,” (London) Sunday Times, 23 September 2007, 6; Paul Gray, 
“[America’s Best] Novelist,” Time, 9 July 2001.
51 Roth, “Interview with Le Nouvel Observateur,” 110.
222
recent American history foregrounding a concern with the state of the nation. From 
the title of the first book {American Pastoral) to the last word of The Human Stain 
(“America”), the trilogy not only grounds its action in familiar eras of American 
history, it makes America—as place, as concept, as ideal—into a contested subject to 
be debated by nearly every significant character. In Zuckerman’s imagining, the 
Swede “loved America. Loved being an American” {AP 206). But for his daughter, 
who “initiatjes] the Swede into the displacement of another America entirely,” “being 
an American was loathing America” {AP 86, 213). In I  Married a Communist, the 
adolescent excitement that Nathan feels when he first spends time with Ira and 
Murray Ringold stems from the sense that they are initiating him into America: “You 
flood into America and America floods into you” {IMAC 39). Murray is particularly 
alert to the American temptation of casting off your roots and becoming someone 
else: “‘You’re an American who doesn’t want to be your parents’ child? Fine. [...] 
You’ve come to the right country’” {IMAC 157). And, for the young Zuckerman, Ira 
seems to represent America itself: “I had never before known anyone whose life was 
so intimately circumscribed by so much American history, who was personally 
familiar with so much American geography, who had confronted, face to face, so 
much American lowlife” {IMAC 189). In The Human Stain, Coleman’s downfall is 
explicitly parallelled with the political machinations of the summer of 1998, and the 
community that so viciously seizes upon his slip is indulging in “America’s oldest 
communal passion [...] the ecstasy of sanctimony” {HS 2). For Zuckerman,
Coleman’s life itself dramatizes a narrative central to the American identity: “To 
become a new being. To bifurcate. The drama that underlies America’s story, the high 
drama that is upping and leaving—and the energy and cruelty that rapturous drive 
demands” {HS 342). In the trilogy, then, America ceases to be merely a setting, but 
emerges as a central fictional subject for Roth to probe.
In Goodbye, Columbus, by contrast, the word “America”—so often debated 
and incorporated into grand statements by the characters of the trilogy—scarcely 
appears. Although Roth’s debut, like the trilogy, is centrally concerned with the 
interaction between individuals and their communities— with the conflict between 
self-determination and social determination— it seems that these concerns are not 
examined outside of the context of the particular Jewish-American community that 
Roth grew up in. Roth has stated that he decided to go away to Bucknell University in 
central Pennslvania as an undergraduate because “I wanted to find out what the rest of
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‘America’ was like. America in quotes—because it was still almost as much of an 
idea in my mind as it had been in Franz Kafka’s.”52 The “American Trilogy” sees the 
quotes well and truly falling away from Roth’s vision of America, as he engages with 
America’s myths of itself directly, daring to address unapologetically three wildly 
contested eras of American history. In doing so, he demonstrates that the concerns 
that preoccupied him in investigating his own community are just as vital and relevant 
when investigated in the context of the nation at large.
52 Ibid., 105.
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Conclusion
(There’s no) Remaking Reality
Everyman, Roth’s novel of 2006, opens with the first of a number of funerals 
the book will depict. In the book’s chronology this is, in fact, the final funeral, as it is 
with the burial of the novel’s unnamed protagonist that Roth begins his narration of 
the man’s life. The protagonist’s adult daughter Nancy, “like a ten-year-old 
overwhelmed,” after delivering a brief eulogy, must face the difficult duty of 
throwing dirt onto her father’s coffin:
Turning toward the coffin, she picked up a clod of dirt and, before 
dropping it onto the lid, said lightly, with the air still of a bewildered 
young girl, “Well, this is how it turns out. There’s nothing more we 
can do, Dad.” Then she remembered his own stoical maxim from 
decades back and began to cry. “There’s no remaking reality,” she told 
him. “Just take it as it comes. Hold your ground and take it as it 
comes.”1
The protagonist’s “stoical maxim” was coined as an attempt to console Nancy after 
his divorce from her mother: “That was the truth and the best he could do” (E  79).
She refigures it here to refer to an acceptance of death as a part of life, an acceptance 
that however unfathomable and intolerable the fact of death is, “there’s nothing [...]
1 Philip Roth, Everyman (London: Vintage, 2006), 4-5. Subsequent references will be noted 
parenthetically in the text
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we can do,” there is no escape from this universal fate. It’s advice given from a 
daughter to her dead father, ostensibly admitting that there’s nothing she can do to 
bring him back, nothing that he can do to “remake reality” and live another day. But 
Nancy is remembering her father’s words to her and thus also advising herself that 
she has no choice but to take part in “our species’ least favorite activity” (£ 15). The 
act of throwing, or shovelling, dirt onto a grave is foregrounded again later on in the 
book, at the funeral of the protagonist’s father, in which, as according to traditional 
Jewish rites, the grave is filled by the mourners. Still recovering from recent quintuple 
bypass surgery and too weak to take part in the heavy labor, the protagonist can only 
watch as his brother, sons, and nephews fill the grave:
His father was going to lie not only in the coffin but under the weight 
of that dirt, and all at once he saw his father’s mouth as if there was no 
coffin, as if the dirt they were throwing into the grave was being 
deposited straight down on him, filling up his mouth, blinding his eyes, 
clogging his nostrils, and closing off his ears. (E  60)
For the protagonist, watching the grave fill up with dirt is “like a second death, one no 
less awful than the first,” and afterwards he tells his ex-wife, “[n]ow I know what it 
means to be buried. 1 didn’t till today” (£61).
Knowing what it means to be buried, and accepting that this fate awaits us 
all—that “there’s no remaking reality”—is an imperative that seems to drive this brief 
and bleak book, which begins with the protagonist’s funeral, moves backward through 
his life through the narration of a series of illnesses, and then forward again to his 
death. Roth’s insistence on including such detailed descriptions of the physical reality 
of burial, as well as a scene in which a gravedigger painstakingly explains to the 
protagonist the ins and outs of digging a grave, seems to continue the stripping away 
of illusions in the face of death, emphasizing the fact that a dead body is buried in a 
coffin under six feet of dirt and will remain there forever. Roth’s protagonist, as is 
indicated by his advice to his daughter, seems to uphold such realism in the face of 
death; we are told that he has no use for the consolations of religion, and is 
determined to see death as nothing more than oblivion: “No hocus-pocus about death 
and God or obsolete fantasies of heaven for him. There was only our bodies, bom to 
live and die on terms decided by the bodies that had lived and died before us” (£51).
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And yet, he cannot help but to rebel against this bleak outcome. Late in life, besieged 
by heart problems that have required surgery after surgery, keeping the presence of 
death close at hand, he finds himself uncontrollably jealous and spiteful over his 
brother Howie’s good health. Although “he was not without a civilized person’s 
tolerant understanding of the puzzle of inequality and misfortune,” he discovers in 
himself “the spiteful desire for his brother to lose his health,” almost believing “that 
Howie’s good health was responsible for his own compromised health” (E 100-1). He 
cannot keep himself from desperately wanting, and therefore ‘trying on’ another fate. 
And despite his apparently clear-eyed resignation to the diminuation of his health and 
potency, he can’t subdue “his longing for the last great outburst of everything,” 
submitting to the “folly” of pursuing a young and beautiful girl he sees jogging {E 
134). Holding your ground and taking reality as it comes, it seems, is no easy matter.
Looked at from one angle, “there’s no remaking reality” might be seen as an 
underlying maxim for Roth’s whole career. As I’ve detailed in this thesis, his fiction 
has been defined by a refusal to commit himself to any one idea or position without 
taking up its opposite in turn. There is a sense in which this approach entails a refusal 
to impose a restrictive and reductive vision upon a reliably complex and unknowable 
world. Everyman's unnamed protagonist echoes Uncle Asher, a character from Roth’s 
early novel Letting Go, who councils Gabe Wallach to “let it flow,” asserting that “I’ll 
take the shape the world gives me.”2 Ross Posnock seizes upon Asher’s statements as 
central to Roth’s sensibility, echoing Emerson’s concept of abandonment, a way of 
being that admits that “[ljife seems immune to our designs, and all we can count on is 
the unaccountable.”3 In this reading, Roth’s interrogation of the commmunities in 
Goodbye, Columbus works to accurately reflect “our sense of reality,” in Saul 
Bellow’s phrase, as opposed to Jewish critics who would paint a different picture for 
the sake of “public relations”.4 Peter Tamopol’s ultimate realization that he is “this 
me being me and none other!” seems, after so many attempts to rewrite the story of 
his self, to reflect a resignation to a reality that he is powerless to make over, as does 
the final image of Zuckerman in The Anatomy Lesson, wandering around a hospital, 
“as though he still believed that he could unchain himself from a future as a man apart 
and escape the corpus that was his” {MLM 330, AL 505). The books of Roth’s
2 Roth, Letting Go, 83.
3 Posnock, Philip Roth’s Rude Truth, 190, 212-3.
4 Bellow, “The Swamp o f Prosperity,” 79.
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“autobiogaphical” period can be seen as insisting upon the often messy consequences 
of the autobiographical move, consistently offering reminders that no writing takes 
place in a vacuum. And there is a sense in which the novels of the “American 
Trilogy,” in Zuckerman’s attempts to “dream” “realistic chronicle[s],” refute naive 
and simplistic notions of American innocence and unfettered individualism. It is this 
Roth for whom the uproar over Bill Clinton’s adultery was merely an example that 
“for the billionth time—the jumble, the mayhem, the mess proved itself more subtle 
than this one’s ideology and that one’s morality” (HS 3). An awareness—often, an 
awe—of the ways in which reality consistently frustrates our attempts to get a handle 
on it has been an element running through Roth’s writing throughout his career.
But of course, in another sense, “remaking reality” is precisely the novelist’s 
task. Roth reminds us that “[l]ife, like the novelist, has a powerful transformative 
urge,” and much of his fiction has worked to emphasize the truth of this maxim, 
exploring the creation and consequences of self-willed realities.5 Roth’s imagining of 
Franz Kafka alive and teaching Hebrew in 1940s New Jersey and Zuckerman’s 
transformation of Anne Frank from martyred victim of the Holocaust to the “Femme 
Fatale” of The Ghost Writer seem rooted in just such a fascination with remaking 
reality, as does Roth’s imagining of a different historical fate for America under 
President Charles Lindbergh in The Plot Against America (2004). The structure of My 
Life as a Man, with Tamopol’s three versions—fictional and ‘autobiographical’—of 
his life’s troubles, suggests that the book is most concerned with the protagonist’s 
attempts to reimagine his reality. The presence of psychoanalysis in both Portnoy's 
Complaint and My Life as a Man offers Roth a series of fictional possibilities, as 
Portnoy and Tamopol work to remake their realities on the analyst’s couch. Each 
chapter of The Counterlife offers up a competing version of reality, with each 
character “writing fictitious versions of [their] lives [...] contradictory by mutually 
entangling stories that, however subtly or grossly falsified, constitute [their] hold on 
reality.”6 And surely one of the reasons Zuckerman is attracted to the singular figures 
of the “American Trilogy” is their seemingly boundless energy for remaking their 
own realities. Zuckerman’s awe at the self-transformative powers of the Swede, Ira, 
and Coleman is prefigured near the beginning of American Pastoral, in a speech he
5 Roth, “Interview on Zuckerman,” 162.
6 Ibid., 161.
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writes, but never gives, for his forty-fifth high school reunion, in which he urges his 
classmates to “remember the energy” that was endemic to their American era: “the 
communal determination that we, the children, should escape poverty, ignorance, 
disease, social injury and intimidation—escape, above all, insignificance. You must 
not come to nothing! Make something o f  yourselves T  (AP 41). This Roth posits 
reality as provisional, subjective, and changeable. Seen this way, Roth’s recurrent 
countermoves, his shifting between alternatives, can be seen as affirming Nabokov’s 
famous dictum that “reality” is “one of the few words which means nothing without 
quotes,” and thus invites challenges, reimaginings, and attempts at gaining a new way 
of experiencing the world.
So where does that leave us? Once again, Roth seems aligned with two 
opposing positions. Is he the clear-eyed realist, admitting and exposing the folly of 
attempting to understand reality as anything but unpredictable, immutable and 
ultimately unknowable? Or is he the playful postmodernist, extolling the power of the 
subjective in narratives that portray reality as constructed and mutable? It’s quite easy 
to make a case for both of these arguments. It’s much more difficult to argue against 
either, or both. In my introduction, I noted the tendency among recent academic 
critics of Roth’s work to attempt to unify his vast career under the rubric of such 
ambiguous concepts as subjectivity, immaturity, willfullness, and comedy. I realize 
that my own reading tends similarly to a resistance to pin Roth down. If this is so, I’d 
argue, it is because Roth has himself resisted pinning himself down throughout his 
career, consistently running counter to his critics’, and indeed his own, understanding 
of his central concerns and approach. If there is anything uniting all of Roth’s writing, 
it is this restless, oppositional, fluid approach, an approach that resists the imposition 
of unity. Yet even this statement is difficult to wholly support, as the characters, 
connections, and threads that are shared by many of Roth’s books seem to grant his 
career a unity not attained by many writers.
Beginning with The Human Stain, the front matter of Roth’s books, which 
previously listed all of Roth’s publications chronologically, now divides up Roth’s 
prior work into four categories: “Zuckerman Books,” “Kepesh Books” (both 
essentially self-explanatory designations), “Roth books” (including the four
7 Vladimir Nabokov, “On a Book Entitled Lolita,” in The Annotated Lolita (London: Penguin, 1995), 
312.
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“autobiographical” works of the late 80s and early 90s), and “Other Books” (a sort of 
grab bag of everything else, including Goodbye, Columbus, Portnoy's Complaint, and 
My Life as a Man). It is unclear whether this new organizing principle was Roth’s 
idea or his publisher’s, but in its attention to the presentation of a body of work, the 
move executes the particularly Rothian trick of giving a sense of unity (as if there was 
a plan all along) while dividing. It certainly seems in line with a sense of lateness, as 
if Roth is tidying up his life’s work for the ages. Almost as if to affirm the rightness of 
this categorization, the four works of fiction Roth has published since The Human 
Stain have cycled through all four categories, each book adding one more title to the 
individual lists. The Dying Animal (2001) completes Roth’s trilogy about David 
Kepesh, begun in 1972 with The Breast, and continued in 1977 with The Professor o f  
Desire. The Plot Against America (2004), like Operation Shylock, is a work of fiction 
with Philip Roth as the main character and narrator, here as a child. A work of 
counterfactual history, Roth (the author) imagines what it would be like for Roth (the 
child) and his family, if Charles Lindbergh had won the U.S. presidency and aligned 
America with the Nazis. Everyman is this decade’s contribution to “Other Books.” 
And Exit Ghost (2007) is Roth’s ninth (and apparently final) Zuckerman book, 
following Roth’s sturdiest character as he makes his way out of his Lonovian exile to 
New York, back into the “Here and Now,” and then back out again.8 Having added to 
each category, and having apparently completed both the Zuckerman and Kepesh 
sagas, where will Roth go next?
Speaking in 1984, Roth reflected:
It’s all one book you write anyway. At night you dream six dreams.
But are they six dreams? One dream prefigures or anticipates the next, 
or somehow concludes what hasn’t yet even been fully dreamed. Then 
comes the next dream, the corrective of the dream before—the 
alternative dream, the antidote dream— enlarging upon it, or laughing 
at it, or contradicting it, or trying to get the dream right. You can go on 
trying all night long.9
8 Philip Roth, Exit Ghost (London: Jonathan Cape, 2007), 41.
9 Roth, “Interview with The Paris Review,” 138.
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His formulation seems an appropriate way to conceive of the strange way his long 
career has been both unified and divergent. The dreamer’s dreams, all the phases of a 
night’s work, are all related—they may even be one long dream—but the way they 
are related is mysterious, not least to the dreamer. Correctives, alternatives, 
contradictions, enlargements, antidotes: each dream comments on the dreams that 
preceded it, and lays some sort o f groundwork for the dreams that are to come. The 
dreams continue on indefinitely, pursuing some ultimate end, but never reaching it. It 
is surely telling that Roth, a longtime student of Freud, conceives of his oeuvre as a 
series of dreams, for, like Freud’s dreams, Roth’s books, and his career as a whole, 
invite endless interpretation, but resist any ultimate, definite, explanation.
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